For each of the Dominion leaders, their visit to London had a different effect. The FO's summary had noted that Curtin in particular had conducted himself in a praiseworthy fashion, his visit having been remarkably successful in demonstrating his ability to stand out among his fellow prime ministers. He had 'hit it off' well with the British leader and admitted his 'boundless' admiration for the British war effort. Fraser also, despite some doubts about the conduct of the war in the Mediterranean and Italy, was assuaged by Churchill's exposition and left in a positive frame of mind. It was noted that Mackenzie King had proven as reluctant as had been expected to commit Canada to specific Commonwealth proposals. He had, however, remained throughout 'most helpful, friendly and enthusiastic' and it was believed that he had returned home well satisfied. Smuts was 'as always a source of strength and inspiration'. The South African had commented in his closing address to the Conference that while it had not been a formal meeting, what had been achieved was successful and 'amazing' under the conditions prevailing in an atmosphere and spirit unlike any he had experienced at previous gatherings. As another writer put it, it had not been expected that Curtin would be such a success; aside from Smuts, 'an international statesman of the Churchill-Roosevelt calibre', his performance was judged to have placed him 'head and shoulders above the other PMs'.48
Some of the doubts about what to expect had been based on the warnings received by the DO beforehand that the Australian leader had been in 'a far from cheerful mood' about the Conference. Indeed, in February 1944, a visiting DO official returned from Canberra with the news that Curtin was not interested in international affairs and would likely still refuse any invitation to visit London. According to Cross, he was apparently apprehensive about the prospect of meeting with Churchill and uncertain about how he would compare to the other Dominion leaders, both in terms of his statesmanship and his stature. He returned home full of self-assurance, feeling that he was 'in every sense one of the brotherhood'. He was also particularly pleased to have formed a strong friendship with the British leader and extolled the degree to which it was vital for the Commonwealth and the Empire that he remained in power for the duration of the war. He felt 'the hatchet had been buried' over 1942 and the high commissioner believed that Australian cooperation would in future be 'more sympathetic' and 'pliant' than in the past. Overall the experience was likely to introduce a new degree of understanding and cordiality and greatly enhance Anglo-Australian relations. Press correspondents who had returned to Canberra brought with them the message that 'Curtin is now as British as Churchill'.49
Curtin briefed the Australian parliament in mid-July on what he had learnt during his trip. It was an upbeat and optimistic review in which he made quite apparent his renewed support for the need to maintain the appearance of a unified Commonwealth. He stressed that the smaller members should offer their views in a discrete fashion allowing them to be discussed within the group who might then develop 'a friendly acceptability' to them. As he concluded, 'we cannot approach by a crude and blatant declaration the problem of getting other countries to see our point of view'. However sincere the sentiment, this all seemed a little ironic in light of the events surrounding the Anzac agreement and the controversy it had caused. It was commented on in the local press about it being axiomatic that Britain should take the initiative in British Commonwealth relations in Europe, but it was appreciated the way in which the main partner 'refrained from trying to assert any political domination'.50 After some reflection the value of Curtin's speech was in fact generally doubted, and the lack of new information it provided was widely criticized. There was, however, some agreement that the promise that large and powerful British forces would soon be fighting in the Pacific region had offered a practical indication of how the power and prestige of the Empire would be restored.51
Mackenzie King's biographer claimed that the Canadian approached his second wartime visit to Britain in a much more positive frame of mind. His position at home was now secure, while he and Churchill had become quite friendly and he had no uneasiness about his reception in London. His diary entries during his stay at the Dorchester, never noted for their brevity, were fulsome as is reflected in the length of the relevant chapter in the volume.52 This seems at odds with the view of one official in Canada House who recorded that his prime minister believed such meetings should be 'for consultation and cooperation but not for the formulation or preparation of policies'. He did not want to work through the Empire towards broader affiliations and, as a result, was said to 'mistrust the whole thing'.53 The Canadian might have arrived in an apprehensive frame of mind but he left reassured by the results of the Conference, although nothing could remove the view that the speeches by Halifax and Smuts expressed the official views of the British government. His speech to the combined House of Commons and Lords was recognized as a warning not to mess with the existing system. The Commonwealth was not founded on racial ties but on the ideals of freedom and justice. This was seen as evidence that if any attempts were made to strengthen political and economic ties Canada would not offer its support. The Canadian leader was widely seen to have 'won on points', he had got his message across to the Whitehall crowd.54 In fact, for Mackenzie King the Conference was a great public relations coup and on his return to Ottawa airport he was greeted by members of the public and politicians of all sides; ovations and civic receptions followed. This was all due to his having been seen to have spoken on behalf of all Canadians, successfully pleading the Dominion's case. It was deemed astonishing within the British High Commission that a man who had considered holding a divisive election on 'the Empire issue' following Halifax's speech only a few months before should have enjoyed his visit so much and returned with such apparently fond sentiments, telling all that he had 'never been more proud to be a citizen of the British Commonwealth'.55
Smuts' visit had re-emphasized the degree to which he was treated differently than the other Dominion leaders. Instructions had been given by Churchill before he arrived that the South African was to be allowed to view any documents of interest as there was nothing seen by the British prime minister that could not be seen by the field marshal. It was stressed that, in this respect he was to be 'treated on an entirely different footing' from his counterparts. As a result, every morning and afternoon a pile of sensitive documents were despatched to South Africa House in Trafalgar Square; included among these were copies of Churchill's personal telegrams, Heads of State telegrams in their special locked boxes, along with any other papers he wished to see connected with military operations. Whenever the South African leader had visited London he had been allowed such apparently unrestricted access to Whitehall's documents; the other Dominion leaders had been given much less.56 The younger Smuts had once again accompanied his father and noted in his diary at the Conference's conclusion: 'The Conference has been largely exploratory and no real resolutions have been thrashed out, but it does indicate for the future that we can at least get together and discuss contentious subjects in a friendly mood. The range of subjects covered was very comprehensive and most of the delegates will leave with a sound background to current world affairs ... There has been much mutual patting on the back. So we are all happy and beaming.'57 While his counterparts went home, Smuts stayed on and took great pleasure in accompanying Churchill on visits to the coalition forces who were preparing for the imminent invasion of Normandy.
