Washington and his administration were not free from blame. It was foolish to attempt the campaign against the Northwestern Indians with men who had only been trained for six months and who were enlisted at the absurd price of two dollars a month. Moreover, there were needless delays in forwarding the troops to Fort Washington; and the commissary department was badly managed. Washington was not directly responsible for any of these shortcomings; he very wisely left to the Secretary of War, Knox, the immediate control of the whole matter, seeking to avoid all interference with him, so that there might be no clashing or conflict of authority;38 but he was of course ultimately responsible for the little evil, no less than for the great good, done by his administration.
The chief blunder was the selection of St. Clair. As a commander he erred in many ways. He did not, or could not, train his troops; and he had no business to challenge a death fight with raw levies. It was unpardonable of him to send back one of his two regular regiments, the only trustworthy portion of his force, on the eve of the battle. He should never have posted the militia, his poorest troops, in the most exposed situation. Above all he should have seen that the patrols and pickets were so numerous and performed their duty so faithfully as to preclude the possibility of surprise. With the kind of army furnished him he could hardly have won a victory under any circumstances; but the overwhelming nature of the defeat was mainly due to his incompetence.
1 American State Papers, Vol. IV, Indian Affairs, I, p. 13. Letter of H. Knox, June 15, 1789. This is the lettering on the back of the volume, and for convenience it will be used in referring to it.
2 American State Papers, Vol. IV, Indian Affairs, I, p. 13.
3 American State Papers, IV, 15. Letter of Knox, July 6, 1789.
4 American State Papers, Vol. IV, 31, 32, 33. Letter of Governor Matthews, August 4, 1787, etc.
5 Do., p. 49. Letter of Benjamin Hawkins and Andrew Pickens, December 30, 1785.
6 Do., e. g., the letter of Galphin and Douzeazeaux, June 14, 1787.
7 American State Papers, Vol. IV, p. 74, September 26, 1789.
8 Do., p. 77, October 5, 1789.
9 American State Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 53, 57, 60, 77, 79, 81, etc.
10 American State Papers, IV, pp. 83, 94, 109, and 111.
11 “American Pioneer,” II, no. American State Papers, IV, 122.
12 American Pioneer,” II, 149.
13 McBride, I, 88.
14 American State Papers, IV, 58.
15 “American Pioneer,” I, 44; Narrative of John Brickell.
16 State Department MSS., Washington Papers, Ex. C, p. 11, etc. Presly Neville to Richard Butler, March 19, 1791; Isaac Craig to Secretary of War, March 16, 1791; Secretary of War to President, March 31, 1791.
17 American State Papers, IV, 145, Corn planter and others to the President, March 17, 1791.
18 State Department MSS., Washington Papers, Knox to the President, April 10, 1791; American State Papers, IV, pp. 139-170, 225-233, 477-432, etc.
19 Canadian Archives, McKee’s speech to the Indians, July 1, 1791; and Francis Lafontaine’s account of sundries to Indians.
20 American State Papers, IV, 196. Narrative of Thomas Rhea, July 2, 1791. This narrative was distrusted; but it is fully borne out by McKee’s letter, and the narrative of Brickell. He saw Brickell, whom he calls “Brittle,” at the Miami.
21 American State Papers, IV, 107, Jan. 5, 1791.
22 American State Papers, IV, 131, Scott’s Report, June 28, 1791.
23 Do., Wilkinson’s Letter, August 24, 1791.
24 St. Clair Papers, II, 286, Report of Special Committee of Congress, March 27, 1792.
25 American State Papers, IV, 118, Report of Secy. of War. January 22, 1791.
26 Denny’s Journal, 374.
27 Bradley MSS. The journal and letters of Captain Daniel Bradley; shown me by the courtesy of his descendants, Mr. Daniel B. Bradley of Southport, Conn., and Mr. Arthur W. Bradley of Cincinnati, Ohio.
