Marius also introduced far-reaching tactical changes in the army. The legions had normally fought in a formation based on three separate lines which differed in age and equipment; these were now abolished and all the infantry were armed alike. For some time the sections (maniples), into which a legion was divided, had on occasion been grouped into threes in a unit known as a cohort. Marius now made the cohort the standard tactical unit (the battalion) of the legion, which henceforth consisted of ten cohorts of 600 men, each of which was subdivided into six centuries. At the same time each legion was given a silver eagle as its standard, and the men began to develop a ‘regimental’ loyalty to their legion. The legionaries’ chief arms were the sword and a long javelin (the pilum). Marius, following the example set by Rutilius Rufus (cos. 105), gave his men a thorough training in armsdrill by methods based on those of the gladiatorial schools, and provided the pilum with a wooden rivet to help fasten the metal head to the wooden shaft; on impact this rivet would break and thus made it impossible for the enemy to throw the pilum back.27 When on the move, Roman armies built a camp each night for protection and for this purpose had depended on baggage trains. Marius made the army more mobile and independent by making the men carry their own entrenching tools and other equipment: consequently they became known as Marius’ mules (muli Mariani). But an efficient army is lost without efficient officers. The commanding officer was normally a consul, who had under him six military tribunes28 and sixty centurions for each legion; and it was these centurions, seasoned and experienced veterans, six to each cohort, that provided firm leadership for the rank-and-file. Thus by his military reforms Marius partly gave final shape to earlier developments and partly introduced real innovations. The Roman army owed him much and became one of the finest fighting machines of antiquity.
Rome was exceedingly fortunate in that the rambling movements of the German tribes allowed Marius time to shape his army into a first-class force. In fact he had so much time that he employed his men in digging a new channel at the mouth of the Rhone to by-pass the estuary which tended to silt-up. This new waterway, the fossa Mariana, which ran from near modern Fos to Arles (Arelate), allowed shipping to get to the Rhone in safety, facilitated the supply-line of Marius’ army, promoted the commercial prosperity of Arelate and of S. Gaul in general, pleased the Equites, and fore-shadowed the similar use of the imperial army on public works.29 In 102, however, Marius, who had been elected to his fourth consulship in Rome with Saturninus’ help, received news that brought him post-haste back to Gaul. The barbarians were planning a converging attack on Italy: the Teutones were hoping to advance along the coast from the west, the Cimbri over the Brenner Pass from the north, and the Tigurini over the Julian Alps from the north-east. This division may have weakened the strength of the attack, but it also forced the Romans to divide their armies. While his colleague Q. Lutatius Catulus stood guard in N. Italy, Marius at first refused battle in S. Gaul (probably near Tarascon), allowed the Teutones to march past him, and then managed to work his way round in front of them before they reached Aquae Sextiae (modern Aix). Here in a valley surrounded by hills he cut to pieces the Ambrones who arrived first, and then engaged the Teutones in a tough struggle; a detachment of 3000 Romans concealed in reserve suddenly threatened the enemy’s rear and helped to achieve a complete victory. The western invasion was smashed and Narbonese Gaul was safe. Meanwhile Catulus had foolishly advanced up the Adige to meet the Cimbri in the hilly country near Tridentum (Trento), but his army managed to extricate itself, though at the cost of abandoning Transpadane Gaul to the invaders. Nevertheless his command was prolonged for 101 when he was joined by Marius, now consul for the fifth time. Together they advanced with some 55,000 men over the Po and finally in the heat of the midsummer met the enemy at Campi Raudii near Vercellae. Here the rout of the Cimbri was no less decisive than that of the Teutones at Aquae Sextiae. The Tigurini found safety by retreating to Switzerland, hastened on their way by Sulla.30
The northern peril was ended. Both Marius and Catulus received triumphs, but though some senators might try to believe that their man Catulus deserved his, the People’s hero Marius clearly was the real saviour of Rome. Memories of the sack of the city by the Gauls in 390 B.C., combined with the series of recent defeats that had culminated at Arausio, had justifiably aroused Rome’s fears and now increased her gratitude towards her preserver. Many Romans may have been thinking that disciplined legions must in the end have succeeded in defeating the barbarians, despite their numbers, but that would not have been possible without outstanding leadership. Marius in his army reforms, tactics and strategy had proved himself to be a general of great ability, if not of genius. The future was soon to show whether he could rival his military achievements when he turned to the battleground of politics.
