The Liri Valley
Page 36
One section of No. 18 Platoon, under Lance Corporal Aubrey Ward, was cut off by a German tank. The men hid out for about thirty minutes in a shell crater until the tank moved off. Then they withdrew through the wire, carrying out two wounded men.5 Another section of five men in No. 16 Platoon found itself surrounded and forced to surrender. The Germans told the men to hand over their equipment and weapons. Section leader Corporal Bannister slipped his wire cutters back to a man sitting immediately against the wire. When the Germans turned their backs, the soldier cut a hole in the wire. The men then waited for a chance to make a break for it, which came when some 51st RTR tanks approached their position and distracted the Germans. The men slipped through the wire and fled to safety under covering fire provided by the tankers.6
‘D’ Company’s attack went so well that 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade commander Brigadier Paul Bernatchez thought if the rest of the Carleton and York Regiment joined it, they could break the Hitler Line wide open a day ahead of schedule. However, by this time it was evident that 1 CIB’s assault on Pontecorvo was faltering and Major General Chris Vokes knew he could ill afford to risk Operation Chesterfield with yet another hurriedly conceived and executed attack. He ordered the New Brunswickers to pull back.7
It had been a costly operation. ‘D’ Company lost one officer killed and one wounded. Twenty-two other ranks were wounded and one killed. Six tanks were also knocked out. However, the Carleton and York Regiment had amassed a great deal of intelligence on the nature of the German defences. The location of many antitank gun and machine-gun positions was now known and several gaps had been cut into the wire to serve as lanes for the major attack in the morning. This enabled Lieutenant Colonel Dick Danby to develop a plan of attack worked out to the last detail, something that the regiments in 2 CIB — having been unable even to reconnoitre their section of the attack line — could not do.8
At 0600 hours on May 23, the Carleton and York Regiment spear-headed 3 CIB’s assault. The brigade plan was simple. The New Brunswick regiment would punch through to the Aquino-Pontecorvo road, code-named Aboukir. Then the West Nova Scotia Regiment would pass through and advance to a height of land overlooking the San Martino River. Operation Chesterfield called for the true breakthrough to come in 2 CIB’s sector, so once the West Novas were on their objective, 3 CIB’s part in the offensive would be concluded. The Royal 22e Regiment was acting as the divisional reserve, ready to move to the assistance of 2 CIB if necessary.9
The two leading Carleton and York companies — ‘B’ on the left and ‘A’ on the right — leaned on the barrage. But that failed to stop a counter-barrage by German artillery, mortars, and Nebelwerfers. Captain James Crook had barely taken ‘A’ Company across the start line when he was killed. Lieutenant H.J. Haining took over. With casualties mounting in ‘A’ Company, Major Rowland Horsey moved up with his much-reduced ‘D’ Company to bolster the leading company and unite the two under his command.
The two companies were to have breached the wire and reached Aboukir in seventy minutes. In fact, it took Major Burt Kennedy’s ‘B’ Company five minutes more than that. A few minutes later, Horsey reported that the composite company had arrived.10 The fighting had been stiff the entire way. Had Horsey not rushed to bolster ‘A’ Company with his own, the attack might have faltered. Horsey’s Company Sergeant Major Earle Upton played a pivotal role in keeping ‘D’ Company’s headquarters section organized. He also brought up the reserve platoons at the critical moment when its extra weight served to overwhelm the German defenders.
