by Amy Knight
Ryazan Reassessed
The Ryazan issue did not die down. In London, Boris Berezovsky and his supporters (the so-called BAB group) gathered their own evidence. In early 2002, Litvinenko and Yuri Felshtinsky, a historian residing in the United States who travelled often to London, published a book in Russian in which they discussed the Ryazan events in great detail, reinforcing the arguments put forward by the Russian media to show that the FSB had intended for a bomb to go off in Ryazan on September 22, 1999.33 Then in early March 2002, a film called Assassination of Russia premiered in London and Moscow. The film, financed by Berezovsky, was a forceful indictment of the FSB and its behind-the-scenes role in the Ryazan affair.34
Apparently to rebut the arguments in the film, Rustam Arifdzhanov, the editor-in-chief of a publication called Top Secret (Sovershenno sekretno), which had close ties with the security services, addressed the Ryazan issue, claiming that he had access to secret documents. In a lengthy June 2002 article, Arifdzhanov presented a phantasmagoric picture of what had happened, replete with minute details of the special operation the group of three from the elite Vympel forces had undertaken. As John Dunlop observed, one problem with this new, officially sponsored version of the Ryazan incident was that the operatives were portrayed as having taken numerous precautions to cover their tracks and yet they returned, for some reason, to the scene of the crime that night and mingled among the residents who had been evacuated.35
The final word on Ryazan from Russian authorities came in May 2002, when the Russian Procuracy responded to an inquiry from a Duma deputy about the September 1999 bombings. The Procuracy’s report noted that the Ryazan exercise, allegedly code-named “whirlwind-anti-terror,” had been a joint undertaking by the head of the FSB and the Minister of Internal Affairs, and that the two officials had signed a directive for a plan to confirm the readiness of local authorities to respond to acts of terror by sending groups of faux terrorists to various locations.36 The problem with this explanation was that Minister of Internal Affairs Rushailo was obviously completely in the dark when he appeared publicly on September 24, 1999 to congratulate local authorities for averting a terrorist attack in Ryazan.
And then, of course, the very idea of such an exercise made little sense. As one Russian analyst asked: “What, in the end was the supposed intention of the Ryazan exercises and what were they trying to verify? The rapid response of the militia? For that, it would have been sufficient to put the sacks of sugar in the basement, have the militia informed by the inhabitants of the building, and then, having evaluated the militia’s level of responsiveness, revealed that it was just a test.”37
To some, such as Evgenii Ikhlov, a member of the group Human Rights and no friend of the security services, the hypothesis that the FSB had intended for a bomb to detonate in Ryazan still made no sense, regardless of all the evidence. In Ikhlov’s view, FSB officials had no logical reason to do so, because they had already achieved what they had intended by the earlier bombings. Russian society was completely mobilized against the Chechens, and another blast, killing hundreds, would have made the authorities look weak and incompetent. Ikhlov postulated that yes, the FSB had added some hexogen to the sugar in the bags and used a real detonator. But the intention was to have FSB officers then thwart what appeared to have been a bombing so they would look like heroes. The plan backfired when the Ryazan police unexpectedly tracked down the people who had planted the sacks of sugar. Patrushev was then compelled to say that the whole thing had been only a training exercise.38
But Sergei Iushenkov, a Duma deputy and member of the Kovalev Commission, argued that the FSB, and Putin, had clear aims in their plans to blow up the Ryazan apartment house on September 22, however misguided. On September 23, he noted, a group of governors demanded from President Yeltsin that he cede some of his powers to Prime Minister Putin. That same day, Yeltsin published a secret decree on initiating military actions in Chechnya, and on September 24 Putin ordered Russian military troops to invade the republic. According to Iushenkov, who would be assassinated in 2003: “These actions and steps were undertaken precisely because there had been formed in society the opinion that the apartment houses in Volgodonsk, Moscow, and, nearly, the house in Ryazan had been prepared to be blown up by Chechen rebels.”39 Iushenkov was apparently hypothesizing that, if the FSB’s plan to blow up the Ryazan building had not been foiled at the last minute, Yeltsin might have been pressured to step down as president immediately, with Putin taking over.
Looking Back on September 1999
It is worth noting that the extensive reporting about the September bombings by the BAB group in London, including a film on the subject, was questioned even by fervent critics of the Putin regime in Russia. Berezovsky’s record of colluding with members of Yeltsin’s “family” to encourage an incursion by Chechen rebels into Dagestan in August 1999, and his promotion of Putin’s candidacy as the heir to Yeltsin, understandably made democrats like Sergei Kovalev hesitant to accept all of what Berezovsky produced in London at face value.40 And the book by Litvinenko and Felshtinsky, valuable as it was for its commentary and analysis, did not contain references to sources.
But, as journalist Dmitrii Sokolov pointed out: “The FSB and its whistleblowers were not on equal grounds. Information on the case is secret, with no access permitted. One can understand and excuse mistakes made by journalists in their investigations (if, in fact, there were mistakes), but how to justify the contradictions that issued from the authorities, who had all the information?”41 The 1999 bombings in Russia were the regime’s darkest secret. And those who attempted to get at the truth of this terrible episode in Russia’s past would be eliminated, one by one.
