The disorder discussed here as ‘nervousness prostration’ and sometimes also identified as ‘hysteria’ or simply ‘shock’, is what would now be diagnosed as post-traumatic stress. Like ‘spinal concussion’ this condition, under its various names, became one of the major discourses in railway accidents. Herbert Page covers it extensively under the title, ‘The Fright Neuroses’, which he prefers to the more common ‘traumatic hysteria’. He confesses that despite ‘naming’ the disorder, the medical profession are little more forward in understanding ‘what is the precise morbid change underlying the so-called functional disorders of the nervous system …’ Again he cites Thorburn, this time, interestingly with regard to his observations of a woman involved in the Hexthorpe accident:
… a case of a woman with left hemianaesthesia [numbness of the whole left side] following severe shock and bruises in the Hexthorpe collision …. her mental condition was remarkable. She had an intensely frightened ‘scared’ look like that of a wild animal. She paid little or no attention to her surroundings and it was with the greatest difficulty that she could be got to answer even simple questions. She was quite incapable of connected speech, but there were none of the emotional manifestations usually regarded as hysterical … there was for a time a profound mental change also of hysterical origin. A year later the condition had passed.
Leeman’s Counsel argued that, because of his ‘nervousness’, he was greatly out of pocket, having had to hire in a buyer to go to market, and from the falling off of his business since he was unable to conduct it fully. This amounted to about £6 a week. The defendant’s counsel argued that the claim was excessive and, finally, the jury assessed the damage to be in the region of £100. Interestingly, Leeman had had the foresight to insure himself when buying his travel ticket, and so also received 25s from the Passengers Assurance Company, as compensation for the injuries he had received as a result of the accident.
On 7 July 1888, the Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser reported two further cases of compensation settlement. One William Stokes, whose leg injury necessitated amputation, accepted £1,400 and Henry Bocking, publican, who had had a compound fracture of the leg, accepted £800. The paper reported that ‘there now remain only three claims, all of them, however, for substantial amounts’.
Most Serious
One of the three cases that probably expected ‘substantial amounts’ was held in Sheffield, in October 1888, before the Under-Sherriff and jury. Thomas Henry Vernon (43), married with three children, was a successful businessman, a cork manufacturer, with a business he had taken over from his father. Vernon had lived a very active life before the accident. Immediately after the collision, he ‘came to’ at the bottom of the embankment with blood streaming down his face and he could not raise his left arm at all. Trauma to his left leg was so severe that it had to be amputated and, thirteen months later, his right one was still useless. He also suffered from memory loss and ‘feeble action of the heart’. His prospects for improvement were poor. The jury awarded ‘heavy damages’ of £4,500 – the largest amount given,23 although this was later reduced to £4,000 on appeal by the MS&L.
The last claim for compensation, dealt with some twenty months later in June 1889, was a big case with seven medical gentlemen appearing as witnesses or to assist counsel, this was not counting the MS&L Company’s own Chief Medical Officer, Dr Thomburn. Several railway companies kept medical men on the payroll, mostly to deal with compensations claims. G. Neele, superintendent of the London & North Western Railway, wrote, in his Railway Reminiscences, that although the company had medical practitioners who covered different districts, it was ‘… decided to have one consultative man for the whole line, and Dr Annesley … was selected. Subsequently a special ‘Medical Committee’ was organised, at which passenger claims of a serious character, or beyond the limit of my free action, were dealt with, and the Medical Officer attended as adviser.’
Mr S.D. Waddy, QC, appearing for the plaintiff, Mr Frederick William Rogerson, suggested that the jury, upon hearing the evidence, would come to the conclusion that this was ‘the most serious of all cases arising from the accident’ because the injuries were ‘not only far reaching, but of a permanent character and last as long as he lived, and in all probability they would shorten his life.’24 Frederick William Rogerson was young (it was estimated he was born 1858 or 1859, so probably thirty years old) and had previously been ‘vigorous and active in every way’, but was now ‘a cripple for life’. He had been apprenticed to his father as an edge tool forger at seventeen years old and, before he was twenty, had saved £100. This was important information in determining his loss of earnings or potential income as no ‘books’ or receipts of any kind had been kept in regard to his earnings before the accident.
Rogerson reported to the jury that he had been ‘excessively thrown’ around the carriage during the collision, ending up with his head out of the carriage and his legs still inside. He remembered that he had to ask people to ‘hold his right foot’. He spent fourteen weeks in the Infirmary but requested to go home for Christmas, since when he had experienced ‘violent palpitations’, which he attributed to his heart. He had never had anything like that before. That Rogerson had a ‘disease of the heart’ was corroborated by his several medical experts. That the disease was brought on by the accident was fiercely disputed by the defence. They also disputed his evidence of a substantial income of some £200 per year, finding it ‘not proven’. The jury obviously found the same, because they finally awarded him just £1,500.
