2. THERE ARE FOUR CABLES EXITING THE CHIMNEY THAT HEAD DOWN THE TUNNEL. ONE SERVICES THE ANTENNA, TWO GO INTO THE BACK OF THE LINE BOX MENTIONED IN REFTEL [reference telecommunication] C, AND ONE CONNECTS TO A UHER MICROPHONE WITH A SWITCH ENCASED IN A PLASTIC BAG. ALL FOUR CABLES TERMINATE IN A JUMBLE OF CABLE LOCATED ABOUT TWO FEET IN FRONT OF THE SHEET METAL.
3. ABOUT TEN FEET BEYOND THE BEND THREE HEAVY BLACK CABLES ENTER WHAT APPEARS TO BE THE BASEMENT OF THE SOVIET APARTMENT BUILDING. THESE CABLES CONTINUE DOWN THE TUNNEL AND ENTER THE JUMBLE IN FRONT OF THE SHEET METAL.
4. TWO HEAVY BLACK CABLES EXIT THE JUMBLE AND GO THROUGH THE ROOF OF THE TUNNEL.
5. TUNNEL CEILING TURNS FROM BRICK TO SHEET STEEL BEYOND POINT WHERE THREE CABLES ENTER BUILDING BASEMENT [from the Soviet apartment building, presumably where the KGB listening post for the antenna was located].
6. SMALL OPENING (TWO FOOT SQUARE) IS LOCATED TO THE SOUTH JUST IN FRONT OF SHEET METAL BARRIER. THIS OPENING IS BLOCKED OFF BY LOOSE BRICK.
7. THERE APPEARS TO BE FIVE TRIP WIRES CONNECTED TO THE LOOSE BRICK FILL. THESE WIRES ARE SOLDERED TO HEAVIER GAUGE WIRES THAT EITHER ENTER THE WIRE JUMBLE OR A PLASTIC WRAPPED OBJECT ABOUT THE SIZE OF A TRANSISTOR RADIO. [Trip wires would trigger alarms, alerting the KGB that U.S. staff had entered the tunnel. Trip wires could also trigger explosive booby traps to kill or injure American investigators. The KGB had booby-trapped their surveillance devices in the past.]
8. TWO TUNNEL ACCESSES ARE IN THE SOVIET CHANGING ROOM AS REPORTED IN REFTEL C.
9. WE ARE NOW TRYING TO TRACE ALL CABLES WITHOUT DISTURBING TRIP WIRES.
10. SINCE OPPOSITION WILL DEFINITELY BE ALERTED AT 8:00 A.M. WHEN SOVIET WORKERS WILL BE DENIED ACCESS TO CHANGING ROOM, WE REQUEST IMMEDIATE DEPARTMENTAL GUIDANCE.
11. ONCE OPPOSITION IS ALERTED, WE SUSPECT THEY WILL ENTER TUNNEL FROM THE FAR END AND SEAL OFF ACCESS OR REMOVE AS MUCH CABLING AS POSSIBLE.
12. PHOTOGRAPHIC DOCUMENTATION CONTINUES.
MATLOCK
After Jack Matlock had sent the above cable, he met with LeChevet, Hathaway, and Carl in the secure bubble on the ninth floor to discuss next steps as Carl had suggested. Carl addressed Matlock.
“Sir, if we want to recover as much equipment as possible to analyze what they have been doing to us in the chimney, we need to try to recover cables and any gear attached to the cables, but I estimate a lot of the stuff is actually in Sov territory.”
Hathaway asked, “What will it take to retrieve it?”
Carl said, “Two options. I can go back in and try to grab as much as possible by hand, hoping to avoid the trip wires, or we can toss hooks out there from our side and try to snag it, then drag it back, never leaving our turf. That’s tougher, of course, but the only way if we want to avoid violating Sov turf.”
Matlock said, “We can’t make this decision here. It’s too far above our pay grade.”
Hathaway asked, “Cable State?”
Matlock nodded. “We cable D.C. and wait for an answer.”
MOSCOW, MAY 25, 1978, 2304Z
11786. SUBJECT: TECHNICAL PENETRATION OF U.S. EMBASSY MOSCOW. REF: (A) MOSCOW 11684 (B) MOSCOW 11713 (C) MOSCOW 11770.2
1. WE BELIEVE WE ARE FACED WITH A DECISION IN THE NEXT FEW HOURS OF WHETHER OR NOT WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO REMOVE CABLES DESCRIBED IN PARA 3.
