7 RABIRIUS. See Hardy, op. cit., 99 ff., also L. Havas, Acta Classica Debrecen, 1976, 19 ff.; E. J. Phillips, Klio, 1974, 87 ff. [p. 93]
8 THE CATILINARIAN CONSPIRACY. For a discussion of the various problems see Hardy, The Catilinarian Conspiracy (1924 = JRS, 1917, 153–228); Rice Holmes, RR, 455 ff. See also N. Criniti, ‘Studi recenti su Catilina’, Aevum, 1967, 370 ff., Bibliografia Catilinaria (1971) and (on Catiline’s reputation) Contrib. Istit. stor. ant. Univ. S. Cu. Milan, 1975, 121 ff. Z. Yavetz, Historia, 1963, 485 ff., attributes Catiline’s failure to a dropping off of the support of the plebs, especially shopkeepers, since the proposed abolition of debts was a temporary expedient rather than a basic social reform. K. H. Waters has argued (Historia, 1970, 195 ff.) that the Catilinarian affair has been grossly exaggerated, not least by Cicero, and that there is no real evidence for a planned coup before Catiline left Rome to prepare for an armed rising. R. Seager (Historia, 1973, 240 ff.) also thinks that Cicero presented as parts of a grand revolutionary scheme elements (the activities of Catiline himself, Manlius’ rising in Etruria and the doings of Lentulus and his confederates in Rome) which were in fact only loosely connected. In contrast to Waters and Seager, E. J. Phillips (Historia, 1976, 441 ff.) emphasizes the real danger from Catiline. C. R. Bradlem, Cl. Ph., 1978, 329 ff., regards Catiline’s slave followers as runaways, not recruits. [p. 93]
9 CICERO’S PRO MURENA. In the middle of these anxious days Cicero defended the consul-elect, L. Licinius Murena, who was accused of bribery; one of the prosecutors was Cato. Though Murena was guilty, Cicero argued that the state must have two consuls ready for the beginning of the next year in view of the dangers of the times, but he conducted the defence with a light touch; Murena was acquitted. Soon afterwards in 62 Cicero defended P. Sulla on a charge of complicity with Catiline, and also helped to vindicate the claim of his teacher Archias to Roman citizenship. [p. 93]
10 CICERO’S EXECUTION OF THE CONSPIRATORS. For a discussion of some of the legal issues involved see H. Last, JRS, 1943, 93 ff., who also draws attention to Sallust’s references to threats to release the prisoners by force, which may well have affected the question of their fate and help to explain the Senate’s backing for Cicero’s quick action. T. N. Mitchell (Historia, 1971, 47 ff.) discusses Cicero’s attitude to the Senatus consultum ultimum and concludes that this measure was designed to substitute in time of danger, the sovereignty of the Senate for that of individuals. [p. 94]
11 POMPEY AND NEPOS. Nepos, whose brother Metellus Celer was Pompey’s brother-in-law, had been Pompey’s legate in the East and now represented his interests in Rome. Nepos’ mission and the resultant events are regarded by C. Meier, Athenaeum, 1962, 103 ff., as decisive for Pompey’s future. Cf. also E. J. Parrish, Phoenix, 1973, 387 ff. [p. 95]
12 PERSONAL AMBITION. On this see C. Wirzubski, Libertas as a Political Idea (1950), esp. 64 f. A treatise on kingship by the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus (preserved on papyrus at Herculaneum) was dedicated to Piso, consul in 58. It advocates moderation in rule and its message was presumably directed to the principes viri of this period. See Oswyn Murray, JRS, 1965, 161 ff. (173 ff. for its political purpose). [p. 95]
13 OTIUM CUM DIGNITATE. On the meaning and history of this slogan see C. Wirszubski, JRS, 1954, 1 ff.; J. P. V. D. Balsdon, Cl. Qu., 1960, 46 ff. [p. 95]
13a THE CLODIUS AFFAIR. See J. P. V. D. Balsdon, Historia, 1966, 65 ff., and on bribery at the trial T. Loposko, Athenaeum, 1978, 288 ff. [p. 96]
14 ASIATIC TAX CONTRACT. See J. P. V. D. Balsdon, JRS, 1962, 135 ff. [p. 96]
