Apart from these dubious electronic means, all other communications methods available relied upon the ability to see. Scouts (mostly the cavalry), runners and staff officers were still a major part of this system, seeing the situation for themselves and then reporting their findings to HQ. This limited the speed of information to that of a horse or motorcycle. Aeroplanes could provide information a little quicker, but even they had to travel over distance, and then either drop messages or land to pass information across. By far the fastest way to send information or orders was through semaphore (flags) or heliographs (mirrors). For these to work, messages had to be short, in code (in case the enemy also saw them), and, most importantly, visible. In thick fog, the communications of an army were extremely limited. When, as in the first attack on Gaza, insufficient reconnaissance had been carried out, and the plans for each unit had been left relatively vague until proper stock of the enemy positions could be taken, the lack of communications was crippling. It took too much time to gather the information required, and too much time to disseminate it, all hampered by a communications white-out.
Despite the fog, most units managed to find their starting points eventually. The cavalry completed the envelopment of the city and reached the sea to the north by around 10 a.m., and established communications with HQ Desert Column soon after. This had been positioned at In Seriate, along with the HQ of the EF. The co-location of these two headquarters would, rather than improving communications, cause some friction during the battle. Murray, meanwhile, had also come forward, leaving Cairo behind and establishing his HQ at El Arish. Here, he was too far away to actively influence events, but close enough to act as an uncomfortable spectre on the shoulders of his field commanders.
Several small Ottoman patrols or outposts had been encountered and dealt with by the cavalry on their march, although the real prize for the morning fell to the 7th Australian Light Horse:
When we set out from Magdhaba to cut in between Gaza and Beersheba we rode through a heavy fog and we managed to pass without being observed. A troop of the 7th regiment surrounded a carriage in which a Turkish General was travelling to Gaza. When he was requested to surrender by the sergeant he was highly insulted and stated ‘I can only surrender to a gentleman of my own rank’. The sergeant explained in no uncertain words that he would either surrender or be shot. He gave in but only if he was allowed to keep his sword until he could hand it over to someone of his own rank.38
The general was the commanding officer of the 53rd (OT) Infantry Division, on its way south from Jaffa to reinforce Gaza. The officer would spend much of the day in complaining about his treatment, or about his escort which had fled at the first sight of the Light Horseman, but he was still a significant intelligence coup.
Elsewhere, an equally surprising, although perhaps less valuable, encounter was made by the QOWH:
Major Ffrench-Blake with ‘A’ Squadron moved towards Sharia. On his way he surprised an enemy camp, strictly speaking a delousing station, when some 60 prisoners were gathered in without clothes, or a shot fired. It is only in Mr. Kipling’s story that men are found courageous enough to fight mother-naked. Breeches and bravery have a strange affinity.39
It had been hoped that the actual attack on Gaza could begin by 10 a.m., but while the vast majority of units were in position by then, Dallas was not ready. His reconnaissance of the Ottoman positions had had to wait until after the fog began to clear at 8 a.m. By the time he had returned and summoned his senior commanders it was 10.15 a.m., by which time Chetwode was issuing reminders to Dallas regarding the requirement for a sense of urgency.40 He issued his final orders to the assembled officers at 11 a.m., but it still took the best part of another hour to arrange his troops properly.41
His orders were that the 160th Brigade was to attack from Esh Shaluf directly up the Es Sire Ridge to Ali Muntar. On their right flank, 158th Brigade was to swing north-west from Mansura and then north against Ali Muntar. The 159th Brigade would also start from Mansura, following the 158th Brigade north-west before passing behind them and attacking Clay Hill, to the north of Ali Muntar. A single battalion, the 1/7th Cheshire Regiment from the 159th Brigade, would be held back at Mansura as the divisional reserve. The 161st Brigade (with the 271st Brigade Royal Field Artillery (RFA) attached) were on loan from 54th Division, and were supposed to be held at Sheikh Nebhan on the Wadi Ghazze, but earlier had received orders from 54th Division to cross and take up position at the foot of the Burjabye Ridge. The division’s artillery, the 265th and 266th Brigades RFA were positioned at Esh Shaluf and on the plateau around Mansura respectively; the division’s third artillery brigade, the 267th, was still being used in the defences of the Suez Canal and would be sorely missed. Those artillery batteries that were available only consisted of four of their usual six guns. Even with the support of six heavy 60-pounders from the Royal Garrison Artillery, the amount of guns that could be brought to bear was woefully inadequate for the frontage that was being attacked.
