Lieutenant Colonel Schroeder continued to orbit above the Alpha Company fight in his C&C ship. He knew that the two Alpha Company platoons were in serious trouble. Since there was almost no wind, the smoke and dust hanging over the battlefield made it difficult to identify his unit’s positions. He wanted to put in an airstrike, but he was reluctant to use heavy ordnance so close to friendly troops. On the ground, Captain Drees was in no better position to direct fires due to the dense vegetation. Both men had to be sure that the forward platoons were a safe distance before the airstrike. There was also an urgent need to evacuate Alpha Company’s numerous casualties.
Lieutenant Wayne McKirdy, the Alpha Company FO, was wounded by shrapnel from an enemy Claymore mine about thirty minutes into the fight. His recon sergeant, Baker, was severely wounded in the same blast. Baker’s left foot had been blown off just above the top of his boot. After, summoning a medic to treat Bakers wounds, McKirdy grabbed the team’s PRC-25 radio, and rejoined Captain Drees. McKirdy wrote, “There was some delay in calling in artillery fire for several reasons…. We really didn’t any idea what we were up against…and our men were so close to the base camp we didn’t want to risk friendly casualties from the fire.” In fact, most of the Alpha Company grunts were within the “danger close” distance for artillery fires, and there was a high risk of accidental casualties. McKirdy held off calling for artillery until he and Captain Drees were satisfied that most of the wounded and KIAs were evacuated to an area where an LZ was being cut. Once he began calling in fire missions, McKirdy recalled that he never actually saw a round hit. He adjusted fires, “primarily by sound and gut instinct.” He “prayed a lot” that no rounds dropped on friendly troops.
Most of the artillery rounds fired by Charlie Battery 2/40th Artillery were 105mm High Explosive (HE) rounds. These rounds fired by Charlie Battery’s howitzers were nearly totally ineffective on the enemy’s well constructed bunkers. Delayed fuse artillery rounds were effective, but they were in limited supply at fire base Nashua on December 6.
Lieutenant Colonel Schroeder knew that he needed more troops in the fight. It was obvious that Alpha Company was engaged with a large, well entrenched enemy force. However, reinforcements posed a problem for the 4/12th commander. Echo Company was in sporadic contact with the enemy north of Fire Base Nashua, and half of Bravo Company was deployed to assist the beleaguered armored Cav platoon. Neither was Charlie Company immediately available, for its line platoons were patrolling west of Nashua. Consequently, Schroeder decided to request the release of the brigade ready reaction force to his control. Concurrently, he ordered Bravo Company’s two uncommitted platoons to move with all possible speed to Alpha Company’s location along with a platoon of Delta Troop, 17th Cav. He also ordered the Charlie Company commander to pull all of his platoon patrols back to FSB Nashua. It was almost mid-afternoon and the fighting was far from over.
First Lieutenant Henderson Garnett was the senior offficer in charge of the two Bravo Company platoons at FSB Nashua. Lieutenant Philip Baynum led Bravo’s 4th Platoon, and Staff Sergeant James Pius was in charge of 2nd Platoon. Less than thirty minutes after the alert, Bravo’s platoons mounted the five ACAVs from Delta Troop that would carry them to the scene of the battle. At 1515 hours, Lieutenant Delbert Ehler, the Cav platoon leader, gave the word and the armored tracks rumbled out of the FSB Nashua perimeter headed for the hard pressed Alpha Company.
Brigadier General Forbes approved Schroeder’s request for deployment of the brigade’s ready reaction force company. The 199th Light Infantry Brigade’s Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) specified that one infantry company from the brigade always be on 30-minute standby to respond to a tactical emergency. This on-call tasking rotated between the brigade’s three infantry battalions. On 6 December, 1967, Alpha Company, 3/7th Infantry was the on-call force.
Alpha Company, 3/7th was located at Fire Support Base Concord a few kilometers northeast of Bien Hoa. The CO of Alpha Company, Captain Antonio (Tony) Smaldone, of Cohoes, New York, was the type of company commander the general could rely on in a tough situation. Forbes later described Smaldone as one of the best company commanders he’d ever known.
