7. ROME’S ALLIES
A more pressing source of discontent and danger nearer home was the festering sore of Rome’s relations with her allies in Italy. This became so inflamed that it poisoned the whole political system, and Rome’s failure to tackle the problem finally threatened to split Italy into two in the Social War of 90 B.C. In view of its importance, it is necessary to see how the Italian Confederacy stood in 133 B.C. after several centuries of development. Regarded in detail, a political map of Italy at this time resembles a complex mosaic pattern, but all its inhabitants fall into one of two categories, Roman citizens or allies, sharply differentiated groups which might interlock territorially but not politically.
The Roman citizens comprised several sections. These were: (a) ordinary citizens in Rome itself; (b) cities on which Rome had conferred full Roman citizenship (e.g. Tusculum, perhaps in 381); the inhabitants continued to live in their own cities which enjoyed administrative autonomy; these oppida civium Romanorum later became known as pro municipiis or municipia, which originally meant something different; (c) municipia civium Romanorum; in origin these were strictly cives sine suffragio, who had received some of the rights and duties of Roman citizenship without all its privileges (this device of ‘half-citizenship’ proved a very valuable training in civic responsibility for some of the more backward peoples of Italy); they were gradually raised to the status of full citizenship so that by 133 the class of half-citizens had virtually disappeared, and the two sorts of municipia differed only in their origin and history. For their local administration these municipia had a council, a popular assembly and magistrates whose titles varied greatly according to their origins (aediles, praetors or octoviri); (d) some 27 colonies of Roman citizens, which were established from the mid-fourth century to 177 B.C. normally on the coast. The colonists, who usually numbered only 300, retained their Roman citizenship, including their right to vote, though they could exercise this only in Rome itself. In early times they were excused from normal military service in return for garrison duty, their purpose being to protect the coast from sudden raids. From 183 B.C. some larger citizen colonies were founded inland in N. Italy. These approximated more closely to the Latin colonies (on which see below), but the Roman colonies, unlike the Latin, were not true respublicae, though very gradually they acquired a municipal character; (e) members of small rural centres, fora and conciliabula civium Romanorum.
Rome’s allies consisted of two groups: the more privileged socii nominis Latini and the rest of the civitates foederatae. The Latins comprised (a) some original Latin towns as Tibur and Praeneste, whose status was established when the Latin League was dissolved in 338 B.C.; (b) some early Latin colonies (e.g. Signia, Norba, Ardea) which were joint foundations of Rome and the Latin League before 340; (c) the much larger number of Latin colonies founded by Rome after the dissolution of the Latin League. Most of the colonists were Romans who gave up their citizenship in return for land in the colony. The colonies were normally larger than the Roman colonies (e.g. 3000–6000 men) and over forty of them had been founded before 180 B.C.; then the process ceased, partly because by then Roman citizens were unwilling to lose their citizenship by entering a new community. It was no doubt because they were composed so largely of ex-Roman citizens that they enjoyed so many privileges. These included (i) rights of connubium and commercium with Romans and presumably also, at this time, with each other; (ii) ius migrandi: by going to live at Rome and registering himself in the Roman census, a Latin could obtain Roman citizenship, provided he had left a son behind him at home. This process was unpopular with the Latin cities, who did not wish to become depopulated, and the right gradually disappeared. It was replaced sometime in the second century by the ius adipiscendi civitatem Romanam per magistratum, i.e. by holding local office in a Latin colony; thus a small body of Roman citizens would now form a nucleus of the governing class of the colony, while the principle was changed, since Roman citizenship could now be obtained without domicile at Rome; (iii) ius suffragii ferendi: any Latins who happened to be in Rome could vote in a tribe which was chosen by lot in the Comitia Tributa. As independent states the Latins were not subject to tax or tribute, but as Rome’s allies they had to supply a quota of troops to fight alongside the Roman legions. Each colony had its own constitution with council and popular assembly, its own laws and magistrates (often called praetors or duoviri, though other titles are found), its own jurisdiction, census and coinage.
