76. Evans et al., A Guide to Government in Afghanistan, p. 14.
77. Feith, War and Decision, p. 123.
78. Lester Grau, ed., The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996), p. 201.
79. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), pp. 131, 167, 202.
80. Ibid., p. 89.
81. Francesc Vendrell, EUSR Vendrell’s Valedictory Report (Kabul: European Union, 2008).
Chapter Eight
1. Author interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, February 22, 2008.
2. Mountstuart Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India (Graz, Austria: Akademische Druck, 1969), p. 489.
3. Radek Sikorski, “The Devil You Know,” Newsweek, August 9, 2004, p. 31.
4. Author interview with Ambassador James Dobbins, July 27, 2007.
5. Ibid.
6. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1383, December 6, 2001, S/RES/1383 (2001).
7. “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions,” December 2001, Annex II.
8. Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking, 2008), p. 184.
9. Author interview with Daoud Yaqub, January 2, 2008.
10. David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How the ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” New York Times, August 12, 2007, p. A1.
11. Author interview with Lieutenant General David Barno, September 4, 2007.
12. Author interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, February 22, 2008; Statement of Zalmay Khalilzad Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 29, 2003.
13. Author interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, February 22, 2008.
14. Statement of Zalmay Khalilzad Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 29, 2003.
15. Author interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, February 22, 2008.
16. Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps, Studies and Analysis Division, 1995).
17. Ali A. Jalali, “Rebuilding Afghanistan’s National Army,” Parameters, vol. 32, no. 3, Autumn 2002, p. 79.
18. Author interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, February 22, 2008.
19. Author interview with Lieutenant General David Barno, September 4, 2007.
20. Michael O’Hanlon and Adriana Lins de Albuquerque, Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, September 15, 2005).
21. Author interview with Lieutenant General David Barno, January 17, 2008.
22. Lieutenant General David W. Barno, “Fighting ‘The Other War’: Counter-insurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003–2005,” Military Review, September-October 2007, p. 36.
23. Memorandum from Donald L. Evans to the President, Subject: “Recent Visit to Baghdad, Iraq, and Kabul, Afghanistan,” October 24, 2003. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld subsequently wrote a memo to Evans noting that “your report to the President on your visit to Iraq and Afghanistan was excellent. Thanks so much for going. I appreciate it a great deal. Thanks also for letting other folks know what you found.” Letter from Donald Rumsfeld to the Honorable Donald L. Evans, October 29, 2003.
24. Author interview with Lieutenant General David Barno, September 4, 2007.
25. George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Washington, DC: White House, 2004).
26. Author interview with Lieutenant General David Barno, January 17, 2008.
27. See, for example, International Crisis Group, Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes (Kabul: International Crisis Group, 2006).
28. ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, Afghanistan—Where Things Stand (Kabul: ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, December 2007), p. 6.
29. Frank Newport, Bush Job Approval at 28%, Lowest of His Administration (Washington, DC: Gallup, April 11, 2008). The poll included Bush’s job-approval average each year from 2001 to 2008.
30. Info Memo from Ronald Neumann to the Administrator, Subject: Highlights of the June 24th MCNS Meeting, June 24, 2004.
31. E-mail from Paul Bremer to Jaymie Durnan, Subject: Message for SecDef, June 30, 2003.
32. Coalition Provisional Authority, Summary: Bomb-Making Tips, Mukhabarat Habits, Views from the Street, July 15, 2003.
33. E-mail from Paul Bremer to Jaymie Durnan, Subject: Message for SecDef, June 30, 2003.
34. Brief on Iraq Security and Military Issues, NSC Meeting, July 1, 2003.
35. Coalition Provisional Authority, Security Update for Ambassador Bremer, July 18, 2003.
36. Office of Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, Iraqis Offer Dim Evaluation of Reconstruction Effort Thus Far, August 22, 2003.
37. Iraqi Impressions of Coalition Forces and the Security Situation in Iraq: Office of Research Survey Results from 7 Cities in Iraq & Preliminary Results from Gallup Baghdad Survey, September 30, 2003.