As for Fraser, he had repeated Savage's pledge that 'where Britain goes, we go; where she stands, we stand'. He had also made himself and his country heard about how the Empire should approach the question of a future international security organization. He left London to visit New Zealand troops fighting in Italy and stood at the ruined site of the monastery at Monte Cassino, before going on to Egypt and then home via the United States. On his return to New Zealand he had travelled over 8,000 miles and once again demonstrated that he had a gift for oratory that could, on occasion, rival that of Churchill himself. As he told the House of Representa
tives in a fitting example of this talent, 'here is a paradox the world outside the British Commonwealth finds it difficult to understand -the paradox that, the freer we become, the closer we draw together; the more our constitutional bonds are relaxed, the more closely we are held in bonds of friendship ... the more truly we are one in sentiment, in heart, and spirit, one in peace, as well as in war'.58 This in many respects was an entirely fitting epitaph for the Conference, far better than the flowery final statement that each of the leaders had signed at its conclusion.59
Speaking in the House of Lords in the first days of January 1945, Cranborne was still finding reason to praise the meeting that had taken place the previous year. Those pessimists who had prophesied that the Statute of Westminster would mean the beginning of the dissolution of the Empire had been proven visibly wrong. He could claim that there was a different reality in which material and spiritual ties were actually stronger than ever before. He also proposed that the Dominions could build on this in peacetime by having an annual prime minister's meeting.60 To British writers at the time the Conference had been a 'milestone in history'.61 More intriguingly, the largely American readership of Time was told that Churchill 'had neither qualified nor abandoned Britain's belief that she must have the Commonwealth and Empire behind her in order to remain a Great Power'.62 The idea that the Dominions might form a bloc had been—at least temporarily—abandoned. Instead, those assembled had publicly agreed that there should be a world organization which would allow them to 'gather around Britain as closely or as loosely as they pleased'. Despite the apparent success of the London meeting and the renewed vows of loyalty and unity of Empire that had spewed forth, the process of creating this United Nations would demonstrate just how much the wartime experience had changed the Anglo-Dominion alliance.
Losing an Empire
The Parliament in Westminster dispersed for its summer vacation after hearing the prime minister's survey of military and diplomatic affairs, delivered with an unmistakeable note of victory. In June 1944 Allied military forces liberated Rome, Operation Overlord successfully began the re-invasion of occupied France and in Eastern Europe Russian troops were advancing along a huge front. In Burma Commonwealth forces—not just British but also Indian and native African troops—were pushing the Japanese onto the defensive. American-led forces were on the point of expelling the Japanese from northern New Guinea and Admiral Nimitz had defeated the Imperial Japanese Navy in the Philippine Sea. Although there was still a great deal of fighting ahead the end could be seen and the Dominions were centrally involved: New Zealand and South African troops were heavily committed in Italy, the large Canadian land force was playing a key role in north-west Europe, Australian forces were proving their worth in New Guinea. This did not include, of course, the continuing efforts of Dominion sailors and airmen who had fought the longest war on the seas and in the air in various theatres throughout the course of the global conflict.1
Adding to Churchill's sense of well-being, the meeting of the Empire's prime ministers had also been a great success and the unity of the coalition never appeared to have been stronger. The British leader had himself described it as the 'highest pinnacle' to which this 'worldwide family organization' had yet reached. As The Round Table warned, however, great as the achievement had been, there was a need to beware, the danger being that 'hope and resolve' might turn into 'complacency and inaction'. This august monitor of Imperial affairs had detected a problem, the relationship of the last five years had been based upon a common goal, defeating the aggressor, but post-war Commonwealth relations would be different. Each of the Dominions was bound not just by the value which it attached to its historical position in the Empire but also its regional position and the development of a future international security organization. 'As nations they pursue their separate national interests; as members of the group they share the group responsibilities as well as the group resources.' It was indeed potentially something of a paradox.2
