by Ross, Hamish
On a fuel run Bokkie became a potential flying bomb. They loaded up with 13 drums of fuel at the ECOMOG store − the maximum they could take to clear the compound −, refuelled at Spriggs airfield, then took on board another two drums of fuel as cargo.
One of the most dangerous things was the drums splitting and the fuel leaking. And when we loaded the fuel, I put the petrol in the centre and then the oil and diesel on the outside, in case they shot at me! But if it was a shot from underneath! And one time, one of these petrol drums, filled to the top, split because of the vibration; and the smell was very strong and there was a pool of petrol on the floor behind the cockpit. And there’s the door and there’s me sitting with my gun and the engineer and there’s nobody else. I thought to myself, suppose there’s a bare electric wire and a spark. Puff! But then you wouldn’t feel it.
This was a possibility they accepted and had lived with since a flight in the early days, when after leaving Roberts International for Lungi airport with a full load of fuel, they crossed the Mano river into Sierra Leone, and Juba saw a open clearing on the Sierra Leone side of the river into which a man came running out of the bush firing an AK-47 at them. While Juba was taking evasive action, he could see the whites of the gunman’s eyes − the man was that close. Initially everyone who had something to shoot with, friend or foe, shot at the helicopter until the word was put out to own forces not to shoot at their own helicopter.16
During the last part of the final flight back to Monrovia at the end of the day, with the fuel gauge reading low, Juba would say, ‘Sendaba, turn off the fuel gauge.’ The craft would fly a little while, and then Juba would give the thumbs up to Sendaba who would turn the fuel gauge on again for Juba to recalculate fuel for distance left. Nursing Bokkie in this fashion, triggered off the warning message recorded in a woman’s voice in Russian. They called the voice Natasha; and over the headset she warned the crew they were running low in fuel. First the voice came on intermittently, but then Natasha’s nagging became constant in the earphones, as they strained their eyes looking for the spot at Mamba Point that would come up as Monrovia, wondering if they had enough fuel to make it. When they landed, Sendaba would check over the helicopter a last time while Juba wrote up his flying log book and Fred opened the inefficient cool box, and they would crack a couple of beers.
Sendaba was a dedicated professional. He treated Bokkie with infinite care and patience. Once, on a flight to Base Zero, as they were touching down, an engine warning light alerted him to a partially blocked filter. He reckoned that he could effect some remedial work to get them back to Monrovia. So for three hours, beneath a blazing sun at Base Zero, Sendaba laboured under great difficulty because he was suffering from malaria. Fred and Juba helped him; they sat with pieces of fine wire painstakingly clearing out blades of grass and debris from the filter, but the bulk of the work was Sendaba’s; and they could see he was weak and that he was struggling. But he succeeded with the repair, and they took off for Monrovia.
For this arduous, dangerous work that no other aircrew was undertaking they were certainly not receiving a king’s ransom: Juba was paid by the hour, while Sendaba and Fred earned $1,500 per month. Killing them became a priority for the junta leaders, because they were obviously the supply line for the Task Force. For their part, ECOMOG officers were fulsome in their praise of the trio, ‘They’re unbelievable, unkillable,’ said a Nigerian major.17
Not that they themselves thought so – quite the opposite. Daily exposure to the risk of death heightened the kind of awareness that humdrum work might not have inspired: a sense of the mystery behind creation.
In the silent moments we were in the air, as the sun rises from the horizon − each to his own God. Juba can vouch for this because we often discussed it.
Juba put it this way,
I’m not a churchman, but the spirit world in WAWA was revealed to me. There is only one Creator and that is the way we are still alive.18
The term that Juba used, WAWA, means West Africa Wins Again, and it has many facets to it. Some of them played a part in the groups that made up the CDF. Fred observed the CDF training at Base Zero, and he suggested to Hinga Norman that it might be an idea to invite the ECOMOG Task Force Commander to see the CDF for himself.
