Caesar was now urged by the Gauls to eject Ariovistus, whose earlier request to become a Friend of the Roman People Caesar himself had supported. This may not have worried Caesar unduly, but in any case Ariovistus made hostilities easier when in an interview later he insulted Caesar with some home-truths, including a reminder that Caesar’s death would rejoice many a noble in Rome. Caesar then occupied Vesontio (Besançon), where for a moment his men wavered until they were recalled to duty by his threat to advance alone with his crack legion, the Tenth; never again during his Gallic campaigns did his troops falter. Confidence restored, he advanced through the Belfort Gap and along the eastern slopes of the Vosges until he encountered Ariovistus’ force (perhaps near Cernay). After a tough struggle, which was only saved when young P. Crassus on his own initiative threw in the reserves on the left wing at the decisive moment, the Germans fled defeated to the Rhine; Ariovistus died soon afterwards.
Caesar put his troops into winter quarters at Vesontio outside his own province, and returned to Cisalpine Gaul. He may have believed that a withdrawal would provoke a fresh German invasion: at any rate, he was clearly taking over responsibility for the Rhine frontier and virtual control of the lands of the Aedui and Sequani. When news reached him that the great confederacy of the Belgae in the north-east was making military preparations, no doubt in anticipation of further Roman advances, he raised two more legions in Cisalpine Gaul and in 57 marched against them. He established a bridge-head over the Aisne, where he gained the support of the Remi, and the Belgae who despite their numbers failed to organize a full-scale assault on his position gradually dispersed. The Suessiones (near Soissons), Bellovaci (around Beauvais) and Ambiani (near Amiens) submitted, but the Nervii further north (at Hainault) resisted and nearly defeated Caesar on the Sambre: however, he snatched victory from defeat, ‘that day he overcame the Nervii’. Meantime young Crassus had advanced through Normandy and Brittany without real opposition. Thus in two years the greater part of Gaul had been over-run, if not conquered, and Cicero in Rome well might move that a public thanksgiving (supplicatio) of 15 days, an unprecedented length, be decreed by the Senate for Caesar’s achievements.
In 56 it became clear that Gaul was by no means conquered. Caesar himself had to hurry off to Luca, where he reached the agreement by which his command would be prolonged until at least the end of 50: he could now plan on wider lines. Meantime the Veneti (in Brittany) had repented of their submission, especially when they heard rumours that Caesar might invade Britain and thus interfere with their cross-Channel trade. The Morini (opposite Dover) and the Menapii (at the mouth of the Rhine) also were restless, and another German invasion was feared. Caesar sent Labienus to watch the Germans and Belgae, while Q. Sabinus overran Normandy, and P. Crassus reduced the Aquitani in the south-west between the Garonne and Pyrenees. Caesar himself moved against the Veneti, but could achieve nothing by land, since most of their settlements were on peninsulas. At last a fleet under Decimus Brutus was made ready. In a naval action in Quiberon Bay the lighter Roman ships were at a disadvantage against the heavy oaken ocean-going vessels of the Veneti, until they managed to cut the enemy’s rigging with scythes fixed on long poles: entirely dependent on sail, the Venetic ships were then at the mercy of the Roman oared fleet. Caesar took savage deterrent action against the Veneti: their councillors were executed and the population sold into slavery. Then he advanced against the Morini in Flanders, but their marshes saved them.
3. GERMANY AND BRITAIN (55–54 B.C.)
Two tribes, the Usipetes and Tencteri, who had been driven westwards over the Rhine by the Suebi, formed Caesar’s next victims. When they refused his offer of land on the east of the Rhine, he annihilated them, probably near Xanten, and barbarously massacred their women and children. In Rome Cato proposed that Caesar should be handed over to the Germans, but his moral indignation will have been reinforced by political motives, and he achieved nothing. Caesar’s terrible warnings to the Germans that they must keep to their side of the Rhine was strengthened by a Roman demonstration on the east bank. Skilled engineers built a trestle bridge over the river (near Andernach or the Lorelei) in ten days, but the army that crossed over met no massed enemy and after ravaging the lands of the Sugambri, returned after eighteen days, destroying the bridge behind it.