The recent London meeting had been keenly watched on the other side of the Atlantic. Halifax had telegraphed back from Washington just before its start to say that the decisions that were reached would likely have considerable influence on American policymakers. As he put it, 'if the result demonstrates Commonwealth solidarity respect for us will increase and vice versa'. He cautioned, however, that any reference to Imperial Preference, or indeed economic questions in general could prove disastrous, having a negative impact on willingness to consider plans for cooperation and the attitude towards Lend-Lease. If this could be avoided he believed it would encourage a desire to work with the Commonwealth. He believed 'a good deal would depend on this' and the FO generally agreed with his comments. Post-Conference the department concluded that American opinion thought Mackenzie King had triumphed in defeating calls for the Commonwealth to be more coordinated and centralized. He had also successfully opposed the efforts of those Dominion leaders who wanted the Commonwealth bloc to have a bigger say in the discussions about the post-war organization. Nonetheless it was also believed that the outcome should have been satisfactory to both American and the British alike, confirming that 'the Commonwealth can no longer be regarded as an end in itself' and showing the rest of the world that 'the Commonwealth is far from moribund'.3
The only concern was that the American press was judged not really to have realized the Conference's significance; radio comments monitored in the British Embassy had included 'a certain amount of talk about "glittering phrases of which people have begun to grow tired"'.4 MacDonald in the High Commission in Ottawa therefore took it upon himself to double his efforts to better explain to the North American audience what the Empire stood for or at very least his interpretation. He had produced a series of rough notes in the spring of 1943, later titled as 'Some Thoughts on the Post-War Position of the British Commonwealth of Nations', which had been distributed throughout Britain's overseas posts.5 Following Lord Halifax's Toronto speech he had promised London that he would provide a more detailed study of Imperial cooperation and his new treatise, which covered 22 tightly typed pages, was delivered in April 1944 with apologies for the long delay in its production.6 This new document had generated scant praise in Whitehall, but it did not appear to deter him from his self-appointed role. Taking the message directly to the target, he told an audience in Boston in October 1944, it would be best for everybody if the ignorance which existed could be overcome and both Americans and Britons could be better informed about each other. The main purpose of British Imperial rule, as it now stood, was to extend freedom 'to all the peoples of the British Colonies, Burma, India and the Dominions, whatever their race, colour or creed'. It might have been more akin to propaganda than education but it was considered to be of stalwart value by those reviewing it—and no doubt helping prepare it—within the High Commission who extolled London to read these excellent speeches being made by MacDonald. Examining the speeches in the DO, what was noted was the undesirable tone and content and Emrys-Evans was clearly upset. This most recent speech was 'altogether too apologetic about the British Empire. It is not good from a historical point of view and merely confirms the Americans in the view held among a large part of the population that the United States introduced constitutional government into this country and the Commonwealth.' He believed that such speeches did not help to improve Anglo-American relations or 'bring any light into the darkness of American ignorance of our Imperial developments'. Cranborne was less scathing but he also could not agree with MacDonald's almost sycophantic praise of American political institutions. In the Dominions secretary's view, the reality was that 'they learned almost all they know on this subject from us, and if they had modelled their constitution more closely on ours, they would be in a much happier situation today'.7
The quest for unity dominated discussions and debate throughout what was to prove to be the penultimate year of the war and a commonly heard theme was the danger that the rest of the world faced if the alliance collapsed. A speaker at the Empi
re Club in Toronto—where Halifax had ignited a crisis—believed at least one of the causes of the two great conflicts of the century had been that Britain's enemies had believed the Dominions were 'so unconcerned for her interests, so remote if not actually hostile in purpose, as to be negligible in a forecast of comparative fighting strength'. The challenge would be to ensure that this never happened again.8 Elsewhere a contributor to Empire Review was convinced that a united Commonwealth would 'save the world future torture', all that was needed to secure this was realistic diplomacy and straight-speaking.9 Mackenzie King's address to the combined House of Commons and Lords in May 1944 was pored over in the FO for clues as to his thoughts on the subject. As a result of this analysis, it seemed the only way to maintain the Commonwealth was the successful establishment of an international authority, one in which unity could be preserved in so much as the Dominions, although associated with other powers, would likely act together. Were there to be no organization, the Whitehall reviewers feared that the Commonwealth 'would gradually cease to exist', or it would 'exist only in part'. Some form of continental isolationism would be encouraged in Canada and South Africa, while Australia and New Zealand would be 'driven into the arms of the United States'. Although such conclusions were seen elsewhere in the same department as being unduly pessimistic, here was evidence of the gloom that existed.10
Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War Page 23