I am not going to suggest that the two events were in point of fact connected, but I know that the sudden and welcome change was universally attributed to General Allenby, and that thenceforward the EEF was ‘on him,’ as the phrase goes, to a man.
I wonder if many of our big commanders realised as fully as did General Allenby the enormous influence the ‘personal touch’ had on the troops they commanded? Just to see your chief wandering about more or less informally, finding things out for himself, watching you – not on parade, but at your ordinary daily jobs; to know that he was not above getting out of his car to ask a question personally, or, during operations, to sit on a gun-limber digging his bully-beef out of a tin with a jack-knife, like any other man. These things went a mighty long way.234
After many months of simply being ordered around by a distant and unseen authority, Allenby gave the impression that the high command did at last care about the troops, and about what the men who actually had to do the job had to say about how it should be done.
Allenby is often said to have brought a new, aggressive spirit to the army, and to have restored their confidence, but these statements need some qualification. That the army in its lower levels already had an aggressive, forward posture is quite evident in the myriad of localised but intensive raids and skirmishes in which they had been engaged along the entire front. It was any larger-scale aggression as an army that was being stymied, as Allenby immediately recognised, by being starved of adequate resources by London. Likewise, this small-scale warfare speaks volumes about the troops’ confidence in themselves as soldiers. Where Allenby really made a difference was in their confidence in their higher command. After the fiascos at the two battles for Gaza, this was indeed sorely needed. The senior commanders, especially Murray, were seen as out of touch with the realities on the ground; the very fact that at no point had Murray been to see these directly for himself but rather lived all the way back in Cairo was a major factor in this.
However, the ‘Allenby Effect’ can be overstated, and was not universal. Some men simply soldiered on as usual, regardless of the changes at the top:
There is a passage in The Seven Pillars of Wisdom which gave me some amusement when I read it. Lawrence talks about the ‘calm drive and human wisdom of Allenby, who was the man the men worked for, the image we worshipped.’ This is a ridiculous exaggeration. The men certainly worked for Allenby – they had no option to do otherwise. But we did not worship him because we did not know him or even General Bols, his Chief of Staff. The average ranker could barely visualise the meaning of an Army Corps; the grand personages who commanded them were usually quite unknown to us. General Bulfin and General Studd used to pay us visits when we were in the trenches, but Allenby was quite unknown to us and what we had heard of him did not endear him to us.235
This seems to be very much a minority opinion, although valid for all that. It is also worth noting that the author, Bernard Livermore of the 2/20th London Regiment, had only just arrived from Salonika and thus had not taken part in the first assaults on Gaza. Perhaps these experiences lent perspective to others.
As well as raising morale and reducing the headquarters staff, Allenby sent his impressions, ideas and plans to the CIGS in London on 12 July 1917. His assessment was that any attack on Gaza would be prohibitively costly, while the western end of the Gaza–Beersheba line was equally heavily fortified. The eastern end of the line, before it reached the garrison town of Beersheba, seemed the weakest point. To break this line, Allenby laid out demands for another two infantry divisions (based on the assumption that 75th Division would not be combat-ready until the very end of the year) and 7,000 replacements to bring his existing six divisions (including the 75th) up to full strength; for significant amounts of artillery to bring his existing divisional artillery up to full complement, and create new heavy artillery units that would be commanded above divisional level, and so could be easily moved to where they were most needed; three squadrons of ‘the latest’ aircraft for the Royal Flying Corps; numerous Royal Engineer detachments, wireless and signals units, and ten new medical units – hospitals, Casualty Clearing Stations and Sanitary Sections. He also required permission and materials to double the railway and the pipeline across the Sinai. His intention was to be ready to mount an offensive in September.236 A rather ambitious target, this early date was partly so as to make the most of the brief period between the end of the worst of the summer heat and the start of the rainy season in late October or early November, and also partly due to intelligence coming out of Palestine. A large Ottoman force, bolstered by German and Austrian units, was being gathered in Syria in preparation for a counter-offensive against the British in Mesopotamia. An attack in southern Palestine could cause some or even all of these forces to be siphoned off into defensive operations there, spoiling the Ottoman plans.