Though it was late in the summer (55) Caesar launched his first attack across the Channel on Britain.6 His excuse might be the help that British tribes had given to the Gauls, but he will not have been unmindful of the glory that Pompey gained from conquests on the fringe of the known world, nor of the mineral wealth of the island. The Belgic tribes in the south-east had made considerable material progress, and apart from the old trade in Cornish tin, the island was reputed to be rich in pearls and precious metals. The invasion was brief. In face of the Britons Caesar effected a landing (near Deal?) with two legions, and the tribal chiefs in Kent submitted, but a storm wrecked his ships which were drawn up on the open beach; yet he succeeded in holding off hostile attacks, refitted his fleet and reached Bologne just before the equinox.
In 54 he returned to Britain with five legions and 2000 Gallic cavalry. Marching inland he met and defeated the Kentish forces near Canterbury, but had to return to the coast where his fleet had again been wrecked: he had not discovered an adequate harbour nor learnt the lesson of the previous year. He now turned to meet the Belgic chiefs who united their forces under Cassivellaunus, king of the Catuvellauni in Hertfordshire. After forcing the Thames, Caesar received the submission of the Trinovantes in Essex, who were hostile to Cassivellaunus, and stormed the king’s stronghold (at Wheathampstead). Cassivellaunus then gave in, but there is no evidence to show that he ever provided the hostages and tribute that he promised. Caesar returned to Gaul, knowing that with S.E. Britain in a state of nominal submission he had at least paved the way for future conquest in the island if that was desired, but other matters claimed his attention.
4. REVOLT AND RECONQUEST
Gaul was restless. Even before the second British expedition there had been trouble among the Treveri and the Aeduan leader Dumnorix had been killed for disloyalty. Caesar was therefore compelled to spread his forces over a wide area of N.E. Gaul for the coming winter (54/3). Ambiorix, king of the Eburones (in the Ardennes) struck first and after treacherously luring the troops under Sabinus and Cotta out of their camp at Atuatuca (near Liège) he destroyed them. The Nervii tried the same trick on Q. Cicero (the orator’s brother), but he wisely stood siege in his camp until relieved by Caesar who hastened up from his headquarters at Samarobriva (Amiens). Labienus managed to suppress the Treveri. During the winter Caesar increased his force to ten legions by raising two new ones and borrowing another from Pompey. In the course of the year he reduced the disunited rebels, the Senones, Carnutes, Menapii and Eburones; he also crossed the Rhine again. By devastating the country of the Eburones and executing some other leaders he attempted to overawe all opposition, but he probably sensed that all was not well.
News of disturbances in Rome after the death of Clodius in 52 encouraged a vast rising in central Gaul, which at last found a true leader in the Arvernian chief Vercingetorix. Caesar hastened back from Cisalpine Gaul, where he had spent the winter, but he reached his army at Agedincum (Sens) only with difficulty, coming through the thick snows of the Cevennes and eluding Vercingetorix, who in vain tried to force a scorched-earth policy on his supporters. After attacking and finally storming Avaricum (Bourges), Caesar sent Labienus against the Senones and Parisii and himself marched against Gergovia (near Clermont-Ferrand), but in attempting to storm the fortress he met with his first real defeat at the hands of the Gauls. This encouraged the Aedui to join the revolt. Caesar linked up with Labienus, who had won a victory near Lutetia (Paris) and then moved south, but on the way, perhaps near Vix, he fell in with Vercingetorix whom he worsted and forced into the hill-town of Alesia. Around this isolated hill Caesar built a double ring of the earthworks, one to keep Vercingetorix in, the other facing out
wards against the inevitable Gallic army of relief.7 This finally arrived, a quarter of a million strong if Caesar is to be believed, but its attack on his lines failed; it then withdrew and Vercingetorix surrendered in an attempt to save his men. After six years in captivity this great champion of Gallic freedom was led in Caesar’s triumph and then executed.