I said to the Chief, ‘Chief why don’t you invite Col Khobe to see the training?’ And he asked Col Khobe and he came down – we picked him up and brought him to the camp. All the CDF were out there, and the colonel with his entourage. And after the Chief introduced Col Khobe and his entourage, all the men of the CDF, welcomed him. Then they did a demonstration. And the demonstration was to get Khobe’s bodyguard to shoot at a chicken that was hanging on a piece of wood about fifteen metres away. And the bodyguard, when he was told to shoot the chicken, thought it was a joke. But the Chief said to him, ‘You can use your weapon.’ And he took aim and fired and missed the chicken. He couldn’t believe it, and then he took aim and fired again and didn’t hit it. Then he knelt down fired, and never hit it. He emptied the whole magazine and never hit the chicken. And then they brought the chicken and gave it to him, and they said you can take it as a souvenir. The chief Kamajor, the chief initiator, stepped in front and he said, ‘Do you want to shoot at me?’ Khobe would have none of it. At the time we didn’t realize why, because from that moment on it was the turning point, I believe, because if weapons were to get to these people – they have this belief that they are invincible. Their belief was that they would take over Freetown without anything.
Whatever the reason for the bodyguard consistently missing the target with his own weapon (there were stories later about initiates to the Kamajors being fired at with doctored ammunition and having survived, convinced it was by some miraculous power, they believed themselves to be invulnerable) this demonstration begs questions. Juba’s take on this sort of thing is interesting.
They have many different beliefs, and especially when you look at all the Ju-Ju activities in these countries. It is mind boggling to see what they are capable of, by tapping into the spirit world. Power and survival are important to them at any cost.19
And what also needs to be brought into the equation is the contrast − among fellow countrymen – between, on the one hand, the fiercely loyal militiamen, whose efforts were focused on restoring democratic government to a centre of power that would probably always be remote from them, and on the other, the mindless killers and rapists who, in large part, comprised the AFRC/RUF People’s Army. Well, it appears that the leadership brilliance of Hinga Norman lay partly in his tapping into the societies of pre-existing warrior/hunter cults with their rituals of rights of passage, testing, oaths and initiation, and imbuing them with a common aim to fight and restore the democratic government.
However potently belief fuelled their determination to bring that government back into power, the CDF needed the military muscle of the sub-region; and maintaining and building up the fibres of the ECOWAS arm meant unremitting toil for Bokkie’s aircrew. They worked all Christmas Day and Boxing Day, but 27 December was completely free. On 30 December, they made their last flight of the year, taking fuel to Lungi and Kossoh, and then they flew on to Base Zero. In his diary, in case he was compromised or it fell into other hands, Fred used a code to write up certain names and places: ‘the junction’ was Base Zero; ‘friend’ or ‘the old man’ stood for Hinga Norman; and ‘presents’ was the code for AK-47 shorts (rounds of ammunition). So having off-loaded ammunition, they picked up ‘friend’ from Base Zero and flew him to Monrovia to have discussions with ECOMOG commanders.
On the evening of the following day, Juba, Fred and Sendaba went to the Ricks Institute, where Hinga Norman’s family had been staying, and had a glass of beer with him and his wife and daughter. On 1 January, Fred lazed on the beach in the morning then joined Chief Norman, and they toasted the New Year. And well they might, for this was the lull before the storm.
Word had been put about, probably at clerical support level in ECOMOG HQ , that Hi
nga Norman, Sierra Leone’s Deputy Defence Minister in exile − branded persona non grata by President Charles Taylor – was in Monrovia. After these two days, secure in the Ricks Institute, on 2 January, Hinga Norman was driven to the ECOMOG HQ where he and four of his headshed boarded Bokkie and were flown first to Spriggs airfield for refuelling. The airfield was guarded by the ECOMOG forces, but the Liberian authorities had a locus there for civil traffic. As Bokkie was being refuelled, a number of Charles Taylor’s security men appeared, and one of them approached the helicopter. In his brief diary note later, Fred referred to them as ‘goons who tried to become big guys but lost nerve and failed miserably.’ What happened was the head goon stepped forward and tried to board the craft, saying he wanted to inspect it. Fred told him that he had no business with their flight; but he tried to call Fred’s bluff. At this, Fred called to an ECOMOG soldier and told him to escort the goon out, and shoot him if he refused. There was no resistance. In his diary Fred simply recorded that when he got back into the helicopter, ‘the old man smiled.’ But the Liberian security service’s attempt to get close to Hinga Norman did not come about by chance, and the likeliest source for tipping them off was local support staff.
