However, the British had other ideas. To move directly up the Hebron road would certainly offer the shortest route to Jerusalem as the crow flies, but it was far from an ideal option. A few miles north of Beersheba the Judean Mountains began: a jumbled mass of steep-sided hills that could only be traversed with great difficulty. An army could not advance along a single road, but any units moving along either side of that road would be slowed to a crawl. Infantry, who usually marched at 3mph in open ground, would find themselves advancing several miles up and down mountain sides to achieve a single mile on the map, while anything with wheels, hooves or (in the case of camels) pads would be slowed even further. Wagons and artillery pieces would have to be manhandled all the way. At the same time, the ever-increasing flanks of the army would be vulnerable to attack from either the east or the west, not least from the several corps of Ottoman troops still holding the Gaza line.
For the offensive to have any serious chance of success, the rest of the Gaza–Beersheba line would need to be cleared out first. The Ottoman defenders would need to be driven out of their formidable prepared defences, and pushed north into the open. There an already defeated and hopefully disorganised and demoralised enemy could be driven away from their headquarters, communications networks, supply dumps and logistical systems. They could be harried and chased into chaos, as long as enough pressure was kept on them to prevent them from forming any new defensive lines. Once the British were clear of the Gaza–Beersheba defences, they could keep pushing north up the coastal plain, which offered not only the easiest (and fastest) ground to traverse, but also the quickest routes to the campaign’s two key objectives. By advancing up the coast they British could capture the port at Jaffa, thus allowing them to use their naval superiority to bring supplies directly into their forwards areas by ship, rather than relying on a lengthy and precarious system based on the railway and then wagons and camels. Once on a level with Jaffa, the army could also swing to the right, and advance up the main road to Jerusalem. While still slow going, the distance to be traversed through the mountains at this point was much shorter than would be the case if advancing from Beersheba.
All of this depended upon the breaking of the defences at Gaza and along the road to Beersheba. This was far from a given; the defences were made up of many separate, independent systems, and (in particular around Gaza) formidable in their own right. On the inland flank, the position at Beersheba could be exploited to push along and behind the lines, bypassing many of the great redoubts along the road and forcing the Ottomans to pull back and defend themselves from an unexpected angle. Gaza would not be so easy. Two previous attempts to take the town had failed, and the trench systems to the south and south-east had only become stronger since. Instead of advancing straight into the mouth of the defences, aiming at the crucial high ground around Ali Muntar, a different approach would be taken. This time, the main axis of advance would run up the coast, along the beach between Gaza and the sea. While still heavily entrenched, this should provide an easier route for the British to get through the lines and then loop around behind the town, forcing the garrison to either withdraw or be cut off from the rest of their army.
As a preliminary to this, a massive bombardment opened on Gaza on 27 October 1917. A force of sixty-eight guns or howitzers was split into three parts; one for the general bombardment, and two (dividing the battlefield in half between them) for specific counter-battery work, destroying Ottoman artillery. The barrage intensified on 29 October when a flotilla of Royal and French Navy ships off-shore joined in.* The largest guns that the Royal Artillery could provide were 60-pounder (5in) and 6in field guns, and 6in and 8in howitzers. The cruisers and monitors off-shore provided, apart from numerous comparable or lighter guns from their secondary armament, a range of 9.2in, 10.8in, and even 14in guns, significantly increasing the weight of the shelling. Indeed, this would be the largest British bombardment staged outside of the Western Front, and even by Western Front standards it was formidable.308 An unidentified sailor on one of the British destroyers, HMS Comet, would recall the awesome effects of the shelling:
I have been trying to think of a suitable simile to describe this bombardment but can’t, the best I can do is to have two similes, one for the view & the other for the sound. The sound is the easier, so take that first. A heavy brewer’s dray drawn by a rattling old steam roller going at 50 miles an hour over a cobbled paved road is my best description. This does not describe the actual noise so much as the continuity of it. A thunderstorm (i.e. rolls of thunders) best describes the sound … The view. Suppose the 5 odd miles of coast was a giant piano the keys of which when struck gave out a flash of light instead of a note of music. Imagined that, then further imagine two gods were playing one of Beethoven’s sonatas & you get some idea. In other words there was one continuous roll of thunder & one continuous flash of light from the guns.