After this titanic struggle the Aedui and Arverni submitted, but some other tribes fought on, perhaps in the knowledge that Caesar’s command would soon end. The Bellovaci were not conquered until in 51 Caesar moved up seven legions against them, while some survivors from a defeated force of tribes in the west took refuge in the almost impregnable hill of Uxellodunum (north of the Dordogne) where they held out until Caesar cut off their water supply. One of the Gallic guerrilla leaders was Commius, whom Caesar in 57 had made king of the Atrebates and thereafter had used as an agent especially in Britain; he now managed to escape and fled finally to Britain, where he established a dynasty of the British Atrebates in Hampshire. Caesar spent the rest of the year and the next (50) trying to heal the savage wounds that he had inflicted on Gaul: in this he proved as successful as in war. He imposed a moderate tribute, which he left to the Gauls themselves to collect, and he left their tribal institutions alone. This conciliatory policy, though parallel to the clementia that he later showed to his political enemies in Rome, doubtless derived some support from the consideration that he would need a contented Gaul if he were to cross swords with the senatorial government. And for this struggle, if it came, he had won a devoted army, wealth and a reputation in arms to equal Pompey.
Few men could have achieved Caesar’s success, which was perhaps only made possible within so short a period by the disunity of the Gauls themselves and, until Vercingetorix arose, by the lack of an accepted leader. Even Caesar, in more than one engagement, saw victory almost slipping from his grasp, and the Gauls’ last desperate effort at Alesia long trembled in the balance. By common consent he is one of the world’s greatest soldiers, and clearly his qualities can not be fully appreciated in a brief sketch of his campaigns, whether his strategic and tactical brilliance, his famous celeritas, his organization of supplies, his use of engineering skills, or his drive and personal magnetism which inspired all ranks. All these he needed to enable the better-armed and disciplined legionaries to overcome brave men who were fighting for their liberty.
The Gauls fought for freedom, but freedom for what? There is little to suggest that, if left alone, they would have composed their internal rivalries and have given their land peace instead of warfare. Indeed, if Rome had not stepped in, the Germans would probably have done so; and they would have brought, not a higher civilization, but a retrogression to barbarism. Whether Caesar, who did not shrink from ruthlessness and atrocity when he regarded these as necessary, always judged the need aright, unbiased by personal considerations and ambition, cannot be said with confidence. Roman civilization might have infiltrated into Gaul more peacefully, but only if the Germans did not flood over the Rhine. As it was, a generation bled, suffered and died, but the succeeding one enjoyed peace, thanks to their predecessors’ sacrifice and to the wisdom of their conqueror’s final settlement. His conquest of Gaul represents a vital act in world history: central Europe was opened up to Mediterranean civilization, and on the Celtic foundation there grew up a peaceful Latin civilization; this was made possible by Rome’s hold on the Rhine frontier and it became so deeply rooted that, when the frontier finally broke as the Roman Empire itself collapsed centuries later, it survived the Germanic flood that followed and France emerged into the modern world as a Latin country. In that sense Caesar was the founder of France.
5. CIVIL WAR IN ITALY, AFRICA AND SPAIN (49 B.C.)8
When Caesar crossed the Rubicon (p. 104) the scales must have seemed heavily weighted against him. He had with him only one legion, control of the Po valley and of Gaul, and some political support in Rome, whereas Pompey, backed by the Senate, had all the rest of Italy, Spain, all the eastern provinces, and control of the sea and the corn-supply. But he had only two legions in Italy, and since these were the two that he had taken from Caesar (p. 103) he dared not risk an attack until he had raised more troops. Caesar struck first, with his usual speed: though it was winter, he pressed down the east coast, seized the passes to Etruria, and overran Picenum. Thus menaced, the consuls and Senate left Rome for Capua, and Pompey aimed at building up his forces in Apulia. His scheme was wrecked by the obstinate folly of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, who had been appointed governor of Transalpine Gaul in succession to Caesar and was thus not subordinate to Pompey. Domitius, despite Pompey’s advice and pleas,9 insisted on trying to hold out against Caesar at Corfinium, where after a short blockade he was forced to capitulate. The addition of Domitius’ men to Caesar’s forces tilted the balance of legions against Pompey, who was thus compelled to withdraw to Brundisium, where he very skilfully embarked his men in face of Caesar’s hasty attempt to thwart him; he then sailed across to Greece, leaving Caesar master of Italy after some two months’ campaigning.
