(A few telegrams, like those Hathaway sent, were handwritten on special forms, then converted into digital text via an OCR, then transmitted over one of the embassy’s encrypted communications links.)
What kind of typed State Department telegrams were sent from Moscow, and what did they contain?
Ironically, the first clue to that question can be found in the cables that went from Moscow to Washington, D.C., when the chimney antenna was discovered. If George Herrmann was right that essentially all telegrams out of Moscow were typed on IBM machines, then the telegrams that Jack Matlock sent, reproduced in chapter 4, to State in D.C. about the “technical penetration” were typed on IBM machines that the KGB had implanted. As mentioned earlier, the placement and aim of the chimney antenna (directly at Toon’s and Matlock’s offices) suggested that the KGB was exploiting those very machines.
This means that the Soviets were almost certainly listening to the State Department describe the chimney antenna of the very KGB collection system that was the subject of Matlock’s cables.
Similarly, Matlock’s and Toon’s regular cables to D.C. about the TUMS and MUTS measurements (such as the one included in chapter 3) also were typed on compromised machines, so the Soviets were monitoring—through the GUNMAN bugs—the U.S. monitoring of Soviet microwave monitoring.
True spy-versus-spy stuff.
It seemed that the Soviet official who, in an argument with Arthur Hartman over the gas pipeline, had claimed in 1982 to “read everything you send back to the States” was actually telling the truth.
Declassified State Department archives provide other hints about what the KGB read coming out of the U.S. embassy in Moscow. Here are examples of cables typed on IBM machines that were almost certainly compromised.
This first cable from DCM Matlock, titled “SOVIET MAN REPORTEDLY FRUSTRATED BY SITUATION IN POLAND,” citing an unnamed Soviet citizen, describes KGB activities in Poland. The classification of the document has been blacked out, but given the subject (the KGB and confidential informants whose relationship with the United States had to be kept away from the Soviets), it was probably TS (TOP SECRET).7
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3793 I
SUBJECT: SOVIET KGB MAN REPORTEDLY FRUSTRATED BY SITUATION IN POLAND
1. (TS) ENTIRE TEXT) D C
2. SOVIET KGB OFFICERS STATIONED IN POLAND ARE REPORTEDLY FRUSTRATED OVER THEIR INABILITY TO CARRY OUT SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST SOLIDARITY LEADERS, ACCORDING TO A MOSCOW REFUSENIK SOURCE. THE SOURCE, C WHO IS WELL KNOWN TO EMBOFF [embassy officials] BUT WHOSE INFORMATION CAN NOT ALWAYS BE CONFIRMED, CLAIMED TO HAVE HEARD THIS ASSESSMENT FROM AN ACQUAINTANCE WHO IS SEEKING TO JOIN THE KGB AND WHO REPORTEDLY SPOKE RECENTLY TO A KGB OFFICER JUST RETURNED FROM POLAND. ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCE, THE KGB MAN TOLD THE POTENTIAL RECRUITEE THAT “THINGS WERE A MESS” IN POLAND, AND THAT THE KGB WAS NOT ABLE TO WORK EFFECTIVELY THERE NOW. HE REPORTEDLY SAID THE KGB HAD CONSIDERED BUT THEN ABANDONED PLANS TO KIDNAP OR PHYSICALLY INTIMIDATE POLISH UNION LEADERS BECAUSE THEIR PERSONAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS WERE “TOO GOOD.” HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT SOVIET KGB WORKERS STATIONED IN [redacted] POLAND HAD A “MORALE PROBLEM” BECAUSE THEY WERE BEING KEPT ON THE SIDELINES, WITHOUT A CLEAR SENSE OF WHAT THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO BE TRYING TO DO.