This morning I experienced quite the most unique & awe inspiring experience of my life. On shore the old piano was going full blaze, a barrage fire to cover the advance … I said the shock of our guns was enormous, you shall judge for yourself. The panel of the port door of the charthouse was blown right out & over the side. The clock, seemingly clamped on to the wall was utterly jiggered up, plaster, nuts, odds & ends such as loose bits of woodwork lay in a chaotic debris about the floor, the bookcase (also clamped to the wall) came down & one window & three electric bulbs were smashed – all by the concussion.309
The gunfire was not a continuous effort; to fire non-stop for six days would over-heat and burn out the guns (and indeed the crews). Instead, a fire plan dictated when and where each battery fired, and how many shells. Enemy gun batteries, supply dumps, headquarters, roads and trenches had all been plotted by aerial reconnaissance and received their doses of shell. The wire in front of the trenches was systematically destroyed, and then occasionally revisited to hamper Ottoman efforts to repair it. Gas shells were also fired at enemy batteries, but as with their use in the 2nd Battle of Gaza, it seems that they had almost no effect and the Ottomans may not even have been aware of their use.310
Allenby had originally planned the ground assault on Gaza to attack around twenty-four or forty-eight hours before the renewal of the attack in the east, on Sharia. This was set in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Beersheba on 3 or 4 November, and so the date of 2 November was chosen. It quickly became apparent that the wells in Beersheba were not as plentiful as had been hoped, and while a small amount of ground water left over from a recent thunderstorm helped to supplement the supply, it would take longer than thought to establish an adequate and regular flow of water. Therefore, the Sharia operation was postponed, but it was decided to go ahead with the Gaza plan anyway. Preparations had already been made, apart from the bombardment. Troops had been practicing on full-scale mock-ups of the Ottoman trench systems, and nightly raids had been made against advanced Ottoman posts. During the afternoon on 1 November, companies of the Egyptian Labour Corps were formed up and marched down to the shore at Deir el Belah, within sight of the Ottoman defenders, and were loaded onto trawlers and launches, attempting to reinforce the deception that the British were going to make an amphibious landing north of Gaza. After dark the Egyptians were disembarked again, although the small ships remained and occasionally showed lights during the night to give the impression of activity.311 Meanwhile troops were prepared for the assault by being issued extra equipment, and marching to their concentration points. Sergeant W. Town MM, a veteran of the 1st Battle of Gaza, was with the 1/5th Essex Regiment:
On the morning of 1November, we were busy getting ready for the evening ‘entertainment’. Bombs were issued, Lewis guns overhauled, and extra good grub served out. A Communion Service was held in the afternoon, and was well attended … We halted just by Sheikh Ajiln and lay down to rest, for we were laden with all sorts of articles, picks, shovels, Lewis gun magazines, bombs etc. We talked to each other in whispers, why I cannot say, because we were well behind the line, and t
he guns were making a terrific row.312
The first phase of the ground assault began at just before 11 p.m. on 1 November by the 156th Brigade of the 52nd (Lowland) Division, on loan to the 54th (East Anglian) Division who were to the main attacking force. The 1/7th Scottish Rifles, supported by two companies of the 1/8th, crept into no-man’s-land opposite Umbrella Hill, which jutted out of the Ottoman lines to the south and from which they could direct fire onto the flanks of attacks to either side. The troops were spotted as they gathered, and received machine-gun and rifle fire until a British barrage descended on the Hill at 11 p.m. At ten past, the artillery lifted and the Scots swarmed over the Hill and rapidly evicted the garrison from the 138th (OT) Infantry Regiment. A heavy Ottoman counter-barrage caused heavier casualties among the Scots than the assault had, but no attempt was made to retake the outpost. Thanks to the raids over the previous few nights, this was assumed to be another such probe that would withdraw of its own accord. Instead, the Scots dug in, having secured the flank of the main attack. Further to the east, the 75th Division, and beyond them the composite force of French, Italian, Indian and West Indian troops made smaller diversionary attacks.