OF MOSCOW 11770. WE ARE CERTAIN THAT THIS CABLE AND THE MATERIALS DESCRIBED IN PARAS 4, 5, 6 AND 7 ARE LOCATED IN SOVIET REPEAT SOVIET TERRITORY.
2. WHILE WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT KNOW WHETHER OR NOT THE SOVIETS ARE AWARE OF OUR DISCOVERY, THEY WILL CERTAINLY LEARN OF IT BY TOMORROW MORNING (ABOUT 6 HOURS HENCE) WHEN WE DENY SOVIET WORKERS THE USE OF THEIR CHANGING ROOMS. BY THEN IT WILL PROBABLY BE UNSAFE FOR US TO GO BEYOND THE EMBASSY’S TERRITORIAL LIMITS. IF THE DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THE MATERIALS IN SOVIET TERRITORY WOULD BE USEFUL IN DETERMINING THE EXTENT AND TYPE OF SYSTEM, WE BELIEVE WE CAN STILL SAFELY ATTACH HOOKS AND ROPES TO THE CABLES AND EQUIPMENT IN SOVIET TERRITORY AND DRAG PARTS OF IT BACK INTO U.S. TERRITORY FROM A POSITION OF SAFETY. WE MUST HOWEVER, HAVE THE DEPARTMENT’S INSTRUCTIONS IN THE NEXT FEW HOURS IF THIS IS TO BE DONE.
3. ANY DECISION TO REMOVE EQUIPMENT FROM TUNNEL UNDER SOVIET TERRITORY SHOULD OF COURSE HAVE HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL APPROVAL, INCLUDING THAT OF AMBASSADOR TOON.
MATLOCK
The answer to Moscow’s urgent request from the State Department in D.C. did not take long.
WASHINGTON, MAY 26, 1978, 0019Z
134109. SUBJECT: TECHNICAL PENETRATION. REFS: MOSCOW 11770, MOSCOW 11786.2
1. DO NOT REPEAT NOT ATTEMPT TO PENETRATE ANY BARRIERS. WE BELIEVE RISKS OF SUCH ATTEMPTS OUTWEIGH POTENTIAL GAINS.
2. IN ORDER TO HOLD DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER AGENCIES WE WOULD LIKE TO LEAVE ALL DISCOVERED EQUIPMENT IN PLACE FOR ADDITIONAL 24 HOURS IF POST CAN DEVISE MEANS OF PROTECTING ALL DEVICES WHICH WOULD NOT FURTHER ALERT SOVIETS. THIS WOULD PRECLUDE BARRING SOVIETS FROM CHANGE ROOM.
3. IF SUCH MEANS CANNOT BE DEVISED ALL DISCOVERED EQUIPMENT ON OUR TERRITORY SHOULD BE REMOVED AND SECURED WITH AS MUCH OF THE CABLING ON OUR TERRITORY AS POSSIBLE. BEFORE CUTTING CABLES PERFORM TESTS TO DETECT DC VOLTAGES, AUDIO OR RF ON CABLES AS TIME PERMITS BEFORE SOVIETS ARE ADDITIONALLY ALERTED. THIS HAS BEEN CLEARED AT POLICY LEVEL IN DEPARTMENT [meaning Vance or Warren Christopher, the deputy secretary of state] BUT NOT WITH AMBASSADOR TOON, WHO IS UNAVAILABLE.
4. ADVISE US OF ALL ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS IN MOSCOW ON FRIDAY.3
5. PLEASE INCLUDE COMMENTS ON APPARENT USAGE OF TUNNEL OR EQUIPMENT, I.E. ANY INDICATIONS OF FREQUENT AND RECENT USE OR DISUSE. ALSO INDICATE IF POSSIBLE USE COULD BE DETERMINED FOR THREE CABLES ENTERING TUNNEL BEYOND BEND, I.E. MULTIPLE PAIR CABLES SUITABLE FOR MICROPHONE SYSTEM, POWER CABLES, COAX CABLES, ETC.
