McGilligan, while undoubtedly brilliant, was something of a hypochondriac. Both he and his wife were constantly convinced that he was in danger of serious illness, which no doubt explains how he lived to the age of 90. In March 1949, Costello wrote to his friend Tom Bodkin that McGilligan had been ill since Christmas, “and finally went into a nursing home whence he emerged with the ‘depressing’ news that there was nothing wrong with him”. Bodkin replied that McGilligan “must be a very tough man for, in the fifty years or so that I have known him, he has always looked delicate and worked furiously”.80 In mid-1950, the British Ambassador was told McGilligan had considered resignation because of ill-health, but had been prevailed upon by Costello to change his mind because MacBride had “put in a claim to the succession”.81 The source of this story was the banker Lord Glenavy—the suggestion of MacBride moving to Merrion Street would have been enough to frighten the financial establishment, and may have been made for precisely this reason, as it is not mentioned anywhere else.
MacBride felt that the people who mattered most in Cabinet were Costello, Dillon, McGilligan, O’Higgins and Norton. He and Dillon had been in school together in Mount Saint Benedict; the Clann leader regarded Dillon as “active and efficient”, with views that “were always amusing and interesting and reasonably sound”.82 By contrast, the Agriculture Minister was not impressed by MacBride’s contributions in Cabinet, describing him as having “the judgement of a hen”.83
Dillon was a colourful and controversial figure. The US Legation noted in December 1948 that Fianna Fáil was expected to continue attacking the Minister for Agriculture, and that his “tendency toward overstatement may damage coalition”.84 These views, curiously, were echoed the following month at a meeting of the Fine Gael parliamentary party. Costello said Fianna Fáil was making Dillon “the object of attack with a view to discrediting him and thereby bringing down the Government and forcing a General Election”. He urged TDS and senators to go on the offensive, speaking to meetings at least every second weekend to get the Government’s message across. Other speakers, while they paid tribute to Dillon’s good work, “felt that he was talking too much and in somewhat exaggerated terms at times”.85
The Minister for Agriculture caused tensions with some of the Independents supporting the Government too. William Sheldon, the Donegal Independent, wrote to Costello the day before his election as Taoiseach to make it clear that while he would be voting for him, he could not “accept the position of having anyone ‘lead’ or speak for me and therefore cannot consider myself represented in any way by Deputy Dillon”.86 Both Sheldon and Wicklow Independent Patrick Cogan later wrote to Costello complaining about Dillon’s attitude towards farmers, particularly regarding the provision of credit facilities and the de-rating of agricultural land. Sheldon told Costello that he was “still prepared to give my support to your government generally, but I should be disingenuous if I were to disguise that I am disturbed by some tendencies in agricultural matters”.87 Costello’s replies were polite, but supportive of his minister. Cogan secured the Taoiseach’s full attention with a letter in May 1950 seeking a discussion on credit for farmers, “as I feel that I cannot support the Government on any issue while they take up such an unreasonable attitude on this question”.88 Costello replied immediately, agreeing to a meeting. Keeping the Independents sweet was a time-consuming process for the Taoiseach, but one he couldn’t afford to ignore.