3. COMMENT: WE DO NOT KNOW HOW MUCH CREDENCE TO GIVE THIS ADMITTEDLY THIRD-HAND ACCOUNT BUT REPORT IT AS POSSIBLY REFLECTING THE ATTITUDE OF A LOW LEVEL CADRE PROBABLY USED TO OPERATING MORE DIRECTLY WITH LESS RESTRAINT END COMMENT
MATLOCK
The next cable, read by the KGB and probably also classified TOP SECRET, is intriguing because it includes the instructions in paragraph three (PROTECT) to protect the fact that the Polish ambassador was speaking freely to the United States, although the Polish ambassador himself, according to Hartman in paragraph ten of the cable, assumed that the Soviets were eavesdropping on the conversation and was making certain statements for the benefit of “listening Soviet ears.”
If the Polish ambassador had in fact assumed the KGB would learn of the conversation, he had been correct.8
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9120
1 (S) ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY POLISH AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW OLSZEWSKI WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT EVENTS IN POLAND AND TOOK A TOUGH, SOVIET-SOUNDING LINE IN A MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HARTMAN NOVEMBER 17. IN ADDITION TO PAGE 02 MOSCOW 15919 01 OF 02 171829Z BEMOANING THE DROP IN POLAND’S INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT, OLSZEWSKI ATTACKED SOLIDARITY, DERIDED THE IDEA OF THREE-WAY POWER SHARING, PRAISED SOVIET ATD, AND CRITICIZED WESTERN RADIO STATIONS—IN SHORT, HE HEWED TO A LINE THAT WOULD PLEASE SOVIET EARS, WHICH MAY WELL HAVE BEEN LISTENING. FOR WHATEVER REASON, OLSZEWSKI’S PESSIMISTIC VIEW CONTRASTS SHARPLY WITH THE TOLERANT, HOPEFUL LINE ANOTHER POLISH EMBASSY OFFICER HAS BEEN PURVEYING TO US AND OTHER WESTERN DIPLOMATS THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS.
3. POLISH AMBASSADOR KAZIMERZ OLSZEWSKI (PROTECT) BEGAN BY DISCUSSING AT LENGTH HIS COUNTRY’S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES EXT OF TELEGRAM B1MOSCOW015919. EXHIBITING LITTLE SYMPATHY FOR THE CRINGES THAT HAVE COME ABOUT IN POLAND DURING THE PAST FIFTEEN MONTHS, HE ATTACKED SOLIDARITY—WITHOUT MENTIONING THE UNION BY NAME—FOR THE DETRIMENTAL EFFECT HE SAID IT HAD HAD ON THE COUNTRY’S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WELL-BEING. HE NOTED THAT IN THE COURSE OF ONE YEAR, POLAND’S INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT HAS DROPPED BACK TO THE LEVEL OF 1968’S AND “NOT A DAY PASSES” WITHOUT A STRIKE BEING CALLED SOMEWHERE IN POLAND.
4. OLSZEWSKI BEMOANED THE POLISH GOVERNMENT’S DECISION TO CONSULT WITH SOLIDARITY AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, SAYING THAT THE GOVERNMENT’S WILLINGNESS TO SHARE POWER WITH THE CHURCH WAS REMINISCENT OF THE MIDDLE AGES, WHEN POWER IN POLAND WAS—INEFFECTIVELY—SHARED BY THE KINGS THE SLECHTAS AND THE CHURCH. THE ONLY OTHER STATE IN THE MODERN WORLD IN WHICH THE RELIGIOUS AUTHORITIES HAVE SO MUCH POWER, HE SAID WAS IRAN. THUS HE CONTINUED THERE ARE THREE CENTERS OF POWER IN POLAND, NONE OF THEM WITH ANY POWER. HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS DONE NOTHING BUT TALK, YET NOBODY LISTENS. DISCIPLINE WITHIN SOLIDARITY IS COLLAPSING, AND THE NEW POLISH PRIMATE, ARCHBISHOP GLEMP, SAYS ONE THING, WHILE “HIS SUBORDINATES DO QUITE ANOTHER.” IN SHORT, HE SAID THERE IS “NO END IN SIGHT” TO THE CURRENT CRISIS.
