MEANWHILE, I knew that the British were having some actions as well, but I didn't know the nature of them. My British liaison team was with the main TAC, caught in the middle of the 3rd AD mass of vehicles. Rupert's passage had begun around noon, and given the usual friction of lanes closed or wrong-way traffic, I figured that both his 7 Brigade and 4 Brigade were through the breach by now and well into the attack. Rupert had planned a generally due-east attack on two axes out of the breach, one in the north for 7 Brigade and one on the south for 4 Brigade.
I found out later that 7 Brigade had passed at about midday, immediately run into enemy contact, and had destroyed tanks and other armored vehicles. They had been joined just after dark by 4 Brigade attacking south of them on a due-east axis.
All this was happening as we listened to the rain crash on the canvas extensions and watched the water run through the sand all around our feet.
For a time, I stared at the map in silence, focusing on what we had to do the next day and the decisions I needed to make then, and trying to think ahead to the day after that. So far I was really pleased with our tactical situation: the hastily defending enemy versus our available combat power, our ability to focus it on the enemy, and the general condition of our troops. Based on the developing clearer picture of the Iraqis, we were in the right place at the right time in the right combination; and I knew I had picked the right time and place for our RGFC battles. We had the Iraqis where we wanted them.
By midnight on 25 February, 1st (UK) Armored was through the 1st Infantry Division, and both were directing their actions east. Second ACR had uncovered from the front of the 1st Armored Division, and the regiment was now searching for the lead elements of the Republican Guards. The 1st Armored Division began pounding the al-Busayyah logistics base, which contained armored vehicles and special forces units, as well as resupplies for the Iraqi army.
The rain showed no signs of letting up. Shortly after 0100, I decided to get some rest.
Because John Landry had not been able to make the trip back to the main CP, he and I shared a small tent with two canvas GI cots and no lights that Toby had gotten from 3rd AD. It was better shelter than most of the soldiers of VII Corps had that night. At least we were dry. I slept on the cot minus only my shoulder holster, which I set down in my Kevlar, within easy reach.
0400 VII CORPS JUMP TAC EIGHTY KILOMETERS INTO IRAQ
It was a short night. Toby shook me awake at about 0400 with some black coffee he had scrounged up from somewhere. I used a portable elec-tric razor to shave quickly, then strapped on my shoulder holster and Kevlar and went the fifty feet to the jump TAC. John Landry joined me, and we got a tactical update before John went back to the corps main CP. It had stopped raining, but it was still dark. I could not hear any weapons firing, but I could hear sounds of tracked and wheeled vehicles moving. Third AD would be rolling into the attack.
The plan for 26 February was to continue to press the attack toward the east. The 1st Cavalry Division was "chopped" from CENTCOM reserve to VII Corps, and was immediately moved through the recently deserted 1st Infantry Division breach sites toward the left corps boundary. While the corps logisticians continued to develop the log bases that would provide the much-needed fuel and bullets to combat vehicles proceeding into the attack, all combat units would continue toward establishing the formation that would provide the "fist" for hitting the Republican Guards.
My sleep had probably been longer and more comfortable than what most of the soldiers in VII Corps had gotten. Since we were right out there in the middle of the corps, I had a good idea of how most of the soldiers and leaders had spent the night. Many were in combat. Others were refueling and doing maintenance. Commanders were collecting units, planning for their next move, and looking to execute their part of FRAGPLAN 7.
I wondered what picture they had in Riyadh of what we were doing.
The comms were still not good, but the troops were working as best they could to fix them. The long-haul comms continued to be intermittent, so I could not talk reliably either to the main CP or to Third Army, but we could get through; nor did I have consistent communications with the British or 1st INF.
In one respect, the fragile comms were a consequence of a deliberate choice I had made. I had wanted to be up front so that I could talk face-to-face with my commanders, feel the tempo of the fight and of our own movement, and monitor the condition of my soldiers. I had known the comms would be fragile from time to time, but had decided it was a risk I was prepared to take rather than be where my comms were good but I was out of personal touch with commanders and soldiers and the rapidly changing situation. What I lost in comms, I gained in "fingerspitzengefuhl."
However, one effect of the situation was that the official hard copy of the FRAGPLAN 7 execution did not reach all units until well past midnight. Third AD plans officer, Major John Rosenberger, wrote the 3rd AD attack order out longhand, three pages, double-spaced, and faxed it to subordinate units. Others made similar arrangements. Tom Rhame did much of his orally as his units began to move forward. It was no problem. From our meetings, I knew they knew what to do.
