by Danny Orbach
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16. Thou Shalt Kill: The Problem of Tyrannicide
1. the decision to assassinate him . . . was difficult: Gotthard von Falkenhausen, “Bericht über Vorgänge in Paris am 20 Juli” (undated), Zeller Papers, IfZ ED 88/1, pp. 42–44.
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2. He rejected assassination: Ibid., p. 42; Hans B. Gisevius, To the Bitter End, trans. Richard Winston and Clara Winston (New York: Da Capo Press, 1998), 526–27; compare with Hans A. Jacobsen, ed., “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung”: Die Opposition gegen Hitler und der Staatsstreich vom 20. Juli 1944 in der SD-Berichterstattung: Geheime Dokumente aus dem ehemaligen Reichssicherheitshauptamt(Stuttgart: Seewald, 1984), 1:175.
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3. Ulrich von Hassell continued to prefer: Ulrich von Hassell, Die Hassell-Tagebücher, 1938–1944: Aufzeichnungen vom anderen Deutschland, ed. Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gärtringen (Munich: Goldmann, 1994), 297.
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4. “crimes taking place behind the army’s back”: Nicholas Reynolds, Treason Was No Crime: Ludwig Beck, Chief of the German General Staff (London: Kimber, 1976), 216; Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:201; compare with G. Falkenhausen, “Bericht,” Zeller Papers, IfZ ED 88/1, pp. 45–47.
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5. “in case of failure”: Niederschrift Manfred Roeder, 3 and 4 December 1951, IfZ, ZS-0124, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zs/zs-0124.pdf., p. 24. Roeder had seen evidence for this plan in the documents confiscated from Dohnanyi on April 3, 1943. Unfortunately, this stack of documents, which could have been a major historical source on the German resistance movement, did not survive the war. Roeder’s testimony backs up and complements Crome’s deposition; see following note.
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6. At the end of January 1942 . . . there was a conspiratorial meeting: Beria to Stalin, 19.9.1944, GARF Fond R-9401, Opis 2, Del 66, pp. 297–98, 320.
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7. in February 1943, the leader of the resistance: Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck: Eine Biographie (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008), 465; Reynolds, Treason Was No Crime, 216.
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8. Beck fully supported Tresckow’s attempt: Hermann Kaiser, Mut zum Bekenntnis: Die geheimen Tagebücher des Hauptmanns Hermann Kaiser, 1941, 1943, ed. Peter M. Kaiser (Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2010), 438.
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9. “Hitler is the source of all misery”: Ibid., 434; Gersdorff to Scheurig, 9.11.1970, Scheurig Papers, IfZ ZS/A 0031-2, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0031_02.pdf, p. 130; Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr von Gersdorff, Soldat im Untergang (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1977), 129.
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10. The fact that young officers . . . became enthusiastic supporters: Peter von der Groeben to Bodo Scheurig (interview, 4.6.1970), Adolf Heusinger to Scheurig (interview, 5.5.1970), Scheurig Papers, IfZ ZS/A 0031-2, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0031_02.pdf, pp. 148, 83.
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11. A coup destined to bring about a moral regeneration: Sabine Gillmann and Hans Mommsen, Politische Schriften und Briefe Carl Friedrich Goerdelers (Munich: Saur, 2003), 2:1199, 1241; Peter Hoffmann, The History of the German Resistance, 1933–1945, trans. Richard Barry (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1985), 370; Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:101.
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12. “Goerdeler countered time and again”: Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:535.
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13. he “does not want to wait any longer”: Kaiser,Mut zum Bekenntnis, 419.
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14. The shift from unrelenting, conscious rejection: Hoffmann, History of the German Resistance, 371.
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15. “You do not have anyone who could do it right”: Cited in Theodore S. Hamerow, On the Road to Wolf’s Lair: German Resistance to Hitler (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997), 367.
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16. “I can’t stand that fellow Helmuth Moltke”: Peter Hoffmann, “The Question of Western Allied Cooperation with the German Anti-Nazi Conspiracy, 1938–1944,” Historical Journal 34, no. 2 (1991): 459; Peter Hoffmann, Stauffenberg: A Family History, 1905–1944 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 194.
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17. “I was and am still uninvolved in violence”: Helmuth James von Moltke, Briefe an Freya, 1933–1945 (Munich: Beck, 2005), 616, 23; Klemens von Klemperer, German Resistance to Hitler: The Search for Allies Abroad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 327–40; Hoffmann, History of the German Resistance, 372.
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18. Bonhoeffer . . . believed that political assassination counted as murder: Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, vol. 6 of Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, ed. Clifford J. Green, trans. Reinhard Krauss, Charles C. West, and Douglas W. Stott (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), 248–49.