The amount of costs incurred by the MS&L in pay outs amounted to many thousands of pounds. On Thursday 27 December 1888, The Sheffield Local Register (from The Sheffield & Rotherham Independent) had a list of damages awarded, although it was not complete:
Annie Burley, aged 14
£550
5 children of Mr and Mrs J.W. Beaumont, an annuity each of 10s a week
14 May
Miss Foster
£350
Mr Bell
£425
1 June
Mr Thomas Trimnell
£4,000
Mr A. Foster
£960
30 June
Mr W. Stokes
£1,400
Mr W. Bocking
£800
10 July
Mr and Mrs C. Sharpe
£1,150
10 August
Mr Henry Redfern
£350
16 October
Mr T.R. Vernon
£4,500 (Reduced 14 November to £4,000)
Leaving aside the children’s annuity that amounts to £13,985. Others found are:
Charles Dobson
£270
Henry Jarvis
£500
Mr H. Leeman
£200
Mr W. Leeman
£100
Mrs Carey
£500
Mr W. Rogerson
£1,500
This amounts to £3,070, making a total of £17,055. That, however, was not the whole story. This is only a fraction of those injured, to say nothing of the compensation for the twenty-five deaths. The final sum would have been a staggering amount.
Inquiry and Trial
On Monday 19 September, Major Francis Arthur Marindin, RE, CMG, member of the Railway Inspectorate since 1875, arrived to carry out an Inquiry on behalf of the Board of Trade. He immediately proceeded to the scene of the accident to inspect the site which had been, as much as possible, left as it was. Such was the demand for admission that he had to set up his inquiry in an alternative location to that planned at the MS&L Railway offices. He moved to the room where the Local Board of Guardians held their meetings. Here, he interviewed officials from both railway companies, as well as all of the other employees involved – some twenty-five, including Mr Halmshaw, district superintendent.
Halmshaw told Marindin that the ‘absolute block system’ had been operational on the line since Septe
mber 1880 – with the exception of Leger and Cup race days. On such days the system was suspended by the Great Northern Railway, and so was not in operation on the section of the line between Hexthorpe Junction and the South Yorkshire Junction (a good distance of 1 mile and 28 chains). He produced a copy of the notice given to drivers regarding operational instructions for these special days. It was the same year on year. The ‘permissive’ system of controlling the line had been used each time with no problem. The ‘flag signalmen’, who were used during these particular periods, were given special instructions to keep the red flag up the whole time there was a train at Hexthorpe platform. (Unfortunately the guard charged with this duty was stood in such a position he could not actually see Hexthorpe platform.) The men in the signal boxes were told not to lower their danger signals until speed had been reduced. He also informed Marindin that, on that Cup Day, twenty-five trains had been dealt with between 9 a.m. and the time of the accident – approximately 12.15 p.m. (roughly one every four minutes – although the MS&L train was only two minutes behind the Midland train).
The invention of the ‘telegraph’ had brought better safety possibilities to the railways, including the ‘block system’. The ‘absolute block system’ was a method of working the trains on the track under the supervision of the signalmen in the signal boxes, who used the telegraph to communicate from one box to the next. Previous to this, the trains were controlled within blocks on a ‘time’ system – five minutes allowed between trains – but this had been open to all sorts of mishaps and misinterpretations. The telegraph came into being in the early half of the nineteenth century but was initially expensive and complicated. After further development, and much government coercion via the Board of Trade, it was taken up and used by a good percentage of the railway companies, but not enough of them, so it was finally made compulsory by Parliament in 1889 (after the notorious Armagh accident, in which a Sunday school excursion train’s brakes failed and eighty people were killed and some 260 injured). The concept was simple. The track, whether single, double or multiple, was divided up into sections or ‘blocks’ between two signal boxes, and at any one time only one train should be inside a block. If there was only one train in a block, then there would not be any collisions. A train could not enter a block unless the one ahead was empty. The signalmen on either side would control this. This was the theory, and, putting aside signal failure or human error, in the main it worked very effectively; however, the ‘absolute block system’ had one drawback: it was time-costly. It was too costly on race days, and so, rather than introduce extra signal boxes to speed things up, even though the track would be under more pressure from higher usage, and despite the fact that resorting back to using ‘flagmen’ introduced a greater possibility of human error, the block system was suspended between Cherry Tree box and South Yorkshire box on Wednesdays and Fridays during Doncaster Race week.
John Mason, driver of the ill-fated Midland excursion train, gave evidence that, although he had been given no specific instructions, he had simply followed the danger and flag signals, reduced his speed and, when the train already at the platform had moved away, he had approached the platform and stopped at around 12.13 p.m. He was stationary at the platform for approximately two minutes before his train was hit. The first jolt of the collision did not move the engine at all, but the second moved it some 20 yards forward. He went to the rear of his train to see what had happened, and found the brake and three bogie carriages severely damaged, whilst the remaining carriages were hardly touched. He saw, he said, that the engine of the MS&L’s express train (a Sacre 4-4-0 locomotive) was fine, with steam blowing off at ordinary pressure (this description is somewhat at odds with that of eyewitness, Mrs Osborne, and the report by Major Marindin). The Inquiry continued all day, and was then suspended until the following afternoon so that the Major could attend the coroner’s court in the morning. By Tuesday 20 September, he had finished his enquiry and was able to give evidence at the coroner’s court on that same day.