Today we would hit the Tawalkana and subordinate units hard. In fact, we had hit the security zone of the developing defense the day before at around noon; and 2nd ACR had continued to intercept units moving to get into the forming defense. With that in mind, I'd figured the 2nd ACR would be well into the fight by midmorning, which is why I had wanted Griffith and Funk on line to their north by that time. So that, later this morning, we would be in our fist, with 1st AD in the north, 3rd AD in the center, and 2nd ACR in the south. Later, the 1st INF (replacing the CENTCOM-held 1st CAV) would pass through the regiment and give us our three-division fist. By that time, in addition to the RGFC Tawalkana and other armored divisions in the area, we also would be fighting the RGFC Medina. We would do all that today, while maintaining the momentum of the attack through the following day to destroy the rest of the RGFC units in our sector.
Even though I was aware that the comms limited our information, I asked for a quick update on the battle activities of VII Corps units. I wanted to hear what they had, then go look for myself.
I was interested in the same questions discussed the morning before.
First I wanted to hear about the enemy, and I had a number of sharp questions for the assistant G-2, Captain Bill Eisel, about what the RGFC36 was doing.
It was ever more clear that the RGFC theater command had a defensive plan and were executing it. They were not as skillful at the tactical level as our troops, but they had a plan! By now I figured they knew we were here. What they still did not know was the size of our force, the power of our rolling armor attack, or the direction from which we would hit them. They would find out the answers to those questions shortly. They were about to get hit by the largest combined-armored corps in the history of the U.S. Army ever to engage in an attack.
So, as battered as they might be from Coalition air attacks, the RGFC HQ was trying to set a defense in depth that would allow its forces to get out of Kuwait (as Don Holder had suggested yesterday) and would set a series of defensive belts in front of Basra, their only port. We knew from studying the Iraq-Iran War that the Iraqis had put up a tough defense of Basra.
The RGFC tactic was to throw armor/mechanized infantry in our way. As they could perform only limited maneuvers, it was mainly a brute-force defense thickened by all the units in the area (as confirmed by the Third Army intel feed and our own intel sources). That is why we ran into so many different units during the battles over the next two days. The 1st AD and the 3rd AD fought elements of the 12th, 17th, 52nd, and 10th Armored. In addition, the 1st AD fought the northern brigade of the Tawalkana, the Medina, and a brigade of the Adnan.
As what the Iraqis were doing became ever clearer, it also became clearer to me that our tactics and maneuvers had been exactly right. We had them where we wanted them. They had fixed themselves. The timing was perfect, and, further, the time we h
ad taken to keep concentrated had not hurt us at all, for at that moment on the twenty-sixth, we were still catching the Iraqis trying to form a defense. In other words, our forecast had turned out right for both our own force and the enemy, and we had our force in the right place at the right time. It does not get much better than that in maneuver warfare!
Meanwhile, as we turned ninety degrees east, I also wanted to keep track of the progress of XVIII Corps. If their attack east did not move at the pace of ours, Ron Griffith and the 1st AD would have an open flank. Open flanks in the desert are no big deal, unless the enemy can do something about it. At that point, the RGFC still had its three Guards infantry divisions to the north of our attack zone (that is, in the XVIII Corps zone). As for the third heavy Republican Guards division, the Hammurabi, I was not sure where they were just then or how the RGFC would play them in the defense. (I learned later that they were in fact still east of the Tawalkana and Medina, standing between these divisions and Basra, and also moving north to reinforce the Nebuchadnezzar, which was an RGFC infantry division.) But it was at least clear that we had the Tawalkana and Medina in our zone now, along with three or four associated divisions of 50 percent strength or better. With the new Third Army boundaries, significant elements of the RGFC were now in the zone of attack of XVIII Corps, not just of VII Corps.
OUR own situation was still good.
The British 1st Armored Division had completed its passage of lines through the 1st INF at about 0300. My division commanders had estimated it would take twelve hours, but it had actually taken them fifteen.
It was then that I learned that the British had been in contact with the Iraqis almost from the time 7 Brigade had exited the breach the afternoon before. Rupert had then had 7 Brigade attack in the north of the British sector, since that sector contained the Iraqi forces that could threaten the rear of our envelopment force. Four Brigade soon followed and attacked in the southern half of the British sector. The lead units of 4 Brigade had had combat actions the previous night, even as the rear of the brigade and division support units were clearing the breach. Both brigades were continuing to attack elements of what was left of the Iraqi VII Corps frontline infantry divisions (the 48th, 25th, 31st, and 27th) and the deeper-positioned tactical reserve, the Iraqi 52nd Division.
