The Chinese Must Go

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by Beth Lew-Williams


  any trou ble with white businesses. He explained to the interviewer, “I know

  where they treat Chinese all right,— then I go. I stay away from other places.”

  Some businesses, spaces, and towns were open to Chinese and others were

  not. Armed with local knowledge, these men believed they could tell the

  difference. Scholars have found no such clarity, peering at these local en-

  counters from the distance of a century or more.97

  Repeal and Regrets

  As Amer ica entered the twentieth century, its policy of exclusion expanded

  before it contracted. First, the United States slowly shifted from a policy of

  Chinese exclusion to one of Asian exclusion. In the winter of 1907–1908, the

  United States negotiated Japa nese restriction through a series of confidential

  diplomatic notes known as the Gentlemen’s Agreement. Under the threat of

  unilateral exclusion, the Japa nese government agreed to prevent the migra-

  tion of Japa nese and Korean workers to the United States unless the laborers

  had immediate family in Amer ica.98 In 1917, the United States unilaterally

  excluded all mi grants from the “Asiatic barred zone,” which included India,

  Burma, Thailand, Asiatic Rus sia, the Malay states, the East Indian Islands,

  the Polynesian Islands, and parts of Arabia and Af ghan i stan. Following an

  emergency stopgap in 1921, Congress passed the nation’s first comprehensive

  immigration law in 1924, the National Origins Act (also known as the

  Johnson- Reed Act), which instituted quotas for all Eu ro pean immigrants

  and excluded the vast majority of Asians as “aliens ineligible to citizenship.”

  In 1934, Congress went so far as to bar Filipinos with the Tydings- McDuffie

  Act, despite their formal status as U.S. nationals.99

  The United States began to dismantle Asian exclusion in the mid- twentieth

  century, when World War II and the Cold War shifted geopolitics in the

  Pacific. China became an essential American ally in the fight against Japan

  during World War II. In an effort to undermine this military alliance, Japan

  began propaganda campaigns in the Pacific, which highlighted Chinese ex-

  232 EXCLUSION

  clusion as evidence of American racism and hy poc risy. Fearing this tactic

  would undermine Chinese morale, President Franklin D. Roo se velt urged

  Congress to repeal exclusion for the “cause of winning the war and of estab-

  lishing a secure peace.” In response, Congress passed the Magnuson Act of

  1943, which repealed Chinese exclusion, allowed China an annual quota of

  105 immigrants, and permitted legal Chinese residents to naturalize.100

  The confluence of geopo liti cal pressure and domestic activism led to the

  demise of the remaining Asian exclusion laws. In 1946, the Luce- Cel er Act

  extended naturalization privileges to Asian Indians and Filipinos and granted

  each nation an annual quota of one hundred immigrants. Comprehensive im-

  migration reform began in 1952 with the Immigration and Nationality Act

  (also known as the McCarran- Walter Act) which ended racial prerequisites for

  naturalization and extended annual quotas to all nations, including those in

  Asia. The law, however, still contained vestiges of Asian exclusion. While Eu-

  ro pean immigrants were subject to quotas based on their nation of origin,

  Asian immigrants were subject to quotas defined by racial ancestry. Whether

  a person hailed from China or Canada, a Chinese was always a Chinese under

  the law. In 1965, the amended Immigration and Nationality Act (or the Hart-

  Cel er Act) fi nal y ended this racial y based quota system. The new law gave

  preference to family reunification and skil ed migration, but granted the same

  number of preference visas to every sending nation while capping the totals by

  hemi sphere. This act, along with legislation al owing war brides and refugees,

  dramatical y expanded the number of Asian immigrants and Asian Americans

  in the United States. Recent immigration rates have made Asian Ameri-

  cans the nation’s fastest growing ethnic group in the twenty- first century.101

  Though Chinese exclusion is no more, its consequences live on. These dis-

  criminatory laws transformed the Chinese American communities in ways

  that cannot be undone, although the United States has occasionally tried.

  The federal government temporarily offered status adjustment between 1956

  and 1965 to Chinese mi grants who were willing to confess their unauthor-

  ized status and report on family and friends in similar situations. The Con-

  fession Program, designed to root out communists, brought 30,530 Chinese

  out of the shadows. Many other unauthorized Chinese, fearful of the gov-

  ernment’s intent, opted not to regularize. To this day, there are Chinese in

  Amer i ca who live with the weight of an unlawful border crossing made

  during the Exclusion Period.102

  AFTERLIVES UNDER EXCLUSION

  233

  Chinese Americans with direct familial connections to exclusion, how-

  ever, are in the minority. Less than 10 percent of Chinese Americans today

  can trace their lineage back three generations in Amer i ca. This, too, is a

  legacy of American gatekeeping. Through exclusion, deportation, and de-

  terrence, U.S. immigration law split up Chinese families for over six de cades,

  stunting subsequent generations and creating a lasting absence.103

  In 2011 and 2012, at the urging of Chinese American community groups,

  both houses of Congress unanimously passed resolutions of regret for Chinese

  exclusion. It was only the fourth such expression to date, following resolu-

  tions on the enslavement and segregation of African Americans, internment

  of Japa nese Americans, and conquest of the Hawaiian Islands. The Senate

  version declared deep regret for:

  The enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act and related discriminatory

  laws that—

  (1) resulted in the persecution and po liti cal alienation of persons

  of Chinese descent;

  (2) unfairly limited their civil rights;

  (3) legitimized racial discrimination; and

  (4) induced trauma that persists within the Chinese community.

