At the end of August 1990, I transferred to SOCOM at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, and became the Deputy Director of Simulations and Analysis. I had the task of overseeing the analysis that would determine special-operations-forces funding into the next century. It was not the most exciting work I’d ever done, but the Iraqis helped make my assignment more interesting. During Desert Storm, I was in charge of the SOCOM liaison to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), getting more SOCOM forces employed in the war and helping the CENTCOM commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, meet terrorist threats outside the combat area. For me, Desert Storm was simple: I went, we conquered, and I came home.
I’d decided to retire from the Navy two days before I got tapped to go to Saudi Arabia. It was time for me to leave. I was too old and too senior to ever again command SEALs, and I knew I wasn’t going to be promoted to admiral. General Carl Stiner, for whom I’d worked in the past, was the commander in chief of SOCOM. In January 1992, when I left the Navy, he and Rear Admiral Chuck LeMoyne, an old swim buddy from UDT-22 days then assigned to SOCOM, gave me a rousing send-off. At a larger retirement ceremony than I had wanted, Stiner awarded me a “good-bye medal,” which I promptly noted should have gone to Becky for putting up with me for so many years. Becky and I were “piped over the side” to civilian life and left Tampa the next day. I haven’t been back and I haven’t looked back.
I became an independent consultant on security and other related matters. One of my clients has been my old Mekong Delta buddy Satch Baumgart. Satch got contracts to transport humanitarian aid—food—from the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossisk, by air to Yerevan, Armenia. I helped him set up the process and establish the security needed to ensure the cargo got to its destination.
The first time I went to Russia, I didn’t know what to expect. I found a country that in many ways reminded me of what America must have been like in the early 1900s. Communications were terrible. Roads, outside of Moscow, were all two lanes. It could take up to five hours to place a telephone call to a town twenty miles away—if you spoke Russian. It was a country in decay. Things have improved since my first visit. Two types of Russians have emerged: the ones who couldn’t shake their ties to the old way, and those who have become prosperous entrepreneurs, taking advantage of the “wild west” opportunities. There are a lot of rich Russians in Moscow now.
But there’s been a price for their new freedom. Out of the rubble of the former Communist Party the organized crime elements, popularly called mafias, have taken over business enterprises and aligned themselves with international crime organizations. Drugs, not a great problem under the old regime, have been flowing into Russia as a result. And the decentralization of political power has not only contributed to the rise of the mafias but also eroded the power the old Soviet Union had over its constituent republics. Decentralization has made Russia vulnerable to a force being increasingly discussed in the West: Islamic fundamentalism.
Ironically, the same two forces—drugs and fundamentalist Islam—now threaten the security of both the West and its former ideological competitor.
In Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tadzhikistan, and all former Soviet republics, lie deep-seated resentments toward the Russians for occupying and subjugating their people. These nations are fertile breeding grounds for the Islamic fundamentalist movement, and the movement is there in force. Additionally many of the republics within the Russian Federation have the same demographics and the same hatreds. Chechnya is the most visible of these, having already begun its war for independence; though the fighting has now stopped, the war is not yet over. Dagestan and North Ossetia could be next. I’m not sure that the Islamic fundamentalist movement had a hand in starting the fighting in Chechnya, but they certainly supported it with men and arms. Though this region has enormous mineral reserves, including large oil deposits, the economies are near collapse. As conditions worsen there will be more pressure to get rid of the people now running the countries, most of whom are former Communist Party members. The area is ripe for the fundamentalist picking.
Why worry about something that’s taking place on the other side of the world? Simple answer: oil. The reason we went to war with Iraq in the Persian Gulf. Another reason to worry lies right here in the United States. A growing segment of our population is suspicious and resentful of the government that runs our country. I’m convinced we still don’t know all those behind the terrible bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City. Though all evidence seems to point toward a domestic, anarchist fringe element, who knows? Could they have pulled off that bombing without international help? Who was the mysterious dark-haired, darkcomplexioned John Doe who has not yet been identified? For years, international terrorist organizations have been cooperating. The bombing of the World Trade Center in New York was not homegrown.
The wellspring of the fundamentalist movement is Iran, whose rulers consider Western culture inimical to their own. They have shown the will and the means to use force to further their movement. Things will get worse. When we supported the mujahedeen fighters in their struggle with the Soviets in Afghanistan, we created a well-armed, combat-experienced force for the fundamentalists. In Afghanistan, many Muslim countries saw an opportunity to rid themselves of their radical fundamentalist elements. They were happy to send “freedom fighters” to the aid of the mujahedeen. The problem was, those fighters weren’t all killed by the Soviets as expected. They won! And then, well armed with U.S. Stinger missiles and other Western arms, they went home. Now they are causing real problems and will continue to do so.
As the Islamic fundamentalist movement becomes more widespread and more energetic it will seek to deflect Western interest from their actions in the East. What better way to do that than to use domestic fringe elements to conduct acts of terrorism in the U.S., thereby focusing our attentions inward while the fundamentalists seek to take control of such eastern Islamic nations as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain? Three years ago, this scenario might have sounded far-fetched. Today, it’s not. We have to be ready. What can we do?