Later I would know the details. According to Brigadier Patrick Cordingly of 7 Brigade, that afternoon at 1500, after passing through the breach, "It was cold; it was wet and it was overcast and we were wearing NBC suits and quite expecting the enemy to use chemical weapons against us. . . . During the ground war, the brigade was involved in six formal . . . attacks in the first thirty-six hours. . . . We destroyed some 150 tanks and armored vehicles and took over 3,000 prisoners (in an attack that covered over 300 kilometers)." He relates the first of those attacks (actually the first tank and armored infantry attack in British army history) early on the evening of 25 February by the Scots Dragoon Guards on an Iraqi communication and logistics site: "As night fell, the columns of tanks closed up. Only the red turret lights betrayed the presence of the mass of moving armor. Suddenly, reports of the enemy came in from D Squadron (Challenger tank company) on the right. It wasn't a preplanned attack, but we knew that there was a defended divisional headquarters in the area. As we advanced into the mine belt, the tanks began to pick up the objective with their thermal sights. . . . It was a particularly unpleasant night; it was raining quite heavily, and visibility was down to about fifteen meters before you could see anything the size of a Warrior. It was absolutely black. Thirty seconds before we went in, the tanks opened up, and when the vehicles they hit started burning, the infantry had a reference point to aim for. . . . And when the infantry debussed and stepped into the blackness, it was a step into the unknown for them. . . . Bullets, both friendly and enemy, seemed to be flying everywhere. Private Evans's life was saved when an AK-47 bullet lodged in a rifle magazine in his breast pocket. . . . We also had another tank and one of the Milans grouped together, putting down fire support as that platoon ran in. As soon as another position was identified, fire was put down. . . . Some of the assaults were very tight and it was undoubtedly a concerning time . . . although we had taken five casualties, we all knew that whatever else happened, we had done it, and despite atrocious conditions, it had worked."
Here is another battle account by Major Simon Knapper, commander of A Company, Staffordshire Regiment--an armored infantry battalion comprising two Warrior and two Challenger tank companies commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles Rogers, 7 Brigade. The time was approximately 2100 25 February. "It wasn't a preplanned attack. We knew that there was a communications site in that area and we knew our battle group had been tasked to clear it. . . . The whole area was quite clearly still occupied, and therefore we went into a quick attack on it. . . . Thirty seconds before H-Hour, the tanks opened fire, destroying the vehicles and generator. . . . The tanks led us to exactly the right places, and in the last 300 meters, the Warriors broke forward of the protective screen of tanks and opened up with their chain guns. We debussed the men on site. . . . All the time there was this incredible noise of firing; cannon fire and small arms and tracer bouncing everywhere." As part of 7 Brigade, this battalion had crossed Phase Line New Jersey out of the 1st INF Division breach at 1525 on 25 February, and attacked east. The attack described by Major Knapper was conducted in a driving rainstorm, lasted about an hour and a half, and resulted in one British soldier wounded. They captured about fifty Iraqis, and the battalion destroyed the CP complex. Other units of the 1st UK had been in similar engagements. "I am very proud of what the company achieved that night," Major Knapper ends his account. "It was the first armored infantry attack of the war, and it worked."
1ST INF had left a task force in the breach and were just now beginning to move forward to get into position to pass through 2nd ACR. As I heard this, it went through my mind that 2nd ACR would be moving east and attacking Iraqi units as 1st INF caught up to them, also moving east. That posed a difficult time/distance problem.
The key question was: Where should we make the passage and when? I needed to make that decision today. In the back of my mind, I wanted the passage to be event-driven and not time-driven--that is, I wanted the 2nd ACR to get as far into the Tawalkana as their combat power permitted, and then I'd pass the 1st INF to take up the attack. I did not want to set a definite time for the passage to happen. To do that might prematurely stop the 2nd ACR or cause them to wait while the 1st INF made its way forward, thus giving the Tawalkana more time to thicken the defense with more units, mines, and artillery. At this point, I still believed that 2nd ACR would get about as far as they could into the Tawalkana defense by late afternoon--still in daylight. By that time, 1st INF should be ready to make the forward passage and take up the fight.
What I did not know then, and did not learn until after the war, was that the zone for the 1st INF to move forward, between the 1st UK attacking east and the 3rd AD moving northeast, had been drawn so narrow that Tom Rhame was forced to move in a column of brigades, thus slowing his movement and forcing him to shift formation later--a time-consuming task. Our staff had to rush the drawing of a sector after I had made the change to FRAGPLAN 7 that replaced 1st CAV with 1st INF. The weather also affected their movement rate. It continued to be lousy, with sandstorms.
1ST AD had pounded Objective Purple for the rest of the night and were about to attack to seize it. During the night, they had fired a total of 340 MLRS rockets and 1,920 155-mm DPICM37 artillery rounds into targets on and around Purple. Ron liked to pound the Iraqis with artillery, and so did I.
Between 1500 on the twenty-fourth until midnight on the twenty-fifth, the division had crossed the berm, moved the fifty or so kilometers through the boulder- and wadi-laced terrain, then taken over the sector from the 2nd ACR, fought a brigade-sized fight, and moved the 8,000-vehicle division nearly 140 kilometers to al-Busayyah. They had been moving during the twenty-fifth in a division wedge, with 1/1 Cavalry Squadron as a
covering force. The 1st Brigade was the lead of the division main body, followed by the 2nd Brigade on the west and the 3rd Brigade on the east. Artillery was in the middle of each brigade formation.
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