51 Draper gives a good plan of the battle. He also gives some pictures of the fighting, in which the backwoodsmen are depicted in full Continental uniform, which probably not a man—certainly very few of them—wore.
52 Ramsey (“Revolution in South Carolina”), writing in 1785, gives the speech verbatim, apparently from Cleavland himself. It is very improbable that it is verbally correct, but doubtless it represents the spirit of his remarks.
53 “Essays in Military Biography,” Col. Charles Cornwallis Chesney. London, 1874. On p. 323 begins a memoir of “A Carolina Loyalist in the Revolutionary War.” It is written by the loyalist himself, who was presumably a relation of Col. Chesney’s. It was evidently written after the event, and there are some lapses. Thus he makes the war with the Cherokees take place in 1777, instead of ’76. His explanation of Tarleton’s defeat at the Cowpens must be accepted with much reserve. At King’s Mountain he says the Americans had fifteen hundred men, instead of twenty-five hundred, of which Allaire speaks. Allaire probably consciously exaggerated the number.
54 Campbell MSS. Letter of Col. Wm. Campbell, Oct. 10, 1780, says 10 minutes: the official report (Gates MSS.) says 5 minutes.
55 “Richmond Enquirer” (Nov. 12, 1822 and May 9, 1823) certificates of King’s Mountain survivors—of James Crow, May 6, 1813; David Beattie, May 4, 1813, etc., etc. All the different commanders claimed the honor of beginning the battle in after-life; the official report decides it in favor of Campbell and Shelby, the former being the first actually engaged, as is acknowledged by Shelby in his letter to Arthur Campbell on October 12, 1780.
56 Haywood, 71; doubtless he uses the language of one of the actors.
57 Shelby MS.
58 The “Carolina Loyalist” speaks as if the hunting-shirt were put on for disguise; he says Ferguson was recognized, “although wearing a hunting-shirt.”
59 Ferguson’s “Memoir,” p. 32.
60 The “South Carolina Loyalist” says he was killed just as he had slain Col. Williams “with his left hand.” Ramsey, on the other side, represents Col. Williams as being shot while dashing forward to kill Ferguson. Williams certainly was not killed by Ferguson himself; and in all probability the latter was slain earlier in the action and in an entirely different part of the line. The “Loyalist” is also in error as to Cleavland’s regiment being the first that was charged. There is no ground whatever for the statement that Fergu son was trying to escape when shot; nor was there any at tempt at a charge of horsemen, made in due form. The battle was purely one of footmen and the attempt to show an effort at a cavalry charge at the end is a simple absurdity.
61 In his “Hist. Mag.” article Gen. Watts De Peyster clears his namesake’s reputation from all charge of cowardice; but his account of how De Peyster counseled and planned all sorts of expedients that might have saved the loyalists is decidedly mythical.
62 Deposition of John Long, in “Enquirer,” as quoted.
63 Chesney, p. 333.
64 Shelby MS.
65 Campbell MSS. Letter of General George Rutledge (who was in the battle, an eye-witness of what he describes), May 27, 1813. But there is an irreconcilable conflict of testimony as to whether Campbell or Evan Shelby received De Peyster’s sword.
66 For the loyalist losses, see ante, note discussing their numbers. The “South Carolina Loyalist” says they lost about a third of their number. It is worthy of note that the actual fighting at King’s Mountain bore much resemblance to that at Majuba Hill a century later; a backwoods levy was much like a boer commando.
67 In some accounts this officer is represented as a major, in some as a colonel; at any rate he was in command of a small regiment, or fragment of a regiment.
68 The official report as published gave the American loss as twenty-eight killed and sixty wounded. The original document (in the Gates MSS., N. Y., Hist. Soc.) gives the loss in tabulated form in an appendix, which has not heretofore been published. It is as follows:
69 It would be quite impossible to take notice of the countless wild absurdities of the various writers who have given “histories” so-called, of the battle. One of the most recent of them, Mr. Kirke, having accepted as the number of the British dead two hundred and twenty-five, and the wounded one hundred and eighty-five, says that the disproportion shows “the wonderful accuracy of the backwoods rifle”—the beauty of the argument being that it necessarily implies that the backwoodsmen only fired some four hundred and ten shots. Mr. Kirke’s account of the battle having been “won” owing to a remarkable ride taken by Sevier to rally the men at the critical moment is, of course, without any historic basis whatever.