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19. “Responsible action . . . takes place”: Ibid., 284.
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20. “‘The shooting itself would have no significance’”: Based on a firsthand testimony of Bonhoeffer’s friend the theologian Wolf-Dieter Zimmermann, reproduced in his book Wir nannten ihn Bruder Bonhoeffer: Einblicke in ein hoffnungsvolles Leben (Berlin: Wichern Verlag, 1995), 112–13.
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17. A Wheel Conspiracy: The Stauffenberg Era
1. “joint, violent action against the Führer”: Ger van Roon, “Hermann Kaiser und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 24, no. 3 (July 1976): 284.
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2. “Although the two of us”: Joachim Kuhn, “Eigenhändige Aussagen,” in Peter Hoffmann, Stauffenbergs Freund: Die tragische Geschichte des Widerstandskämpfers Joachim Kuhn (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2007), 195.
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3. From the outset, Stauffenberg endorsed: Rudolf Fahrner, “Geschehnisse um 20. Juli 1944,” in Gesammelte Werke, ed. Stefano Bianca and Bruno Pieger (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2008), 254.
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4. “Kaiser was a confidant and mediator”: Roon, “Hermann Kaiser,” 284.
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5. Even if one does not believe the unfounded theories: For such conspiracy theories, see, for example, Hedwig Meyer, “Die SS und der 20. Juli 1944,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 14, no. 3 (July 1966): 299–316. Gotthard von Falkenhausen assumed after the war that the evidence gathered against Goerdeler and Oster led the Gestapo astray, shifting its attention from the truly dangerous group around Stauffenberg. See Gotthard von Falkenhausen to Eberhard Zeller, 29.11.1945, Zeller Papers, IfZ ED 88/1, p. 32.
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6. Prof. Johannes Popitz . . . recklessly tried to win over Himmler: Abschrift Huppenkothen, 11.7.1947, IfZ ZS 0249-1, pp. 17–19, 35. The best source for the bizarre Himmler-Popitz “negotiations” is the secret indictment against Popitz. However, this source has to be read critically, as Popitz overstated the support he received from some people in the resistance for his SS overtures. It is highly unlikely that Tresckow and Witzleben, with their well-known hatred of the SS, supported such plans, and even less reasonable that Goerdeler did not object at the very beginning. Even Popitz conceded that he was virtually ostracized by everyone after his meeting with Himmler. The entire document is reproduced in Allen W. Dulles, Germany’s Underground (New York: Macmillan, 1947), 151–62; about Kaiser’s arrest, see Roon, “Hermann Kaiser,” 285.
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7. “Never mention names”: Dorothee von Meding, Courageous Hearts: Women and the Anti-Hitler Plot of 1944, trans. Michael Balfour and Volker R. Berghahn (Providence, R.I.: Berghahn Books, 1997), 53, 56.
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8. only around February 1943 was he informed: Hermann Kaiser,Mut zum Bekenntnis: Die geheimen Tagebücher des Hauptmanns Hermann Kaiser, 1941, 1943, ed. Peter M. Kaiser (Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2010), 424, 434–35; Hans A. Jacobsen, ed., “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung”: Die Opposition gegen Hitler und der Staatsstreich vom 20. Juli 1944 in der SD-Berichterstattung: Geheime Dokumente aus dem e
hemaligen Reichssicherheitshauptamt(Stuttgart: Seewald, 1984), 1:522; Berg to Scheurig, 16.3.1970, Scheurig Papers, IfZ ZS/A 0031-2, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0031_02.pdf, pp. 9–15.
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9. Stauffenberg considerably tightened: Stauffenberg did not disclose many operational details to members of the Social Democratic group, for example, and even Goerdeler was partially kept in the dark. See Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:212–13, 217.
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10. “spotless National Socialist worldview”: Gotthard von Falkenhausen to Eberhard Zeller, 29.11.1945, Zeller Papers, IfZ ED 88/1, p. 32; Oberleutnant a.D. Herber, “Was ich am 20.7.1944 in der Bendlerstrasse erlebte,” BA-MA Msg 2/214, pp. 4–5; GARF Fond R-9401, Opis 2. Del 66, pp. 293–322; Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr von Gersdorff, “History of the Attempt on Hitler’s Life (20 Jul. 1944),” Historical Division Headquarters, United States Army Europe, Foreign Military Studies Branch, USAMHI, 2–3, 8; “Von Tresckow, Henning: Beurteilung,” BA-MA BAarch PERS 6/1980.