  Congress’s resolutions of regret represent a profound act of recognition. For

  a moment, which later proved fleeting, American policymakers came together

  to confront the racism that underwrote the nation’s policy of exclusion.104

  Reflecting on the passage of the Senate resolution, Senator Patrick Leahy

  (D- VT) voiced his hopes that it would “mark a step in the Senate’s pro gress

  toward greater commitment to protecting the civil and constitutional rights

  of all Americans, regardless of race or ethnicity.”105 No doubt many mem-

  bers of Congress shared this egalitarian sentiment. His rhe toric, however,

  glosses over the fact that most Chinese who faced discrimination under

  exclusion were not “Americans.” They were aliens. Congress’s declaration of

  regret reaffirmed its commitment to equal protection for all U.S. citizens,

  but it sidestepped a critical question that the history of exclusion raises: What

  rights can an alien claim in modern Amer ica?

  In the nineteenth century, the “heathen Chinaman” formed the social

  and legal basis for
modern American alienage, but the category itself and its

  234 EXCLUSION

  profound significance has far outlived him. To date, the Supreme Court has

  not extended the same constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due

  pro cess to aliens in matters of immigration. Plenary power continues to en-

  able the federal government to restrict migration based on nationality and

  class routinely, and, potentially, to bar aliens based on religion and race as

  well. In the twenty- first century, many aliens can be summarily removed

  without a court hearing and those who do stand before a judge have no guar-

  antee of government- appointed counsel.106 Inevitably, these legal disadvan-

  tages have bled into the social realm. Immigrants, especially those deemed

  undesirable or unlawful, occupy a particularly vulnerable space in Amer i-

  ca’s neighborhoods, workplaces, and imagined community. If the history of

  Chinese exclusion teaches us about the perils of racial discrimination, it

  should also warn us about the dangerous inequalities produced by alienage.

  EPILOGUE

  The Modern American Alien

  “A TOLERANCE OF foreign faces, garbs, and tongues is, perhaps, the birth-

  right of citizens of New- York,” opined the editors of the New York Times in

  1890. On the streets of the “polyglot city,” Americans, Germans, Dutch,

  British, and Irish now regularly mixed with the people of Scandinavia, Bo-

  hemia, Armenia, Japan, Rus sia, and China. But even when surrounded by

  other foreigners, “the Chinese within our gates” seemed “more alien than

  any” according to the paper. And it was not only among immigrants that

  the Chinese stood out. “The black man and the red man are better liked,”

  commented the editors. “With the proper care and teaching, with fair treat-

  ment as citizens, the red and black assimilate and become of us, to the

  extent that we are willing they should.” “Not so the Chinaman,” concluded

  the Times. “The Chinese are not to be digested.”1

  In retrospect, the making of the Chinese alien looks peculiar against

  the larger backdrop of late- nineteenth- century Amer i ca. With the end of

  the Civil War, after all, came a dramatic expansion of U.S. citizenship to

  people who stood outside the traditional bounds of whiteness. The 1866 Civil

  Rights Act and Fourteenth Amendment made Amer ica’s former slaves into

  citizens by virtue of their birth on American soil. Though these mea sures

  still excluded “Indians not taxed,” Congress began, in piecemeal fashion, to

  extend citizenship to rising numbers of Native Americans in the de cades

  that followed. In part, the postbellum reconfiguration of formal citizen-

  ship was driven by pragmatic concerns. In the South, African American

  citizenship helped dismantle the former Confederacy, and in the West, Native

  American citizenship accelerated the dispossession of tribal lands. But lofty

  235

  236

  THE CHINESE MUST GO

  ideals of racial inclusion also played a vital role. Radical Republicans envi-

  sioned a state- guided pro cess of assimilation and incorporation that would

  enfold the “black” and “red” races into the nation and its polity. Through

  the reconstruction of the South and the West, the federal government

  would mold these “uncivilized” peoples into worthy citizens. Federal proj ects

  of prolonged naturalization could be coercive or even violent, but envi-

  sioned a more inclusive Amer ica.2

  Why, then, did Chinese exclusion and the modern American alien emerge

  at this time? Looking back on this turn toward racial liberalism, the treat-

  ment of the Chinese may appear anomalous. But in fact, these histories of

  rigid exclusion and radical inclusion are two sides of the same coin. The post-

  bellum period saw both the creation of the modern American citizen and

  the modern American alien, a synchrony that was not coincidental. There

  could be no substantive concept of alienage in American law and society be-

  fore there was a meaningful concept of citizenship. And it was only after

  the Civil War that the national citizen was born.