5. AMBASSADOR HARTMAN ASKED ABOUT PLANS FOR STABILIZING THE SITUATION IN POLAND. OLSZEWSKI SAID THERE ARE TWO PLANS, ONE ECONOMIC AND THE OTHER POLITICAL. THE ECONOMIC PLAN, HE SAID, CALLS FOR REFORMS IN MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION’S “EXTREME” DECENTRALIZATION OF DECISION-MAKING POWER, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GREATER INCENTIVES FOR WORKERS. THE POLITICAL PLAN CALLS FOR AVOIDING THE USE OF FORCE BY THE GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT AND CREATION OF A FRONT OF NATIONAL AGREEMENT, TO ACCOMPLISH POWER-SHARING WITH THE CHURCH AND THE UNION
6. ASKED BY AMBASSADOR HARTMAN ABOUT THE REACTION OF POLISH WORKERS TO “ADVICE” THEY MIGHT GET FROM THE IMF TO INCREASE WORKER PRODUCTIVITY, OLSZEWSKI DECLARED “THEY OF COURSE WILL NOT LIKE IT” BUT THEY WILL NOT HEED IT ANY MORE THAN THEY CURRENTLY HEED THE GOVERNMENT OR, INCREASINGLY, THEIR OWN UNIONS.
7. ON THE QUESTION OF SOVIET AID, OLSZEWSKI CLAIMED THAT WITHOUT IT ~ POLAND WOULD BE COMPLETELY BANKRUPT IN “TWO OR THREE DAYS” CITING THE 1982 PLAN, HE SAID THAT IF THE SOVIET UNION INSISTED ON A “BALANCED EXCHANGE, WHICH THEY ARE ENTITLED TO DO UNDER THE TERMS OF THEIR AGREEMENTS WITH POLAND,” THEN THE USSR COULD LEGALLY DELIVER, ON THE AVERAGE, LESS THAN ONE HALF OF THEIR COMMITMENTS OF OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, NATURAL GAS, AND COTTON, TO SAY NOTHING OF GOLD, INDUSTRIAL DIAMONDS, AND SO FORTH. GIVEN THEIR SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC STAKE, IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SO INTERESTED IN WHAT IS HAPPENING IN POLAND, OLSZEWSKI SAID.
8. AMBASSADOR HARTMAN ASKED OLSZEWSKI IF HE THOUGHT THE SOVIETS REALLY BELIEVED THEIR OWN CHARGE THAT THE WEST ~ AND PARTICULARLY THE U.S. WAS INTERFERING IN POLAND’S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, OR IF THE ACCUSATIONS WERE SIMPLY PROPAGANDA. OLSZEWSKI REPLIED “IN ALL HONESTY” THAT IF ONE LISTENED TO THE WESTERN RADIOS ESPECIALLY RADIO FREE EUROPE, AS HE CLAIMED HE DOES “CONSTANTLY,” ONE WOULD HAVE TO CONCLUDE THAT THESE BROADCASTS CONSTITUTE �
�DIRECT INTERFERENCE IN POLAND’S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, “AND THAT MANY OF THEM CONTAIN “DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS” TO CERTAIN ELEMENTS ON “WHEN AND WHERE TO ACT.” AMBASSADOR HARTMAN OBJECTED, STATING THAT HE KNEW THESE BROADCASTS WERE CAREFULLY EDITED TO AVOID APPEARING TO INTERFERE IN THE CRISIS, AND THAT THEY CONTAIN FACTUAL STATEMENTS ON THE SITUATION IN POLAND. OLSZEWSKI REJOINED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE IN MIND THE NEWS PROGRAMS, BUT RATHER COMMENTARIES AND EDITORIALS, AND THAT HE STOOD BY HIS CHARGE.
9. IN CONCLUSION, OLSZEWSKI EMPHASIZED HIS COUNTRY’S INTEREST IN AN IMPROVED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR, AND STATED HIS HOPE THAT HARTMAN WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL IN HELPING TO BRING THAT ABOUT.