Both Costello and Browne later recalled differences of opinion at the Cabinet table between members of Fine Gael. Browne said the hostility between individual Fine Gael ministers “dissolved when faced with outside opposition in the Cabinet”,89 although he didn’t specify what led to this hostility. Costello said there was no disagreement between Fine Gael and Labour, and that any trouble “would be more between Fine Gael members, or between the Department of Industry and Commerce who wanted to put tariffs on for the benefit of Irish industry, and James Dillon who wanted to keep them off for the benefit of agriculture”.90
But while there may not have been disagreements between Fine Gael and Labour Ministers, the wider parties were another matter. In May 1948, after three months in Government, the Fine Gael parliamentary party was congratulating itself on “the rising tide of enthusiasm and willing support which is everywhere in evidence”, and planning more party meetings around the country to take advantage. But these were to be resolutely Fine Gael occasions—the minutes of the meeting, chaired by Mulcahy, note that “the organisation of Inter-Party meetings are often a snare and must be treated cautiously”.91 Two months later, however, a change of emphasis was apparent, with Gerard Sweetman and Michael O’Higgins reporting on exploratory talks with the party’s coalition partners. These talks had suggested a series of inter-party meetings, designed “to review, explain and support Government policy and to solidify inter-party strength”. The parliamentary party supported the creation of a permanent Inter-party Committee to oversee such events.92
The following year Sweetman, the party’s Honorary Secretary, reported the Taoiseach’s request that every deputy and senator should submit a monthly report “stating what Meetings they had addressed either on behalf of the Party or of an Inter-party nature so that he, the Taoiseach, could get a picture of the manner in which propaganda was moving throughout the country”.93 He also urged branches of the party to counter “mendacious propaganda” being spread about the Government and to ensure that people were properly informed about what the Government and party were doing.94 An interesting insight into the real views of people in the party is given in the minutes of the Fine Gael Advisory Committee, a body containing a number of senators and other influential figures. In January 1949, it complained that “Labour doctrine and false philosophy, social and economic, is being imposed on the Government. Fine Gael is strongest party and should not be afraid to make its weight felt … Supporters shocked to find Fine Gael so out of touch with economic realities and industrial relations and highly impregnated with Socialism.”95
This view would have come as something of a surprise to left-wing members of Labour and Clann na Poblachta (including Noël Browne) who regarded the Government as being dominated by Fine Gael, and in particular by the more reactionary elements within that party. Costello was called upon once or twice a year by delegations of Labour deputies anxious about particular matters—the cost of living, unemployment, housing, worker representation on State and semi-State boards, and so on.96 Again, smoothing ruffled feathers was time-consuming, but necessary, and the Taoiseach was generally regarded as being good at it.
A more crucial issue for Labour in government was Norton’s proposed social security scheme. Costello knew how important making progress was for Labour—but he had doubts about the scheme. His own copy of the Social Security White Paper was clearly well read, with copious marginal notes and underlining. He also highlighted a sentence in a memorandum by McElligott, presumably because he agreed with it: “While some reform of existing insurance schemes may be necessary, the improvements proposed go much too far.”97
His economic adviser, Patrick Lynch, was extremely critical of Norton’s plans: “In its present form the draft White Paper contains disincentives both for work and saving; in short, it tends to undermine the Government’s policy of securing more productivity … and more investment … Redistribution of a low national income as proposed in the White Paper would impose a flat direct tax indiscriminately on rich, not so rich and poor alike. It would have the effect of dampening the spirit of enterprise and discouraging saving …”98 McGilligan was even more critical, describing it as “a centralised bureaucratic type of scheme following the well known lines of doctrinaire socialistic teaching … I think the community will have to be very careful of not being fooled by words as they certainly are being fooled in England …”99
However, whatever his private thoughts, Costello was head of an inter-party government, and he defended his government’s agreed policies in public. At the February 1950 Fine Ga
el Ard Fheis he stoutly supported Social Security, claiming “it is nonsense to suggest, as a few people have suggested, that the White Paper proposals represent the first step on the road to totalitarian socialism. This attitude represents a confusion of thought that refuses to distinguish between genuine social security and the totalitarian Welfare State.”100 Given McGilligan’s views quoted above, it would be interesting to know what he thought of this statement.