It should come as no surprise that the Russian government not only cynically prevented information about the September 1999 bombings from emerging, but also did little to address compensation for the victims and their families. Some of the victims’ families took their own initiative. Thus, in September 2007, a Civic Organization for Victims of Volga-Don (the Volgodonsk attack), with seven hundred adults and two hundred fifty children as members, was formed. (The head of the organization has insisted that this represents only a small fraction of those who suffered harm from the attack.) The group has met with nothing but indifference from officials at all levels of the government. President Putin rejected outright their appeal for a law that guarantees special compensation to those disabled by acts of terrorism.42
A lawyer for the victims, Igor Trunov, estimated that about three thousand people were recognized as having suffered losses as a result of the bombings in Moscow and Volgodonsk. But only a few dozen received compensation, and even that was very small—seven thousand rubles, or about two hundred dollars. As Trunov observed: “many people regarded these seven thousand rubles as a mockery of the authorities and didn’t seek help, since the compensation failed even to cover their travel expenses, not to mention the loss of their beloved ones, and lost health, housing and property.”43
How can one explain the continued support for Putin, given the government’s handling of the bombing cases and the suspicions among Russians that the FSB was behind the attacks, or at least that the security services did not do their job in protecting Russian citizens? According to Sergei Kovalev, most Russians are simply indifferent: “I have met people who were convinced that the accusations [of the involvement of the security services] were true, and yet they voted for Putin with equal conviction. Their logic is simple: genuine rulers wield the kind of power that can do anything, including commit crimes.”44 One wonders how long this dynamic will hold. It is not far-fetched to suggest that, if Russians start to question the legitimacy of their leader, their thoughts will return to the violent events of September 1999.
Clinton and Putin, Japan, July 2000.
(Photograph courtesy of Pool/Getty)
Bush and Putin, St. Petersburg, June 2003.
(Photograph courtesy of REUTERS/Alamy Stock Photo)
5
SI
LENCING CRITICS
It isn’t just one story that ends with a journalist’s death; a climate of intimidation builds. If no one is punished, killers are emboldened, and violence repeats.
Myroslava Gongadze, The Committee to Protect Journalists
Russia stands on the threshold of a new era. I am convinced we will be witnesses of a huge revitalization of Russian society.
Paul Klebnikov, editor of the Russian edition of Forbes, three months before he was murdered
The brutality of Russia’s second military campaign in Chechnya—particularly after the Kremlin, in early December 1999, gave an ultimatum to residents of the capital, Grozny, to leave the city or be killed—drew harsh criticism from Western governments. (There was even speculation about economic sanctions against Russia.) President Bill Clinton, while acknowledging that Russia had to pursue counterterrorist operations in the wake of the apartment bombings, warned that such operations could incite even more extremism.1 Nonetheless, in a telephone conversation in February 2000 with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Clinton expressed optimism about the new Russian leader: “We’re trying to resolve bilateral issues with Russia and kind of get this Chechnya thing resolved. Putin has enormous potential, I think … he’s very smart and thoughtful. I think we can do a lot of good with him.… His intentions are generally honorable and straightforward, but he just hasn’t made up his mind yet. He could get squishy on democracy.”2 President George W. Bush had a similarly favorable impression of Putin, noting famously after their first meeting in June 2001: “I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy and we had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul.”3
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S. cemented the friendship between Bush and Putin, and they also quelled U.S. concerns about the Kremlin’s military campaign in Chechnya. Putin was the first government leader to call Bush and voice his condolences over the attacks. He later said in a televised address to Russians: “Russia knows directly what terrorism means. And because of this we, more than anyone, understand the feelings of the American people. In the name of Russia, I want to say to the American people—we are with you.”4
Indeed, the 9/11 attacks were serendipity for Putin. The atrocities being committed daily by Russian troops in Chechnya could now be justified as part of a global war against terrorism. Putin went on to offer logistic and intelligence support to the United States in its war against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, including the use of bases in the former Soviet Union. In doing this, Putin endeared himself further to Bush, while linking Russia’s fight against Chechen separatists to the overall struggle against global terrorism. As terrorism expert Elena Polakova noted in a recent book: “The triumph of Putin’s position became clear when U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell declared [in May 2002] that Russia was ‘fighting terrorism in Chechnya, there is no doubt about that.’”5 Polakova points outs that this shift in Western opinion was furthered by reports about connections of North Caucasus rebels with Al Qaeda, although in fact there was little solid evidence to link Chechen terrorists to Osama bin Laden.6
When Boris Berezovsky, having fled Russia, visited Washington with his aide Alex Goldfarb not long after 9/11, they were told by Thomas Graham, then a top State Department official, that Putin was now considered a U.S. ally. This news caused the two men great consternation, given that Berezovsky had become an outspoken Putin opponent. As Berezovsky said to Goldfarb after their meeting with Graham, “Volodya [Putin] is so fucking lucky. If there was no bin Laden, he should have invented him. I wonder whether the Americans understand that he is not their friend at all. He will play them and the Muslims against each other, exploring every weakness to his advantage.”7
Addressing Domestic Criticism
Although Putin now had international opinion on his side, the Kremlin still had to suppress its own internal critics, including the courageous Russian reporters who were witnessing the devastation of Chechnya firsthand. In the year 2000 alone, five reporters covering the Chechen conflict—Aleksandr Efremov, Luisa Arzhieva, Vladimir Yatsina, Iskandar Khationi, and Adam Tepsurgaev—were killed. To be clear, Efremov, Arzhieva, and Yatsina died in war zones. But Khationi and Tepsurgaev were actually assassinated. Khationi, a correspondent for Radio Free Europe, who reported on human-rights abuses in Chechnya, was butchered with an axe outside his Moscow apartment block. Tepsurgaev, who filmed footage from Chechnya for Reuters, was shot to death by an unknown assailant in a Chechen village.8 Clearly, someone wanted to discourage journalists from showing the outside world what was happening in that republic.