The infantry began to advance at 11.50 a.m., and at noon the guns began to fire despite having little information on the exact location of the enemy positions. Inevitably, a gap soon opened between the 160th and 158th Brigades as they crossed the valley and went around Green Hill on opposite sides. It was the 158th Brigade, in the centre of the line, that reached the enemy first, or at least, reached a point where it could directly attack the enemy. All through the advance it had been under artillery fire:
During the advance the enemy’s artillery opened a pretty hot shrapnel and high-explosive fire on the brigade; fortunately few casualties occurred during that period. This advance was carried out perfectly by the troops, and also the wheel facing north. Each battalion as it completed its wheel went quickly forward towards its objective till the firing-line was held up by heavy rifle fire and machine-gun fire about 500 yards from the enemy position. I must point out that the 1,500 yards of our advance was in full view of the enemy and an absolutely open glacis; the battalion nevertheless worked a magnificent advance in splendid order, showing the greatest bravery and determination.42
Now the troops could themselves engage the enemy positions with rifle and machine-gun fire. The 1/5th Royal Welsh Fusiliers (RWF),* on the left of the brigade line, had reached the cactus gardens before Green Hill ahead of the rest of the line and had to pause as the 1/6th and 1/7th RWF came up in support on its right. Fire from Green Hill soon pinned the whole line down, and also caused casualties among the two flanking brigades as they passed. The 158th Brigade’s reserve, the 1/1st Herefordshire Regiment, were brought up to directly assault Green Hill. However, the weight of machine-gun fire from the hill pushed them off to the right, leaving the gap between the 158th and 160th Brigades still open and the garrison of the hill free to keep up their fire on all of the attacking columns.
At this point, about 12.40 p.m., General Dallas made redoubled efforts to locate 161st Brigade, which he had originally sent for just before sending in his main attack. However, 54th Division had not informed him of the change in location, and his staff officers could not find it at Sheikh Nebhan. It would not be until after 1 p.m. the brigade would be found, by accident, at the base of Es Sire Ridge, to where they had moved on the brigade commander’s initiative.43 Now orders were issued for the brigade to advance on Green Hill directly, but it would be 3.30 p.m. before they could march to Mansura, and 4 p.m. before they began their attack. Their deployment also meant the deployment of the 271st Brigade RFA, which proved a much needed boost to the division’s firepower.
By then, the 160th Brigade had met with limited success on the left of the line. The 2/10th Middlesex Regiment had taken the area known as The Labyrinth at 1.30 p.m., and now overlooked Gaza from the south. However, when the 1/4th Sussex Regiment had attempted to extend to the right, behind Green Hill towards Ali Muntar, they had been repulsed with heavy casualties. In the centre and the right, the 158th and 159th Brigades had slowly forged ahead against Ali Muntar. The 1/7th Cheshires were now sent
forward to reinforce their brigade, and not before time as the forward units were suffering heavily. Where the two brigades met, their respective flanking units – 1/5th Welsh Regiment and 1/7th RWF – had made a lodgement on the lower slopes. Both units had taken heavy losses: the 1/5th Welsh had already lost their commanding officer, most of his senior staff, and three of their company commanders, and by the end of the battle both battalions would have lost around a third of their strength – the heaviest casualty rates in the division.