6. BASED ON YOUR ACTIONS WE WILL FURTHER ADVISE BY THE COB [close of business] IN WASHINGTON ON FRIDAY.
7. ASSUME YOU WILL TAKE WHATEVER MEASURES ARE POSSIBLE TO PRECLUDE INADVERTENT PUBLICITY.
8. WOULD APPRECIATE EMBASSY RECOMMENDATION ON PROTEST.
CHRISTOPHER
The following day, LeChevet, armed with some test equipment and tools, entered the tunnel through the trapdoor in the changing room. He spent most of the day—firmly on U.S. territory—cutting, probing, and measuring the cables that traveled to the chimney. He wrote up his findings and passed them to Matlock for transmission to D.C. late that afternoon.
MOSCOW, MAY 26, 1978, 1428Z
11855. SUBJECT: TECHNICAL PENETRATION OF UNITED STATES EMBASSY MOSCOW. REF: (A) MOSCOW 11792, (B) MOSCOW 11720, (C) MOSCOW 11770 (D) STATE 134109.2
1. PENETRATION APPEARS TO BE LIMITED TO AN ANTENNA LOCATED IN THE SOUTH WING CHIMNEY THAT CAN BE LOWERED OR RAISED BY A PULLEY SYSTEM AT THE BOTTOM OF THE CHIMNEY SHAFT. LISTENING POST REPORTED IN PARA 2 OF REFTEL B APPEARS NOW TO BE A TWO WAY COMMUNICATIONS LINK BETWEEN THE ANTENNA OPERATOR AND MONITORING SITE. DETAILED INSPECTION OF LINE BOX AND CONNECTIONS WILL BE NEEDED TO VERIFY THIS HYPOTHESIS. ONLY THE FOUR CABLES REPORTED IN REFTEL C, PARA 2, ARE IN AMERICAN TERRITORY.
2. PER PARA THREE OF REFTEL D, VOLTAGE AND AUDIO CHECKS WERE PERFORMED ON THE FOUR CABLES WHICH SERVICE THE CHIMNEY.
A. THE UHER MICROPHONE WAS FOUND TO BE PASSING AUDIO. THE CABLE WAS CUT AT THIS TIME. DC AND AC VOLTAGES WERE FOUND ON THE MIKE CABLE.
B. THE ANTENNA CABLE WAS SPLICED WITHOUT BREAKING THE CONDUCTOR PATHS TO THE ANTENNA AND A DC VOLTMETER WAS APPLIED. AT 0705 HOURS, PLUS 12 VDC AND 25 VAC POWER WAS APPLIED FROM THE OPPOSITION END OF THE CABLE. AT 0715, THE VOLTAGE FELL TO ZERO, AT 0733 12 VDC RETURNED, 0743 OFF AGAIN, AND AT 0855 ON AGAIN UNTIL WE CUT THE CABLE AT 1304 HOURS. SEVERAL FREQUENCY SCANS WERE CONDUCTED FROM 20–1000 MEGACYCLES [frequency scans were looking for signals from bugs or implants picked up by the chimney antenna] WHILE VOLTAGE WAS APPLIED [so that the Soviet amplifiers and circuits that received, filtered, and processed received signals from bugs would operate while frequency scans were conducted; in essence, LeChevet was substituting himself for the KGB, trying to hear what they were hearing] AND BEFORE THE CABLE W
AS SEVERED.
C. CABLES THREE AND FOUR WERE ALSO CHECKED FOR VOLTAGE AND IMPEDANCE DATA. THE SMALLER OF THE TWO CABLES REGISTERED 1000 OHMS OF IMPEDANCE FOR THE SECTION LEADING BACK TO THE CHIMNEY AND AN OPEN CIRCUIT FOR THE OPPOSITIONS CABLE END. THE LARGER CABLE ALSO READ AN OPEN CIRCUIT FOR THE OPPOSITIONS [meaning the KGB’s] SEGMENT OF CABLE AND ONE OHM FOR THE CHIMNEY SECTION.
3. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER WHICH OCCURRED FRIDAY:
0600–0700—Cable voltage and impedance measurements conducted.
0640—First char force [cleaning crew of Soviet citizens] personnel was refused permission to enter south wing char force change room.