15 THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE. On its crucial importance see R. Syme, The Roman Revolution (1939), ch. i, who adopts the same starting point as Pollio, in this outstanding study of the period from 60 B.C. to A.D. 14. Cf. also the remarks of C. Wirszubski, Libertas, 74 ff. The date of the formation of the triumvirate is uncertain. All sources (except Suetonius) place at least a limited agreement between Caesar and Pompey before the elections of 60, though the full agreement of the three men may have been later in the year. Cf. Rice Holmes, RR, i, 474 ff. G. Zecchini, Rendi. Ist. Lomb, 1975, 399 ff., attributes the agreement to Caesar and to two stages, before and after the elections of 60. G. R. Stanton and B. A. Marshall, Historia, 1975, 205 ff., regard Pompey and Crassus as the moving spirits. On the career of Afranius see M. Malavolta, Miscell. Gr. e. Rom., 1977, 251 ff. [p. 97]
16 SILVAE CALLESQUE. Thus Suetonius (D. J., 19, 2), the sole source. This statement has been challenged by, e.g., J. P. V. D. Balsdon, JRS, 1939, 180 ff., as a misunderstanding for Italy, but is widely accepted. Balsdon’s view is supported further by P. J. Rhodes, Historia, 1978, 617 ff.: Italy was declared a token province to allow the Senate more time to assess the threat of danger from Gaul. [p. 97]
17 CAESAR’S LEGISLATION. The order and dating of his measures are uncertain, but probably the agrarian law came before the lex Vatinia; the first measure may have been carried by the end of January, the lex Campana near the end of May. For a discussion see L. R. Taylor, AJP, 1951, 254 ff., and (for a revised view) Historia, 1968, 173 ff.; C. Meier, Historia, 1961, 19 ff.; J. Linderski, Historia, 1965, 423 ff. The lex Iulia de repetundis is dated Aug. or Sept. by S. I. Oost, AJP, 1956, 19 ff. R. E. Smith, Phoenix, 1964, 303 ff., regards Caesar’s first consulship as sealing the doom of the Republic. After attacking Caesar in edicts and pamphlets Bibulus adopted more obstructive tactics, designed to prevent business in the Comitia and to thwart Caesar; these consisted in shutting himself up at home and announcing that he was ‘observing the sky’ for omens. But, as pointed out by A. W. Lintott, Violence in Republican Rome (1968), 144 f., an announcement of an omen, to be valid, had to be made in person and therefore Bibulus’ servatio from his house could technically be ignored by Caesar and did not invalidate the latter’s acta. On attempts to make Caesar respect the auspices see C. Meier, Museum Helveticum, 1975, 197 ff. On the chronology of Caesar’s legislation see further, R. Seager, Pompey (1979), 190 ff. [p. 98]
18 VATINIUS. On his career see L. G. Pocock, A Commentary on Cicero In Vatinium, an invective which Cicero delivered in 56 when he was defending P. Sestius (a quaestor of 63 who had helped him against Catiline); Vatinius was a witness against Sestius. In 59 Cicero unsuccessfully defended his former consular colleague Antonius when charged with extortion (the speech is not extant) and successfully defended L. Flaccus (speech extant). [p. 98]
19 THE VETTIUS AFFAIR. See esp. Cicero, Ad Att. ii, 24. Much remains obscure. Vettius tried to implicate various members of the aristocracy, e.g. Lucullus, Bibulus and Brutus, but it is improbable that there was any serious plan to murder Pompey; Vettius himself was imprisoned and died there. It is unlikely that Caesar employed him; possibly Vatinius did, as Cicero later alleged; more probably he was a free-lance. That Brutus was involved is unlikely, but the inclusion of his name is interesting and would have made the alleged plot more plausible since he was known, perhaps as early as this, to have Republican sympathies: about this date he was mint-master and issued coins with the head of Libertas and the inscription LIBERTAS, which at any rate will have been a criticism of the triumvirs (see E. A. Sydenham, CRR, n. 906; Crawford, RRC, n. 433). Cf. P. A. Brunt, Cl. Qu., 1953, 62 ff.; L. R. Taylor, Cl. Qu., 1954, 181 ff.; C. Meier, Historia, 1961, 88 ff.; R. Seager, Latomus, 1965, 525 ff. [p. 98]