70 “Tarleton’s Campaigns,” p. 166.
71 Williams.
72 The striking nature of the victory and its important consequences must not blind us to the manifold shortcomings of the Revolutionary militia. The mountaineers did well in spite of being militia; but they would have done far better under another system. The numerous failures of the militia as a whole must be balanced against the few successes of a portion of them. If the States had possessed wisdom enough to back Washington with Continentals, or with volunteers such as those who fought in the Civil War, the Revolutionary contest would have been over in three years. The trust in militia was a perfect curse. Many of the backwoods leaders knew this. The old Indian fighter, Andrew Lewis, about this time wrote to Gates (see Gates MSS., Sept. 30, 1780), speaking of “the dastardly conduct of the militia,” calling them “a set of poltroons,” and longing for Continentals.
73 Shelby’s MS. autobiography.
74 Among these privates was the father of Davy Crockett.
75 But the accounts of indignity being shown him are not corroborated by Allaire and Ryerson, the two contemporary British authorities, and are probably untrue.
76 Certificate of Matthew Willoughby, in “Richmond En quirer,” as quoted.
77 Gates MSS. Deposition of John Satty, and others, Sept. 7, 1780; of Wm. Hamilton, Sept. 12th, etc., etc., etc.
78 Campbell’s General Orders, Oct. 14th, and Oct. 26th.
79 “Our captors … cutting and striking us in a most savage manner.”—”South Carolina Loyalist.”
80 Allaire’s diary, entry of Nov. 1st.
81 Campbell’s General Orders, Oct. 11th.
82 Allaire’s diary, entry for Aug. 20th; also see Aug. 2d. He chronicles these hangings with much complacency, but is, of course, shocked at the “infamous” conduct of the Americans when they do likewise.
83 Shelby MS.
84 Shelby MS.
85 Thirty years after the battle, when Campbell had long been dead, Shelby and Sevier started a most unfortunate controversy as to his conduct in the battle. They insisted that he had flinched, and that victory was mainly due to them. Doubtless they firmly believed what they said; for as already stated, the jealousies and rivalries among the backwoods leaders were very strong; but the burden of proof, after thirty years’ silence, rested on them, and they failed to make their statements good—nor was their act a very gracious one. Shelby bore the chief part in the quarrel, Campbell’s surviving relatives, of course, defending the dead chieftain. I have carefully examined all the papers in the case, in the Tenn. Historical Society, the Shelby MSS., and the Campbell MSS., besides the files of the “Richmond Enquirer,” etc.; and it is evident that the accusation was wholly groundless.
CHAPTER VI
THE HOLSTON SETTLEMENTS TO THE END OF THE REVOLUTION, 1781–1783
JOHN SEVIER had no sooner returned from doing his share in defeating foes who were of his own race, than he was called on to face another set of enemies, quite as formidable and much more cruel. These were the red warriors, the ancient owners of the soil, who were ever ready to take advantage of any momentary disaster that befell their hereditary and victorious opponents, the invading settlers.