0710–0855—B plus [high voltage] applied repeatedly by opposition [KGB] to the antenna cable.
0855–1205—B plus remained steady.
1015–1205—Frequency spectrum scans of antenna cable conducted.
1240—Pounding sounds emanating from opposition end of tunnel [the KGB was trying to intimidate U.S. investigators].
1245—Light coming from opposite end [controlled by the KGB] of tunnel first observed.
1255—Visual sighting occurred approximately halfway down tunnel between resident Seabee and opposition.
1305—Antenna cable cut to preserve antenna electronics.
1320—Watch posted by opposition at point where three large cables enter the tunnel. Observation post was basement area of adjoining apartment building controlled by opposition.
1326—Four cables retrieved at demarcation between opposition and embassy grounds.
4. AT 1400 HOURS WORK COMMENCED TO GAIN ACCESS TO THE SECOND TUNNEL ENTRANCE HIDDEN UNDER THE CHAR ROOM SUB-FLOORING. THIS ENTRANCE WILL BE ENLARGED TO PERMIT THE MATERIALS REQUIRED FOR A BARRIER WALL TO BE ERECTED AT THE EMBASSY GROUNDS BOUNDARY IN THE TUNNEL PROPER.
5. ONCE CHIMNEY AND CHAR ROOM TUNNEL ARE SECURE FROM FURTHER COMPROMISE WORK WILL COMMENCE ON ANALYZING THE ANTENNA ARRAY ASSEMBLY. DEPARTMENTAL GUIDANCE IS REQUESTED SOONEST REGARDING ANTENNA DISASSEMBLY AND/OR RETRIEVAL.
MATLOCK
Twenty minutes later, Matlock followed up this cable with a request.
MOSCOW, MAY 26, 1978, 1445Z
11859. SUBJECT: TECHNICAL PENETRATION. REF: STATE 134109.2
1. SUBJECT TO AMBASSADOR TOON’S CONCURRENCE [Toon was in D.C., so Matlock couldn’t contact him easily], EMBASSY RECOMMENDS STRONGLY THAT VIGOROUS PROTEST BE LODGED WITH SOVIETS REGARDING MAJOR PHYSICAL PENETRATION OF EMBASSY PREMISES, IN TOTAL VIOLATION OF ALL PRINCIPLES OF EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS GUARANTEEING IT. PERTINENT FACTS WHICH MIGHT BE MENTIONED INCLUDE:
A. CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE OF SURREPTITIOUS ACCESS TO EMBASSY PROPERTY.
B. EVIDENCE OF SYSTEMATIC AND REPEATED VIOLATION OF EMBASSY PREMISES BY SOVIET PERSONNEL.
C. INSTALLATION AND OPERATION OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES ON EMBASSY PROPERTY.
2. CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE GIVEN TO DELIVERING PROTEST TO GROMYKO DURING WEEKEND MEETINGS, PARTICULARLY IF HE WEIGHS IN HEAVILY ON CHERNYAYEV AND ENGER ARREST.3 [These were two undercover KGB officers working at the Soviet mission to the UN in New York. Gandy was well aware of their arrest and concerned that he might be arrested to swap for Cherneyev and Enger.]
3. THIS WOULD SEEM APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE AT HIGH LEVEL OUR STANDING DEMAND THAT MICROWAVE SIGNALS DIRECTED AT EMBASSY BE SHUT OFF FORTHWITH. (ALTHOUGH FINAL JUDGMENT MUST AWAIT FULL TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT, IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE DEVICES WE DISCOVERED ARE ASSOCIATED WITH MICROWAVES [MUTS])
MATLOCK
MOSCOW, MAY 26, 1978, 2352Z
11787. FOR DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY READ FROM CHARGE [Chargé d’Affaires Matlock]. SUBJECT: MAJOR TECHNICAL PENETRATION OF EMBASSY MOSCOW.