28 Denny, October 29, 1791, etc.
29 Bradley MSS. In his journal Captain Bradley expresses his astonishment at seeing the regiment and his in ability to understand the object in sending it back. Captain Bradley was not over-pleased with his life at the fort; as one of the minor ills he mentions in one of his letters to Ebenezer Banks: “Please deliver the enclosed letter to my wife. Not a drop of cider have I drinked this twelve month.”
30 St. Clair’s Letter to the Secretary of War, Nov. 9, 1791.
31 Denny, November 4th; also p. 221.
32 McBride’s “Pioneer Biography,” I, 165. Narrative of Thomas Irwin, a packer, who was in the fight. There are of course discrepancies between the various accounts; in the confusion of such a battle even the most honest eye-witnesses could not see all things alike.
33 “American Pioneer,” II, 150; Van Cleve’s memoranda.
34 Bradley MSS. The addition of two hundred sick and wounded brought the garrison to such short commons that they had to slaughter the pack-horses for food.
35 Brickell’s Narrative.
36 McBride’s “Pioneer Biography,” John Reily’s Narrative. This expedition, in which not a single hostile Indian was encountered, has been transmuted by Withers and one or two other border historians into a purely fictitious expedition of revenge in which hundreds of Indians were slain on the field of St. Clair’s disaster.
37 Tobias Lear, Washington’s Private Secretary as quoted by both Custis and Rush. The report of an eye-witness. See also Lodge’s “Washington,” p. 94. Denny, in his journal, merely mentions that he went at once to the Secretary of War’s office on the evening of the 19th, and does not speak ‘ of seeing Washington until the following morning. On the strength of this omission one or two of St. Clair’s apologists have striven to represent the whole account of Washington’s wrath as apocryphal; but the attempt is puerile; the relation comes from an eye-witness who had no possible motive to distort the facts. The Secretary of War, Knox, was certain to inform Washington of the disaster the very evening he heard of it; and whether he sent Denny, or another messenger, or went himself, is unimportant. Lear might very well have been mistaken as to the messenger who brought the news; but he could not have been mistaken about Washington’s speech.
38 State Dept. MSS., Washington Papers. War Dept. Ex. C, Washington to Knox, April i, 1791. Vol. VIIL—4
CHAPTER V
MAD ANTHONY WAYNE; AND THE FIGHT OF THE FALLEN TIMBERS, 1792–1795
THE UNITED States Government was almost as much demoralized by St. Clair’s defeat as was St. Clair’s own army. The loosely-knit nation was very poor, and very loth to undertake any work which involved sustained effort and pecuniary sacrifice; while each section was jealous of every other and was unwilling to embark in any enterprise unlikely to inure to its own immediate benefit. There was little national glory or reputation to be won by even a successful Indian war; while another defeat might prove a serious disaster to a government which was as yet far from firm in its seat. The Eastern people were lukewarm about a war in which they had no direct interest; and the foolish frontiersmen, instead of backing up the administration, railed at it and persistently supported the party which desired so to limit the powers and energies of the National Government as to produce mere paralysis. Under such conditions the national administration, instead of at once redoubling its efforts to ensure success by shock of arms, was driven to the ignoble necessity of yet again striving for a hopeless peace.
It would be impossible to paint in too vivid colors the extreme reluctance of the Government to enter into, or to carry on, war with the Indians. It was only after every other shift had been vainly tried that resort was had to the edge of the sword. The United States would gladly have made a stable peace on honorable terms, and strove with weary patience to bring about a friendly understanding. But all such efforts were rendered abortive, partly by the treachery and truculence of the savages, who could only be cowed by a thorough beating, and partly by the desire of the settlers for lan
ds which the red men claimed as their hunting grounds.