8. MARIUS’ SIXTH CONSULSHIP (100 B.C.)
After his triumph Marius enjoyed such prestige and auctoritas that, had he so wished, he might have achieved a great measure of social reform, but there is little to suggest that his mind ever moved on such lines except in so far as the interests of his veterans were involved. They needed land and they should have it, but of statesmanship to match his generalship he showed not a spark. So far from taking any personal lead, he merely used Saturninus for his immediate purpose. Saturninus, glad of the chance to increase his own popularity, sponsored measures to provide allotments in Transalpine Gaul and colonies in Sicily, Achaea, Macedonia, Cercina (an island off the coast of N. Africa), Africa (now or earlier), and perhaps in Corsica. A land commission (decemviri agris dandis attribuendis iudicandis), on the lines of the Gracchan commission, was set up, and it perhaps dealt with the colonies as well; one of the members was the father of Julius Caesar (he became praetor in 91). Though few of these ambitious plans were implemented, at least the settlements in Africa, which had been voted if not actually started in 103 (p. 46), were considerable. One feature of the scheme shows insight: some at any rate of the colonies were to be Latin not Roman. Since not many Romans would be willing to sacrifice their citizenship by joining them, the colonists presumably must have been drawn largely from the Latins and allies. It was only fair that their share in the joint repulse of the northern invaders should be rewarded, but unfortunately the experience of Gaius Gracchus had shown that the selfish Roman plebs was reluctant to share any of its privileges and so in fact this generous feature of the proposal alienated some of the popular support which Saturninus enjoyed in Rome.31
A law had been passed a little earlier (probably December 101) to supplement the efforts of M. Antonius against the pirates in the eastern Mediterranean (p. 47). It was designed to mobilize resources for a drive against them, and closed all harbours of the empire and of allied states to their ships. Its real purpose was scarcely to create an extra-ordinary command in Asia for Marius, as has been suggested, though he was probably becoming anxious about his future; nor can it definitely be associated with Saturninus, though he might well favour a measure which would promote the interests of the Equites.32 The law contained a sanctio which bound magistrates to take an oath to observe its provisions. This was not necessarily an unusual feature, but Saturninus broke new ground when he tried to anticipate senatorial opposition to his lex agraria by inserting into it a sanctio under which all senators, on pain of exile, must swear to abide by it. This gave great offence. The urban plebs were already displeased because of his attitude to the allies, but by bringing some of Marius’ veterans into the Forum Saturninus routed his opponents in a fracas and got his measures carried. After some hesitation the senators followed the lead of Marius who took the oath, but subject to the validity of the law; Metellus Numidicus alone refused and preferred exile.33
At the elections for 99 Saturninus secured a third tribunate. Glaucia, though holding a praetorship, illegally stood for the consulship; his chief rival, C. Memmius (tribune in 111) was murdered or killed in a riot. This was too much for Marius, who had a strong sense of law and order and must have been increasingly uncomfort
able about the wisdom of his political alliance with these demagogues and perhaps also about their ultimate political aims. When the Senate passed the senatus consultum ultimum and summoned him to see to the safety of the state, he deserted his allies, who with their followers had seized the Capitol. By cutting off their water-supply he soon compelled them to surrender, and in order to save them from lynching at the hands of the mob he shut them up in the Senate House, but the crowd broke through the roof and pelted them to death with the tiles.
The Senate possibly declared that Saturninus’ legislation, or at any rate the measures carried in 100, was invalid, since it had been carried by force (per vim). Marius’ lack of political principle was exposed. No longer feared by the Senate or respected by the People, he was in a weak position; after a vain protest against a measure to recall Metellus from exile, in 98 he went off to Asia and obscurity.34 This conduct at least showed his loyalty to the constitution: unusually close ties had bound him to his army, and the support of the People had secured him six consulships. These, however, he had held primarily because of the military needs of the day and he had not attempted to use them as stepping stones to a personal predominance. The use of his soldiers in the Forum in 100 was a disquieting precedent, but Marius’ own lack of political ability or ambition, combined with his innate sense of law and order, limited the possible development of the evil. Danger to the State would arise only when military need elevated men of greater political insight who were prepared to use the army for their own personal advancement. In the meantime the authority of the nobility had prevailed over the turbulent demagogues and over the novus homo who became an army commander.