Fred’s alertness to danger for Hinga Norman from Charles Taylor’s security service was activated earlier by related incidents. Playing power politics, and having failed to stymie Hinga Norman by confining him to Guinea or Lungi, President Kabbah tried to neutralize him by looking for another national CDF co-ordinator, but this came to nothing, so he tried to install a co-ordinator of the CDF for the north of the country, and thereby limit Hinga Norman’s influence. The man the president chose for northern co-ordinator was S Dumbuya. Shortly after, Dumbuya turned up in Liberia at a time when Hinga Norman was making a stop-over at the Ricks Institute. The hotel that Dumbuya booked into in Monrovia was the Palm Hotel, where both Juba and Sendaba were staying. By chance he was booked into a room on the third floor, next to Juba’s room. And it was in the hotel that Fred first met him.
On one of my visits to Juba, I saw this guy dressed in fine traditional African dress and he introduced himself as Col. Dumbuya. He came as an envoy from President Kabbah. He told me that he trained some of the Liberian Army when Siaka Steven was in power. But the curious thing was that in Monrovia, he was a guest of Taylor’s deputy minister of tourism, a young woman. He wanted to see the Chief who was at Ricks with the ECOMOG battalion securing the area. Yet Charles Taylor had declared the Chief a persona non grata in Liberia. Juba said to me that this guy is up to no good. I told Juba that I totally agreed with him; it was very obvious what he was busy with. Dumbuya asked us about the Chief and we told him that we had not seen him for a while.
I went and told the Chief about Dumbuya as an envoy of the President here in Monrovia, and he just smiled and said, ‘Fred, you know why he is here.’ The following day Hassan [Fred’s driver] and myself went to visit the Chief and update him on what we were doing regarding our flights to Lungi. On our way back we saw Dumbuya and that woman in a car going towards Ricks. So we called and warned the Chief off. They went to the Chief ’s place but people there told them that the Chief had gone up-country. We believed that the aim was to eyeball him and confirm that the Chief was there. ECOMOG tightened the movement of people visiting the Chief afterwards. Dumbuya went twice but did not see the Chief. The last attempt was a meeting to be held in Dumbuya’s hotel room with the Chief. The Chief came with his escort but I went in first, and as I was going up I saw Taylors’ security men on the second floor. I quickly came down and told the Chief that it was a trap and he must leave immediately. Which he did, with his two-man escort.
Thus, on 2 January 1998, when Fred took the initiative with the security man at Spriggs, it was because he had learned from experience that Hinga Norman had to walk circumspectly in Liberia, and so he took it on himself to watch out for him. There was no follow-up by Taylor’s men, and when Bokkie was refuelled, they took off for Base Zero
Two days later, on 4 January, Kamajors launched an operation against junta forces in the town of Bo. International aid workers there reported that the Kamajors were fighting with AK-47s, machetes and spears. The following day the junta radio put out that Kamajors had been airlifted to ECOMOG bases at Lungi and Jui. It was to be a month of intense fighting by the CDF, and it would tie up considerable junta forces and prevent them reinforcing their western command. All the signs were there for mobilization in preparation for an offensive. The Nigerian Defence HQ announced that a new overall commander of the ECOMOG force in Liberia, Major General Timothy Shelpidi, would take over from Major General Malu, who indicated that the force’s presence in Sierra Leone would be increased to about 15,000 troops.20 The change-over happened swiftly, and on Friday 9 January, Juba, Fred and Sendaba took Gen Malu in Bokkie to Lungi to bid farewell to his troops and commanders in Sierra Leone. A formal ceremony was held, and Bokkie took part with a lone fly past in front of the general and his command.