The main attack was to run up the beach to the west of Gaza. This stretch of open ground lay below the hilltop town between it and the sea, and was only thinly defended. The front line consisted of three small redoubts - Beach Post, Cricket Redoubt and the Sea Post – joined by trenches, a second line of trenches behind, and fairly clear ground back to Gun Hill and a further trench system, beyond which was the small village of Sheikh Hasan on the coast. Once Sheikh Hasan was taken, there was one more trench – Lion Trench – between them and open ground, and a clear path to the Ottoman rear. A further series of trench systems ran at ninety degrees to these, along the western side of the town on high ground overlooking the beach. At the south-west corner was El Arish Redoubt, with Burj Trench to the north of it and running into Zowaiid Trench, which itself ran into Rafah Trench. The sand was deep and soft, making it slow ground to cross. On the other hand, it also meant that the British bombardment had been unusually effective, and many of the trenches had at least partially collapsed under the concussions.
The attack would be made by 54th (East Anglian) Division on a front of about 3.2km (2 miles). The start time was set for 3 a.m., which was a compromise based on the conditions faced. The darkness would help cover the advance, which would be slow over the soft sand, as well as being long; no-man’s-land was just under a kilometre (1,100yds) wide at this point. On the other hand, it was only just past the full moon, so there should be enough light to navigate by. Two brigades would make the first assault. The first wave of the 163rd Brigade would angle across towards the El Arish Redoubt (which would also be attacked from the east by the 156th Brigade) and Burj Trench, before the following wave moved through them and pushed further into the Gaza defences, with their final objectives around 460m (500yds) behind the Ottoman front lines. On their left, the 161st Brigade would have a longer haul, sweeping up Beach and Sea Posts and Cricket Redoubt, before continuing on to come up on the northern side of 163rd Brigade to take Zowaiid and Rafah Trenches. These attacks would be supported by six tanks (with two in reserve). The tanks would be used in closer cooperation than during the 2nd Battle, but still as individuals rather than in their most effective formations of small teams. Behind the two leading brigades, 162nd Brigade would come up, passing directly up the beach to take Gun Hill and Sheikh Hasan. Typical of the flexibility that Allenby weaved into all of his plans, behind them would be the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade – three regiments of Indian lancers – who would be ready to exploit any breaches in the Ottoman lines, albeit in a limited fashion. A single brigade was unlikely to be enough to turn an Ottoman retreat into a rout, but they could certainly help cause fear and confusion by attacking the rear areas.
The Ottoman bombardment provoked by the attack on Umbrella Hill died down just as the main assault forces were forming up, and so it did not impede the operation at all. A heavy British barrage replaced it as the two leading brigades surged ahead, but both ran into problems immediately. Heavy cloud blocked the moon and starlight, while the bombardments had thrown up dust, sand and smoke in vast billows. Visibility was greatly reduced, and most of the advancing units were either delayed or lost their way. The first wave of the 163rd and 156th Brigades successfully took El Arish Redoubt and Burj Trench, supported by two tanks which were quickly either disabled or knocked out. The following wave, though, became disorientated and scattered. Few men made it through to their objectives, and these were soon pushed back by counter-attacks from the 163rd (OT) Infantry Regiment, while Ottoman artillery fire also pounded the captured positions. The 161st Brigade successfully overwhelmed the 79th (OT) Infantry Regiment detachments in the Beach and Sea Posts, Sergeant Town recalling how:
At that moment the signals came to ‘Advance!’. Then it seemed that an absolute inferno was let loose … so loud was the uproar that we were unable to hear the bursting of Johnny’s shells, or the whistle of their bullets as they opened fire on us …
The order was given to charge, and we set up a yell with such wind as we had left, and charged through the wreckage of ‘Johnny’s’ wire … Well, we piled into the trenches, and set to work to clear away any Johnnies left. L/Cpl S— discovered a dug-out full of Turks, who fired at him; to quote his own words, he at once ‘let drive’ with some Mills No. V Bombs, a sure cure for Turks. Two more he bayoneted, as they tried to escape. I found myself in a communications trench, which led into a deep hollow, and there were quite a few Turks dodging about that hollow. Needless to say, I also ‘let drive’ with my rifle, and it was quite exciting for a time.