IV
THE RISE AND FALL OF SULLA1
1. THE NINETIES
The end of the second century had witnessed stirring events both at home and abroad. By contrast the first few years of the next century were relatively peaceful in both spheres, though in fact they were to prove merely an uneasy lull before even greater storms. Pacification abroad was symbolized in a series of triumphs by victorious generals: the joint triumph of Marius and Catulus over the Teutones and Cimbri was followed by those of M. Antonius over the pirates (100), T. Didius over the Scordisci, and Dolabella over the Lusitanians (98), while Manius Aquilius celebrated an ovatio for his reduction of the Sicilian slave-war. While these public spectacles assured the people of Rome that the frontiers of the empire were safe, the domestic scene was also enlivened by a number of political trials, in which several men alleged to have been sympathizers of Saturninus were condemned.2 Both Senate and Equites were breathing more freely and in their common desire to avoid such upheavals as had disfigured the year 100 they achieved a state of co-existence, if not of harmonious co-operation. The Senate in particular failed to express by more generous action any relief it may have felt at having rounded a dangerous corner. Rather, it attempted to strengthen its position: the consuls of 98 carried a lex Caecilia-Didia, which (a) by forbidding ‘tacking’ various measures together in omnibus-bills guarded the Senate against possible coalitions, e.g. between Equites and People, and (b) by enacting that a regular interval must elapse between the promulgation of a measure and its voting in the Assembly, guarded the Senate against suprise attacks.
Of far greater moment, however, was the Senate’s criminally short-sighted attitude to the Italian allies, many of whom had come to Rome during the recent upheavals. By a lex Licinia-Mucia the consuls of 95 set up a quaestio on aliens who were claiming to be citizens.2a This action, though quite legal, was incredibly foolish, but before its full consequences were felt the mutual toleration between Senate and Equites received a rude shock. An equestrian jury condemned on a charge of extortion P. Rutilius Rufus (cos. 105) who had served in Asia as a legate of Mucius Scaevola: so far from being guilty of oppression, he had helped to draft an exemplary edict for the administration of the province and had protected the provincials from the exactions of the equestrian tax-gathers.3 The Equites now had their revenge: despite the dignity of his defence, Rufus was condemned and retired to live in exile at Smyrna among the very provincials that he was alleged to have oppressed. Though he was a novus homo (and therefore an easier target than Scaevola), the Senate must have felt this affront to their Order very bitterly, while the political bias of the ‘Gracchan’ juries was patent.
2. THE YOUNGER DRUSUS
Conscious of the personal risk that he was taking, a leader at long last came forward, bold enough to follow in the footsteps of Gaius Gracchus and to tackle the twin problems of the law-courts and the Italians. Ironically enough he was the son of Drusus who had opposed C. Gracchus. Elected tribune for 91, the younger M. Livius Drusus was not prepared to stand by and let the State drift into disaster. Aristocratic, wealthy and somewhat severe in manner, he sponsored a more generous senatorial policy and gradually worked towards his ultimate aim of gaining franchise for the Italian allies. In the Senate he had many friends who included the Princeps Senatus, Scaurus, and the great orator Crassus, but he needed wider support and so he turned to the People. He carried a bill to provide allotments, and served on the decemviral commission which it established, as well as being one of the five members of another such commission set up by a law of his tribunician colleague Saufeius. He also made arrangements for the distribution of cheap corn and sponsored a colonial bill, perhaps to implement the scheme started by his father (p. 31). After having gained, as he hoped, popular support he then turned to the thorny question of the law-courts. He probably proposed (the evidence is contradictory) that they should be shared between the two Orders, i.e. ‘mixed’ juries of senators and Equites should be established, and that all members should be subject to a law against judicial corruption, based on an adaptation of Gracchus’ legislation (p. 30). Or he may have proposed to add 300 Equites to the Senate which would then provide the iudices.4