What was in fact happening? When Russians began their bombing campaign of Chechen territory in September 1999 and moved troops into Chechnya in early October, it soon became clear that their “anti-terrorist” operation was really a full-scale war against the civilian population. Grozny was bombarded daily, reducing buildings to rubble, killing scores of innocent people and causing thousands of refugees to flood out of the city. Federal forces began carrying out “cleanup” operations in areas under their control, which resulted in widespread murder, rape, and wanton violence against civilians. The Kremlin installed a puppet Chechen regime, headed by Akhmat Kadyrov, which ignored the atrocities being committed by Russian troops in exchange for monetary rewards.
Anna Politkovskaya, in her book A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya, described the terrible suffering she witnessed in the monthly trips she had been making to Chechnya: “Torture is the norm. Executions without trial are routine. Marauding is commonplace. The kidnapping of people by Federal soldiers … is the stuff of everyday Chechen life.” As for Putin, Politkovskaya observed: “He’s in the Kremlin, enjoying the respect of the world community as an active member of the international ‘antiterrorism’ VIP club, the so-called coalition against terror.” She went on to note: “Bush is in Moscow … fraternization … a ‘historic visit’ … but barely a word about Chechnya, as if the war did not exist.”9
Outside of Chechnya, Russian journalists were reporting on the rampant corruption that was plaguing the Putin government at all levels. And sometimes they paid for their investigations with their lives. In addition to the five journalists mentioned above, scores of other Russian journalists were killed during Putin’s first term in office.10 These cases could not be attributed directly to the Kremlin, because they often involved reporters covering local corruption throughout the country. But the general atmosphere of lawlessness and impunity that the Kremlin did nothing to discourage was what gave rise to these crimes. And it also meant that many of the perpetrators went unpunished.
Igor Domnikov
On May 12, 2000, Igor Domnikov, a reporter for Novaia gazeta, was attacked in the entryway of his apartment building in southeastern Moscow by unidentified assailants. He was beaten unconscious on the head with a heavy metal object, suffering traumatic injuries. No money or documents were stolen by the killers. After being hospitalized in a coma for more than two months, Domnikov died on July 16 at age forty-two. His murder was not only devastating for his family (his parents, wife, and young son), but for his colleagues at Novaia gazeta. The editors there could not understand why Domnikov had been singled out for what seemed to be retribution for his writing: “Igor of course wrote critical articles, but the entire newspaper team was committed to investigating the dirty work of the authorities at all levels.” As Novaia gazeta pointed out, Domnikov was reporting on financial malfeasance and bribery within the government of the region of Lipetsk. But, after all, the paper noted, “when are Russian officials not involved in corruption? This is the routine and only lazy reporters don’t write about it.”11
The investigation of the case dragged on for years. Finally, in 2007, five members of a notorious criminal gang headed by Eduard Tager’ianov, were convicted in the death of Domnikov, as well as in a number of other murders. (In fact, because Domnikov did not die immediately, the crime was not called murder but rather “inflicting bod
ily harm leading to death.”) But these were only the attackers. The mastermind was still at large. It was not until December 2013 that Pavel Sopot, a member of Tager’ianov’s gang, was sentenced to seven years in a labor camp for organizing the attack on Domnikov. In fact, investigators concluded that Sopot was actually acting on the orders of the former vice-governor of Lipetsk, Sergei Dobrovskii, who Domnikov had criticized in his reporting.12 In the end, because the case dragged on for so long, Dobrovskii was able to avoid being tried because the statute of limitations ran out. In May 2015, a Moscow court declared the case closed.13 Such is the way with Russian justice.
Sergei Iushenkov
Meanwhile, questions over the 1999 apartment bombings would not go away. Sergei Iushenkov, a liberal member of the Duma, was serving as vice-chair of the Kovalev Commission on the bombings when, in April 2003, he was shot four times in the chest as he walked from his car to the entrance of his apartment building. He died immediately. On that very day, Iushenkov’s party, Liberal Russia, had officially registered to compete in the next Duma elections that December.