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11. Even a sharp observer: Kivimäki’s report from Berlin, 12.2.1943, UMA, UM 5 C. See also Errki Kouri, “Das Bild der Finnen vom deutschen Widerstand gegen Hitler,” in Die deutsche Widerstand: Wahrnehmung und Wertung in Europa und den USA, ed. Gerd R. Ueberschär (Darmstadt: Wissenschafliche Buchgesellschaft, 2002), 191–92.
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12. To use terminology taken from criminal-law theory: Gregory D. Lee, Conspiracy Investigations: Terrorism, Drugs, and Gangs (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2005), 31.
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13. “Stauffenberg was considered the person”: Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,”1:523; compare with pp. 177–78.
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14. The count . . . did not know every individual: For indications of the relative autonomy of Goerdeler in the network, see ibid., 177–78. Goerdeler played a predominant connecting role in the civilian oppositional networks. For a summary of his connections with civilian networks, see ibid., 350–52.
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15. Stauffenberg distrusted Gisevius and Helldorff: Gisevius, Bis Zum bittern Ende (Zurich: Fretz & Wasmuth,1946), 446–47, 468–69, 471–74; Jacobsen, ibid., 177–78, 217, 362; Konstanze von Schulthess, Nina Schenk Gräfin von Stauffenberg: Ein Porträt (Munich: Pendo, 2008), 80; Fahrner, “Geschehnisse,” 254. On Stauffenberg’s hostility to Helldorff, see “Bericht von Urban Thiersch über seine Begegnungen mit Oberst Graf Stauffenberg im Juli 1944,” Zeller Papers, IfZ ED 88/2, p. 335.
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16. “I am sending tens of thousands”: Peter Hoffmann, Stauffenberg: A Family History, 1905–1944 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 192.
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17. “I was nervous”: Meding, Courageous Hearts, 53.
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18. Oven realized that she was privy: Ibid.; Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 197; Peter Hoffmann, “Oberst i. G. Henning von Tresckow und die Staatsstreichpläne im Jahr 1943,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 55, no. 2 (2007): 344.
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19. Stauffenberg knew, too, that masses of people: Christian Müller, Oberst i. G. Stauffenberg: Eine Biographie (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1971), 382.
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20. a poem written by his spiritual mentor: Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 197–98. Hans von Bittenfeld had also testified that Stauffenberg radiated with “sacred fire” and believed that he was a “divine tool” in the fight against National Socialism. See Bittenfeld, “Meine Verbindung mit Graf Stauffenberg” (newspaper clipping, 18.7.1969), Deutsch Papers, series 3, box 2, rounds 3 and 4 Material.
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21. “those responsible in Germany”: Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 283–84.
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22. “In our Dubno garrison”: Axel von dem Bussche, “Eid und Schuld,” Axel von dem Bussche, ed. Gevinon von Medem (Mainz: Hase & Koehler, 1994), 138. In his full report, Bussche argued that he was promised by the authorities that the remaining women at least would be kept alive, because around fifty Jews were needed for forced labor. However, that protection was valid only for a limited period of time, and finally all survivors of the massacre were deported to Auschwitz. See Axel von dem Bussche, Ns v.18.6.1948, betr. Massenerschießungen v. Juden Ghetto Dubno 1942, IfZ ZS-1827, pp. 7–12.
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23. At Dubno, Bussche had witnessed: Bussche, “Eid und Schuld,” 139–40, 150–53; Peter Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat: Der Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler(Munich: Piper, 1985), 399–401.
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24. “These days . . . were illuminated”: Bussche, “Eid und Schuld,” 141.
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25. When Beck . . . visited Olbricht: Helena Page, General Friedrich Olbricht: Ein Mann des 20. Juli (Bonn: Bouvier, 1994), 192.
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26. Originally, the Valkyrie orders were designed: The original Valkyrie orders were drafted in October 1941. See Allgemeines Heeresamt, Abt. Demob. Nr. 350/42 g.Kdos, “Herstellung einsatzfähiger Verwenungsbereitschaft des Ersatzheeres,” 5.2.1942, Chef der Heeresrüstung und Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres, AHA Ia VII Nr. 1160/42 g.Kdos., “Betr.: Walküre II,” 21.3.1942, BA-MA RH/12/21, 7, pp. 128–42, 204–12; Stellv. Generalkommando XX.A.K (Wehrkreiskommando XX), Abt. Ib/Org, “Betr. Einsatz Walküre,” 14.5.1942, BA-MA RH/53/20, 27, pp. 78–84. The phantom of a mass uprising of foreign workers, which was later to become associated with the plan in the resistance literature, can be traced to autumn 1943. See Kommandeur der Panzertruppen XVII, Wien, 10.9.1943, “An die Herrn Kommandeure,” BA-MA RH/53/17, 143.