For many years Sevier was the best Indian fighter on the border. He was far more successful than Clark, for instance, inflicting greater loss on his foes and s
uffering much less himself, though he never had anything like Clark’s number of soldiers. His mere name was a word of dread to the Cherokees, the Chickamaugas, and the upper Creeks. His success was due to several causes. He wielded great influence over his own followers, whose love for and trust in “Chucky Jack” were absolutely unbounded; for he possessed in the highest degree the virtues most prized on the frontier. He was open-hearted and hospitable, with winning ways toward all, and combined a cool head with a dauntless heart; he loved a battle for its own sake, and was never so much at his ease as when under fire; he was a first-class marksman, and as good a horseman as was to be found on the border. In his campaigns against the Indians he adopted the tactics of his foes, and grafted on them some important improvements of his own. Much of his success was due to his adroit use of scouts or spies. He always chose for these the best woodsmen of the district, men who could endure as much, see as much, and pass through the woods as silently, as the red men themselves. By keeping these scouts well ahead of him, he learned accurately where the war parties were. In the attack itself he invariably used mounted riflemen, men skilled in forest warfare, who rode tough little horses, on which they galloped at speed through the forest. Once in position they did the actual fighting on foot, sheltering themselves carefully behind the tree-trunks He moved with extreme rapidity and attacked with instantaneous suddenness, using ambushes and surprises wherever practicable. His knowledge of the whereabout and size of the hostile parties, and the speed of his own movements, generally enabled him to attack with the advantage of numbers greatly on his side.1 He could then out-flank or partially surround the Indians, while his sudden rush demoralized them; so that, in striking contrast to most other Indian fighters, he inflicted a far greater loss than he received. He never fought a big pitched battle, but, by incessantly harrying and scattering the different war bands, he struck such terror to the hearts of the Indians that he again and again, in a succession of wars, forced them into truces, and for the moment freed the settlements from their ravages. He was almost the only commander on the frontier who ever brought an Indian war, of whatever length, to an end, doing a good deal of damage to his foes and suffering very little himself. Still, he never struck a crushing blow, nor conquered a permanent peace. He never did anything to equal Clark’s campaigns in the Illinois and against Vincennes, and, of course, he can not for a moment be compared to his rival and successor, grim Old Hickory, the destroyer of the Creeks and the hero of New Orleans.
When the men of the Holston or upper Tennessee valley settlements reached their homes after the King’s Mountain expedition, they found them menaced by the Cherokees. Congress had endeavored in vain to persuade the chiefs of this tribe to make a treaty of peace, or at least to remain neutral. The efforts of the British agents to embroil them with the whites were completely successful; and in November the Otari or Overhill warriors began making inroads along the frontier. They did not attack in large bands. A constant succession of small parties moved swiftly through the country, burning cabins, taking scalps, and, above all, stealing horses. As the most effectual way of stopping such inroads, the alarmed and angered settlers resolved to send a formidable retaliatory expedition against the Overhill towns.2 All the Holston settlements both north and south of the Virginia line joined in sending troops. By the first week in December, 1780, seven hundred mounted riflemen were ready to march, under the joint leadership of Colonel Arthur Campbell and of Sevier, the former being the senior officer. They were to meet at an appointed place on the French Broad.
Sevier started first, with between two and three hundred of his Watauga and Nolichucky followers. He marched down to the French Broad, but could hear nothing of Campbell. He was on the great war trace of the Southern Indians, and his scouts speedily brought him word that they had exchanged shots with a Cherokee war party, on its way to the settlements, and not far distant on the other side of the river. He instantly crossed, and made a swift march toward the would-be marauders, camping on Boyd’s Creek. The scouts were out by sunrise next morning—December 16th,—and speedily found the Indian encampment, which the warriors had just left. On receipt of the news Sevier ordered the scouts to run on, attack the Indians, and then instantly retreat, so as to draw them into an ambuscade. Meanwhile the main body followed cautiously after, the men spread out in a long line, with the wings advanced; the left wing under Major Jesse Walton, the right under Major Jonathan Tipton, while Sevier himself commanded the centre, which advanced along the trail by which the scouts were to retreat. When the Indians were drawn into the middle, the two wings were to close in, when the whole party would be killed or captured.
