The question of which side was responsible for the border violation on May 10–11 depends on whose interpretation of the border one accepts, since both sides claimed the territory between the Halha River and Nomonhan. However, nearly all the accounts agree that the actual fighting was initiated by the Manchukuoan forces. After May 13, the day on which the two client states notified their respective great-power patrons of the clash, the historical record is less ambiguous.
At midday on May 13, General Komatsubara was presiding over a conference he had convened specifically to discuss with his staff officers and regimental commanders the implications of the recently received Kwantung Army Operations Order 1488. Ironically, the first report of fighting at Nomonhan reached Komatsubara at the very moment he was discussing Major Tsuji’s new border principles. According to officers who were present, the general, “decided in a minute to destroy the invading Outer Mongolian forces,” in conformity with Order 1488.27
Komatsubara notified KwAHQ that afternoon of the incident at Nomonhan and of his intention to wipe out the intruders, requesting air support and trucks to facilitate his countermeasures. The prompt reply from Kwantung Army commander, General Ueda, approved of Komatsubara’s “positive attitude” and dispatched to the 23rd Division an air wing consisting of six scout planes, forty fighters, and ten light bombers as well as two antiaircraft batteries and two motorized transport companies. Ueda cautioned, however, “to take the most extreme caution not to let the matter become enlarged.”28 It is illustrative of the overheated atmosphere at KwAHQ that authorities there could recommend the destruction of a Mongolian army unit on territory claimed by the MPR while at the same time urging “extreme caution” lest the matter become enlarged. Apparently these were not seen as contradictory objectives.
On the same day, General Ueda sent a summary of Komatsubara’s initial report, together with Kwantung Army’s response, to AGS in Tokyo. The deputy chief of staff immediately radioed his reply that “it is expected that appropriate measures will be taken by Kwantung Army.” Thus, in spite of its reputation for rash action, Kwantung Army was left to its own initiative in the matter. Perhaps authorities in Tokyo felt that the strategic situation in the north, where Kwantung Army’s eight divisions faced approximately thirty Soviet divisions from Lake Baikal to Vladivostok, would compel the local forces to act “appropriately,” that is, with discretion. If so, their confidence was misplaced.
On May 14 Major Tsuji flew from KwAHQ and personally conducted an air reconnaissance flight over the Nomonhan area. He sighted about twenty horses but saw no enemy troops. However, upon landing he discovered what appeared to be a fresh bullet hole in the fuselage of the light scout plane. He correctly concluded that some MPR troops probably were still east of the Halha River and so informed the 23rd Division staff before returning to KwAHQ, where he reported to General Ueda that the Nomonhan incident seemed to be a small and unimportant one.29
Meanwhile, in accordance with the letter as well as the spirit of Kwantung Army’s new “Principles for the Settlement of Border Disputes,” General Komatsubara dispatched a force to expel the intruders. This force, led by Lieutenant Colonel Azuma Yaozo, consisted of an armored car reconnaissance company, two infantry companies, and a cavalry troop. The Azuma detachment reached Nomonhan on May 15 to learn that the bulk of the Outer Mongolian forces had withdrawn to the left bank of the Halha on the previous night, that very small elements still remained on the right bank, and that even they appeared about to withdraw. Nonetheless, Azuma began pursuit operations that afternoon. His advance from Nomonhan to the Halha made almost no contact with the enemy, which had retired across the river. A flight of Japanese light bombers, however, sighted a small enemy troop concentration on the left (west) bank of the Halha River and attacked. The target was MPR Border Outpost Number 7, which reported two men killed and fifteen wounded in the air raid. The Japanese flyers reported killing thirty to forty enemy troops. All accounts agree that the air attack was directed against troops west of the Halha River, indisputably within the territory of the Mongolian People’s Republic.30
When news of the events of May 15 reached General Komatsubara, he concluded that the Outer Mongolian intruders had been chastised appropriately and that the mission was completed. The Azuma detachment returned to Hailar on May 16. KwAHQ also considered the incident closed. Soviet authorities, however, took a different view.