The rest of the allies were bound to Rome by treaties (foedera) which might be either aequa or iniqua; the latter may on occasion have bade the allies ‘imperium maiestatemque populi Romani comiter conservanto’. The conditions would vary in accordance with the circumstances in which the state had first come into permanent relationship with Rome. The chief obligation of the allies, who like the more privileged Latins paid no tribute, was to supply troops when required.16a They retained the rights of sovereign states when these did not clash with the supremacy of Rome. A large proportion of the cities of Etruria and of Italy south of Naples were in this legal position.
During the first half of the second century Rome’s relations with her allies deteriorated.17 The Senate did not maliciously begin to intervene in their internal affairs, but unless Rome adopted a totally new policy, her growing centralized power would inevitably tilt the balance against them: Roman control (as exemplified in the suppression of the Bacchic conspiracy) would gradually overshadow the local authorities until at length they became part of the machinery worked by the central government. Further, the degree of tact shown by the Senate or individual Roman magistrates varied on occasion: the way in which L. Postumius, consul in 173, abused his imperium by making outrageous demands on Praeneste when he was visiting the town, became a notorious scandal. Again in 177 the allies did not get their fair share of warbooty, which hitherto had been divided equitably between Romans and Latins, while some harsh aspects of Roman military law had been modified by some Leges Porciae in respect of Roman citizens only and not the Latins. Further, economic conditions began to make life more difficult for many of the allies. Thus numbers of them began to desire Roman citizenship either for its positive benefits or for the protection against oppression that it would confer, while others later began to consider the possibility of breaking away from Rome altogether.
8. ECONOMIC CHANGES AND THE LAND PROBLEM18
Many Italians and Romans alike were suffering from changing economic conditions. The changes arose partly from the upheaval caused by the Hannibalic War, but chiefly from the influx of wealth from the provinces: this upset the older economy which was based on the peasant farmers who also formed the main bulk of the Roman army. Hannibal’s invasion of Italy had caused widespread devastation so that in some parts of Italy farms and land were neglected and abandoned, but hard work would have restored this deterioration if it had not been accompanied by other difficulties. One complication that faced the small independent farmer who was still trying to make both ends meet was that more corn was being imported into Italy from the provinces, especially Sicily and Sardinia. This competition from abroad is often alleged to have ruined Italian farmers, but until 167 and perhaps until 146 most of this foreign corn was used by the Roman armies fighting overseas and did not reach the home market.19 By the time of the Gracchi, however, the pinch may have been felt by many farmers in the relatively limited area around Rome which had hitherto supplied the capital with corn and around some of the coastal towns (transport by sea was cheap, by land extremely dear); Italy as a whole was less affected. Further, conscription fell heavily upon the peasant when overseas wars demanded long periods of service: the rich could ensure that their farms were looked after during their absence, but the poorer man might often return to a ruined homestead.
Two other factors depressed the small farmer’s prospects still further: wealth and slaves. War and provincial administration filled the pockets of senators and Equites, who often returned to Italy and looked around for safe investments. Lan
d attracted most of their capital and it so happened that as a result of the Hannibalic War the State had much ager publicus of which to dispose: when unable to attract the peasant-farmer back to it, the State was ready to lease it out in large assignments to anyone who had the capital and vision to undertake the venture. Thus a slow revolution took place: land now became an object of speculation to be exploited as a regular source of profit. The owner might no longer live on his estate or take any personal interest in it, but would entrust its management to a steward (vilicus) while he himself joined the ranks of the aristocracy in Rome or some other city. At the same time the foreign wars had flooded the Italian slave-markets, so that servile labour, being abundant, began to oust free labour on the bigger estates. In many parts of Italy, especially in Etruria and the South, peasant husbandry, devoted to arable farming and cereal cultivation, gave place to a capitalist system of large estates (latifundia) worked by slaves and given over to pasturage and stock-rearing or to the cultivation of the vine and olive. Mixed farming could be quite profitable in Campania and Latium, and Cato in his handbook De Agri Cultura wrote for men, senatorial nobles or others, who would invest in a mixed estate of 100–300 iugera (66–200 acres), worked by slaves and with grazing on public land. These mixed farms could supply the towns with oil, wine, fruit, vegetables, meat and wool; together with the larger ranches, they might in fact represent the best use to which the land could be put in some parts of Italy. But few of the small farmers would have the capital or skill to switch over from corn-growing to other forms of production.20 The result was therefore disastrous: free men began to abandon their land to the larger proprietors. Forced off the land, some were absorbed by commercial enterprise abroad, since the number of Italians trading in the eastern Mediterranean greatly increased; some may have moved northwards to the Po valley, but most drifted to Rome and the other cities. Since no new industries were developed to absorb their labour and since the number of slaves was increasing in the cities as well as in the country, they soon became a useless mass of unemployed, whose presence would lead to social and political unrest.