Over the next month compromises, changes and improvements were made. Typical of Allenby’s thorough approach, the various schools of instruction* were visited and assessed, and changes made to modify or update courses, while many instructors (seen as out of touch) were rotated out to active units to improve their own knowledge. However, few reforms were so easy, as most of the changes that Allenby wanted to make relied on outside factors. Only one new infantry division could be spared – the 10th (Irish), from Salonika – although efforts would be made to bring the 75th up to full strength. The work on the railway and pipeline could begin straight away with what resources were at hand, while the additional materials required would be ordered immediately but would take time to be delivered. As Murray had found after the 1st Battle of Gaza, guns, shells, aeroplanes and other material could not simply be magicked into existence, and compromises had to be made based upon the production capacity of the factories at home, and what was needed by or could be spared from the other fighting fronts. The number of artillery pieces was eroded, although not severely, and the amounts of different types of shells also modified by London. Robertson, who as CIGS was the conduit between Allenby and Lloyd George, found himself increasingly in a bind as he continued to pass messages and requests between the two, while attempting to stem Allenby’s demands and ambitions on the side. As a ‘Westerner’, Robertson believed that the Palestine front was a distraction, and in his unofficial correspondence with Allenby continued to attempt to limit the scope of the latter’s plans and requests, even while officially passing to him, on 10 August 1917, the War Cabinet’s instructions to mount an offensive aimed at reaching the Jaffa–Jerusalem line, if not further, at the earliest opportunity.237
One of the most important responses to Allenby’s requests, although even this was a compromise, was the revitalisation of the Royal Flying Corps in Palestine. The Middle East Brigade of the RFC, under Brigadier General Geoffrey Salmond, had responsibility for all British military aviation in Palestine, Mesopotamia, East Africa, and the Hedjaz, and for the training organisation in Egypt. Salmond had been appealing for months for more aircraft, and of more modern types, as the Germans in Palestine in particular continued to dominate the air. Flieger Abteilung (FA) 300, with their fewer but better aircraft, continued to take a toll on the British and Australian airmen opposite them, one of whom recorded that:
We were, so it was said, the Suicide Club. You know: roosters to-day, and feather dusters to-morrow. Anyway, the average casualty hours over the line were something like five or six … After which it was the hospital or sad slow music.238
Ottoman command of the air allowed them to freely observe troop movements, new artillery positions, new supply dumps, and all of the other obvious signs of an impending attack. In order to achieve any kind of surprise in his proposed attack, Allenby needed control of the air.
Some small modernisations were made over the summer of 1917. At the end of May, two D.H.2 pusher-type single-seat fighters arrived in theatre. Totally outdated by Western Front standards, they at least made a start towards giving No. 14 Squadron an offensive capability. The following month two more types,
both single-seat fighters with tractor engines, arrived in larger numbers. The Vickers F.B.19 ‘Bullet’ had been tested on the Western Front and found to be underpowered and with poor visibility, but was deemed suitable for use in the ‘sideshows’. The Bristol M1c, on the other hand, was a fast and capable fighter, but it was also a monoplane. Since a series of pre-war accidents, the RFC had been wary of monoplanes and were reluctant to adopt any into general front-line use, although again it was good enough to be sent to the desert. Although these three types allowed the British to begin defending their airspace (although lack of numbers, and an early warning system based on binoculars and telephones, made that defence far from solid), none of them had the ability to escort British aircraft on long-range observation, reconnaissance or bombing operations over the Ottoman lines.239
Such long-range raids and flights occurred regularly as the British gathered intelligence on Ottoman movements and defences, photographing and mapping the areas over which it was hoped the army would soon be advancing. Bombing raids were also carried out. On 23 June 1917 seven aircraft bombed the German airfield at Er Ramle (Ramleh/Ramla) to keep FA300 grounded while three Short seaplanes from HMS Empress bombed a supply dump at Tul Karum. Three days later eight aircraft (four BE2cs flying without observers to make them lighter and thus longer ranged, and four Martynsides) bombed an Ottoman headquarters on the Mount of Olives, just outside Jerusalem. Five of the aircraft were lost on the way home; one due to engine failure north of Beersheba, one with an engine failure after landing to pick up the pilot of the first aircraft, one from a broken undercarriage after landing to pick up both of the stranded pilots, and two more due to running out of fuel after circling the other three to see if they could assist. Miraculously, the first three pilots were rescued by a patrol of the Australian Light Horse, and the other two were picked up by two of the remaining aircraft.240
On 11 July, after Allenby added his voice to Salmond’s, permission was received to create a new squadron for service in Palestine, No. 111 Squadron. The pilots for the new squadron were to be found from the existing squadrons or the training organisation in Egypt, while at least some of the new aircraft and the engines would be sent out from the UK. (One major factor in the delay in getting new aircraft out to Palestine had been a serious backlog in the aircraft and engine production systems in the UK. Existing production had barely coped with the losses in France up until the spring of 1917, when a massive expansion plan was introduced. Soon, production rose rapidly, with nearly four times as many aircraft being produced each month over the summer, although problems in engine production still slowed the over all process.)241 This squadron was to be a designated fighter unit, the first in the theatre, and was rapidly followed by permission to raise a new observation squadron as well. No. 113 Squadron would be raised on the same terms – local pilots but aircraft from the UK – but with observation aircraft instead. Shortages in aircraft meant that the third requested squadron would have to be postponed until early 1918.