First, we ought to use Iraq as a counterbalance to the fundamentalist movement—a counter to Iran, right at the heart of the movement. To do that we have to start to bring Iraq back into the world’s political arena. George H. W. Bush may have been thinking the same thing when he ordered the cessation of Desert Storm. In the aftermath of the war many pundits chastised him for not going all the way to Baghdad and occupying the country. In a famous radio transmission, the commander of one of the 18th Airborne Corps units said, “I’m at the Basra road [the main road to Baghdad from Kuwait] and meeting no resistance. Should I turn left [toward Baghdad] or right in accordance with the plan?” Schwarzkopf told the commander to turn right. That was the correct answer, just as stopping the war when we did was the correct decision. Iraq, personified by Saddam, was the enemy of the moment.
But Iraq is not the real enemy for posterity. The Iranians occupy that lofty position, because they are the fount of the real enemy of Western goals in the region: Islamic fundamentalism. Fostered by Iran, the movement has spread throughout the Middle East and the former Soviet Union. If that trend continues (and I think it will), in the not too distant future we will see a large Islamic empire stretching east through the central Asian republics to the border of China, and west along the southern Mediterranean to the Atlantic Ocean. The empire will include Pakistan, which has a nuclear capability now, and Iran, which will probably have one soon. And the empire will control much of the world’s oil.
Second, the United States needs to develop better means to deal with one of the tools: fundamentalists’ international terrorism. The actions urged by President Clinton in the aftermath of the Oklahoma bombing are exactly what terrorists want. When we start pushing more control mechanisms on our society, we are helping the bad guys. More controls will mean more dissatisfied citizens and further unrest. More infringement on our historical liberties is not what�
�s needed.
We need to develop new strategies to deal with terrorism inside our borders. We have to get our heads out of the sand. The key to stopping a terrorist act is to know about it beforehand. Intelligence is the key to foiling terrorists, but getting good intelligence is not easy. All terrorist organizations are set up in cells—otherwise they don’t last long. It’s not impossible to infiltrate cells, but it’s difficult. It takes a lot of time and money. And it’s the only sure way to discern terrorists’ intentions. We can gather a lot of information electronically, but the bad guys know we’re listening so they routinely spread disinformation. We have to have brave, dedicated people inside the terrorist cells, as close to the organizational leaders as possible. Only by “looking the terrorists in the eyes” can we hope to stop them before they act.
Outside our country, the ingredient that’s all too often been missing is the political will to use force early enough. Many times I’ve sat in forward bases with highly trained and dedicated troops, waiting for the signal to go, only to be kept on a string until it was too late. Our political leadership calls the shots on the use of military force. I wouldn’t have it any other way. But we have to recognize that talking will get us only so far with people whose thinking is so unlike ours as to seem insane. We must be willing to “thump them on the heads” before we talk, instead of after. The United States has the best-trained commando forces in the world. They all volunteered for the chance to fight our country’s enemies. I know that’s what they want—I was one of them. But they should be employed wisely so they don’t become cannon fodder for well-intentioned but procrastinating politicians. They should be committed to action when the element of strategic surprise is in their favor, not after all else fails and the bad guys are just waiting for them to appear. Conducting raids on terrorist facilities by aircraft flying at 10,000 feet is not the best way to get their attention. We have to put forces on the ground and have them send the terrorists to meet their makers. We have to terrorize the terrorists in their sanctuaries, doing unto them before they do unto us. This strategy will also work against another of our national threats: drugs.
Drugs are as threatening to our national society as Islamic fundamentalism. Our streets are battlegrounds for drug gangs waging war on each other. Competition is intense among the gangs, intent on infecting the youth of America with their deadly product. I first got into the antidrug business by default in 1988 while I was in the Pentagon. Another division had primary responsibility for Navy counterdrug operations. When pressure started to build in Congress and elsewhere to involve our special operations forces on the ground in Central and South America and in the Pacific, I decided my shop needed to get involved.
DoD wanted no part of the antidrug effort. Military leaders reasoned correctly that the “war on drugs” really wasn’t a war and that eliminating the demand was the real solution to the problem. The military had been doing that internally, with fair success, but had neither the charter nor the means to do it for the entire country. Pentagon leaders figured any increased military involvement in combating the supply side—interdicting the drugs before they got into the United States—would come at the expense of readiness. The war-fighting ability of our forces would diminish. And if the military took responsibility for the “war on drugs,” it would be scapegoated when the war proved unwinnable given the Rules of Engagement.
Personally, I wanted to involve special operations forces to a greater extent than that envisioned under government policy, which provided for advising and training selected military units in Central and South America under the aegis of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). DEA agents are good and brave guys but not well versed on special operations tactics. Properly employed, our special operations forces could have made a major contribution, and our guys wanted to be involved. It was something real and that’s why all of us are in the business—we want to be involved in combat.