A symptom of this economic decline is seen in the surviving census figures, which probably represent all adult male Roman citizens. After the great losses in man-power during the Hannibalic War, the figures steadily rose until 164 B.C., but thereafter they declined with equal regularity and had dropped by nearly 20,000 in 136 B.C. Nor was the fall in the population confined to the Romans themselves. The Latin authorities had on occasion to try to counter the drift of their population to Rome, while all the Italians found it increasingly difficult to meet the military demands of Rome. Both Appian and Plutarch stress the plight of the Italians at this time.
The development of the latifundia was accelerated not only by the plight of the small farmer, who was compelled to abandon his land, but also by the way in which the State had disposed of the public domain in the past. The ager publicus populi Romani was the land that Rome had acquired during her expansion in Italy: after a victorious war she normally confiscated about a third of the enemy’s territory, leaving him in possession of the rest. This ager publicus had been used in various ways: for founding colonies, for distribution in allotments to individual Roman citizens, while some had been sold. The rest was leased out by the censors. The more fertile districts, as the ager Campanus in Campania, brought in a good revenue to the State, but large tracts were poor ground and the censors in Rome lacked an adequate staff to deal with this in a careful manner. In fact any Roman citizens (and, if there was enough land available, probably Italian allies as well) could occupy this land as squatters (possessores) in return for payment of a rent (vectigal): this was a poll-tax for graziers, but a fluctuating amount for others (a tithe on ploughland, and a fifth on vineyards and orchards). But to have enforced strict payment clearly would have involved creating a large fiscal machine which would not have justified itself financially. Instead, the rent was often overlooked and the squatters came to regard the land as their own, which they might even bequeath to their children.
There was, however, one proviso: the amount of ager publicus that any individual could hold was limited by law. This limitation had probably been imposed in 367 B.C., and two hundred years later the maximum amount that anyone could hold (Cato refers to it in a speech of 167 B.C.,) was 500 iugera (some 300 acres). But in practice this limitation had often been disregarded, and the State had turned a blind eye, partly perhaps because the senators themselves, as large landowners, would benefit, and partly because it was better that the land should be occupied rather than remain idle, while the rich would be able to develop it to better purpose. Thus the growth of large estates had gone on apace, though in so far as many men held public land in excess of the legal limit, it was always possible strictly to enforce the law and reclaim the excess land for the populus Romanus, its legal owners.21
II
THE GRACCHI1
1. ATTEMPTS AT REFORM
Thoughtful Romans began to realize the need to attempt some alleviation of the economic situation, if only because it affected Rome’s military strength. The Roman army was a citizen militia: it consisted of men enrolled in five property classes, but if these men lost their farms and became urban paupers they would sink below the minimum property qualification and would be classed as capitecensi or proletarii who were not subject to conscription. The evidence suggests that the needs of recruitment had in fact led to some relaxation of the necessary requirement and that some such men had been enrolled in the armies which fought in Africa and Greece. This would produce further difficulty, because on demobilization men previously had a farm to which to return, whereas now some men might be left resourceless apart from any war-booty that they had won. If the strength of the army was to be kept up under the traditional system of recruitment, the peasant farmers of Italy must be restored to their old prosperity. This concern for the needs of the army might combine with distrust of recent developments in the countryside to induce some Romans to attempt some reform.