20 CLODIUS. A general assessment of his career is given by A. W. Lintott, Gr. and R., 1967, 157 ff., while E. S. Gruen, Phoenix, 1966, 120 ff., also argues for Clodius’ considerable independence of the triumvirs. On the support which Clodius received from his clientela in the East see E. Rawson, Historia, 1973, 219 ff. On Clodius and Cicero see W. K. Lacey, Antichthon, 1974, 85 ff., and W. M. F. Rundell, Historia, 1979, 301 ff. On the collegia see J. M. Flambard, Mélanges d’arch., 1977, 115 ff. [p. 99]
21 CYPRUS AND CATO. See S. I. Oost, Cl. Ph., 1955, 98 ff.; E. Badian, JRS, 1965, 110 ff. Needing money for his corn dole, Clodius proposed that Cyprus should be annexed. Since Cyprus was to be added to Cilicia, the task was to be given to Gab
inius, but the latter was transferred to Syria and so Cato went to Cyprus with a specific financial commission. When joined to Cilicia it received its lex provinciae from P. Lentulus Spinther, the first governor of the united province. Badian, Rom. Imperialism in late Rep., 77, denounces the annexation of Cyprus as ‘this most disgraceful act of Roman imperialism apart from the Gallic War’. [p. 100]
22 CICERO’S DE DOMO SUA. See the edition by R. G. Nisbet (1936). Clodius attacked Cicero again in 56 about the rebuilding of his house, to which Cicero replied in De haruspicum responsis: n. 19, 40, where the haruspices warn that dissensions among the nobles may lead to one man rule (a reference to Pompey and Messius). [p. 100]
23 CICERO PRO SESTIO. Cf. n. 18 above. In this speech Cicero attacked Caesar’s agents, Vatinius and Clodius and tried to rally all loyal citizens to defend the constitution. On Cicero and the lex Campana see M. Cary, Cl. Qu., 1923, 103 ff. On the politics of 57–55 see J. F. Lazenby, Latomus, 1959, 67 ff. On an attempt by a tribune, probably Antistius Vetus, to prosecute Caesar, probably early in 56, see E. Badian, Polis and Imperium (ed. J. A. S. Evans, 1974), 145 ff. [p. 101]
23a LUCA. On the conference and its political background see E. S. Gruen, Historia, 1969, 71 ff., C. Luibheid, Cl. Ph., 1970, 88 ff. and J. Jackson, Liverpool Class. Monthly, 1978. 173 ff. For a presentation of the view that Luca was less a planned summit meeting of the big three than a hastily arranged get-together, Crassus probably being absent and his interests represented by Caesar, see R. Seager, Pompey (1979), 122 ff. [p. 101]
24 CICERO IN 56–4. For his palinode see ad Atticum, 4, 5. For the De provinciis consulari-bus see the edition by H. E. Butler and M. Cary (1924). Earlier in 56 Cicero had successfully defended a brilliant young man M. Caelius Rufus, who had supplanted the poet Catullus as the lover of the notorious Clodia, Clodius’ sister, and now discarded in turn was being accused by her of attempted poisoning: for Cicero’s Pro Caelio see the edition by R. G. Austin (1960). In his Pro Balbo, delivered in defence of Balbus’ claim to citizenship later in 56, Cicero praised Pompey. In 55 Cicero in the Senate bitterly attacked Caesar’s father-in-law L. Calpurnius Piso (cos. 58) charging him with peculation and mis-government in Macedonia. Cicero’s In Pisonem has been edited by R. G. M. Nisbet (1961). The (probably pseudo-) Sallustian Oration in Ciceronem is a reply. With less pleasure, and under pressure from Caesar, in 54 Cicero was forced to defend Vatinius, who was being prosecuted under a law carried by Crassus against bribery and the misuse of political clubs (sodalicia) for political purposes. Pompey insisted that Cicero should defend Gabinius, who had restored Ptolemy to Egypt, had been acquitted on a charge of maiestas, and was now accused de repetundis; he was condemned. On Gabinius see E. M. Sanford, TAPA, 1939, 64 ff.; E. Badian, Philologus, 1959, 87 ff. On the role of amicitia in the career of Gabinius see R. S. Williams, Phoenix, 1978, 195 ff., and on his trials in 54 B.C. see E. Fantham, Historia, 1975, 475 ff. Cicero also defended, with greater success, C. Rabirius Postumus, who had acted as Ptolemy’s finance minister. Cicero also started writing in 54 his great study of political theory, De Re Publica. On Caelius Rufus see M. Volponi, M. Celio rufo (Mem. dell’Ist. Lombardo, 1971). On Cicero’s relations with Milo see A. W. Lintott, JRS, 1974, 62 ff. [p. 102]