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27. “the preparations must be carried through”: Chef der Heeresrüstung und Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres, AHA/Ia (I), Nr. 3830/43 g.Kdos, “Betr.: Walküre,” 31.7.1943, BA-MA RH/12/21, 56, pp. 171–79 (hereafter this source is cited as Valkyrie 31.7.43); another, more formal copy can be found in BA-MA RH/53/17, 39). The orders were revised again on 6.10.1943 so as to put all troops that happened to be in Germany at that moment under the command of the Home Command. See Walküre, 6.10.1943, BA-MA RH/53/17, 39. For a summary report on the drills and rehearsals, see, for example, Wehrkreis Kommando XVII, Wien, 1.9.1943, “Verwendungsbereitschaft des Ersatzheeres,” BA-MA RH/53/17, 143. The stringent secrecy measures were inherited from Valkyrie II, 5.2.1942, and the version from 23.6.1942, BA-MA RH/53/20, 27, p. 100. In this version, it is maintained that cooperation with SS and police should take place only under explicit orders covered by a different code name (Neptun). For a concise discussion on the evolution of the orders, see Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 198–200.
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28. The idea was, of course, to keep the prying eyes: Indeed, in a plan against enemy paratroopers drafted in January 1944, which orchestrated close cooperation between army, Luftwaffe, SS, and police forces, Valkyrie was not mentioned even once. If the drafters of such a comprehensive plan did not know about coeval measures intended to achieve the same purpose, it seems that even the “legitimate,” military part of Valkyrie was hidden quite well. See Wehrkreiskommando XVII (Stellv. Gen. Kdo. XVII A.K.), Wien, 12.1.1944, “Grundsätzlicher Befehl für die Abwehr feindlicher Einzelspringer, Fallschirmjäger und Luftlandetruppen,” BA-MA RH/53/17, 39.
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29. The leaders of the resistance decided: For the full distribution list, see Valkyrie 31.7.1943, BA-MA RH/12/21, 56, p. 175.
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30. The first communiqué would disclose: Kuhn, “Eigenhändige Aussagen,” 199–200; Horst Mühleisen, “Patrioten im Widerstand: Carl-Hans Graf von Hardenbergs Erlebnisbericht,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 14, no. 3 (January 1993): 452. According to SS prosecutor Walther Huppenkothen, Helldorff was supposed to lead the police on the first day and then be replaced by Tresckow. The conspirators, according to Huppenkothen, wanted to remove Helldorff because of his “bad reputation.” See Abschrift, Anlage zur Aussage Huppenkothen zum 20. Juli 1944, 51, Deutsch Papers, series 3, box 2, material on Huppenkothen.
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/> 31. Stauffenberg and Tresckow had worked on detailed operational plans: “Maßnahmenkalender,” in Hoffmann, “Oberst i. G. Henning von Tresckow”; Hoffmann, Stauffenbergs Freund, 171–82; Kuhn, “Eigenhändige Aussagen,” 200–201.
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32. it was probably written by Stauffenberg: Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 210–11.
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33. “Germans! . . . The tyranny of Hitler is broken!”: Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:140–42.
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34. “above all we have to act”: Ibid., 201; Roon, “Hermann Kaiser,” 275.
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35. the charismatic leader Carlo Mierendorff: Emil Henk, Die Tragödie des 20 Juli 1944: Ein Beitrag zur politischen Vorgeschichte (Heidelberg: Rausch, 1946), 46–52.
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36. Even if such a network did exist: Exilvorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (SOPADE), Sozialistische Mitteilungen: Newsletter, herausgegeben vom 1939–1948. Hefte Nr.45, 3–9, Nr.47, 5, Nr.49, 3–8, Nr.52 p. 19, Beilage 2: I-XII, Nr.53/4, 1–5, Nr. 55/6, 7–15, Nr.57, 4–9, Nr.58/9, 1–14, Nr.62, 20, Nr.63/4, Beilage 2: I–XVI.
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37. the conspirators hoped to reach a truce: Agent “Dogwood” to U.S. Military Attaché General Richard D. Tindall (Ankara), 29.12.1943; Report of the OSS Planning Group, 3.4.1944; OSS assistant director G. Edward Buxton to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, 16.5.1944; OSS director William J. Donovan to President FDR, 22.7.1944; Wallace R. Deuel (OSS-Washington) to OSS director William J. Donovan, 24.7.1944, all in American Intelligence and the German Resistance to Hitler, ed. Jürgen Heideking and Christof Mauch (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), 177–80, 204–5, 219–22, 245–46, 251; Bengt von zur Mühlen, Die Angeklagten des 20 Juli vor dem Volksgerichtshof (Berlin: Chronos, 2001), 252–54.