The events in mid-May prompted Soviet action on behalf of the MPR. A Red Army force designated as the 57th Corps had been stationed in Mongolia for several years in accordance with the Soviet-MPR Mutual Defense Pact of 1936. At the time of the initial clashes, Corps commander Nikolai Feklenko and his chief of staff, A. M. Kushchev, were both away from headquarters, Feklenko on a hunting trip in the hinterland and Kushchev with his ailing wife in the Soviet city of Ulan Ude, north of the Soviet-MPR border. The Soviet High Command first learned of the clashes from international newspaper accounts based on Japanese/Manchukuoan press releases. Red Army chief of staff Boris Shaposhnikov’s angry call to 57th Corps demanding information caused a minor panic. Feklenko and Kushchev hurried back to Ulaanbaatar. They dispatched a mixed force—one battalion from 149th Infantry Regiment (36th Infantry Division) plus light armor and motorized artillery from the 11th Tank Brigade—to Tamsag Bulak, a staging area about eighty miles west of the Halha River. This force, commanded by Major A. E. Bykov, was ordered to support the Mongolian 6th Cavalry Division in securing the border. Bykov and the MPR cavalry commander, Colonel Shoaaiibuu, drove to the site of the clashes on May 15 and found that the Azuma detachment had left. The cavalry division was dispatched to the combat zone that day and arrived two days later, supported by Bykov’s force, which was ordered to stay west of the river and, if possible, to avoid being drawn into the skirmishing. Some MPR troops recrossed the Halha and took up positions between the river and Nomonhan, in the disputed territory. Combat resumed between MPR and Manchukuoan cavalry and gradually grew in intensity.31
When notified of the renewed hostilities, Komatsubara became angered by what he took as defiance by the enemy and a direct challenge to him as the area commander. Spurred on by Order 1488, the general resolved not merely to chase the intruders back across the river again.32 This time, by employing greater stealth and strength, he would encircle and destroy them. The incident was about to become enlarged.
The May 28 Battle
Although Kwantung Army considered itself an elite component of the Imperial Army, the 23rd Division, less than one year old, was a green unit that had not yet reached the level of training and élan characteristic of Kwantung Army. The 23rd Division staff officers, from the commander on down, shared a universal lack of significant combat experience. The division intelligence officer, Major Suzuki Yoshiyasu, a cavalryman, had no intelligence experience prior to joining the division. The senior line officers (regimental commanders) were experienced men, graduates of the military academy, but most company and platoon leaders were recently called-up reservists or youngsters one or two years out of the academy. When the brand-new division arrived in Manchukuo in August 1938, its base at Hailar had not been completed. Only half the division could be billeted there. Other division components were scattered in different locations. The division was not assembled in Hailar until November, by which time the onset of severe winter weather hampered large-scale training exercises. Unit commanders had not had enough time to get to know one another very well. This overall lack of experience, training, and cohesion would weigh heavily against the 23rd Division in the coming test at Nomonhan.33
From 1930 to 1937, the size of the Imperial Army had been fixed at seventeen divisions. But with the growing conflict in China, seven new divisions were created in 1938 and nine more in 1939. The demands of the China theater prevented properly equipping all these new units simultaneously. The 23rd Division, assigned to what was believed to be a quiescent backwater, was near the end of the queue. Until the late 1930s, Japanese army divisions were “rectangular,”
with a core of four infantry regiments. The 23rd Division was of the new “triangular” configuration, with three infantry regiments (64th, 71st, and 72nd). There were materiel deficiencies as well.
The 23rd Division’s area of operations was almost entirely flat, open country—tank country. The division had a transport regiment equipped with trucks. The reconnaissance regiment included a company of light tracked armored vehicles, “tankettes” with thin armor skin and a machine gun as its main armament. But overall, the division lacked the mobility and weaponry appropriate to the region. When the division deployed from Hailar to the Nomonhan area, the infantry marched the last fifty miles. Most of the artillery was horse drawn. Twenty-four of the division’s sixty artillery pieces were Type 38 short-range 75-mm guns. Dating from 1907, they were the oldest in the Imperial Army, in use in no other division. Each infantry regiment was allotted a battery of four rapid-fire 37-mm guns and four 75-mm mountain guns (circa 1908). The artillery regiment, in addition to the ancient Type 38s, had twelve 120-mm howitzers. The mountain guns and howitzers were high-angle, short-range weapons. The division had no high-velocity, low-trajectory guns appropriate to the terrain—and vital against tanks. The lack of antitank weapons was a critical weakness in a region so suited to armored warfare. Besides its rapid-fire guns, the division’s main antitank weapons were demolition charges and incendiary fire bombs (gasoline-filled bottles) that, in open country, required “human bullet” (i.e., suicidal) tactics to employ effectively.