On Friday 16 January, Bokkie flew a special consignment to ‘the junction’: personnel, food and fuel; the load also contained a package of money, amounting to $25,000 from Sandline, supplied via Lifeguard. The money was allocated as follows: $20,000 on communications − to buy radios and repeaters; and $5,000 for food, fuel and medicine. Fred was involved in organizing the radios from Lebanese contacts; Hinga Norman’s nephew, Samuel Margai, and Michael Josiah, who later became a doctor, bought a range of medicines following Hinga Norman’s directions. That day a series of co-ordinated attacks were made by Kamajors in the south and east of the country. A fierce fight developed for control of Tongo. On 19 January, Hinga Norman said on the BBC World Service that ‘Tongo is going to be a tug of war.’21
At the end of January the Task Force drew up its final battle options. Phase one would concentrate on the liberation of Freetown, and Col Khobe wanted to know what CDF strength he could count on for this part of the operation as well as the next phases up-country. Hinga Norman was flown to Lungi in Bokkie. On the evening of 28 January, a meeting was held at Lungi, in the house used by the company Lifeguard, who still operated in the mines at Koidu (since the AFRC tried to sustain a veneer of normalcy to encourage external investment). Brig Bert Sachse, formerly of Executive Outcomes, and now of Lifeguard, was in attendance; and during the meeting Hinga Norman asked Fred to take notes. Khobe wanted to know how many men of the CDF he could count on to back up his force. Hinga Norman read out figures from twenty-one chiefdoms, chiefdom by chiefdom; and Fred’s notebook contains the numbers: Bumpe could muster 2,500; Gerihun’s figure amounted to 800; Tongo produced one of the largest numbers at 7,000. The total came to 37,050 men. In the circumstances of wartime, this figure would have been inflated, but it was still an impressive backup that chiefs could muster. Then Fred noted down the logistical problems: transport, which ranged from on foot, by bicycle, by air; medivac would be mancarry; feeding could meet with local resistance from already deprived and suffering communities; but the biggest problem in an operation of this kind was communication.
That date of Col Khobe’s meeting to ascertain CDF support is a noteworthy anniversary: it marked one year since the Sierra Leone government terminated Executive Outcomes’ contract; a contract, by means of which the country had paid for fewer than two hundred men to bring about a level of stability that to re-attain now required about 15,000 ECOMOG troops and an indeterminate number of militiamen.
Airlifting contingents of CDF to support the taking of Freetown, Bokkie ferried them from Moyamba, Bonthe and Bambatok to back up the ECOMOG battalion stationed at Kossoh.
They were so happy, as if they were going on a picnic. Quite an incredible sight to see men dressed in their fighting gear, mostly without weapons except their traditional fighting knife.
The final build up of the attacking force took place on 5 February. A Hercules C-130 made three flights from Liberia to Lungi airfield, ferrying a battalion of ECOMOG troops and their equipment. They were then airlifted in Bokkie to Kos
soh, six loads for each C-130 flight; and each round trip took about thirty minutes plus. At the end of the eighteenth flight, they made one more trip this time taking a cow for the battalion feast before the coming offensive.
A total of 275 troops and 37 tons of freight and equipment were moved in one day with one helicopter. Some loads went up to 5.5 tons due to the fuel being low, but still, with 1.5 tons over maximum all-up weight, Bokkie was setting new world records.22
Bokkie’s crew were about to round off a long day with their usual evening beer, when an urgent call came through that an ECOMOG soldier on a recce foot patrol had stepped on an Anti Personnel Mine (APM) the junta had planted; the man lost both legs. The crew immediately took to the air and got the soldier back to Lungi, where they had a good medical set-up with a small team of doctors who were able to stabilize cases before having them moved to Monrovia and then on to Nigeria.
At 04.00 hours on 6 February, the assault on Freetown began with an ECOMOG bombardment from Lungi using heavy weapons, followed by a break out from Kossoh to the west towards Freetown. Initial progress was satisfactory: Fred noted in his diary that the Task Force,‘took over Waterloo and Wellington. Casualties were light, 5 dead and 42 wounded.’ Timed to coincide with the ECOMOG offensive, Kamajors launched an all-out attack on Kono. And a few days later Kamajors took on the junta’s forces at Koribunda. Throughout the fighting to retake Freetown, Bokkie was flying long hours most days, resupplying and extracting casualties or whatever was required. At the end of a flight between Kossoh and Lungi, when the crew reported in, Col Maxwell Khobe informed Juba of reports that the enemy were firing at the ECOMOG force from a gunboat in Freetown harbour. Juba took note and followed their previous route back to see where the firing was coming from.