1. ASSUME SY [State Department security] HAS BRIEFED YOU ON DETAILS OF MAJOR PENETRATION OF EMBASSY PREMISES DISCOVERED TODAY. WE FACE URGENT AND CRITICAL DECISION WHETHER TO ATTEMPT TO REMOVE CABLING AND OTHER EQUIPMENT FROM PORTION OF TUNNEL WHICH IS OUTSIDE THE BOUNDS OF EMBASSY TERRITORY. WE CONSIDER IT PROBABLE, BUT NOT ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN, THAT THE SOVIETS ARE AWARE OF OUR DISCOVERY. NEVERTHELESS, OUR PEOPLE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THEY CAN RETRIEVE MUCH OF THE CABLING WITHOUT MAJOR PHYSICAL DANGER (THERE IS WITHOUT QUESTION SOME DANGER INVOLVED) IF THEY DO SO TONIGHT.
2. TECHNICIANS CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT TO RETRIEVE FOLLOWING FROM SOVIET END OF TUNNEL TO DETERMINE PURPOSE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM:
• A. SECTION OF EACH OF 3 CABLES WHICH RUN FROM METAL PLATE UP TUNNEL, AND INTO SOVIET APARTMENT HOUSE. THESE ARE BELIEVED TO BE RF CABLES BUT MAY CONCEIVABLY BE POWER CABLES.
• B. DEVICE (PROBABLY COUPLER) IN PLASTIC BAG WHERE TRIP WIRES AND SOME CABLING TERMINATE.
• C. SECTION OF EACH OF TWO CABLES EXITING TUNNEL ROOF SEVERAL FEET IN FRONT OF METAL BARRIER.
3. I AM INFORMED THAT THE CABLE CAN BE CUT WITHOUT DANGER TO PERSON CUTTING. RETRIEVAL OF PLASTIC BAG WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY ATTACHING ROPE AND PULLING FROM OUR END WHEN ALL PERSONNEL ARE OUTSIDE TUNNEL, IN CASE THE TRIP WIRE SHOULD ACTIVATE EXPLOSIVE OR GAS.
4. ASIDE FROM PHYSICAL RISK, WHICH IS PROBABLY ACCEPTABLE IF RECOVERY OF ITEMS IS CONSIDERED CRUCIAL, THERE IS OF COURSE THE POLITICAL RISK INVOLVED IN REMOVING OBJECTS FROM SOVIET TERRITORY. INASMUCH AS ALL OF THIS EQUIPMENT APPEARS TO BE A PART OF A SYSTEM WHICH HAS FLAGRANTLY VIOLATED EMBASSY TERRITORY, A DECISION TO REMOVE WOULD PROBABLY BE DEFENSIBLE, IF THE SOVIETS SHOULD COMPLAIN. HOWEVER, THIS IS A QUESTION OF SUFFICIENT GRAVITY THAT I BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE DECIDED AT A HIGH POLITICAL LEVEL. IF IT WERE MY DECISION, I WOULD GIVE IT A TRY.
5. IF WE ARE TO PROCEED, WE MUST HAVE INSTRUCTIONS NO LATER THAN 6:00 A.M. MOSCOW TIME (11:00 P.M. EST).2
MATLOCK
After Carl, LeChevet, and Bainbridge had made multiple forays into the chimney and tunnel, the chances that the Soviets knew of the chimney discovery were quickly rising, so, to protect the chimney from interference, LeChevet requested an armed Marine guard station himself with a flash camera at the base of the tunnel to wait for the Russians to inspect the shaft. The three also agreed to cut an observation panel into the wall opposite the antenna to monitor it, and possibly grab it, if the Russians tried to recover it first.
Jon got to work directing the Seabees to create an observation port, as well as a shelf below the antenna to prevent it from falling to the chimney floor, then paid the commander of the embassy Marine guards a visit.
The next day, a Marine stationed himself at the base of the shaft in total darkness and waited. After a few hours, he heard the creak of hinges—probably from the basement door that Carl had seen the day before. Looking into the gloom, the guard saw no light at all from that direction. But after sixty seconds, he did hear labored breathing approaching. When the guard judged that the man—or men—who were advancing toward him were within a few feet of him, he pointed his camera in their direction and activated the flash.
For the briefest instant, he caught a ghostly impression of a very surprised KGB technician, who promptly turned and scurried back the way he had come.
Mission accomplished, the guard climbed up through the trapdoor in the changing room and emerged from the tunnel with his camera.
When the film in his camera was developed later that day, it clearly showed the face of a very surprised KGB man in coveralls.
If the Russians hadn’t already known about the Americans getting into the chimney, they certainly did now.