I floated a proposal up to my bosses, recommending that special operations forces target and eliminate drug lords in their safe areas. Nothing would make them give up the business as fast as knowing they were going to die if they didn’t. Capturing them and turning them over to their host countries wasn’t working. Bringing them back to our country for prosecution wasn’t working, either—we couldn’t get them extradited. Drug lords have too much money and influence; they routinely escape prosecution by hiring high-priced legal “gunslingers” to get them off. The only way to pressure them is to make them fear for their lives.
Not surprisingly, my bosses said, “Great idea, Bob—no.” The Secretary of Defense and the service chiefs were afraid of being dragged so far into the war that DoD would be held responsible for the outcome. Even though what I was suggesting would involve only intelligence and special operations, it was too far out to be accepted.
In the end, we developed a policy that protected our guys on the ground as much as possible. If they weren’t going to be used effectively, I wanted them used minimally. Anyway, the real solution from the beginning was on the demand side. We had to reduce drug usage in the United States. Someday we may get our national testosterone level high enough to do what’s required to eliminate the supply side. Maybe the problems drugs cause our society aren’t yet big enough to force our leaders to do the right thing.
Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, and drugs—these are the enemies of democracy in the twenty-first century. We must deal harshly with them. Maybe deadly force sounds outlandish because these three evils haven’t been viewed as a real problem by the average American; each has always been perpetrated on the other guy. But not anymore. Like the drug scourge, international terrorism sponsored by Islamic fundamentalists has invaded our country. It’s time that our national leadership stop viewing drugs and international terrorism in America as simply law enforcement issues—the problems are more complex and far-reaching.
Special operations forces are well suited to meet the challenges of terrorism and drugs. Existing posse comitatus laws preclude the routine use of military forces against domestic threats. Congress enacted those laws to ensure, among other things, that our military structure could not be exploited for internal political gain. That reason remains valid. But there is also a provision in the law for the president to authorize certain military forces to carry out specific missions. In the past, presidents have waived the law to combat situations that threatened national security. I was involved in executing one such waiver, the details of which I will not discuss. International terrorism and the continuing flow of drugs into our society are real threats to our national security. Our special operations forces have talents and capabilities not possessed by even the best-trained domestic law enforcement organizations. Our special operations forces should eliminate international terrorists and drug kingpins, wherever they live. Either Congress should modify the Posse Comitatus Act, or the president should issue a standing waiver, to allow our Special Operations Forces to enter the fray.
Those are my concluding thoughts. But though the final section of this book has been written, the final chapter of Bob Gormly’s life has not. I’ve dodged many bullets of all types and survived. I’ve been “dinged” in combat and punished by my many years of rigorous and dangerous SEAL training—and after-hours activities. I’m not unique. Anyone who’s survived nearly thirty years in the SEAL business will understand what I mean. We all have the same aches and pains. I tell people that had I known, when I was younger, that I would live this long, I’d have taken much better care of myself. As the doctor who performed my retirement physical explained to me after viewing my head-to-foot X rays, “Your problem, Captain, is not that you have the body of a sixty-five-year-old man. Your problem is that you still have the brain of an eighteen-year-old.”
No problem—lock and load.
GLOSSARY
AC-130—U.S. Air Force gunship designed to interdict targets on the ground and provide close air support. The aircraft is a basic C-130 modified with special weapons and electronics.
AH-6—U.S. Army light attack helicopter. Hughes 530 variant, affectionately dubbed “Killer Egg” because of the shape of the fuselage and the numerous weapons the helo can carry.
AN PVS-2—Vietnam-era Night Vision Device (NVD). Commonly called the “Starlight Scope” because it used ambient light to provide a magnified image, much as a telescope would do during the day. Newer versions are binocular.
APD—Converted World War II destroyer designed to carry underwater demolition teams.
auger stake—Device with a helix-twisted bottom, commonly used to anchor dog chains in the backyards of America; UDT adapted them to anchor survey lines during submerged reconnaissances.
barilyme—Carbon dioxide-scrubbing chemical used in the Emerson closed-circuit scuba.
Blackhawk—UH-60 helicopter. The basic troop-carrying helo for the U.S. Army.
Boat Support Unit—During the Vietnam era, the organization that ran most SEAL boats. The organizations are now called Special Boat Squadrons.
BTR-60—Russian armored personnel carrier. The BTR-60PB version is equipped with a ZPU-1 heavy machine gun.
BUDS—Basic Underwater Demolition SEAL. Present-day organization that runs basic training for all who seek to become SEALs. When I went through it, it was called UDT Replacement Training. Before that, it had other names, but it’s always had the same purpose: to provide only the best-qualified men to the Seal Teams.
bunker works—System of bunkers, connected to allow movement through the system.
Capewell—MC-1 military static-line parachute canopy-release system. Located where the two canopy risers attach to the jumper’s harness, capewells have a two-trigger assembly for each riser; the triggers must be pressed simultaneously to detach the riser from the harness and are often difficult to press when there is tension on the canopy.
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