10. COMMENT: LIKE MANY POLES THESE DAYS BUT UNLIKE AT LEAST ONE YOUNGER MEMBER OF HIS OWN STAFF, OLSZEWSKI HAS A DESPERATE TONE. I HAVE MET HIM A NUMBER OF TIMES OVER THE YEARS AND HAVE ALWAYS FOUND HIM A PRAGMATIC INTELLIGENT FELLOW; SOME OF WHAT HE SAID, I BELIEVE, WAS INTENDED FOR LISTENING SOVIET EARS. OLSZEWSKI HAS BEEN HERE [Moscow] SINCE 1978 AND SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN LEFT RELATIVELY UNTOUCHED BY THE HISTORIC EVENTS OF 1980-81. HE TOLD ME THAT HE AND HIS WIFE HAVE “MANY FRIENDS: DOCTORS, PROFESSORS, ARTISTS AND ACTORS, “BUT THAT NOW, WHEN THEY GO BACK TO WARSAW, “WE FIND WE CANNOT TALK WITH THEM.” OLSZEWSKI SAID THAT HE WAS “EXILED” TO MOSCOW BECAUSE OF A FALLING OUT WITH THE OLD REGIME (GIEREK). LIKE MANY POLES BEFORE HIM, HE HAS A HANKERING FOR THE STRONG-MAN SOLUTION. SINCE HE DID NOT ONCE MENTION JARUZELSKI, EXCEPT TO SCOFF AT “TRI-LATERAL” GOVERNMENT, I CAN ONLY CONCLUDE THAT HE DOES NOT SEE HIS PRESENT LEADER AS THE SOLUTION. END COMMENT.
MATLOCK
Aside from tipping off the KGB about the existence and identities of U.S. sources, such as Refuseniks (Jewish Soviet citizens who wanted to emigrate but were denied exit visas) and Warsaw Pact ambassadors, the KGB’s bugs in IBM typewriters that prepared classified cables also gave the Soviets invaluable insights about U.S. negotiating positions and strategies on issues such as nuclear arms control.
A 1981 cable from Jack Matlock in Moscow to the State Department in D.C. provides an example of the kind of insights the Soviets gleaned about U.S. thinking. This cable was originally classified SECRET. Note Matlock’s assessment of the negotiating strategy that the Soviets were likely to take, along with his detailed recommendations about tactics to handle expected Soviet positions. (Numerous paragraphs have been deleted for brevity.)9
MOSCOW, SEPTEMBER 8, 1981, 1337Z
12552. FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER FROM CHARGE. SUBJECT: GROMYKO AS AN INTERLOCUTOR. REF: STATE 237032.2
1. (SECRET—ENTIRE TEXT).
4. TACTICS FOR THE BILATERAL [discussion on arms control with the United States]: GROMYKO’S PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO MOVE THE U.S. INTO NEGOTIATION OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, PARTICULARLY SALT AND TNF, WITHOUT MAKING CONCESSIONS IN OTHER AREAS. HE WILL HAMMER HARD AGAINST LINKAGE, AS HE DID WITH THE SENATORS. HE WILL PROBABLY COME ON AS THE “WOUNDED PARTY,” WITH REPETITION OF SOME OF THE THEMES HE PLAYED TO CRANSTON AND MATHIAS: THE U.S. ILLOGICALLY SUSPENDED THE SALT PROCESS, THE U.S. IS AN UNRELIABLE PARTNER WITH CHANGES IN POLICY EVERY FOUR YEARS, SOVIET INTENTIONS ARE PURE AND IT IS THE U.S. WHICH IS FLEXING ITS MUSCLES DANGEROUSLY, HEIGHTENING TENSIONS AND FANNING A WAR PSYCHOSIS.
5. SUCH AN APPROACH HAS THE OBVIOUS TACTICAL AIM OF PUTTING THE SECRETARY ON THE DEFENSIVE, IN EFFECT CHALLENGING HIM TO “PROVE” U.S. GOOD FAITH AND RELIABILITY BY MOVING TOWARD THE SOVIET POSITION THAT ARMS CONTROL SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED WITHOUT REGARD TO OTHER ISSUES. NOT ALL OF IT WILL BE SHAM, HOWEVER. GROMYKO AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED WITH THEIR INABILITY TO GET A LONG-TERM “FIX” ON U.S. POLICY; THEY GENUINELY FIND THE MAJOR U.S. POLICY SHIFTS THAT THEY EXPERIENCE EVERY FOUR YEARS A PERPLEXING AND FRUSTRATING EXPERIENCE.