However, they had to bypass Cricket Redoubt until tank support could be brought forward. Then this brigade too became confused and disjointed as they advanced north-east against the main Gaza defences. The battalions detailed to take Zowaiid and Rafah Trenches somehow swapped places without realising it. The units fragmented in the confusion of battle, and command and control began to break down.* Still, the next phase of the operation went ahead as planned, with the 162nd Brigade moving directly up the beach behind them. After a brief struggle, Gun Hill fell and by 6 a.m. the brigade was ready to attack Sheikh Hasan. A fifteen-minute barrage cleared a path and the settlement fell to the brigade. Just the Lion Trench now lay between the EEF and open ground, and at 7.30 a.m. this too was taken by a company of the 1/4th Northamptonshire Regiment. However, by now the Ottomans had started to bring up their reserves, with the 20th and 21st (OT) Infantry Regiments of the 7th (OT) Infantry Division pushing south to shore-up the Gaza defences. By 8 a.m. the single company of British troops had been pushed back to Sheikh Hasan, and by 9 a.m. a series of counter-attacks were being staged all along the front. The British artillery had not had either the range or a clear view to support the position at Lion Trench, but now heavy barrages could be placed to break up advancing Ottoman formations. All along the line the British went to ground in whatever cover they could find, often in trenches that were badly damaged and partially collapsed. Over the following day, night and into 3 November the Ottoman counter-attacks, and limited British attempts to expand their toe-hold on the city, continued. The initial assault troops were still on the front line and taking the brunt of the fighting. Sergeant Town:
‘Abdul’ got excited, and his machine guns started ripping the sand bags on the trench to pieces. We had to lie flat because the trench was very shallow, having been almost obliterated by our artillery … Shortly afterwards we had to withdraw from our part in the communications trench, it having become untenable. We got out by wriggling and squirming along, dragging the Lewis gun and magazines with us. We managed to find a fairly comfortable part of the trench, and settled down again. Thirst was an awful drawback. For the first forty-eight hours we had only what water we had brought in our bottles, and the men were in a state of semi-stupor by the time we got the glad news that several petrol tins of water were being sent
up at night …
Johnny tried to counter-attack three times, but the monitors lying close in to the shore had him ‘taped’ with their searchlights, and broke up his attacks before they could develop. The night passed fairly quietly, except for constant artillery fire from both sides, and rifle and machine-gun fire from the left sector … We had no blankets or greatcoats, just our thin khaki drill tunics and shorts, and the nights were perishingly cold.
By the end of 4 November both sides were exhausted, and the fighting petered out, although local Ottoman counter-attacks continued for two more days. British loses had been heavy – over 360 men killed, nearly 2,000 wounded and nearly 400 missing, against nearly 450 prisoners taken – and Gaza was still substantially in Ottoman hands. However, the fighting had drawn in the Ottoman reserves in this sector, and further depleted the overall Ottoman reserve pool. This left the Ottoman forces in the east under-strength for the counter-attack they were planning to retake Beersheba.
In the hills north of Beersheba, the reformed III (OT) Corps was gathering. The 19th (OT) Infantry Division formed the core of the force, with elements of the 16th and 27th (OT) Infantry Divisions (the rest of which were formed in a screen running through Sharia), and the 3rd (OT) Cavalry Division on the far eastern flank. The RFC spotted and plotted the gathering of these forces from 2 November, but their exact intentions remained unclear. Allenby worried that they were meant to create a threat on his flank, forcing him to divert troops into the Judean foothills where they would become increasingly sucked into the rugged, tangled and waterless hills.313 Another possibility was that the Ottomans would strike south towards Beersheba, recapturing the valuable water supplies. This counter-attack option seems to have been the actual intention of the Ottomans, but confusion as to the situation reigned within their own ranks, too.314 By the time that they began to form a coherent force, this area and most of the formations had been under the command of the 7th (OT) Army for about a week, but Kress von Kressenstein, commander of the 8th (OT) Army, was still issuing them orders.315 (The Ottoman command problems would be further exacerbated when Falkenhayn finally decided to join his headquarters in Jerusalem, leaving Aleppo on the morning of 4 November. After spending the night in Damascus, he reached Jerusalem on the evening of 5 November, having been out of touch with his staff and senior commanders for the best part of two days.)316 From Allenby’s point of view, whatever the intentions of the enemy, a solid line had to be formed and held to the north of Beersheba; one that would neither be lured into an advance in the direction of Hebron, nor allow the Ottomans to threaten Beersheba. This task was given to 53rd (Welsh) Division, supported by cavalry on their right flank and parts of the 74th Division on their left.
From Gaza to Jerusalem Page 22