When his section commander had been killed, ‘A’ Company’s Private Samuel Dow took over and led the men into the wire. The section got separated from the rest of the company when it dodged incoming mortar fire and was forced to ground by a German .88-millimetre antitank gun emplacement that stood about 300 yards ahead. Armed with a PIAT, Dow crawled to a position 50 yards from the gun. Although scoring three direct hits on the concrete emplacement, he failed to knock the gun out. However, his fire marked the weapon’s position for the tanks. They blasted the gun position to pieces. Dow was, however, mortally wounded.11
Behind the Carleton and York Regiment, the 51st Royal Tank Regiment was caught in a fierce tank battle as several German tanks and self-propelled guns came up on the right flank to add the weight of their guns to the many antitank guns and Panzerturms engaging the British tankers. When both squadron commanders were wounded, the commander of the tank regiment rushed up to assume command. It took until 1000 hours for the British tanks to drive the German armour off and knock out most of the antitank gun emplacements. Losses among the tankers were heavy.12
While the tank battle raged, the New Brunswickers consolidated their hold at Aboukir. ‘B’ Company dug in on the left, ‘D’ and ‘A’ companies on the right, and ‘C’ Company lay in support. The Bren carrier company came up to protect the main breach in the wire. No sooner was everyone settled in than a German tank ground up to a position just fifty yards from ‘B’ Company’s front. When Danby sent the antitank platoon, under Captain L.A. Watling, forward to strengthen the regiment’s position, the tank retreated.13
Germans were surrendering all along the regimental front and others who had been bypassed earlier were also giving up. The scout platoon roved behind the wire rounding up or killing snipers, while Horsey’s men sent prisoners to the rear in batches of twenty to forty at a time. Effective opposition against the Carleton and York Regiment had ceased. Although still taking significant amounts of German artillery and mortar fire, the regiment had successfully completed its mission of breaching the Hitler Line. The way was clear for the West Nova Scotia Regiment to pass through and begin the next phase.14
That phase of the offensive was to have begun when 2 CIB and 3 CIB had established a three-regiment-wide front along the Aquino-Pontecorvo road. Only then was the second half of the massive barrage to begin. By noon, it was clear things were badly awry. Although 2 CIB’s Seaforth Highlanders of Canada had reached the road, they had been devastated in the process. The Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry and the Loyal Edmonton Regiment had no prospect of breaking through.
Vokes faced a dilemma. Currently, the West Nova Scotia Regiment was waiting in badly exposed ground for an order to pass through the Carleton and York Regiment. That advance was to have gone in behind a barrage that was now indefinitely postponed because of 2 CIB’s situation. The only success Vokes had was that won by the New Brunswick regiment. Now he had to decide how best to exploit it.15
Throughout the morning, Vokes had sought news of progress on the 2 CIB front. But Brigadier Graeme Gibson had little to tell him and Vokes was having difficulty keeping calm. Communications between Gibson and the regimental commanders were badly disrupted. Vokes had told Gibson to “get a clear picture of the situation employing every means at his disposal.” He told the brigadier to go out personally if need be to gather a situation report.
Eventually, Gibson, having sent a staff officer forward, reported the debacle his brigade had met. Vokes realized that he must either use the ground won by the Carleton and York Regiment or fail. Accordingly, Vokes decided to continue with the original plan for 3 CIB, but to supplement it by having the Royal 22e Regiment exploit through the West Nova Scotia Regiment. This regiment would drive across the Pontecorvo–Highway 6 road. By having the Van Doos hook to the right during their drive, he could open a path for 5th Canadian Armoured Division almost identical to that originally planned. By 1300 hours, Vokes had ordered Bernatchez to attack at 1700 hours with the postponed second phase of the artillery program to begin minutes before. As the 51st RTR had taken so many casualties during the Carleton and York attack and while waiting for the West Novas to go in, Vokes had to bring in the Three Rivers Regiment from 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade to support the attack. This regiment had been hanging in reserve, should it be needed.
The Three Rivers tanks and the R22eR were Vokes’s last reserves. If this attack failed, Operation Chesterfield was finished
. Vokes impressed this point on Bernatchez. Time was of the essence, he said, but he did not want to “have the attack go off half cocked.”
Shortly after Bernatchez departed, I Canadian Corps commander Lieutenant General Tommy Burns arrived. Vokes thought the corps commander seemed “rather depressed by the picture” he painted of the battle’s course. As it was Burns’s first offensive battle as corps commander, Vokes thought his reaction understandable. Vokes himself was optimistic that the 3 CIB attack would succeed. He was also encouraged by the progress 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade had made at Pontecorvo. He expected this brigade to “have cleared the enemy out of their sector of the Hitler Line before dark.”
