While Livy devoted himself to the great theme of Rome’s growth from its foundation, others turned to more detailed aspects. C. Asinius Pollio (76 B.C.–A.D. 5) consul of 40 B.C., who had fought in the civil wars for Caesar and Antony, retired from public life after the failure of the treaty of Brundisium and turned to literature, as writer and patron; he encouraged the custom of semi-public recitations of his own works by an author, as a means of preliminary ‘publication’. His most important work was a history from the year 60 B.C. down to, perhaps, the battle of Philippi; it was much used by Plutarch and Appian, but does not survive.39 Pompeius Trogus, another historian, wrote a Universal History in forty-four books, dealing with the peoples outside Italy, of which a surviving epitome was made later by Justin. Among memoirs and biographies our greatest loss is that of the thirteen books of Augustus’ autobiography, which probably went down to the year 25 B.C. Augustus was in fact a man of culture who composed much both in verse and prose, e.g. a biography of Drusus, a poem on Sicily and epigrams. His chief surviving work is the simple and dignified account of his own Res Gestae. Maecenas and Messala both tried their hands at writing as well as encouraging others.
Finally, three Greek writers of the Augustan age may be mentioned here. Nicolaus of Damascus, the secretary of Herod the Great, wrote a Universal History in 144 books and also a panegyrical account of Augustus’ youth, of which some fragments survive. Timagenes of Alexandria, who taught rhetoric in Rome, attacked Augustus, whose favour he lost, and found refuge with Asinius Pollio; his Histories may be the source of much of the scandalous gossip about Augustus that is found in later writers as Suetonius. Strabo from Amasia was both historian and geographer; his historical work is lost, but the seventeen books of his Geography are a mine of information about the world of the early Principate.
XII
FRONTIERS AND PROVINCES
1. IMPERIAL PROBLEMS
It was not enough to try to restore better social and political conditions in Rome and Italy, not enough even to extend an adequate administrative system to the provinces: the heart and body of the empire must be shielded from attack from beyond its frontiers. This involved two problems: the establishment and maintenance of suitable frontiers and the ability to man them. The last requirement involved yet another problem: an adequate army must be created on a professional basis, and its loyalty to the central government must be guaranteed. One reason for the collapse of the Republic had been the challenge that had arisen from successful provincial governors, backed by their armies: the Principate must not be allowed to go the same way to destruction. Thus Augustus was faced with an awkward problem. The safety of the empire demanded that he should push the frontiers well back, but distant frontiers involved entrusting armies to men far from the eye of the Princeps, and long frontiers required more men and expense. Augustus therefore tried to establish as economical a frontier system as was consistent with safety, and at the same time to create an army that would guard it adequately while remaining loyal to himself. We must therefore look first at his army reforms and then at the various provinces and the problems that their defence involved.
2. THE ARMY
Realizing the weakness and dangers inherent in the army system of the Republic, Augustus created from the armies of the triumviral period a professional standing force, loyal to State and Princeps. Under the later Republic generals had normally kept a bodyguard (cohors praetoria). Augustus, besides keeping a select body of German troops as a personal bodyguard, developed the praetorian cohorts as a special corps: the Guard comprised nine infantry cohorts each one thousand strong with a cavalry squadron and commanded by a tribune.1 It was commanded by prefects, usually two in number, who were of equestrian rank; in the course of time they often became extremely influential since they tended to be entrusted with a variety of duties and to serve the emperor as general aides-de-camp. Under Augustus normally only three cohorts were stationed in Rome, the other six being quartered in various Italian towns. The Guard did not usually undertake active service unless the emperor or a member of his family took the field, and its members enjoyed privileged conditions as compared with the legionaries: they served for only sixteen years, were paid 2 denarii a day, and received a bonus of 5000 denarii on discharge.