“Jobbery”, or the filling of jobs in the gift of the Government on the basis of political bias, had been one of the sins of Fianna Fáil in the eyes of the Opposition. Once they were in power themselves, of course, their perspective changed. Noël Browne claimed to be shocked by an example of “Fine Gael jobbery” early in the lifetime of the Government, when Seán MacEoin proposed to appoint someone who had left school at 12 or 13, despite there being a number of better qualified candidates. Browne suggested that he was only being appointed because he knew MacEoin or was a Fine Gael member. “Unperturbed, MacEoin smilingly replied, ‘That’s not a bad way to make an appointment, Noël!’”101 This may or may not have been an accurate report of MacEoin’s behaviour, but the Minister for Justice did write to Costello in November 1949 strongly urging the appointment of a non-civil servant (by inference a party supporter) to the post of Controller of Government Publications.102
After 16 years in opposition, it was only natural to give what patronage was available to party supporters. For instance, in March 1949, the Fine Gael Advisory Committee agreed to draw the attention of Costello and McGilligan to vacancies on the Boards of State companies “with a view to making Fine Gael appointments to replace those directors who retire annually”.103 Costello and his colleagues were no worse than Fianna Fáil, or indeed their coalition partners, in this regard. But, as Patrick Lynch pointed out, while Costello “was personally the epitome of integrity”, he was willing to change policy where necessary for short-term political advantage. “In the longer-run the totality of these apparently trivial day-to-day expedients may compromise the possibility of adhering to principles earlier formulated.”104
The result was the most notorious example of jobbery from the period, the Battle of Baltinglass in 1950. This involved the transfer of Baltinglass Post Office in County Wicklow from Helen Cooke, whose family had run it since 1880, to Michael Farrell, a supporter of Jim Everett, the local TD and Minister for Posts and Telegraphs. Local protests generated huge media interest at home and abroad, and led to the Independent TD Patrick Cogan withdrawing his support for the Government, and the resignation of Noel Hartnett from Clann na Poblachta. Costello backed his minister, although Everett eventually had to back down in the face of public outrage. The Battle of Baltinglass was to prove a potent weapon for Fianna Fáil in the 1951 general election.
One Fine Gael member for whom a job was found under the new government was Costello’s leading constituency activist, Mick Byrne, who was given a temporary commission as a commandant and appointed his aide-decamp.105 Then aged 56, he had been a member of the Volunteers, a collector for the Irish Republican Prisoners’ Dependents, and a captain in the National Army up to 1924.106 Later he worked for the gas company. Following an accident there he had an artificial steel hand shaped like a hook, and was known as “Steeler” Byrne. The hook was reputed to be very useful during attempts to disrupt election meetings.107 Noël Browne was in awe of his brilliance as a tallyman (he was able to predict Browne’s election early on the day of the 1948 general election count).108
While formally serving as ADC, Byrne’s role was more that of a personal assistant to the Taoiseach. It was a job which evidently only he could fill, for when Costello returned to office in 1954 he was decidedly lukewarm about having an ADC at all.109 This reluctance was castigated by his son-in-law, Alexis FitzGerald, who said he should always be accompanied by an ADC. “I don’t mind you writing yourself down. You shouldn’t write your office down. Every time you go out at the moment you do. It should stop. Of this, I am convinced.”110 There were no such problems during Costello’s first term as Taoiseach, as Byrne filled his ceremonial role enthusiastically, being described by a British journalist as “the smartest man in the Irish Army—beautifully polished tan boots, buff breeches, olive-green tunic and Sam Browne”.111 On the day before the first Inter-party Government left office, Byrne was appointed Inspector of Supplies in the Office of Public Works.112 Costello remained very close to him—the Mass card from his funeral was one of a number kept in the former Taoiseach’s bedroom in later life.113
Two days after the formation of the Government, the British newspaper the News Chronicle confidently predicted that MacEoin’s appointment as Minister for Justice “has dashed the hopes of unrepentant followers of the new IRA. He has a fine battle record in the revolution, a shrewd outlook, and is not likely to grant any amnesty to IRA firebrands now in gaol.”114 At about the time this was being written, MacEoin was informing Seán MacBride that the prisoners would in fact be released. According to MacBride’s own account, the Minister for Justice told him he appreciated the fact that the Clann leader hadn’t raised the issue, but had decided to take immediate action. “This is exactly what I was hoping would happen … If they were really genuine about cooperation they would do this without my having to say it. And it worked …”115 Given MacBride’s difficulty in persuading the Clann to enter government such concessions were important—already in March the US Minister in Dublin was advising Washington that while MacBride “is a charming individual and will probably prove to be a good Minister … his party Clann na Poblachta is a dead duck …”116
There was naturally a suspicion that the release of the prisoners was part of the Clann’s price for entering government. This was, equally naturally, vehemently denied by ministers. The archival evidence is not conclusive. The first written reference is a letter from Stephen Roche, Secretary of the Department of Justice, to Maurice Moynihan, Secretary to the Government, seeking formal confirmation of a decision to release Liam Rice and Eamon Smullen from Portlaoise Prison. MacEoin had told Roche that the Government had decided on 24 February that the two men should be released, and they were duly set free.117 The fact that Justice had to seek formal confirmation of this decision from the Department of the Taoiseach is an indication of the somewhat chaotic arrangements surrounding Government meetings at the time, but doesn’t shed any light on the question of who originally suggested the releases. Although the initiative was clearly political rather than departmental, that doesn’t rule out MacEoin as the originator. In any case, the release would have appealed to Costello, given his long-standing aversion to emergency powers.