  Of course, there were both citizens and aliens in the antebellum period, but

  at that time citizenship and alienage played only a minor role in defining a

  person’s rights and status within society. This was due, in part, to the frag-

  mentary nature of citizenship in the early nineteenth century and, even more

  so, to the many competing forms of social membership available. Since the

  Constitution had not created a single, formal, undifferentiated notion of na-

  tional citizenship, states reserved the right to grant citizenship and enu-

  merate its privileges. This resulted in diverse and disparate civil rights, many

  of which ended at the state border. In addition, local and state jurisdictions

  recognized many other forms of social membership from which individuals

  derived their rights, privileges, and duties. An individual’s status was based

  on sex, race, freedom, property, marital status, church affiliation, state of resi-

  dence, and more. With these many forms of membership came many forms

  of exclusion. Instead of a national gate separating Americans from foreigners,

  there were internal fences dividing masters from slaves, men from women,

  parents from children, property holders from the landless, and New Yorkers

  from Rhode Islanders.3

  This convoluted system of membership did not stop all attempts at gate-

  keeping. Since the founding of the nation, nativist movements and immi-

  EPILOGUE

  237

  gration laws had targeted small groups of Eu ro pe ans and Africans for ex-

  clusion and expulsion. This regulation of migration was left primarily to the

  states in the early nineteenth century. As an outgrowth of colonial poor laws,

  states developed systems to exclude and remove paupers and other “undesir-

  ables.” Often, these state regulations targeted aliens, but they also removed

  citizens born in other states. In addition, southern states often regulated the

  entry of free blacks ( whether or not they were born in Amer ica) in order to

  preserve the institution of slavery. This produced a splintered system of state

  gatekeeping, which policed the movement of aliens as well as that of citi-

  zens, free blacks, and slaves.4

  Other than the regulation of the slave trade, the only federal laws to re-

  strict immigration before 1882 were the Alien Enemies and Alien Friends

  Acts of 1798. The former affected enemy aliens solely during times of war,

  but the latter allowed the federal government to expel any alien based on

  suspicions of danger. Though a clear precursor to Chinese exclusion, the

  highly controversial Alien Friends Act was never enforced, quickly expired,

  and left little judicial trace.5 Other attempts to federalize border control were

  blocked by southern statesmen. In order to preserve their ability to regulate

  the movement of slaves and free blacks, southerners consistently fought fed-

  eral intervention in matters of migration. Therefore, on the eve of the Civil

  War, the United States lacked consolidated notions of citizenship, alienage,

  and national gatekeeping.


  The aftermath of the Civil War spurred dramatic changes in the regulation

  of aliens and citizens in the United States. With the Thirteenth Amendment’s

  emancipation of slaves in 1865 came the end of southern re sis tance to feder-

  alized border control. No longer was there such a strong incentive for the

  southern states to claim the power to regulate the movement of people. And

  with the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of equal protection in 1868 came

  increased judicial scrutiny of state regulations. In the years following, judi-

  cial decisions found that the states had little right to police the movement

  of citizens and aliens. These legal and po liti cal shifts paved the way for the

  federal government to take control of national gatekeeping.

  The postbellum era also marked a transformation of U.S. citizenship. Not

  only did Congress extend citizenship to more people, but it also imbued

  the idea of citizenship with new meaning. For the first time, Congress

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  THE CHINESE MUST GO

  defined a singular form of national citizenship, granted citizens certain rights

  and immunities, and pledged federal protection of these civil rights. Con-

  stitutional amendments did not bring actual equality in law or practice— sex,

  race, class, and ability continued to influence one’s legal and social status— but

  they provided the theoretical outlines of modern citizenship. To forever pro-

  tect Americans from slavery or other abuses by the states, Congress enshrined

  in the Constitution the rights- bearing citizen who lives on to this day.6

  Once the federal government began to fashion the national citizenry, it

  was only a matter of time until it defined who would stand outside those

  ranks. The existence of the citizen demanded the concept of alien— and they

  developed in tandem.7 Though national citizenship had begun taking shape

  in the late 1860s, it was not immediately clear what alienage in modern Amer-

  i ca would entail. Who would be considered an alien and for how long?

  Which aliens would be allowed to enter the nation? What power did the

  government hold to exclude and expel unwanted aliens? What rights did an

  alien possess? Could unauthorized aliens claim those same rights? The Chi-

  nese were not Amer ica’s first aliens, but Amer ica first drafted national an-

 

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