THEY PROBABLY ALSO HONESTLY SUSPECT THAT CURRENT U.S. POLICY AIMS AT STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY AND HAVE GENUINE DOUBTS (WHICH THEY ARE TOO CAGEY TO ADMIT) THAT THEY COULD MATCH US IN AN ALL-OUT ARMS RACE.
6. GROMYKO WILL BE A MASTER OF HIS BRIEF AND WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO CHANNEL THE DISCUSSION INTO THOSE AREAS OF PRIMARY INTEREST TO THE SOVIETS. ALTHOUGH HE IS CAPABLE OF EMPLOYING FILIBUSTERING TACTICS (AS HE DID WITH THE SENATORS), I DOUBT THAT HE WOULD INSULT THE SECRETARY WITH EXCESSIVELY LONG WINDED LECTURES. BUT HE WILL BOLSTER HIS PRESENTATION WITH FREQUENT EXAMPLES WHICH CRY OUT FOR REFUTATION, AND IT WOULD PROBABLY BE A MISTAKE TO RISE AUTOMATICALLY TO THE BAIT, SINCE THIS WOULD IN EFFECT ENABLE HIM TO DETERMINE THE AGENDA OF THE DISCUSSION.
7. I BELIEVE THE SECRETARY CAN BEST COPE WITH THESE TACTICS BY INSISTING ON A FULL DISCUSSION OF THE PRIORITY ITEMS ON OUR AGENDA. IF GROMYKO CHOOSES TO PLAY THE “OFFENDED PARTY” ROLE, THE SECRETARY SHOULD COUNTER IN KIND WITH A CLEAR EXPOSITION OF THOSE SOVIET ACTIONS WHICH HAVE BROUGHT US TO THE CURRENT UNSATISFACTORY RELATIONSHIP. (THIS SHOULD BE DONE IN ANY EVENT, BUT THE TONE AND CONTEXT MIGHT BE ADJUSTED TO THE EMOTIONAL LEVEL GROMYKO CHOOSES TO ADOPT.)
8. ONE FAVORITE GROMYKO TACTIC IS SIMPLY TO IGNORE SIGNIFICANT POINTS RAISED BY HIS INTERLOCUTOR, AND TO TALK ABOUT OTHER THINGS UNTIL TIME RUNS OUT. THE SECRETARY SHOULD NOT LET A SENSE OF POLITENESS DETER HIM FROM RETURNING REPEATEDLY TO POINTS OF INTEREST TO US IF GROMYKO PROVES EVASIVE IN RESPONDING TO THEM.
9. AS THE SECRETARY’S AGENDA IS WORKED OUT, IT WOULD BE WELL TO BEAR IN MIND THAT THE SOVIETS WILL TAKE IT AS A CLEAR SIGNAL THAT ANY SUBJECT OMITTED IS SECONDARY TO THE ONES RAISED, IN OUR ASSESSMENT OF PRIORITIES. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE SECRETARY MUST PROVIDE A DEFINITIVE CATALOG OF ALL OUR DESIDERATA—WHICH WOULD BE QUITE IMPOSSIBLE IN ANY CASE—BUT SIMPLY THAT IF HE DOES NOT TALK ABOUT (FOR EXAMPLE) COMPLIANCE ISSUES OR MENTION THAT WE STILL EXPECT MORE ON SVERDLOVSK, THE SOVIET INFERENCE WILL BE THAT OUR CONCERNS ON THESE MATTERS ARE NOT REALLY VERY ACUTE. FOR THOSE SUBJECTS RAISED, THE SOVIETS WILL BE ATTENTIVE TO SUCH MATTERS AS THE LENGTH OF TIME SPENT ON THEM AND THE VIGOR OF THEIR PRESENTATION AS DIRECT CLUES TO U.S. PRIORITIES. PERFUNCTORY MENTION OF A SUBJECT CAN BE INTERPRETED AS SIGNALING LOW PRIORITY SINCE THE PRESUMPTION WOULD BE THAT IT WAS READ INTO THE RECORD MERELY TO SATISFY SOME INTEREST GROUP OR COTERIE.