In pursuance of their timidly futile policy of friendliness, the representatives of the National Government, in the spring of 1792, sent peace envoys, with a flag of truce, to the hostile tribes. The unfortunate ambassadors thus chosen for sacrifice were Colonel John Hardin, the gallant but ill-starred leader of Kentucky horse, who had so often and with such various success encountered the Indians on the field of battle; and a Federal officer, Major Alexander Trueman. In June they started toward the hostile towns, with one or two companions, and soon fell in with some Indians, who on being shown the white flag, and informed of the object of their visit, received them with every appearance of good will. But this was merely a mask. A few hours later the treacherous savages suddenly fell upon and slew the messengers of peace.1 It was never learned whether the deed was the mere wanton outrage of some bloodthirsty young braves, or the result of orders given by one of the Indian councils. At any rate, the Indians never punished the treachery; and when the chiefs wrote to Washington they mentioned with cool indifference that “you sent us at different times different speeches, the bearers whereof our foolish young men killed on their way”;2 not even expressing regret for the occurrence.
The truculent violence and bad faith of the savages merited severe chastisement; but the United States Government was long-suffering and forbearing to a degree. There was no attempt to avenge the murder of the flag-of-truce men. On the contrary, renewed efforts were made to secure a peace by treaty. In the fall of 1792 Rufus Putnam, on behalf of the United States, succeeded in concluding a treaty with the Wabash and Illinois tribes,3 which at least served to keep many of their young braves out of actual hostilities. In the following spring three commissioners—Benjamin Lincoln, Beverly Randolph, and Timothy Pickering, all men of note,—were sent to persuade the Miami tribes and their allies to agree to a peace. In his letter of instructions the Secretary of War impressed upon them the desire of the people of the United States for peace in terms that were almost humiliating, and even directed them if necessary to cede some of the lands already granted by the Indians at previous treaties.
In May, 1793, the Commissioners went to Niagara, where they held meetings with various Iroquois chiefs and exchanged friendly letters with the British officers of the posts, who assured them that they would help in the effort to conclude a peace. Captain Brant, the Iroquois chief, acted as spokesman for a deputation of the hostile Indians from the Miami, where a great council was being held, at which not only the Northwestern tribes, but the Five Nations, were in attendance. The commissioners then sailed to the Detroit River, having first sent home a strong remonstrance against the activity displayed by the new commander on the Ohio, Wayne, whose vigorous measures, they said, had angered the Indians, and were considered by the British “unfair and unwarrantable.” This was a preposterous complaint; throughout our history, whether in dealing with Indians or with other foes, our Peace Commissioners have invariably shown to disadvantage when compared with the military commandants, for whom they always betray such jealousy. Wayne’s conduct was eminently proper; and it is difficult to understand the mental attitude of the commissioners who criticised it because the British considered it “unwarrantable.” However, a few weeks later they learned to take a more just view of Wayne, and to thank him for the care with which he had kept the peace while they were vainly trying to treat; for at the Detroit they found they could do nothing. Brant and the Iroquois urged the Northwestern tribes not to yield any point, and promised them help, telling the British agent, McKee, evidently to his satisfaction, “we came here not only to assist with our advice, but other ways, … we came here with arms in our hands”; and they insisted that the country belonged to the confederated tribes in common, and so could not be surrendered save by all.4 Brant was the inveterate foe of the Americans and the pensioner of the British; and his advice to the tribes was sound, and was adopted by them—though he misled them by his never-fulfilled promise of support. They refused to consider any proposition which did not acknowledge the Ohio as the boundary between them and the United States; and so, toward the end of August, the commissioners returned to report their failure.5 The final solution of the problem was thus left to the sword of Wayne.
The attitude of the British gradually changed from passive to active hostility. In 1792 and 1793 they still wished the Indians to make peace with the Americans, provided always there were no such concessions made to the latter as would endanger the British control of the fur trade. But by the beginning of 1794 the relations between Great Britain and the United States had become so strained that open war was threatened; for the advisers of the King, relying on the weakness of the young Federal Republic, had begun to adopt that tone of brutal insolence which reflected well the general attitude of the British people toward the Americans, and which finally brought on the second war between the two nations.