But even with this breakthrough, progress was slow. By the outbreak of the 3rd Battle of Gaza at the end of October 1917, No. 113 Squadron had just five ‘of the latest’ aircraft – RE8s – and was still predominantly equipped with the older BE2es. No. 111 Squadron fared a little better, although it had accumulated the hodge-podge of obsolete fighters already in theatre. These included five Vickers Bullets, three D.H.2s, two Bristol M1cs, and a single Bristol Scout. However, they also had the most important aircraft on either side: six Bristol F2b Fighters. Although called fighters and indeed fast and highly manoeuvrable, these two-seater aircraft, equipped with a forward firing gun as well as one for the observer, could also be used for reconnaissance and bombing work. They were by far the most capable aircraft in the theatre. The first F2b patrol was mounted on 7 October, and by the end of the month they had claimed two enemy aircraft shot down. More importantly, they could dominate the airspace over the British lines, and give Allenby the freedom to move his forces and deploy decoy sites without fear of discovery.242
To reflect the new capabilities of the RFC, on 5 October the Middle East Brigade was reorganised. The EEF elements were separated out to form the new Palestine Brigade, while the Middle East Brigade was redesignated HQ RFC Middle East. The new brigade was still under Salmond, but now was divided into two wings. The Fifth (Corps) Wing, under Lieutenant Colonel A.C. Boddam-Whetham, consisted of No. 14 Squadron (BE2es) and No. 113 Squadron (BE2es and RE8s). As corps squadrons these were to undertake artillery-spotting, ‘contact patrols’ (monitoring and making contact with forward units on the ground) and tactical reconnaissance operations. Meanwhile, Fortieth (Army) Wing, under Lieutenant Colonel Amyas ‘Biffy’ Borton, consisted of No. 111 Squadron (various – see above) and No. 1 Squadron Australian Flying Corps (usually referred to by the British as No. 67 Squadron to avoid confusion with their own No. 1 Squadron, and equipped with a mix of BE2cs, BE2es, RE8s, BE12as, and a Martynside). As army squadrons these would be free to operate across the whole front, providing longer-range and strategic reconnaissance, escorts for corps squadrons, and interceptors to chase off enemy aircraft. The brigade also included No. 21 Kite Balloon Company (consisting of Nos 49 and 50 Sections) and a system of aircraft parks to provide spares and repairs.243 There would also be an expanded system of some fifty-three wireless stations to improve communications between the ground and the air.244
The reorganisation of the air forces reflected a reorganisation that had already occurred on the ground. As had been suggested by Murray earlier in the year, the Eastern Frontier Force was abolished, and the EEF was formally restructured into several corps to simplify the command structure. On 3 August 1917 it was announced that three new corps were to be created, and that the administrative and physical changes should begin immediately. The new structure was to be:
Desert Mounted Corps (based on the Desert Column) (Lieutenant General Sir Harry Chauvel):
A&NZ Mounted Division
Australian Mounted Division
Yeomanry Mounted Division
Imperial Camel Corps Brigade
XX Corps (Lieutenant General Sir Philip Chetwode):
10th (Irish) Division
53rd (Welsh) Division
60th (London) Division
74th (Yeomanry) Division
Four brigades of heavy artillery
XXI Corps (Lieutenant General Edward Bulfin):
52nd (Lowland) Division
54th (East Anglian) Division
75th Division
Three brigades of heavy artillery
The 7th Mounted Brigade was kept back as an army unit, under the direct control of Allenby, as was a new Composite Force, consisting of the French and Italian contingents, the 20th Indian Imperial Service Infantry Brigade, and the 1st Battalion, British West Indian Regiment. The new structure was to come into effect on 12 August, 1917, the same day on which the new General Headquarters, EEF, was to become operational near Khan Yunis. This new GHQ would directly control the three corps in the field, while a rump headquarters would remain in Cairo to oversee Martial Law and other administrative and logistical issues. This move had been contemplated by Murray in May, but had been dismissed as it would, ‘Completely upset the military and political machine in Egypt and would be most unfortunate from every point of view’.245
The move certainly did upset the situation in Egypt (see Chapter 6), but it also greatly improved the military situation in Palestine and came to symbolise the new, aggressive policy of the army.