Relations between the two Orders, however, were too strained to permit of compromise: Drusus found that he had pleased neither, but had fallen between two stools. Some public disturbances ensued, in one of which Drusus’ brother-in-law Caepio, with whom he had quarrelled, was in danger of being hurled from the Tarpeian Rock. In the Senate the opposition to Drusus was led by one of the consuls, L. Marcius Philippus, whose following gradually increased despite the help that Drusus received from the oratory of Crassus. The scales began to tilt against him when it became known that he was contemplating a bill to give Roman franchise to the Italians, many of whom came to Rome to support him. He was known to have entertained the Marsic leader, Q. Poppaedius Silo, in his home, and men who feared that the Italians were now so restless that they might turn to force in order to secure their demands, began to doubt his loyalty. The fact that he warned Philippus of a plot to murder him showed that such doubts were unfounded, but it also revealed his knowledge of the allies’ plans.5 His position was thus quickly undermined: he lost the support of the Senate, of the Equites, of the People who continued selfishly to refuse to contemplate extending their privileges to the Italians, and lastly even of some of the Italians themselves who feared that their land might be threatened under his agrarian and colonial schemes. Philippus then persuaded the Senate to declare all Drusus’ legislation invalid, because it infringed the lex Caecilia-Didia, probably on the technical ground that some of the measures (e.g. the agrarian and colonial plans) had been ‘tacked’ together. Disappointed, disillusioned and deserted on all sides, Drusus had to admit himself beaten, since he was not prepared to lead the Italians against Rome as some of his political enemies may have feared. Soon afterwards he was murdered by an unknown assassin. Nor were his friends left in peace: early in the year 90 a tribune, Q. Varius Hybrida, disregarded the veto of his colleagues and carried a law that established a court with equestrian jurors to try anyone suspected of collusion with the allies. Those who fell victims to this enquiry included many famous men (though in the next year Varius was hoisted on his own petard and condemned under his own law).6 Thus Drusus’ attempt at reform had failed. He may not
have shown great wisdom in his methods, which combined with his proud manner may have aroused fears that he was seeking too much personal power, but at least his aims were the aims of a statesmen, and his death was the signal for war.
3. THE OUTBREAK OF THE ITALIAN OR SOCIAL WAR
Fearing widespread discontent in Italy, the Senate had already sent Roman agents to various districts to watch developments. At Asculum in Picenum the people, thinking that their plans were revealed, turned on a visiting Roman praetor who had behaved rashly: they promptly killed him and all other Romans in the city. A deputation of allies went to Rome to protest at Rome’s past treatment of them, but the Senate refused to listen unless they made restitution for the massacre at Asculum. Feelings ran too high for compromise. The highlanders of Picenum and Samnium were determined to fight for their independence, and both sides spent the winter of 91/90 preparing for war.
The ensuing struggle is sometimes called the Social War (the war of the socii), but the title is misleading because it obscures a fact of the highest importance: the Latin allies did not join in, but every one, with the single exception of Venusia, remained loyal to Rome.7 If therefore the more privileged Latin allies abstained, what drove the rest of the Italici to such extreme measures?8 They had many grievances as has been seen, but why did they so eagerly want Roman citizenship? If they got it, few of them would have been able to go all the way to Rome to vote, and fewer still could ever have hoped to win their way into the exclusive circle of Roman nobles and magistrates. At first in the days of the Gracchi they apparently wanted the protection that citizenship would give them against oppression and exploitation by Roman magistrates and they might even have been satisfied if granted the ius provocationis (cf. p. 27). But as time went on and their hopes were continually shattered they became more sensitive to their social and political inequality. Rome could never have won her present position without their help: why should they not be treated as Romans? Thus Roman disregard of their legitimate complaints (about the effect of Roman agrarian laws and other matters) hurt their spirits even more than their material interests: frustrated and cheated of proper recognition, their patience suddenly snapped. Denied equality, they would fight for independence. The violence of the war that ensued testifies to the depth of the feeling involved.
From the Gracchi to Nero: A History of Rome from 133 B.C. to A.D. 68 Page 11