The British officials in Canada were quick to reflect the tone of the home government, and, as always in such cases, the more zealous and belligerent went a little further than they were authorized. On February 10th Lord Dorchester, Governor of Canada, in an address of welcome to some of the chiefs from the tribes of the north and west said, speaking of the boundary: “Children, since my return I find no appearance of a line remains; and from the manner in which the people of the United States push on and act and talk … I shall not be surprised if we are at war with them in the course of the present year; and if so a line must then be drawn by the warriors … we have acted in the most peaceable manner and borne the language and conduct of the people of the United States with patience; but I believe our patience is almost exhausted.”6 Of course such a speech, delivered to such an audience, was more than a mere incitement to war; it was a direct appeal to arms. Nor did the encouragement given the Indians end with words; for in April, Simcoe, the Lieutenant-Governor, himself built a fort at the Miami Rapids, in the very heart of the hostile tribes, and garrisoned it with British regulars, infantry and artillery; which, wrote one of the British officials to another, had “put all the Indians here in great spirits”7 to resist the Americans.
The same officials further reported that the Spaniards also were exciting the Indians to war, and were in communication with Simcoe, their messengers coming to him at his post on the Miami. At this time the Spanish Governor, Carondelet, was alarmed over Clark’s threatened invasion of Louisiana on behalf of the French Republic. He wrote to Simcoe asking for English help in the event of such invasion. Simcoe, in return, wrote expressing his good will, and inclosing a copy of Dorchester’s speech to the Northern Indians; which, Carondelet reported to the Court of Spain, showed that the English were following the same system adopted by the Spaniards in reference to the Indians, whom they were employing with great success against the Americans.8 Moreover, the Spaniards, besides communicating with the British, sent messages to the Indians at the Miami, urging them to attack the Americans, and promising help;9 a promise which they never fulfilled, save that in a covert way they furnished the savages with arms and munitions of war.
The Canadians themselves were excited and alarmed by Dorchester’s speech,10 copies of which were distributed broadcast; for the general feeling was that it meant that war was about to be declared between Great Britain and the United States. The Indians took the same view as to what the speech meant; but to them it gave unmixed pleasure and encouragement. The British officials circulated it everywhere among the tribes, reading it aloud to the gathered chiefs and fighting men. “His Excellency Governor Simcoe has just now left my house on his way to Detroit with Lord Dorchester’s speech to the Seven Nations,” wrote Brant the Iroquois chief to the Secretary of Indian Affairs for Canada, “and I have every reason to believe when it is delivered that matters will take an immediate change to the westward, as it will undoubtedly give those Nations high spirits and enable them by a perfect union to check General Wayne.”11 In April, Lieutenant-Colonel John Butler, of the British Army, addressed a great cou
ncil of chiefs near Buffalo, beginning, “I have now a speech to deliver to you from your father Lord Dorchester, which is of the utmost consequence, therefore desire you will pay strict attention to it.”12 He then delivered the speech, to the delight of the Indians, and continued: “You have heard the great talk of our going to war with the United States, and by the speech of your Father just now delivered to you, you can not help seeing there is a great prospect of it, I have therefore to recommend you to be all unanimous as one man, and to call in all your people that may be scattered about the Territories of the United States.” McKee, the British Indian agent among the Northwestern tribes who were at war with the Americans, reported with joy the rapid growth of warlike spirit among the savages in consequence of Dorchester’s speech, and of the building of the British fort on the Miami. He wrote, “The face of the Indian affairs in this country, I have the greatest satisfaction in informing you, seems considerably altered for the better. His Excellency Lord Dorchester’s speech and the arrival here of speeches from the Spaniards induce me to believe that a very extensive union of the Indian Nations will be the immediate consequence. The Lieutenant-Governor has ordered a strong detachment of the 24th Regt. to take post a mile & a half below this place, this step has given great spirits to the Indians and impressed them with a hope of our ultimately acting with them and affording a security for their families, should the enemy penetrate to their villages.”13
The Winning of the West Page 99