Vokes’s major concern was that the Germans would counterattack the Carleton and York Regiment. If they mounted a determined operation, it could seriously disrupt the planned attack. Vokes impatiently paced around his headquarters, waiting to hear that Bernatchez’s men were ready. At 1610 hours, he got word that they were in position. Vokes decided to move the attack time up from 1700 hours to 1650. Even ten minutes might mean the difference between an attack going in clear or being blocked by a German counterattack. Vokes was profoundly aware that the second phase of Operation Chesterfield was now getting under way a full eight and one-half hours behind schedule. Such a delay, he later wrote, “seldom happens in peacetime training, and officers without battlefield training find it hard to understand. Those who study this battle will be critical of the delay and will no doubt believe I should have exploited the success of 3rd Brigade much earlier.”16
Vokes could hardly have moved more quickly. No clear picture existed of what was happening on the 2 CIB front until shortly before noon. Perhaps if Gibson had sent staff forward earlier, or conducted a personal reconnaissance, he would have realized that his regiments were too badly shredded to fulfill their assigned task. He did neither. By the time 2 CIB’s situation was clearly understood at divisional headquarters, the armour that was to have supported the West Nova Scotia attack had been so badly shot up at its start line that it had to be reinforced and rearmed.17
The West Nova Scotia Regiment and supporting 51st RTR squadrons had formed up in an extremely exposed position close to the German lines in expectation that their phase of the attack would soon begin. When the Carleton and York Regiment reported its success in reaching Aboukir just five minutes behind schedule, it was 0715 hours. The Nova Scotians and British tankers geared up for an imminent advance.
No order came. The German shelling of the area, heavy from the outset, steadily increased. More deadly for the tankers was the persistent and frighteningly accurate antitank fire from behind the German wire. The well-sited Panzerturms and a number of .88-millimetre gun emplacements were able to range in on the tanks, but their own positions were masked by the terrain and the dust and smoke raised by the Canadian barrage.
Hours passed and the situation remained unchanged. No orders came to either withdraw or advance. At 1030 hours, West Novas commander Lieutenant Colonel Ron Waterman told the infantry to dig in. Already, the regiment had had a number of men killed or wounded. Several Churchills were burning in every company area. Two hours later, it started to rain, but the German fire only intensified. More tanks burst into flames, more casualties were quickly evacuated. The West Novas’ war diarist scribbled, “Everyone is getting a bit worried, no news, what can be holding up the attack?”18
‘A’ Company commander Major John Millard was running from one disabled tank to another trying to find the commander of the squadron assigned to his unit. Each Churchill was fitted with a buzzer on its back that infantrymen could use to signal the tankers inside. When the tankers heard the buzzer, the commander opened the top hatch and tossed a headphone set on a wire down to the infantryman to allow communication over the racket of exploding shells and whining bullets. After going through this process several times, Millard learned that the squadron commander, Major Hare, had already lost two tanks and had moved to one named Champion.
Millard found Champion and pushed the button. Repeated attempts brought no response. Seeing the hatch was open, he climbed up on the turret to shout inside. A shell had struck Champion and the interior was a shambles. Millard was backing away when Hare called to him from another tank. The infantry commander asked Hare how his squadron was faring. Hare said he had only five of eighteen tanks left and these had scattered. If and when the attack order came, Hare said, he would try rounding them up.
Twenty minutes later, Hare tracked Millard down. The major was in a badly battered tank that barely ran. Hare said grimly that the squadron was literally destroyed; only a handful of the Churchills were even repairable. A desert campaign veteran, Hare told Millard, “I’ve seen some rough goes but this is the worst. My whole squadron’s had it. I’m going up with a tommy-gun to fight with the Carleton and Yorks!” Thompson in hand, he took off for the German wire.
Millard headed back toward ‘A’ Company’s headquarters section to radio a report to Waterman. He ran across a small field that was blanketed by shell holes. More than a dozen tank wrecks were strewn about. Half were burning. One exploded, the turret flipping off and landing upside down on the ground. The driver and the commander crawled out of the escape hatches of one burning hulk. Both men were ablaze. The commander staggered toward Millard, his eyes seeming to plead for help. Millard started toward him, but the tank blew up, the blast hurling the man twenty-five yards through the air. Millard crawled over to him, but he was dead.