The first task of Augustus was to reduce the swollen number of forces (over sixty legions) that were under arms at the end of the civil war, and then to retain what he regarded as the necessary minimum.2 For those that were discharged he found land, which he claimed to have purchased and not confiscated. After 13 B.C. not more than twenty-eight legions were retained and these were reduced to 25 by the disaster in Germany in A.D. 9. The legions were now permanent units, each with its number and title and comprising 5500 infantry (divided into ten cohorts) and 120 cavalry. As under the Republic, they were recruited from Roman citizens; this meant that they came primarily from Italy and the western provinces, and any non-citizens that might be admitted thereby received citizenship (as happened more frequently in the east than in the west). Though conscription could be applied if necessary, numbers were normally maintained by voluntary enlistment, since conditions were not unattractive: good pay (225 denarii a year), occasional bonuses (donativa), and a pension in the form of money or land after twenty years’ service (3000 denarii). Prospects of promotion were reasonable; there were 60 centurions in each legion, and the senior centurions (primi ordines, and especially the primus pilus) were men of considerable authority. Most of them had risen from the ranks and after retirement they might look forward to other useful forms of employment; a primus pilus received equestrian rank on leaving his legion. As under the Republic the higher positions were reserved for men of senatorial or equestrian rank: the legion was commanded by a senatorial legatus (new as a regular title, though Caesar had assigned parts of his army to legati); they were exquaestors, and later normally ex-praetors, and usually did not hold their commands for more than two or three years. Under the legatus were tribuni militum, young men who were starting a senatorial or equestrian career and who had received little technical military training apart from their experience in the clubs of luvenes (p. 196); they were concerned largely with administrative duties on the legate’s staff. Any lack of military experience in tribunes or legates was counter-balanced by that of the centurions and men like the regular praefecti castrorum (quartermasters) and praefecti fabrum (chief engineers).
The second main branch of the army consisted of the Auxilia.3 Their units came under the command of the legionary legate and were brigaded with a legion, but they are to be sharply distinguished from the legions. They numbered perhaps some 150,000 men, roughly the same strength, so that the total number of the regular army was about 300,000 men. Like the legions, the auxiliaries bore titles (often geographical) and numbers. They comprised infantry cohorts (normally 500 men) commanded by praefecti cohortis, and cavalry alae under praefecti equitum; the prefects were often tribal chiefs or legionary primipili. The auxilia were recruited from non-citizens in the less Romanized (i.e. the imperial) provinces. Their period of service was, later, twenty-five years, and on discharge they received Roman citizenship. This use by Augustus of the manpower of the provinces was not only a wise measure of economy, but involved much more. Under the Republic the provinces had not been seriously drawn upon for their own defence: now Augustus by showing confidence in their trustworthiness fostered their loyalty to the empire and they felt that they had a share in defending civilization against the barbarians beyond the pale.
The army was permanently stationed in the provinces where it was most needed, and in relation to the length of the frontiers to be guarded, it was none too large. Wars often involved moving troops from one front to another, especially under Augustus: under his Julio-Claudian successors the normal distribution was to keep three legions in Spain, eight on the Rhine, seven on the Danube, four in Syria, two in Egypt and one in Africa. In peace-time the army would be engaged on many tasks, as building roads and frontier-fortifications, br
idges, aqueducts and canals. Living in their permanent camps, the legionaries would gain efficiency through knowledge of local conditions. They would attract traders, whose settlements (canabae) outside the camps often developed into small towns where the retired soldiers might themselves settle. Further, as the troops naturally brought their own language and customs with them, they automatically became centres of Romanization from which Roman ways of life spread to the more remote parts of the empire. Men also often developed a pride in their local units: excellent as this was, there was a risk that their links with Rome might weaken, that they might gain an unhealthy local patriotism and that rivalry might grow up between the different armies. But these were dangers that developed slowly.