25 THE TERMINAL DATE OF CAESAR’S COMMAND. See especially Cicero, ad. fam. iii, 8, 4–9; 11, 3; ad. Att. vii, 7, 6; 9, 3. The precise date of the end of the command (the legis dies) is obviously of little importance in itself, but it becomes of vital importance because of the principle behind it, namely that Caesar wanted to step straight from his proconsular command to office in Rome, while his opponents hoped that for a short time he would become a private citizen and thus be exposed to prosecution. A vast literature has grown up on this question, from Mommsen’s paper on Die Rechtsfrage onwards. For a summary discussion see How and Clark, Cicero, Select Letters (1926), appendix v; cf. Rice Holmes, RR, ii, 199 ff. More recent discussions include F. B. Marsh (The Founding of the Roman Empire, 1927, pp. 275 ff.) who puts it at 1 March 50; F. E. Adcock (Cl. Qu., 1932, 14 ff.) and C. A. Gianelli (Ann. Sc. Norm. Pisa, 1966, 107 ff.) 13 Nov. 50; C. E. Stevens (AJP, 1938, 169 ff.) between July and Oct. 50; J. P. V. D. Balsdon (JRS, 1939, 57 ff and 167 ff.) argues that no such day was laid down by law; G. Elton (JRS, 1946, 18 ff.) discusses these views and returns to Mommsen’s belief in 28 Feb. 49. See also R. Sealey, Cl. Med., 1957, 75 ff., P. J. Cuff, Historia, 1958, 445 ff.; H. Gesche, Chiron, 1973, 179 ff.; D. Stockton, Historia, 1975, 232 ff. (1 March 50); K. Bringmann, Chiron, 1978, 345 ff.; R. Seager, Pompey, (1979), 193 ff., a summary, in line with Balsdon. [p. 103]
25a CICERO IN CILICIA. See M. Wistrand, Cicero Imperator. Studies in Cicero’s Correspondence 51–47 BC (1979). [p. 103]
26 CURIO. See W. K. Lacey (Historia, 1961, 318 ff.) who believes that Curio was not bribed to support Caesar and that he proposed a special commission for roads (Cic. ad. fam. 8. 6. 1) to enable Caesar to withdraw from Gaul in peace without a consulship. On the tribunes that supported Caesar see K. Rauflaub, Chiron, 1974, 293 ff. [p. 104]
27 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CIVIL WAR. On Caesar’s dignitas see Caesar, Bellum Civile, 1, 9, 2 (cf. 1, 7, 7. Cic. ad Att. 7, 11, 1). Cf. K. Rauflaub, Dignitatis Contentio. Studien zur Motivation und politischen Taktik im Burgerkrieg zwischen Caesar und Pompeius (1974). On Pompey see Tacitus, Hist. 2, 38, 1. Cicero admits that both Pompey and Caesar strove for their own aggrandizement: ad Att. 7, 3, 4; 8, 11, 2. For further discussion cf. C. Wirszubski, Libertas, 77 ff.; R. Syme, Roman Revolution, 47 ff. On the motives that drove Pompey to war see L. G. Pocock, Gr. and R., 1959, 68 ff. For lists of nobiles and members of other senatorial families that supported Caesar, Pompey or remained neutral see D. R. Shackleton Bailey, Cl. Qu., 1960, 253 ff.; H. Bruhns, Caesar und die römische Obersicht in Jahren 49–44 v. Chr. Untersuchungen zur Herrschaftsestablierung im Burgerkrieg (1978). [p. 104]
28 PARTHIA AND CRASSUS. On Parthia see W. W. Tarn, CAH, IX, ch. xiv; N. C. Debevoise, A Political History of Parthia (1938); M. A. R. Colledge, The Parthians (1967); on the cavalry, W. W. Tarn, Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments (1930), 73 ff. A Chinese historian of the first century A.D. describes some historical paintings which show troops attacking a city in Turkestan; some of the defenders are drawn up in a formation with interlocked shields resembling the Roman testudo. H. H. Dubs (A Roman City in Ancient China, 1957; cf. Gr. and R., 1957, 137 ff.) believes that these men may represent some of the survivors of Carrhae who escaped from the Parthians and took service first with the Hun Jzh-Jzh, whose capital on the Talass River, east of the Jaxartes, was captured, despite the help of the Romans, by the Chinese leader Ch’en T’ang (36 B.C.). They then passed to the service of Ch’en who settled them in a frontier city to which the Chinese gave their name for Rome, Li-jien. D. Timpe (Museum Helveticum, 1962, 194 ff.) has discussed the influence of Carrhae on later Roman policy towards Parthia and upon Roman internal politics. [p. 106]