The remains of two companies had managed to work their way painfully slowly up Ali Muntar to about 200m (220yds) from the Ottoman positions. Captain E.W. Walker, with Lieutenants Latham and Horace Fletcher, and about forty men from the 7th RWF, and Captain A.H. Lee and Lieutenant R.H. Taylor with about the same number of men from the 1/5th Welsh, had found an area where they were sheltered from direct machine-gun fire, but both felt that they lacked the numbers to stage a final rush on the summit. Both sent for reinforcements, only to be told that their battalions were fully committed and no one was available to help add weight to their advance. Deciding to attack anyway, Walker sent word at 2.30 p.m. for the British barrage on the positions around the summit to be lifted. He waited an hour for the shelling to stop, but the message did not get through. Instead, the two captains had to lead their men not only into the fire of Ottoman machine guns, but also their own artillery. Captain Lee reported:
Worn out and heavily laden (besides their packs the men carried extra rations, a second water bottle, and extra bandoliers of ammunition) the prospect of having to rush the entrenched and steep slopes was not a pleasant one, but with bayonets fixed and revolvers cocked, off we went with a cheer. The Turks evacuated their trenches and ran. The top of the hill was reached and we rounded up many Turks. Those who ran were fired at and some bowled over. On looking round we found ourselves behind Turks who were still firing on other oncoming troops, and we got some fine firing at their backs, until they withdrew. Our party had reached the top, I suppose unobserved, at any rate for a while, for we were troubled by British shells and rifle fire from converging troops. These troubles soon ceased, and Colonel Lawrence of the Cheshires came along and took command of the situation … Water shortage was serious, and parties were sent off to collect water bottles from the dead, and ammunition from the wounded and dead.44
By 4 p.m. the hill top was in British hands. The 1/7th Cheshires arrived in time to consolidate the British hold on Ali Muntar and man the defences against an Ottoman counter-attack, which was just as well, as the attacking brigades, who another officer reckoned had had seven hours’ sleep over the past four days, were exhausted from their attack.
With the capture of Ali Muntar, the two flanking hills were overrun, although not without a fight. At around 4.45 p.m., 159th Brigade took Clay Hill, with the assistance of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles. Although effectively cut off, Green Hill held out until assaulted by the 161st Brigade, who advanced down the long slopes of Es Sire Ridge and up the other side under constant Ottoman bombardment.
The infantry would have gone forward in a style that had been tactically advanced in 1914. The Boer War had impressed on the army the need to move in open order when assaulting entrenched positions. Doctrine was to advance in widely spaced lines, which unfortunately now suffer from the stereotypes of the long ranks of soldiers marching slowly into the mouths of machine guns. In fact, the system, although outdated by the standards of the Western Front, was still more or less valid for the terrain faced outside Gaza. The 1/5th Essex Regiment, from 161st Brigade, are a typical example. They advanced on Green Hill in four lines. The first three were made up from C and D Companies, side by side. Two platoons from each company (each of forty to fifty men) made up the first line, followed probably by the headquarters platoons in the second line, and then the remaining two platoons of each in the third. The fourth line was denser, made up of the remaining two companies and the battalion headquarters. With some 3.7km (2.5 miles) to cover, each platoon started off in a tight column four men wide; this was the most efficient way to move large bodies of men quickly over broken ground. With each column were mules carrying the platoon’s heavy (in weight but not calibre) Lewis machine guns. As soon as the columns came under long-range rifle fire, the Lewis guns were unloaded and the mules led to the rear. Each column then spread out into four single files to make smaller targets. Once effective rifle range was reached, the columns swung out into a long line, four platoons wide, with each man three paces from the next. This kept the chances of too many men being hit by a single shell or burst of machine-gun fire to a minimum. As clear sight was made of the enemy positions, a system of leapfrogging would begin. Alternate sections of each platoon would lay down covering fire, to keep the enemy’s head down, while the one next to it dashed forward. Throwing themselves into whatever cover was available, that section would then provide covering fire for its partner as it advanced. Should the enemy fire prove too fierce for an advance, following lines would either move up to add their own weight to the covering fire, or possibly would be able to swing out to either side to move around the flank of the enemy position and attack it from there, although the terrain was generally unsuitable for this at Gaza. If the worst came to the worst, these following lines could also provide covering fire while the front lines pulled back.