The coroner had sat on the case on several occasions. Initially, and immediately, to identify those already dead at the scene of the accident, and thereafter to identify those who died subsequently. A further sitting was required to determine if there was a case to answer. Major Marindin believed there was, his feeling being that the block system should not have been suspended – ‘if [it] is necessary as a safeguard under the ordinary conditions of service, it is surely all the more necessary when the number of train is largely increased … the alternative arrangements were not all that they could have been.’ Whilst he acknowledged that the driver had ‘lost no time in applying the continuous brake, sanding the rails, sounding the whistle and reversing the engine, doing all in his power to stop his train’, he concluded that both the driver and the fireman of the MS&L train were at fault for not obeying the signals given, and he said so in his report.25
Samuel Taylor (39), of 21 Whally Street, Toxteth Park, Liverpool, and driver of the fateful train, was an experienced driver. He had worked for the MS&L for twenty years. His fireman, Robert Davis (28), of 25 Nelson Street, had worked for them for eight years. Davis confessed that he had seen a guard with a red flag, who had also held up his hand with one finger up (sometimes a finger was held up and moved around to start a train). Not understanding what the guard meant he had not informed his driver. The driver believed that he had responded to the signalman’s instruction – the Hexthorpe Junction starting signal was off (but had a red flag under it). He had reduced his speed and proceeded cautiously; however, the curve and the bridge over the line obstructed the driver’s view, and it was not until he was on the bend that he had sight of the stationary train, at which point he had reacted immediately.
At the coroner’s court, the men were represented by Mr W. Warren and Mr Warren Jr, solicitors, of Leeds, who had been retained by their union. It was the first time a union had taken such an action. Thursday 22 September 1887 was not an auspicious day for Taylor and Davis. The Doncaster Borough coroner resumed his inquiry following the jury’s visit to the site of the accident. After hearing further testimony, the coroner outlined his understanding of the evidence, stating that, ‘the signalling had been carried out most faithfully’,26 but neither the driver nor the fireman had looked out for them. He directed the jury that, if the arrangements that the company had set in order had been followed, no collision would have occurred. After such emphatic direction the jury brought a verdict of ‘guilty of manslaughter’. The coroner issued a warrant for the pair’s arrest. He agreed bail on a surety each of 50s, but, not having the money upon them, they were taken into custody. Later that day they appeared before the Magistrates’ Court and were formally charged. They were bailed on the same conditions and sureties as before, as offered by T.G. Sunter, secretary of Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen, and C.E. Stretton, vice-president of Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants.
The verdict was not popular amongst the general public, who thought the wrong persons had been put in the dock. A letter, which appeared in the Liverpool Mercury on Saturday 24 September 1887, summed up the general feelings:
The people who are not only morally but actually to blame are the directors and managers of the line, who suspended the block system for the two heaviest days’ work in the year, at a time when its services were imperative … It is time the farce of punishing workmen for the faults of the directors was brought to a close and the real guilty persons convicted. If a few directors were to be locked up for a smash like Hexthorpe we should soon hear of measures being taken which would prevent their reoccurrence.
On Sunday 25 September, a number of experts, deputised by the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, tried to visit the site to gather information in preparation for the trial. They were denied access to the track.
The trial of Taylor and Davies, for ‘the manslaughter of Mrs Jane Hale and other persons killed in the accident’ was ground-breaking in the railway world. It made legal history,
and was an outstanding event in the history of the Society.27 Held at York Castle on Wednesday 16 November 1887, it excited a great deal of attention and curiosity, and large numbers attended the proceedings. The prosecutor’s case rested on the ‘culpable negligence’ of both men in either not looking for the flag signals, or not responding to them. The defence found themselves facing all the custom and prejudice which had proved so hard on drivers in similar accidents in the earlier history of railways.28 The defence’s case was two-pronged: a) that the signalman and guards had failed in their duty, having given contradictory directives – this they proved through robust questioning of the men involved; and, b) that the type of brake (the simple vacuum brake) in use on the train was totally inadequate.
Brakes
Having spent a great deal of time, ingenuity and effort in getting locomotives and trains moving, it seems unthinkable today that no thought was given to the need to be able to stop them when required or the consequences if they could not (as was witnessed by the tragic death of William Huskisson). O.S. Nock writes, ‘while engineers vied with one another to increase the tractive capacity and the speed of the locomotives, no-one in those early days made any attempt to develop the science of braking’.29 Even when the need for brakes was conceded, the ‘Battle of the Brakes’ raged long and bitter in the British railway world for decades. Lined up on one side were the railway companies (and their shareholders), and on the other side were the Railway Department of the Board of Trade and the public.
Death, Dynamite and Disaster Page 15