Notes
* There were many of these, for officers, NCOs, machine-gunners, ‘bombers’, signallers and other specialists, as well as more general ones such as the Trench Warfare School at El Arish.
224 TNA CAB24/11/33
225 TNA CAB23/44B/1 and CAB23/13/24
226 TNA CAB23/2/42 and CAB23/2/44
227 TNA CAB23/2/52 and CAB23/13/4
228 TNA CAB23/3/2
229 Armstrong p. 219
230 Badcock Transport Services p.
316
231 Inchbald pp. 140–1
232 Inchbald pp. 140–1
233 Godrich p. 107
234 Bluett pp. 152–3
235 Livermore p. 89
236 TNA WO158/611
237 TNA WO158/611
238 Sutherland pp. 160–1
239 Jones Vol. V p. 230
240 Jones Vol. V pp. 231–3
241 See TNA CAB23/2/41
242 Jones Vol. V p. 227 & p. 231
243 Jones Vol. V p. 227
244 Jones Vol. V p. 229
245 TNA WO106/716 Lynden-Bell to Maurice 26 May 1917
10
PLANS
WHILE THE EGYPTIAN Expeditionary Force was undergoing reinforcement, reform and redirection, so were the Ottoman forces opposing them. Throughout 1917 great changes were afoot, although it would take many months to bring them into effect, and as much, perhaps even more, discussion and dissent as to what to do with the forces gathered. Just as the British senior commanders were split between the Easterners and Westerners, so the Ottoman high command would be split between those intent on retaking lost ground, and those who wanted to concentrate on not losing any more.
After the 2nd Battle of Gaza, the Fourth (OT) Army included the 3rd, 16th and 53rd (OT) Infantry Divisions, and the 3rd (OT) Cavalry Division, spread along the lines between Gaza and Beersheba. All of these forces were under strength. The 3rd (OT) Cavalry Division consisted of only two cavalry regiments (each the equivalent to a British brigade) although as it was based in Beersheba it also had infantry units attached to help man the town’s defences while the cavalry conducted longer patrols. All of the units also suffered from shortages of men. The 16th (OT) Infantry Division, for example, had left Constantinople in September 1916 with some 11,100 officers and men. After seeing action in the 2nd Battle of Gaza and spending the summer on the front lines, by October 1917 the division could muster just over 5,000 officers and men.246 This was fairly typical, with battle casualties, desertions, and, by far the most draining factor, disease leaving most units at around 50 per cent of their authorised strength. Even units far from any fighting suffered similar rates. When the 24th (OT) Infantry Division was posted to Palestine from the Dardanelles later in the year, it left with 10,000 men but arrived with just 4,600. Some 19 per cent of the division had been listed as sick during the journey, and another 24 per cent had gone missing, with just 3 per cent being accounted for by sanctioned leave.247 In an army that struggled to feed and clothe its soldiers or care for its sick, and where home leave was a rarity, the confusion of the movement of a division (which might also bring a soldier close to his home for the first time in years) could be the ideal time to desert, or at least take an extended absence without leave.
From Gaza to Jerusalem Page 17