The 23rd Division’s most valuable asset was its men, drawn mainly from Kyushu, the southernmost of Japan’s four main islands. For centuries Kyushu had been renowned for producing strong and resilient fighting men. The personnel of the 23rd Division were no exception. Deficiencies in training and equipment were partially offset by personal hardiness, fortitude, courage, and a strong sense of loyalty and honor. Moreover, the scope and intensity of the fighting at Nomonhan developed gradually, and Japanese-Manchukuoan forces in the early stages enjoyed numerical superiority over their Soviet-Mongolian adversaries.
The Soviet position was hampered by a major logistical problem. The nearest Soviet rail line was at Borzya, some four hundred miles west of the Halha River. From Borzya, supplies had to be transported by truck over dirt roads or no roads at all, through flat, open territory vulnerable to air attack. In contrast, the major northern Manchurian center of Hailar was two hundred miles from Nomonhan, while the Japanese railhead at Handagai was only fifty miles from the battle zone. Hailar and Handagai were connected to the Nomonhan area by three unpaved roads. Perhaps these facts, plus the rapidly developing Polish crisis, helped convince AGS and Kwantung Army officials that the Soviet Union would not risk a serious test at Nomonhan. In any case, General Komatsubara, with the approval of KwAHQ, decided on a policy of force to settle the bothersome Nomonhan incident.
When on May 20 Japanese reconnaissance discovered the Soviet infantry battalion and armor near Tamsag Bulak, Komatsubara decided to “nip the incident in the bud.” He formed a new, more-powerful strike force for this purpose, led by Colonel Yamagata Takemitsu, commander of the 64th Infantry Regiment. This new unit, the Yamagata detachment, was built around the four companies of the 3rd Battalion, 64th Regiment (approximately eight hundred men), a regimental gun company (three 75-mm mountain guns and four rapid-fire 37-mm guns), three truck companies, and Lieutenant Colonel Azuma’s reconnaissance group, composed of mounted cavalry and light motorized elements (220 men, a tankette, 2 sedans, and 12 trucks). Yamagata was also supported by some four hundred and fifty Manchukuoan troops in the area. With a total strength of approximately two thousand men, Colonel Yamagata was ordered to destroy all enemy forces east of the Halha River. The attack was scheduled for May 22–23.34
No sooner had General Komatsubara made this disposition then he received the following message from KwAHQ:
In settling the affair Kwantung Army has definite plans, as follows:
For the time being Manchukuoan Army troops will keep an eye on the Outer Mongolians operating near Nomonhan and will try to lure them onto Manchukuoan territory. Japanese forces at Hailar [23rd Division] will maintain surveillance over the situation. Upon verification of a border violation by the bulk of the Outer Mongolian forces, Kwantung Army will dispatch troops, contact the enemy, and annihilate him within friendly territory. According to this outlook it can be expected that enemy units will occupy border regions for a considerable period; but this is permissible from the overall strategic point of view (italics added).35
At this point, KwAHQ was urging tactical restraint in order to achieve an ultimately more decisive result. However, Komatsubara already had issued preliminary orders for Yamagata to launch his attack. Komatsubara radioed Hsinking that it would be “undignified” for him to cancel his order, meaning that he resented KwAHQ interference in his local command prerogatives no less than KwAHQ resented interference from AGS. However, Komatsubara added that, “out of deference to Kwantung Army’s feelings,” he would postpone the attack for a few days. The date was pushed back to May 27–28.36
Soviet air force units attached to the 57th Corps made several unsuccessful forays over the Halha River from May 17 to 21. Inexperienced Soviet pilots, flying obsolescent I-15 biplanes, fared poorly. At least nine and perhaps as many as seventeen Soviet fighters and scout planes were shot down. Defense Commissar Kliment Voroshilov ordered air operations suspended. This contributed to the tactical surprise achieved by the Japanese.37