38. Memo from James Ellery to Ambassador Bremer, Subject: Read Ahead for Ambassador Bremer: Infrastructure Security Strategy, January 11, 2004.
39. Infrastructure Security Planning Group, Infrastructure Security Strategy, January 12, 2004.
40. Info Memo from Bill Miller to the Administrator, Subject: Security Town Hall, March 18, 2004. Also see Memorandum from L. Paul Bremer to Regional and Governorate Coordinators, Subject: Safety and Security, March 19, 2004.
41. Memo from L. Paul Bremer to Hon. Chris Shays, April 16, 2004; Memo from L. Paul Bremer to Hon. Brian Baird, April 1, 2004; Memo from L. Paul Bremer to Hon. Jim Kolbe, April 1, 2004.
42. Some have argued that the insurgency began in earnest in June 2004. But Taliban offensive operations two years earlier suggest that it was in the spring of 2002. Colonel Walter M. Herd et al., One Valley at a Time (Fort Bragg, NC: Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan, 2005), p. 121.
43. “Country Risk Assessment: Afghanistan,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 16, no. 5, May 2004, pp. 38–41; Michael Bhatia, Kevin Lanigan, and Philip Wilkinson, Minimal Investments, Minimal Results: The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, June 2004), pp. 1–8; Anthony Davis, “Afghan Security Deteriorates as Taliban Regroup,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 15, no. 5, May 2003, pp. 10–15.
44. ANSO Security Situation Summary, Weekly Report 039, September 24–30, 2004, p. 15.
45. Carlotta Gall, “21 Killed in Afghanistan Attacks Directed at Provincial Governor,” New York Times, August 15, 2004; ANSO Security Situation Summary, Weekly Report 039, September 24–30, 2004, p. 7; ANSO Security Situation Summary, Weekly Report 036, September 3–9, 2004, p. 5; ANSO Security Situation Summary, Weekly Report 038, September 17–23, 2004, PP. 7–8.
46. Author interview with Daoud Yaqub, January 2, 2008.
47. Author interview with Lieutenant General David Barno, January 17, 2008.
48. Memo from Donald Rumsfeld to General Dick Myers, Paul Wolfowitz, General Pete Pace, and Doug Feith, Subject: Global War on Terrorism, October 16, 2003.
49. On Afghan numbers, see Seth G. Jones et al., Establishing Law and Order After Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), pp. 89–91.
50. The Asia Foundation, Voter Education Planning Survey: Afghanistan 2004 National Elections (Kabul: The Asia Foundation, 2004), p. 106.
51. International Republican Institute, Afghanistan: Election Day Survey, October 9, 2004, slide 13.
52. Arno J. Mayer, The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 323.
Chapter Nine
1. Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, translated by Samuel B. Griffith II (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), p. 93.
2. William Cullen Bryant, Poems (Philadelphia: Henry Altemus, 1895), p. 79.
3. On the definition of insurgency, see Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, n.d.), p. 2; Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 102 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2001), p. 266.
4. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 1964), p. 3.
5. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1–02, defines unconventional warfare as: “A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery.” U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 102 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2001), p. 574.
6. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, translated by Daniel Lee (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), p. 6.
7. Daniel Siegel and Joy Hackel, “El Salvador: Counterinsurgency Revisited,” in Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, eds., Low-Intensity Warfare: Counter-insurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), p. 119.
8. Bruce Hoffman, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004); U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940); Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning (London: Faber and Faber, 1967); Charles Simpson, Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982); Robert J. Wilensky, Military Medicine to Win Hearts and Minds: Aid to Civilians in the Vietnam War (Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2004).
9. Daniel Byman, Understanding Proto-Insurgencies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), p. 1.
10. Trinquier, Modern Warfare, p. 8; Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, pp. 7–8.
11. Kimberly Marten Zisk, Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Amitai Etzioni, “A Self-Restrained Approach to Nation-Building by Foreign Powers,” International Affairs, vol. 80, no. 1 (2004); Etzioni, From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Stephen T. Hosmer, The Army’s Role in Counterinsurgency and Insurgency (Santa Monica, Calif,: RAND Corporation, R-3947-A, 1990), pp. 30–31.
12. Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008). On time, also see Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, p. 10.
13. David M. Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail,” International Security, vol. 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004), p. 51.
14. See, for example, James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review, vol. 97, no. 1, February 2003, pp. 83, 85; Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Nicholas Sambanis, “The Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset and the Case Study Project Research Design,” in Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, eds., Understanding Civil War, Vol. 2: Europe, Central Asia, and Other Regions (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), pp. 1–34; Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, pp. 37–38.
15. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, p. 38.
16. Ann Hironaka, Neverending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” pp. 75–90. On the importance of building institutions, see Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
17. Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 218.
18. Nelson Manrique, “The War for the Central Sierra,” in Steve J. Stern, ed., Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980–1995 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), p. 204.
19. Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973), p. 199.
20. Richard Berman, Revolutionary Organization: Institution-Building within the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1974), pp. 4–-5
21. Adrian H. Jones and Andrew R. Molnar, Internal Defense against Insurgency: Six Cases (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, 1966), p. 47.
22. Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 78.
23. Jane Stromseth, David Wippman, and Rosa Brooks, Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law After Military Interventions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 137–140.
24. William R. Easterly, The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001); Robert E. Klitgaard, Institutional Adjustment and Adjusting to Institutions (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995); Nicolas van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).
25. Mohammed Ayoob, “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure,” in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2001), p. 130.
26. Hironaka, Neverending Wars, pp. 42–46.
27. Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks, Can Might Make Rights? pp. 137–40; Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 92–118; Ayoob, “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure.”
28. Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” pp. 75–76.
29. Hironaka, Neverending Wars, p. 45.
30. See, for example, Jeffrey Herbst, “Responding to State Failure in Africa,” International Security, vol. 2I, no. 3, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 120–44.
31. David D. Laitin and Said S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987); I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988); Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 145–61.
32. Patrick Brogan, World Conflicts (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1998), p. 99.
33. Hussein M. Adam, “Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?” in I. William Zartman, ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 78.
34. Richard J. Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 140.
35. William Chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987).
36. Samir Makdisi and Richard Sadaka, “The Lebanese Civil War, 1975–1990,” in Collier and Sambanis, eds., Understanding Civil War, Vol. 2, pp. 59–85.
37. Michael Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1992).
38. Thomas A. Marks, Maoist Insurgency since Vietnam (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1996), p. 261.
39. Crawford Young, Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 56.
40. William Minter, Apartheid’s Contras (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1994); Leonid L. Fituni, “The Collaps
e of the Socialist State: Angola and the Soviet Union,” in I. William Zartman, ed., Collapsed States, pp. 143–56.
41. Mwangi S. Kimenyi and Njuguna S. Ndung’u, “Sporadic Ethnic Violence: Why Has Kenya Not Experienced a Full-Blown Civil War?” in Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, eds., Understanding Civil War, Vol. 1: Africa (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), pp. 123–56.
42. See, for example, Stephen Saideman, The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Saideman, “Explaining the International Relations of Secessionist Conflicts,” International Organization, vol. 51, no. 4, 1997, pp. 721–53; Tatu Vanhanen, “Domestic Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Nepotism: A Comparative Analysis,” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 36, no. 1, 1999, pp. 55–73; Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security, vol. 20, no. 4, Spring 1996, pp. 136–75.
43. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
44. Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” pp. 136–75.
45. There is no definitive assessment of ethnic breakdowns in Afghanistan, since there has been no census since 1979. Even the 1979 census was partial and incomplete. For estimates, see, for example, Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2007 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2006).
46. On Pashtuns and the Taliban, see Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000); William Maley, ed., Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban (New York: New York University Press, 2001).
47. Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo, Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qa’ida (New York: Crown Publishers, 2005), p. 219.
48. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan,” Orbis, vol. 51, no. 1, Winter 2007, p. 86. Also see Thomas H. Johnson, “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building After War,” Central Asian Survey, vol. 25, nos. 1–2, March-June 2006, pp. 1–26.
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