10. IF ANY PORTION OF THE MEETING IS CONDUCTED ONE-ON-ONE, THE OPPORTUNITY SHOULD BE USED TO CONVEY OUR MOST IMPORTANT POINTS AS DIRECTLY AND POINTEDLY AS ELEMENTARY POLITENESS PERMITS. GROMYKO, LIKE MOST RUSSIANS, CAN TAKE STRAIGHT TALK IN PRIVATE. INDEED, THEY PRIZE IT, AND THE SIGNALS GIVEN AT SUCH A MEETING—SHOULD ONE BE HELD—WILL BE THE MOST IMPORTANT HE WILL BRING BACK TO MOSCOW WITH HIM (ASSUMING GROMYKO DOES NOT MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT).
MATLOCK
Although very few TOP SECRET cables from Moscow outlining U.S. negotiating positions and strategies have been declassified, from George Herrmann’s assertion that virtually all cables were typed on IBMs, it is safe to assume that, from 1976 through 1984, when the GUNMAN bugs were active, the KGB collected a significant amount of information on U.S. positions in TOP SECRET Moscow-to-D.C. cables on nuclear arms negotiations, such as SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), and INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaties) that were discussed during that period.10
Whether the KGB’s possession of that sensitive information resulted in more favorable terms for Russia in various nuclear arms agreements—advantages that persist to this very day—is unknowable, but it’s hard to imagine that the Soviets knowing about U.S. negotiating goals and tactics prior to arms negotiations helped U.S. interests.
But what about Gandy’s original reason for traveling to Moscow in 1978: Hathaway’s concern that leaks in the embassy were exposing CIA assets and CIA case officers to the KGB? Is there any evidence that the GUNMAN implants played a role in these compromises or that putting an end to KGB collection of typed information made CIA case officers and their assets safer?
In addition to asserting that the GUNMAN bugs compromised no human assets, Burton Gerber went on to say that each and every asset roll-up or case officer PNG between 1976 and 1984 had been fully explained by factors unrelated to GUNMAN. Ogorodnik, for example, had been betrayed by a Czech double agent named Koecher.11 while Richard Os
borne, Peter Bogatyr, Lon Augustenborg, and Louis Thomas were expelled either because of rare examples of flawed tradecraft or, more often, successful dangles, where the KGB entrapped the CIA men with Soviet “volunteers” under KGB control.
Asked about the arrest for espionage of Soviet citizen B. Nilov in 1981 and four Soviet scientists that the Soviet newspaper Moskovskaya Pravda (Moscow Truth) claimed were arrested for spying for the CIA in 1982,12 Gerber replied, “There were no such assets. Don’t believe everything you read in the Soviet press.” (Gerber’s skepticism is well-placed, because the Kremlin insiders sometimes publicly claimed that political dissidents, or merely those who’d fallen out of political favor, were spies in order to discredit them.)
The dangle explanation of CIA case officer expulsions, however, raises the question of how the KGB knew to target those CIA men in the first place.
Here we encounter a potential flaw in the assertion that GUNMAN implants in IBM typewriters played no role in HUMINT compromises in Moscow from 1976 through 1984.
Although CIA and State Department operations were kept separate, and the CIA station was much more secure than the rest of the embassy, as Burton Gerber stated, CIA case officers in the embassy were officially U.S. government employees. This meant that, when new CIA case officers were sent to foreign postings, the State Department in D.C. had to know who they were and had to communicate their identities to the ambassador and DCM. In addition, when CIA deployed officers for temporary duty (TDY), that information also had to be transmitted to senior embassy officials. These D.C.-to-Moscow communications were not compromised by GUNMAN implants, but the embassy’s response to those communications, through something called the Roger channel, was almost certainly compromised, because Roger-channel telegrams were typed on IBM Selectrics.
The Spy in Moscow Station Page 23