Colonel Yamagata concentrated his force at the town of Kanchuerhmiao, situated roughly forty miles north of Nomonhan, and from there dispatched reconnaissance patrols to the Nomonhan area. His reconnaissance units soon reported that the enemy had constructed a bridge across the Halha River just above its junction with the smaller Holsten River. Two mixed groups of MPR and Soviet troops, about two hundred men each, were identified east of the Halha, on either side of the Holsten, as well as a small MPR position less than a mile west of Nomonhan. Yamagata decided to trap these enemy troops east of the Halha and destroy them there. His plan was to have the Azuma unit drive south along the east bank of the Halha River directly toward the bridge, cutting off the enemy’s escape route. The four infantry companies and the Manchukuoan troops, with artillery support, would attack individually from the west along different axes toward identified pockets of MPR troops, driving the enemy toward the river and the waiting Azuma unit. The enemy would be trapped between the Japanese forces east of the river, where they would be destroyed. Yamagata further ordered that after enemy forces east of the Halha had been destroyed, any remaining enemy elements on the west shore near the river—indisputably MPR territory—should be mopped up as quickly as possible.38 This complex battle plan would have been more than adequate to deal with the Outer Mongolian forces that had been engaged in the first few days of fighting. However, with striking lack of foresight, neither Komatsubara nor Yamagata took into account the possibility of encountering any of the Soviet army units that their reconnaissance had discovered at Tamsag Bulak on May 20.
In the predawn hours of May 28, the Yamagata detachment left Kanchuerhmiao for Nomonhan. The 220-man Azuma unit separated from the main body and began its southward thrust toward the bridge near the confluence of the Halha and Holsten Rivers to block the enemy’s presumed route of retreat. Unknown to Lieutenant Colonel Azuma, the bridge was defended not only by Mongolian light cavalry, but also by a Soviet infantry company, combat engineers, armored cars, and a battery of self-propelled 76-mm artillery. Before daybreak, the Soviet-MPR forces detected the approaching Azuma unit but remained ignorant of the disposition of the main body of the Yamagata detachment. The element of surprise would cut both ways in the coming action.
The core of Soviet-MPR forces near Nomonhan was Major Bykov’s infantry battalion, consisting of three motorized infantry companies, a company of sixteen BA-6 armored cars, a battery of four 76-mm self-propelled guns, a combat engineer company, and a reconnaissance platoon with five more armored
cars (total about 1,000 men). The 6th MPR Cavalry Division (about 1,250 men) comprised two small cavalry regiments, an artillery unit (four 76-mm guns), an armored car unit, and a training company. Major Bykov deployed his forces on a north-south axis with two of his infantry companies holding the northern and southern flanks and the Mongolian cavalry in the center—an odd configuration, since cavalry typically was positioned on the flanks rather than the center. These forces were strung out along a ten-mile front roughly parallel to the Halha River but well east of it, only a mile west of Nomonhan. Bykov held one infantry company, his combat engineers, and artillery in reserve near the bridge but on the west side of the Halha. Colonel Shoaaiibuu’s four 76-mm guns were also held west of the river to keep them from being bogged down in the sandy terrain on the east side.39
Map 4. Nomonhan, May 28–29
At the outset, the Japanese enjoyed numerical superiority and surprise at the point of attack, especially against the Mongolian cavalry. This was offset by several factors. Colonel Yamagata dispersed his force into at least five separate units, none of which was particularly strong. His complex attack plan required careful coordination, but radio communication between units broke down immediately because of chronic equipment failures. Most important was the Soviet advantage in fire power from their self-propelled artillery (plus the four MPR guns) and armored cars. The BA-6 armored car was not some 1930s version of a Brinks or Wells Fargo money carrier. It was a genuine armored fighting vehicle with the same turret as the T-26 tank, mounting a high-velocity 45-mm gun. Tracks could be installed over the two sets of dual rear wheels, giving it the off-road capability of a half-track. However, its speed (27 mph) and light weight (five tons) came at the expense of armor protection (9-mm, one-third of an inch) which could be penetrated by heavy machine gun fire at close range.
Nomonhan, 1939: The Red Army's Victory That Shaped World War II Page 14