The first move came from Laelius, the close friend of Scipio Aemilianus who must certainly have been behind the proposal. At some date before or during his consulship in 140 Laelius raised the question of public land.2 No details unfortunately are known about his scheme. It was possibly on the lines later followed by Tiberius Gracchus and envisaged that the State should reclaim all land held in excess of the legal limit of five hundred iugera and distribute this in allotments to the landless, but it may have been less thoroughgoing than the Gracchan plan (e.g. it might have dealt only with quite recent seizures of land in excess of the legal amount). In view of the conclusion of the wars in Greece and Africa in 146 and the possible needs of some of the troops, the allotments may have been designed for veterans as well as the poor of Rome and Laelius perhaps made the proposal during his praetorship in 145. But when the scheme was mooted, it met with such severe opposition from the Senate and landowners that Laelius dropped it; according to one tradition he gained the cognomen of Sapiens for this act of political expediency.
Scipio also showed a similar moderation. The final fate of Carthage, which he had witnessed at close quarters during the last six days of bitter street-fighting, had impressed him with the impermanence of great empires, even those with mixed constitutions as that of Carthage, and he may have begun to harbour some fears for Rome’s future. He wanted to maintain the existing stability and the traditional balance of society. Thus in order to restore the peasant-farmer he was willing to check the growing greed of the landowners, but he would not push the issue to an open conflict when he realized the strength of the opposition to Laelius’ proposal.
After Laelius’ failure, however, some senators continued to work for reform, but so far from coming from Scipio’s supporters they were in opposition to the dominant Scipionic group. The political fortunes of the various groups fluctuated at the elections during the next few years, when some important reforms were carried: in 139 secret ballot was established for elections
and this principle was extended to the judicial assemblies of the People in 137.3 These measures would clearly give the People greater freedom from pressure by the nobles. If Scipio’s political power varied during these years, a series of military disasters and scandals in Spain soon gave him a chance to win further glory in war; a tried soldier was needed to bring the Spanish wars to a decisive end, and the obvious man was the conqueror of Carthage. So in 134 Scipio became consul for a second time, after receiving from the People a special dispensation from a law of 151 which prohibited such re-elections. While he was absent in Spain, the reform party in Rome acted.4
2. TIBERIUS GRACCHUS
The lead was taken by Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, one of the tribunes of 133 B.C. He belonged to a distinguished family. His grandfather, the elder Scipio Africanus, had conquered Hannibal; his mother Cornelia,5 Scipio’s daughter, was a lady of wide culture. His father, Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, embodied many of the older Roman virtues: a good soldier and provincial governor, he had brought a Celtiberian war to a successful end, established peace there for a generation, and reduced Sardinia; twice consul (177; 163), he had been censor in 169. After his death in 154 Cornelia refused an offer of marriage from the reigning king of Egypt, Ptolemy Physcon, and devoted herself to the education of her children, Tiberius (born c. 163), Gaius (some ten years younger), and their elder sister Sempronia (who married Scipio Aemilianus, the adopted son of Publius, a son of the elder Africanus). An admirer of Greek culture, Cornelia employed Greek tutors for her children; one, an eminent rhetorician Diophanes, who was a political exile from Mitylene, taught the boys oratory, an art in which they soon excelled. Another formative influence on Tiberius’ life was Blossius of Cumae, a Stoic philosopher and a member of a distinguished ‘liberal’ family which in earlier days had supported the democratic anti-Roman party at Capua.6 In Rome, where he had settled as a guest (hospes) in the family of P. Mucius Scaevola, he won the friendship of Tiberius who will have been impressed by his family tradition of democracy and independence, perhaps even more than by his Stoicism.
From the Gracchi to Nero: A History of Rome from 133 B.C. to A.D. 68 Page 6