The plan worked well. The scouts soon came up with the warriors, and, after a moment’s firing, ran back, with the Indians in hot pursuit. Sevier’s men lay hid, and, when the leading warriors were close up, they rose and fired. Walton’s wing closed in promptly; but Tipton was too slow, and the startled Cherokees ran off through the opening he had left, rushed into a swamp impassable for horsemen, and scattered out, each man for himself, being soon beyond pursuit. Nevertheless, Sevier took thirteen scalps, many weapons, and all their plunder. In some of their bundles there were proclamations from Sir Henry Clinton and other British commanders. The Indians were too surprised and panic-struck to offer any serious resistance, and not a man of Sevier’s force was even wounded.3
Forty years afterward Haywood writes of the affair, trying to tell simply the truth, but obliged to rely mainly on oral tradition. He speaks of Sevier’s troops as only two hundred in number; and says twenty-eight Indians were killed. He does not speak of the number of the Indians, but from the way he describes Sevier’s troops as encircling them, he evidently knew that the white men were more numerous than their foes. His mistake as to the number of Indian dead is easily explicable. The official report gives twenty-nine as the number killed in the entire campaign, and Haywood, as in the Island Flats battle, simply puts the total of several skirmishes into one.
Thirty years later comes Ramsey. He relies on traditions that have grown more circumstantial and less accurate. He gives two accounts of what he calls “one of the best fought battles in the border war of Tennessee”; one of these accounts is mainly true; the other entirely false; he does not try to reconcile them. He says three whites were wounded although the official report says that in the whole campaign but one man was killed and two wounded. He reduces Sevier’s force to one hundred and seventy men, and calls the Indians “a large body.”
Thirty-four years later comes Mr. Kirke, with the “Rearguard of the Revolution.” Out of his inner consciousness he evolves the fact that there were “not less than a thousand” Indians, whom Sevier, at the head of one hundred and seventy men, vanquishes, after a heroic combat, in which Sevier and some others perform a variety of purely imaginary feats. By diminishing the number of the whites, and increasing that of the Indians, he thus makes the relative force of the latter about twenty-five times as great as it really was, and converts a clever ambuscade, whereby the whites gave a smart drubbing to a body of Indians one-fourth their own number, into a Homeric victory over a host six times as numerous as the conquerors.
This is not a solitary instance; on the contrary it is typical of almost all that is gravely set forth as history by a number of writers on these Western border wars, whose books are filled from cover to cover with just such matter, almost all their statements are partly, and very many are wholly, without foundation.
Having thus made a very pretty stroke, Sevier returned to the French Broad, where Campbell joined him on the 22d, with four hundred troops. Among them were a large number of Shelby’s men, under the command of Major Joseph Martin. The next day the seven hundred horsemen made a forced march to the Little Tennessee; and on the 24th crossed it unopposed, making a feint at one ford, while the main body passed rapidly over another. The Indians did not have the numbers to oppose so formidable a body of good fighters, and only ventured on a little very long range and harmless skirmishing with the
vanguard. Dividing into two bodies, the troops destroyed Chota and the other towns up and down the stream, finding in them a welcome supply of provisions. The next day Martin, with a detachment, fell on a party of flying Indians, killed one, and captured seventeen horses loaded with clothing, skins, and the scanty household furniture of the cabins; while another detachment destroyed the part of Chilhowee that was on the nearer side of the river. On the 26th the rest of Chilhowee was burned, three Indians killed, and nine captured. Tipton, with one hundred and fifty men, was sent to attack another town beyond the river; but owing to the fault of their commander,4 this body failed to get across. The Indian woman, Nancy Ward, who in ’76 had given the settlers timely warning of the intended attack by her tribesmen here came into camp. She brought overtures of peace from the chiefs; but to these Campbell and Sevier would not listen, as they wished first to demolish the Hiawassee towns, where the warriors had been especially hostile. Accordingly, they marched thither. On their way there were a couple of skirmishes, in which several Indians were killed and one white man. The latter, whose name was Elliot, was buried in the Tellico town, a cabin being burned down over his grave, that the Indians might not know where it was. The Indians watched the army from the hills. At one point a warrior was seen stationed on a ridge to beat a drum and give signals to the rest; but the spies of the whites stole on him unawares, and shot him. The Hiawassee towns and all the stores of provisions they contained were destroyed, the work being finished on the last day of the year.
The Winning of the West Page 59