Tony Smaldone was no stranger to Vietnam, and he had already earned a reputation as a Warrrior before he was assigned to the 199th LIB. Prior to his assignment to the brigade, he had spent six months with the 5th Special Forces Group, and another 24 months as an adviser to a Vietnamese Ranger battalion and a Vietnamese Airborne battalion. Smaldone volunteered for three tours in Vietnam, and was wounded four separate times. The most serious was a wound in the chest that collapsed his right lung. In another firefight he was shot in the right hand and refused to be evacuated until the fight was over. He went AWOL from the hospital after treatment of this wound, and returned to his unit in the field before his doctors gave their OK. After interviewing him, a reporter for the Army Times described Smaldone as “the kind of guy who would walk around for 20 hours with a bullet hole through his right hand and a leg full of shrapnel rather than give up command of his company while the enemy is still engaged.” The war correspondent wasn’t far off the mark.
Smaldone’s Alpha Company stood at the ready on the pick-up zone (PZ) by1500 hours. The 187th Assault Helicopter Company was the Ready Reaction lift company tasked to support the airmobile assault. The assault helicopter pilots knew the potential for a hot LZ was high, but were reassured that their gunship team, the “Rat Pack,” would prep the LZ with rockets and machine-gun fire.
Clouds of brown dust swirled around the Alpha 3/7th grunts as they ran toward the helicopters on the PZ. Smaldone and his command group loaded up with the first lift. With their engines roaring, the lift ships were airborne at 1525 hours. LTC Schroeder selected an LZ north of the enemy base camp. His choices were few in the dense jungle terrain. The LZ was within small arms range of the enemy base camp, but Schroeder was counting on the element of surprise.
As the lift ships flew toward the LZ, volleys of high-explosive artillery shells pounded the jungle surrounding the LZ. When the troop-carrying helicopters were five minutes out, the “Rat Pack” gunships pounced upon the enemy positions, firing their 2.75 rockets and mini-guns. As the lift ships were on their short final approach to the LZ, they took automatic weapons fire, but the gunships suppressed the enemy fire with a torrent of their own. As the helicopters touched down, Smaldone’s men leapt into the waist-high elephant grass and sprinted to their assembly areas around the LZ.
Schroeder landed on Smaldone’s LZ immediately after the lift ships cleared the LZ. Jumping out of his C&C ship, Schroeder ran toward Captain Smaldone’s location just off the LZ. He gave the Captain an update on the situation and ordered him to move his company to an attack position north of the enemy base camp. Alpha Company’s situation was too serious to wait for Smaldone’s second lift to land. Schroeder recalled telling the Captain to make sure that his men moved forward in a low crouch as they assaulted the enemy bunker line. All indications were that the VC had sighted their weapons a bit high. After briefing the Captain, LTC Schroeder returned to his C&C ship to take control of the battle from the air.
While Smaldone’s grunts moved to join the fight, Lieutenant Ehler’s ACAVs, carrying Bravo’s 2nd and 4th Platoons, smashed their way through the jungle en route to the battle area. Ehler knew his mission was to reach Alpha Company’s position in the shortest possible time. He only hoped that his column would not be ambushed on the way in.
CHAPTER 4
VICTORY AT NIGHT
The scene at Alpha Company’s LZ was horrific. The small jungle clearing was littered with the debris and carnage of combat. Discarded rucksacks, damaged weapons, smashed ammo crates, and empty metal ammo boxes lay strewn about the ground. The mangled bodies of dead and wounded men were scattered about the CP area. A bomb crater served as the LZ. Most of the trees around the LZ were blown apart and toppled as if chewed up by a giant chainsaw. Some of the wounded were unconscious while others lay moaning on the ground a
round the makeshift LZ. Those who were still able to hold a rifle were given one, and told to help man the defensive perimeter. As the afternoon wore on, more wounded and dead were carried into the perimeter. The wounded were “triaged” by the medics as they were carried in. Those who had a better chance of surviving were worked on first, while those who were unlikely to live were made as comfortable as possible and set aside.
Dust-off helicopters dropped into the small LZ, risking a tricky touchdown amid ground fire aimed at shooting off their tail rotors. The wounded were quickly stacked on board the medevacs, and the intrepid dust-off pilots pulled pitch to lift off before the enemy mortar crews began dropping rounds on the LZ.