During these months at least three attempts at conciliation had been made. When Caesar was still at Ariminum he received an official communication from the Senate and a private message from Pompey. Caesar’s reply envisaged roughly a renewal of their alliance, in which of course he would inevitably predominate. Though Pompey accepted most of Caesar’s suggestions, negotiations broke down when Pompey insisted that he should continue to levy troops for the present. After the fall of Corfinium Caesar made another attempt, but the terms of Pompey’s reply are not known; and again at Brundisium Pompey refused to meet him.10 From Brundisium Caesar returned to Rome after taking steps to secure Sicily and Sardinia. Already he had got a praetor, L. Roscius, to carry a bill to grant full franchise to the Transpadanes.11 When he reached Rome, no proscriptions followed on the pattern of Marius and Sulla: he merely collected what senators he could and tried to persuade them to renew peace negotiations with Pompey, but nothing came of it. Since he needed money, he disregarded tribunician obstruction, broke into the Aerarium and helped himself. Then leaving Aemilius Lepidus in charge of Rome as praefectus urbi, an office that had lapsed since the time of the Kings, and M. Antony in charge of Italy, after a fortnight in the capital Caesar went off to face the Pompeians in Spain: he had not got a fleet, so Pompey himself must wait.
Soon after this Pompey was joined by Cicero, who had spent some anxious months, first exerting himself for peace, and then trying to make up his mind whether to remain neutral or join Pompey. He owed this freedom of choice to the generosity of Caesar who had a frank discussion with him at Formiae when on his way to Rome; having failed to persuade Cicero to attend the Senate-meeting, Caesar left him unharmed. Finally, although his letters reflect no high opinion of Pompey’s conduct or aims, Cicero decided that past loyalties demanded that he went to him. Pompey also received another unenthusiastic supporter when Cato joined him. At the approach of Caesar’s legates Cato, who was organizing the defence of Sicily, had left the island in order to avoid needless bloodshed: if Caesar is to be trusted, Cato publicly blamed Pompey for having let him down by rushing into a ‘non necessarium bellum’.
Sicily was thus occupied by Curio, to whom Caesar had entrusted the task of seizing Africa from its Pompeian governor, P. Attius Varus and his three legions. The political skill that Curio had hitherto exercised in Caesar’s interests was not matched in the military field, where he lacked experience. After crossing to Africa he gained some initial successes around Utica, for which his legions optimistically hailed him as imperator, but then he had to face the forces of the Numidian king, Juba I, who had come to support the Pompeian cause: Juba was a personal enemy of Caesar, who many years before in Rome had pulled the king’s beard in the heat of a quarrel. Lured into a trap in the Bagradas valley, Curio was killed and his army was annihilated. Africa, and its corn, remained in Pompeian hands for the next two and a half years.
Meantime Caesar was fighting for supremacy in Spain. On
his way there he encountered the hostility of Massilia, which at first wished to remain neutral, but on the arrival by sea of Domitius, the governor of Transalpine Gaul, the city declared for Pompey. Caesar left Trebonius to conduct the siege with three legions and Decimus Brutus to command the fleet, and pressed on with six legions to Spain. There he faced five legions under two competent commanders, L. Afranius who had fought against Sertorius and in the East, and M. Petreius, who had defeated Catiline in Etruria; in western Spain there were two more legions under M. Terentius Varro, more noted as a writer than soldier. Caesar found Afranius and Petreius entrenched at Ilerda by the Sicoris, a tributary of the Ebro. In the operations that ensued at one moment he ran short of supplies and was dangerously cut off by the spring rise of the river, but he succeeded in turning the tables and forced his enemies into a position where, cut off from supplies, they were compelled to capitulate. Caesar showed great clemency, pardoning the commanders and disbanding the men. He then marched south, received the submission of Varro at Corduba, and settled the province, granting Roman citizenship to Gades. In less than three months by brilliant generalship he had mastered Spain. Meantime Massilia, hard pressed by the blockade, was ready to surrender to Caesar on his return from Spain. In view of the city’s past history and glories, Caesar allowed it to retain its autonomy, but deprived it of most of its territories: though it remained a centre of Greek culture, it quickly declined.
From the Gracchi to Nero: A History of Rome from 133 B.C. to A.D. 68 Page 20