MOSCOW, MAY 27, 1978, 1516Z
11950. SUBJECT: TECHNICAL PENETRATION OF US EMBASSY MOSCOW. REF: STATE 135571.2
1. PHYSICAL BARRIER WAS ERECTED [by LeChevet’s team to protect the chimney] EARLY THIS MORNING. BARRIER IS BRICK, REINFORCED CONCRETE, AND SHEET STEEL AND LOCATED APPROXIMATELY TWO FEET WITHIN EMBASSY PROPERTY. BARRIER ERECTED AT NORTH EDGE OF SECOND HATCH ENTRANCE IN SOVIET CHANGE ROOM. THIS IS ABOUT 18 FEET DOWN TUNNEL FROM CHIMNEY ENTRANCE.
2. WE ATTEMPTED TO ERECT BARRIER AT EMBASSY PROPERTY LINE, BUT EFFORTS WERE THWARTED BY SOVIET HARASSMENT (POUNDING ON WALL, ERECTION OF TRIP LINE IN TUNNEL, PRODDING INTO TUNNEL WITH S
TEEL BARS FROM SOVIET BASEMENT, AND VERBAL ABUSE). [The Soviets were now overtly reacting, possibly due to the flash photography incident.]
3. [One line not declassified.] A 24 HOUR MARINE POST REMAINS AT SOVIET CHANGE ROOM.
4. PER PARA 1 OF REFTEL WE HAVE BARRED ALL SOVIETS AND CHARS FROM THE CHANCERY. IT WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL TO BAR CHARS FROM ALL AREAS OF BUILDING (APARTMENTS, BASEMENT, FIRST FLOOR) AND WOULD PROBABLY ALERT PRESS.
5. RESIDENT TSOS [technical security officers] WILL SURVEY BUILDING FOR OTHER CHIMNEYS AND SHAFTS THAT MIGHT POSSIBLY BE USED FOR SIMILAR INSTALLATIONS.
6. EQUIPMENT IS ON SITE TO CONDUCT LIMITED NON-DESTRUCTIVE TESTS OF ANTENNA. WE HAVE LEVELED GENERATORS, CALIBRATED DIPOLES, RECEIVERS, SPECTRUM ANALYZERS, AND PREAMP POWER SUPPLY. FIRST PRIORITY WILL BE TO DETERMINE BANDWIDTH OF SYSTEM [the bandwidth, or range of frequencies that the antenna and attached circuits spanned, would give clues to which types of bugs were used and how they transmitted information to KGB listening posts].
7. TEST PROCEDURES SUGGESTED IN PARA 4 OF REFTEL WILL BE CARRIED OUT TO EXTENT POSSIBLE.
8. EXTENSIVE PHOTOGRAPHIC DOCUMENTATION IS BEING MAINTAINED.
9. PER PARA 7 OF REFTEL, ACCESS AT SEVEN LEVEL AND SOVIET CHANGE ROOM WILL BE PRESERVED.
10. MUTS MONITORING CONTINUES AS BEFORE. NO CHANGES IN TIME OF ACTIVITY OR GENERAL SPECTRAL SHAPE HAS BEEN OBSERVED.
11. PER PARA 10 OF REFTEL:
(A) GENERAL APPEARANCE OF ANTENNA INDICATES RECENT (PAST YEAR OR SO) INSTALLATION. GENERAL APPEARANCE OF MACHINERY AND ELECTRONICS AT BOTTOM OF SHAFT INDICATES MUCH OLDER INSTALLATION. GRILL INSTALLED AT TOP OF CHIMNEY ALSO APPEARS TO BE OF RECENT VINTAGE. PLEASE NOTE THAT CLOSE VISUAL INSPECTION OF ANTENNA OR GRILL WOULD REQUIRE DISTURBING ANTENNA. [These descriptions are emphasized to imply that the antenna was actively listening to a bug or implant, or to U.S. wireless communications within the bandwidth of the system.]
(B) ANTENNA CAN BE HOISTED SEVERAL FEET ABOVE SOUTH WING ROOF LEVEL. CONFIRMATION OF THIS FACT WILL REQUIRE ACTUAL MOVEMENT OF ANTENNA.
The Spy in Moscow Station Page 9