Medic George Hauer treated the wounded as they arrived at the makeshift clearing. His jungle fatigues were covered with blood. He later recalled that as soon as he “patched up” one group, Father Litkey would arrive with more. Phil Tovin, who arrived at the LZ with the Cav and Bravo platoons, recalled, “They were carrying them out one by one, between the respite in the fire. Each one was dead, their bodies riddled with bullet holes and mangled by high explosive booby traps.” Medics and members of Drees’ command group applied dressings to torn flesh, injected morphine into those writhing in pain, and gave water and smokes to those who could handle it. When he expended all the morphine in his own aid bag, George “Doc” Hauer replenished his supply from the aid bags of those medics who were killed in the fight. Chaplain Liteky circulated among the most critically injured, offering encouragement and administering last rites to the dying.
Since 2nd Platoon’s sergeant was wounded and out of the action, Captain Drees gave Morris the remaining men from the platoon. With the additional men, Morris’ 4th Platoon was almost up to its original strength. The men were exhausted, but knew that they would have to attack again. The remaining ammunition, C-rations, and water were redistributed, and those who had cigarettes shared them with their buddies. Most of the grunts had buddies who were killed, wounded, or missing, and they were determined to recover those who still had not been evacuated.
At 1620 hours, a Forward Air Controller (FAC) arrived over the battlefield. Schroeder radioed Captain Smaldone, giving him instructions to hold in place until the air strike was complete. He planned to launch a coordinated ground assault with Smaldone’s company attacking from the north and his own units attacking from the east after the air strike.
The FAC orbited the area, trying to spot the precise location of the enemy fortifications. He also had to identify all of the friendly ground unit locations. It was not an easy task. The thick jungle canopy hid the enemy fortifications, and when he asked for smoke to identify the friendlies, there were smoke grenades popped in several areas around the strike area. Schroeder did his best to identify the targets for the FAC. The FAC decided that 20mm cannon fire would be the safest type of ordnance to use, due to the proximity of friendly troops on the ground.
After the FAC marked the target with rockets, two F-100s swooped down from the cloudless sky and strafed the target with 20 mm cannon fire. Kicking in their after-burners after each run, the F-100s returned for more passes until they had expended all their 20mm ordnance. The air strike boosted the morale of the troops, but even though it was right on target, the overall damage to the enemy hunkered down in their bunkers was negligible.
Frank Paoicelli, a member of Alpha 3/7th’s 4th Platoon, landed with the second lift of Smaldone’s Alpha Company. Part of his platoon landed with the first lift, and he was surprised that there were no friendly troops securing the LZ when the second lift landed. He recalled seeing the air strike commence moments after he came in. As he watched the jets strafing the base camp, he knew his company was in for it.
As the Air Force F-100s strafed the determined enemy, Ehler’s armored Cav platoon arrived at Alpha Company’s location with Bravo’s two platoons. Captain Drees, as the senior officer on the ground, took command of these forces and organized them for a second assault on the dug-in enemy battalion. He quickly outlined his plan to the platoon leaders and their sergeants. The ACAVs were to attack on the left flank of Alpha Company’s two platoons. Their attack was to be supported by one platoon from Bravo Company. The second Bravo Company platoon led by Lieutenant Baynum would support Alpha Company’s two platoons led by Lt. Morris on the right. While Captain Drees’ force attacked the enemy base camp from the east, Captain Tony Smaldone’s Alpha Company was to launch an attack the enemy position from the north. Everyone hoped that the combined weight of these two attacks would overrun the enemy defenses.
The plan of attack was dependent on close coordination between the maneuver units working together in tandem. Captain Drees and Captain Smaldone were in radio contact, but there was no physical contact between their respective units. At platoon level there was only minimal time for platoon leaders to prepare their men for the assault. Morris and his men knew all too well what they were going up against, but the others did not.
The attacking platoons moved out at 1700 hours. The grunts were pumped with adrenaline and nicotine. There was less than two hours of daylight remaining. Sunset was around 1830, and by 1900 the troops would be operating in total darkness. It was a high risk attack, but there were still wounded men near the enemy fortifications to recover. There was also a strong likelihood that the enemy would attempt a breakout during the hours of darkness.