The driver was still alive, tumbling over and over in the grass. A soldier grabbed him and beat out the flames on his clothes with bare hands. His coveralls were charred to a crisp, his burns dreadful. The man swore repeatedly, offering no other complaint and showing no visible sign of fear or pain. Millard and a couple of infantrymen helped him to the Regimental Aid Post. On his way back, Millard met West Novas Captain A.H. Maclean. The captain had half the flesh on one arm torn away by shrapnel, but had come to ask Millard if there were enough tanks left for the attack. Millard told him no and then radioed Waterman. The regimental commander said he should wait. “We waited and waited,” Millard later said.19
What they waited for was new tanks. The Three Rivers Regiment was on its way, but could not reach the area until 1630 hours at the earliest. The regiment had been holding behind 2 CIB’s lines in anticipation of supporting the Royal 22e Regiment. Now they had to shift southward across rough ground. At the same time, the R22eR was also coming. ‘A’ Squadron was to support the West Novas, ‘C’ Squadron the Van Doos. Neither tank squadron was at full strength. Like the 51st RTR, they had been ordered to form up perilously close to the German front lines and had paid accordingly.
Three Rivers Intelligence Officer Lieutenant Horace Dugald Beach had thought the spot where ‘A’ Squadron had formed up was “not too good a one tactically.” Both ‘A’ and ‘C’ had been positioned on a rise where they enjoyed a superlative view of the battleground and could watch the North Irish Horse tanks brewing up one after the other as they approached the Hitler Line in support of the PPCLI and Seaforths. The position also exposed their tanks to the same deadly combination of Panzerturm and .88-millimetre antitank gunfire. Armour-piercing shot, he noted, “was flying around as thick as the HE and mortars. Suddenly, ‘BLAP’ and ‘A’ Squadron’s tanks were going up in flames. They were committed before they could bat an eyelash, on our side of the Start Line Major R.C. Yelland’s tank and Corporal O’Brien’s tank went up in flames. Lieutenant Homer-Dixon jumped from his tank and with a fire extinguisher tried to put out the flames and rescue the crew of 3 Baker. He was sniped in the back. ‘A’ Squadron moved back slightly and pulled over to the left.”20
Captain D.C. Whiteford took over ‘A’ Squadron and led its remaining tanks over to the West Novas. They arrived with just three minutes to complete the marrying-up process before going into the attack at 1650 hours.21 As the Canadian Shermans rolled past the still smoking wrecks of the Churchills, the West Novas dispensed with all training proced
ure for coordinating actions with tanks. The infantry just waved the tanks forward, climbed out of their slit trenches, and started running toward the German wire. As one officer put it, “Our plan was clear enough — to get forward out of that hell hole.” The companies were terribly depleted. Millard’s ‘A’ Company went into the attack with only 55 men. Five days previously, it had numbered 107. The West Novas had ‘A’ and ‘B’ companies forward, with ‘C’ and ‘D’ following 200 yards back. Leaning into a barrage that preceded them almost to where the Carleton and York Regiment waited on the Aquino-Pontecorvo Road, they found many holes torn in the wire by shells.22
With the tanks having difficulty keeping up, the West Novas reached the Carleton and York position and kept on without pause. “Good luck, West Novas!” the New Brunswick men yelled. The charge continued until the West Novas came up to the steep gully through which the San Martino River flowed. Here, Waterman called a halt to let the tanks catch up, but the regiment also caught the Panzer Grenadiers frantically trying to man fighting positions dug into the reverse slope. The West Novas cut them apart with small-arms fire and many Germans surrendered.23
When the Three Rivers tanks came up, they found the gully too steep to cross. Whiteford told Waterman that the tankers would have to reconnoitre for a crossing point.24 The West Novas commander feared losing momentum so sent the infantry on alone. With the rain now a downpour, ‘A’ and ‘B’ companies led the way across the gully. They bypassed pockets of resistance, driving hard for the road above the San Martino River and leaving it to the following companies to mop up. The speed of the attack overwhelmed the Germans. The war diarist wrote, “Jerry prisoners and dead everywhere, they are completely demoralized at the speed of the attack but the shelling and mortaring is still intense. Before reaching the Pontecorvo Road the advance has been so rapid that the enemy counter barrage is dropping behind the reserve companies. ‘B’ Company reports Caporetto Code word for final objective, less than three-quarters of an hour after passing the start line. Seconds later ‘A’ Company report the same. The CO is so surprised he cannot at first believe it.”25