Under the Republic the navy had always been the junior service, and so it remained.4 Augustus, however, had learned its importance in his war with Sextus Pompeius and at Actium, and resolved to maintain a regular force with naval bases at Misenum, Ravenna, Forum Iulii (modern Fréjus; in Gallia Narbonensis),5 Alexandria, and probably Seleuceia in Syria, and with river flotillas on the Rhine and Danube. Thus the seas could be kept free from piracy, and troops and supplies could be moved with ease and safety. During the stress of the civil war both Sextus and Octavian had enrolled slaves in their fleets (though Octavian freed his), but in the more settled times that followed the crews were raised from freeborn provincials, though at first with a certain admixture of freedmen. The two fleets in the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic Seas were commanded by equestrian prefects, or on occasion during the Julio-Claudian period by imperial freedmen. In general, conditions of service resembled those of the Auxilia. A ship’s company was organized as a centuria under a naval centurion, and the majority of the ships were triremes.
By this reorganization of the army and navy, provided always that Augustus could rely upon the continued co-operation of the commanders, the pax Romana was secured. One of the compliments that Augustus justly deserved and valued most was given to him just before his death when some sailors in a ship off Puteoli thanked him: ‘per illum se vivere, per illum navigare, libertate atque fortunis per illum frui’.
3. THE EASTERN FRONTIER6
The importance of eastern problems is shown by the presence of Augustus himself in the East after Actium in 30–29 and again in 22–19 and by the eastern commands granted to Agrippa in 23–21 and again in 16–13.7 The basic question was to reach a modus vivendi with Parthia, the one power that might seriously threaten any settlement by Rome in Asia Minor. Here were three Roman provinces, Asia, Bithynia and Cilicia; the rest of the area was occupied by native rulers who were client-kings of Rome. One of the greatest of them was Amyntas who ruled over Galatia and neighbouring districts. When he died in 25 B.C., Augustus decided to annex his kingdom as a Roman province: this, after it had been reduced in size five years later, consisted of Galatia, Pisidia, Isauria, western Lycaonia, and Pamphylia, but no legions were stationed in the new province. Part of Cilicia was incorporated in the province of Syria, and part transferred to Archelaus, king of Cappadocia. Just to the north there lived a wild tribe, the Homanades, whom Amyntas had been trying to pacify when he was killed. Between 12 B.C. and A.D. 1 they gave further trouble until they were crushed by P. Sulpicius Quirinius, who was appointed governor of Galatia and Pamphylia and was given troops from Syria and Egypt.8 In order to maintain order in this area, five colonies of veterans were settled: three in Pisidia and two (including Lystra) in Lycaonia, while some years before (19 B.C.) a colony had been established at Pisidian Antioch (Colonia Caesarea). The construction of roads also helped to spread Roman influence.
In northern Asia Minor Pontus was ruled by a vassal-king, Polemo, while across the Black Sea in southern Russia the Bosporan kingdom remained in the hands of Rome’s ‘friend’ Asander until his death in 17 B.C. Disturbances followed, and it was not in Rome’s interests that neighbouring Scythian or Sarmatian tribes should benefit or that trade in the Black Sea should be threatened. Agrippa therefore used Polemo to intervene and granted the kingdom to him. Polemo then married Dynamis, the widow of Asander, but they soon quarrelled and in 8 B.C. Polemo was killed. Augustus, however, decided to accept the situation and Dynamis was left in control and remained a loyal friend of Rome until her death (A.D. 7–8). Thus the northern flank of Asia Minor was covered.
The key to the whole eastern question however was the native kingdom of Armenia, because geographically it looked both east and west; it is attached to the plateau of Asia Minor and to the Iranian plateau. It was thus a potential bone of contention between Rome and Parthia.9 After his conquest of Egypt, Augustus might have turned against Parthia in order to avenge the defeats of Crassus and Antony: in fact public opinion expected that he would. But he judged that the two Empires could live at peace, with the Euphrates as a limit of their spheres of interest. To have attempted to overthrow Parthia would have been expensive in men and money, and if successful would have upset the whole balance of the Roman empire which was based on the Mediterranean. Further, Rome needed peace, not more wars, and conditions were such that it could be attained. The Parthian king, Phraates, was involved with a pretender named Tiridates; and Rome, who was holding as hostages the brothers of the Armenian king Artaxes, also established an enemy of his called Artavasdes on the throne of Armenia Minor. Thus Augustus was ready to welcome envoys from Phraates and postponed the issue for ten years.