Sergeant Jim Pius’ Bravo platoon attacked on the left with the platoon of ACAVs from D/17th Cav. Pius worked out a plan with the Cav platoon leader, Lieutenant Ehler. Pius and his men were to move dismounted behind Ehler’s ACAVs as they rolled forward toward the enemy position. In Pius’ words, “My platoon would move in behind his APCs and while he smoked the area with 50 caliber machine gun, we would follow him in. Once they stopped, we would move out and set up a base of fire and try to cover him and Alpha Company.”
As Sergeant Pius and his men moved out with Ehler’s tracks, Morris led his platoon forward on the right. He thought that Lieutenant Baynum’s Bravo platoon was moving directly to his rear. He was wrong. Baynum’s platoon halted at the trail and contact between the two units was broken. Morris wrote, “The B Company platoon was directly behind my unit as we moved to contact. Or so I thought. As we reengaged the enemy we were again being cut to pieces and were pinned down again…the supporting platoon had not moved from the ready line.” Morris was furious and radioed Captain Drees, shouting into his radio handset over the din of battle and told him, “If he didn’t get us some help soon there would be nobody left at the end of the day.” After Morris’ radio call, Drees moved to the ready line along the trail, and got the Bravo platoon moving forward again. The situation on the left was going no better.
As the Cav tracks rumbled forward in the attack, one of them was blasted by an explosive device that was hanging from a tree. The track commander was seriously wounded along with the other members of the crew. Specialist John Noel, a crew member, quickly took command of the disabled vehicle. Although Noel’s arm was nearly severed from the blast, he continued to deliver fire on the enemy until he received another severe wound in the abdomen.
Jim Choquette was an M79 gunner on the Cav platoon’s Track 12. Choquette’s ACAV was moving right beside Noel’s track. Choquette recalled that Russ Anderson was behind the .50 caliber machine gun on his track. When the enemy opened up, Anderson returned fire with the .50 caliber, depressing the butterfly trigger and firing up an entire belt of ammo before releasing it. The barrel was red hot, so Anderson poured a can of oil over it before loading a second belt. Seconds later Choquette received multiple shrapnel wounds from another Claymore blast. Despite his wounds, he continued to place effective fire on the enemy until his platoon leader ordered him to take cover and treat his wounds. Since there was no medic nearby, Choquette bandaged his bleeding left arm, and then moved to man one of the track’s machine guns.
Bravo Company’s Sergeant Jim Pius saw that Noel’s ACAV and its crew were in serious trouble, and quickly went into action. He grabbe
d four men nearest his position along with two medics, Specialists Albert Bohrer and Teddy Whitton, and rushed under intense fire to the burning ACAV. He positioned two men on each side of the vehicle and then climbed onto the track with the two medics. While the medics pulled the wounded from the crew compartment, Sergeant Pius attempted to fire the ACAV’s .50 caliber at an enemy RPG team that was rushing forward to finish off the disabled track. When he couldn’t get the damaged gun to fire, Pius muscled the .50 caliber from its cradle mount and ordered the medics to get the wounded off the vehicle. After getting the wounded men and the machine gun off the ACAV, Pius and his men took cover nearby. Pius later wrote:
“I only remember the seriously wounded driver, who was riddled with shrapnel and his arm was missing. I can recall him because he asked me if I got the birthday cake his mother sent him and he thought the fire ants were all over the one side of his body. I don’t believe he knew his arm was gone while the medics worked frantically on him.”
Specialist John Noel survived his ordeal, and was subsequently awarded the nation’s second highest award for valor, the Army’s Distinguished Service Cross, for his extraordinary heroism.
After rescuing the wounded cavalrymen, Pius redeployed his men in time to counter a group of NVA who had left their fortifications and moved to flank his platoon’s position. After directing his machine gunner, Bill Hill, and his M79 gunners to keep the attackers pinned down, Sergeant Pius took four men and rushed to reinforce the platoon’s endangered left flank. Pius later wrote, “The same four men and I moved to take out the NVA I saw moving to flank us on the left. With hand grenades and automatic weapons we were able to take out the three positions they had set up.” By his aggressive action, Pius stopped an enemy counterattack from rolling up Bravo’s exposed left flank.
Days of Valor Page 7