In this case, the tactics worked, although at a high cost. Green Hill fell to the 161st Brigade at about 5.30 p.m. After a deal of mopping up and digging in across all three hills, the positions, dominating Gaza, were secured by dusk at around 6 p.m.
While the infantry had been attacking from the south-east, the two mounted divisions had not been sitting idle. From midday onwards patrols had been clashing with Ottoman scouts. There were known to be Ottoman garrisons at Jemmame, about 18km (11 miles) east, at Tel esh Sheria, about 24 km (15 miles) to the south-east, and of course at Beersheba, about 40km (25 miles) south-east. The principal fear was the troops from the latter two places could sweep around in the British rear, cutting them off from their supplies. In addition, it was now known from prisoners that at least parts of the 53rd (OT) Infantry Division were moving south, and that the garrison of Gaza itself was nearly twice the size previously thought, around 3,500 men. In fact, several additional infantry battalions, supported by Austrian artillery, had arrived in the city several weeks earlier.45
Kress von Kressenstein’s contingency plan for an attack on Gaza was exactly what the British feared. While the 3rd (OT) Infantry Division was to advance from Jemmame against the British troops to the eastern side of Gaza, pushing them back and reinforcing the garrison, the 16th (OT) Infantry Division at Tel esh Sheria and a mixed force of the 27th (OT) Infantry Division with cavalry support at Beersheba were both to advance west towards Khan Yunis, taking the British in the rear. As news of the British advance reached him at 8 a.m., Kress von Kressenstein had immediately put this plan into action, and by mid-morning most of the relief forces were moving. However, all were a long march from Gaza and it would always be close as to whether they could reach the city by dark.46
Under normal circumstances, the cavalry could only hope to delay the Ottoman relief columns. Mounted regiments were small – just over 500 men at full strength – and lightly equipped, and could not hope to stop a determined Ottoman infantry attack in such numbers. However, by full use of their mobility, they could both slow down and annoy superior forces in relatively open ground. The 5th Mounted Brigade’s experience was probably typical:
The Brigade occupied a position on the right of the Imperial Mounted Division, technically holding a line between two places with unpronounceable names. As there was nothing whatever to mark the locality of these places on the ground, their situation was determined by compass bearings and speculation. But in no sense of the term was it a line. About mid-day the enemy began to show signs of activity, and columns of infantry from Nejile or Sharia were reported advancing by the patrols. ‘A’ Squadron [QOWH] came in contact with them soon after 1 p.m., and,
for the next four hours, this squadron was engaged upon some very pretty cavalry fighting. The heads of the columns were not met frontally, but they halted mechanically as a brisk fire from a troop broke out on their flank. Slowly the Turks deployed to the threatened flank, only to find the cavalry vanished into space while fire opened upon them from another troop, this time in their rear. This method of defence adopted by ‘A’ Squadron, admirably handled by Major Ffrench-Blake, was fluid to the last degree, but it was most effective. Harried this way and that by their mobile opponents and never given the opportunity to indulge in a frontal fire fight, where their numbers would have given them the advantage, the enemy were unable to make any progress, until finally they gave it up and marched sulkily back to Sharia.47
The number and size of approaching Ottoman columns increased dramatically as the afternoon wore on. Just as these troops came within close range of Gaza, the defending cavalry were stripped away, and the already thin shell of the piquet line became egg-shell thin. As early as noon Chetwode, becoming frustrated by the delays being experienced by the infantry, had warned Chauvel and Hodgson that he might call on them to send a brigade each against the north of the city, and had ordered reconnaissance in this direction to be made. At 1 p.m., he took the decision (with Dobell’s approval) to make an amended version of this plan a reality. He sent orders to Chauvel to take command of both mounted divisions. He was to move the Imperial Mounted Division north, stretching them to take over the area held by the A&NZ Mounted Division, while the ICC Brigade also moved north to take up a little of the slack. The A&NZ Mounted Division was then to be turned inwards to assault the city.48
From Gaza to Jerusalem Page 5