The following month, the remaining three prisoners, Tomás MacCurtain, Henry White and James Smith, were also released (both MacCurtain and White had originally been sentenced to death for murdering gardaí, although White’s sentence had been reduced to manslaughter on appeal).118 In August, the Government agreed to the reburial of the remains of six IRA men who had been executed during the Second World War and whose bodies were buried on prison grounds.119 (While this was of course welcome to Clann na Poblachta, it is perhaps significant that it was Labour Deputies James Larkin and Roddy Connolly who lobbied MacEoin on this issue.)
In April 1948, Costello outlined in the Dáil his position on the inclusion of Republicans in government. He had been tackled by Fianna Fáil’s Gerry Boland over MacBride’s attendance at an Easter Rising commemoration at which volunteers had been sought for the IRA. With some passion, Costello said that his chief reason for becoming Taoiseach was his belief that bringing Clann na Poblachta into government would lead to “the end of the gun as an instrument for furthering political theories or wishes … we will see the end of the gun in politics in this country”.120
But the most important concession to Republicans was “a general easing of pressure on the republican movement”,121 and “the end to police harassment and intimidation”.122 In this more benign atmosphere, Republicans like the newly released MacCurtain began rebuildi
ng the IRA.123 By the middle of 1950, this was being noted in Government circles. Maurice Moynihan was told by Daniel Costigan, an official in the Department of Justice (later appointed Garda Commissioner) that “the IRA are getting more active—drilling, instructing in explosives, but [he] thinks the police may be playing it down”.124
Coalition led to changes in the way government worked. One aspect was the increased use of Cabinet committees. These were not unknown in single-party governments, but were far more prevalent under Costello. A summary of the number of outstanding Cabinet committees shows there were eight in February 1938 and 10 in January 1940. But the First Inter-party Government established 57 of these committees, and the Second Inter-party Government 33. By contrast, in de Valera’s government of 1951–4 there were just 15. The most important of these committees in the First Inter-party Government was the Economic Committee, established on 27 February, made up of Costello, Norton, Mulcahy, MacBride, Dillon, McGilligan and Morrissey.125
There was change, too, in the approach to collective responsibility. A strict interpretation of collective responsibility and Cabinet confidentiality had been laid down even before the formal establishment of the Irish Free State. In August 1922, the Provisional Government decided “that all decisions of the Cabinet should be regarded as unanimous, and should be treated as strictly confidential”.126 There were a number of cases of ministerial dissent being recorded in the minutes of the Executive Council, all of them in 1923—Joe McGrath’s opposition to the appointment of the Commissioner of the Dublin Metropolitan Police; W.T. Cosgrave objecting to the deletion of a number of sections of the Civic Guard Bill; and Kevin O’Higgins’ attempt to have allegations against army officers in Kerry properly investigated.127 But in the main both Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna Fáil stuck to a rigid interpretation of collective responsibility.
The Reluctant Taoiseach Page 27