An opportunity then occurred for Augustus to deal with both Parthia and Armenia. The pretender Tiridates had fled to Augustus with the kidnapped son of Phraates, who requested his surrender. At the same time there was a demand in Armenia that Artaxes should be replaced by his younger brother Tigranes who had spent ten years in Rome. Augustus decided to go to the East and ordered Tiberius to advance from Macedonia through Armenia to join him. In face of this show of force Phraates decided not to fight, but agreed to surrender to Augustus the Roman standards that he had captured from Crassus and Antony. In Armenia Artaxes was murdered and Tiberius crowned Tigranes as a client-king (20 B.C.). Augustus regarded this diplomatic triumph over Parthia as one of the great achievements of his reign: coins depicted the handing over of the standards with the legend ‘signis receptis’, the scene adorned the centre of his breastplate on a famous statue, and he was acclaimed Imperator IX; other coins showed a kneeling Armenia (‘Armenia capta’). Thus Parthia acquiesced in Roman control of Armenia, and peace was established; it was strengthened a few years later when Phraates sent his four sons to live in Rome. After the death of Tigranes (c. 6 B.C.) struggles in Armenia enhanced Parthian influence there, so that later Augustus decided to send out his grandson, the young prince Gaius Caesar. When Gaius in A.D. 1 met Phraataces, the new king of Parthia who had succeeded his father Phraates, on the Euphrates, agreement was once more reached between the two Powers, and Roman influence in Armenia was again recognized. But internal dynastic troubles developed in Parthia and in Armenia where Roman influence was weakened. If Augustus thus failed to establish stable Roman control over Armenia by these indirect means, he had at any rate pursued a prudent policy: considerations of prestige precluded the complete abandonment of Armenia, while its annexation would have involved further advance eastwards and fresh commitments, and at the same time it would have provoked Parthia. In his Parthian policy he had achieved a diplomatic success sufficient to silence the earlier Roman demands for war and to provide security for the eastern provinces. When the recovered Roman standards were placed in the new temple of Mars Ultor, dedicated in 2 B.C. in his new Forum, Augustus may well have felt that a policy of compromise had been justified.
The military defence of the East, on which all these diplomatic moves rested, was based on the province of Syria, to which eastern Cilicia had been added. Its governorship ranked highest of all the imperial provinces. Its normal garrison was four legions, stationed in the northern part, whence they could turn to the Euphrates, Armenia or Asia Minor; the south of the province could be watched by client-rulers in Emesa, Ituraea and Judaea. As the legions were
quartered in or near cities rather than in more remote fortresses, discipline tended to suffer. The towns of Syria, as Tyre, Berytus (where there was a colony of veterans) and Antioch (a legionary centre), were wealthy and prosperous.
Judaea was left in the hands of Herod the Great who had started his reign in 37 B.C. (see p. 141).10 On the material level he did much for his country, which thanks to the continued favour of Augustus was enlarged by the inclusion of Ituraea and other districts (23 and 20 B.C.). He enforced order, developed the economic resources, built a new port (named Caesarea in the emperor’s honour), refortified Jerusalem and started rebuilding the Temple, refounded several cities including Samaria-Sebaste, and in general tried to enhance the standing of his country at home and abroad. But by behaving as a Hellenistic monarch and by promoting the hellenization of his realm he won the bitter hatred of the orthodox Jews (he himself was a dissenting Jew, an Idumaean). He had therefore to impose his rule by force, by crushing the old nobility, by employing secret police and mercenary troops, by building a chain of dominating fortresses, and by developing a centralized bureaucracy. Further, he offended not only the religious but also the nationalistic feelings of many of his subjects: he was ‘Philocaesar’, the friend of the Roman oppressor. This friendship, however, was later jeopardized by the cruelty which he showed in his domestic quarrels; this offended Augustus, who was further annoyed when in 9 B.C. Herod attacked the Nabataeans.
From the Gracchi to Nero: A History of Rome from 133 B.C. to A.D. 68 Page 34