CHAPTER VII
1 SOURCES FOR 49–44 B.C. The writers are in general those mentioned in note 1 to ch. VI: Appian (BC, ii, 32–117), Dio Cassius (41–44), Cicero (Pro Marcello, Pro Ligario, of 46 B.C. and Pro Rege Deiotaro of 45; Letters, nos. 301–698 in Tyrell and Purser), the Corpus Caesarianum (cf. n. 8), Livy’s Periochae (109–16), Velleius Paterculus (2. 49–57). Plutarch, Suetonius. To these are added Epistulae ad Caesarem (see n. 20 below) and Lucan’s Pharsalia (see p. 300). See also notes 5 and 8 below. Coins (cf. n. 16 and 28) and inscriptions (cf. n. 11, 21, 23) are important. [p. 107]
2 BUREBISTAS. See V. Parvan, Dacia, ch. v. [p. 107]
3 PRE-ROMAN GAUL. See Caesar, Bell. Gall., esp. 6, 13–20; Diodorus, 5, 21–2; 25–32; Strabo, 4. The fundamental modern work is still C. Jullian, Histoire de le Gaule, II (4th ed., 1921). See also A. Grenier, Les Gaulois (1945) and T. G. E. Powell, The Celts (1958). For accounts of recent work on Gaul of all periods see R. Lantier, JRS, 1946, 76 ff.; P-M. Duval, Historia, v, 1956, 238 ff. Cf. M. Pobé, The Art of Roman Gaul (1961). [p. 108]
4 DRUIDS. See T. D. Kendr
ick, The Druids (1927); Stuart Piggott, The Druids (1968). [p. 108]
5 CAESAR’S GALLIC CAMPAIGNS. The chief source is Caesar’s own Commentaries De Bello Gallico in seven books, each dealing with one year, to which his staff-officer Hirtius added an eighth book covering the years 51–50 and thus linking with Caesar’s own De Bello Civili. Other sources add little. Commentaries were not strictly historia but rather formed the material for future historians, though Caesar brought great literary skill to their composition. They were based on the despatches that he sent back every year to the Senate in Rome. The date of their composition and publication offer many problems. Some believe that they were published annually, or in small groups of Commentaries in order to influence public opinion in Rome, while others suppose them to have been published as a single work about 51 with a view in part to future elections. On these questions see the recent discussion by Sir Frank E. Adcock, Caesar as a Man of Letters (1956), esp. 77 ff. An even more important question is that of their accuracy. This has been impeached in modern times on grounds of political misrepresentation or the glossing over of military errors. It is too much to suppose that any man can ever achieve complete and absolute objectivity, and it would be naïve to suppose that Caesar has written the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Nevertheless his work has stood up well to critical attacks and its essential trustworthiness is beyond question. An extreme, and as some would think in itself a tendentious, criticism of Caesar’s veracity is found in a recent work by M. Rambaud, L’Art de la déformation historique dans les commentaires de César (1953): for a criticism of this see J. P. V. D. Balsdon, JRS, 1955, 161 ff. and cf. Gr. and R., 1957, 19 ff. A further attack on Caesar’s reliability, especially in Book 1 and in his account of the Germans (4 and 6) is made by G. Walser, Caesar und die Germanen (1956), but on this see A. N. Sherwin-White, JRS, 1958, 188 ff. Modern works on Caesar’s campaigns include C. Jullian, Hist. de la. Gaule, III (2nd ed. 1920); T. Rice Holmes, Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul2 (1911); L. A. Constans, Guide illustré des campagnes de César en Gaule (1929); C. Jullian (ed. P. M. Duval), Vercingetorix (1963). D. Timpe, Historia, 1965, 189 ff., views Caesar’s policy in the context of Roman tradition, but E. Badian, Roman Imperialism in the late Rep., 89 ff., emphasizes the vast financial profits made by Caesar, for which ‘in some cases, the opportunity had been deliberatley sought and created’ (p. 77): Caesar is ‘the greatest brigand of them all’ (per contra, for the non-imperialist view of Caesar see A. N. Sherwin-White, Gr. and R., 1957, 36 ff.). [p. 109]
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