The Liri Valley

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The Liri Valley Page 37

by Mark Zuehlke


  The road proved to be little more than a narrow one-lane gravel track following a low wooded ridge that overlooked the gully of San Martino River. The West Novas crossed the road and dug in on the other side, with ‘B’ Company forming the right flank in the protection of some trees and shrubs. ‘A’ Company set up on a small spur rising above the road, ‘C’ moved to the southwest end of the ridge where some farmhouses were located, and ‘D’ dropped down into a sector of fields amid another cluster of farmhouses about a thousand yards north of Pontecorvo.

  No sooner had the companies dug in than the Germans counterattacked with tanks and infantry. The West Novas faced a dicey few minutes, for they had been told that the 48th Highlanders of Canada, from 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade, were on their left flank. Seeing a strong German force coming up the road from that direction, ‘D’ Company commander Captain J.K. (Dusty) Rhodes radioed Waterman for artillery support. Waterman said, “I can’t give you artillery fire on that position — the Highlanders are there.”

  “Then, sir, they’re wearing damned funny helmets!”

  “Very well, Dusty — but on your head be it.”

  “For God’s sake, not on my head, sir. On theirs!”

  “Roger.” Waterman signed off.26 Artillery fire crashed down minutes later and broke the German counterattack from that direction, but not before a ‘D’ Company section had been overrun in a large house situated on the left flank.

  Elsewhere, the Germans struck with equally determined counterattacks supported by tanks. As a tank approached ‘C’ Company, its men braced for a mauling. The commander, however, opened his turret, scanned the ridge with binoculars, and dropped promptly out of sight when one of the Bren gunners fired a burst at him. Everyone sighed with relief as the tank withdrew.

  From his position on the spur looking west from the ridge, ‘A’ Company’s Major Millard saw Panzer Grenadiers massing with tanks in the valley below. All he had to meet the tanks were a few PIATs. Millard withdrew his company from its exposed position to one astride the road, where the company’s 6-pounder antitank gun platoon was scheduled to set up once it arrived. Meanwhile, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery Forward Observation Officer Captain Robinson directed a concentration of 25-pounder gunfire on the German forming-up point, successfully scattering them.

  At dusk, ‘A’ Company was still digging in when a German soldier rose up out of the tall wheat and started blazing away with a Schmeisser submachine gun at the company headquarters section. His first targets were Millard and three other men, who were having a huddled conference in the open. Millard was unscathed but the other three, including RCHA FOO Robinson, were hit.

  Everyone dived for cover as more Germans opened fire from the southeast side of the road. It soon became evident that the Germans had infiltrated behind ‘D’ Company’s rear to attack the centre of the regiment. Most of the men in ‘A’ Company were surprised in the process of digging in. Only a few sentries were armed; the others had put down their guns in favour of shovels and bayonets. As the attack struck from behind, the sentries had been caught looking the wrong way and were cut down by the advancing Germans. In minutes, the majority of ‘A’ Company was forced to surrender.

  Despite the gunfire coming from the right of ‘A’ Company, the German commander curiously decided that the captured West Novas were the only Canadians in the sector. He formed his men up behind the prisoners and marched them north up the road. Minutes later, a Bren gun team on the left flank of ‘B’ Company was astonished to see about twenty-five West Novas approaching their position with hands raised in surrender. Behind the prisoners followed a closely grouped bunch of Germans. Privates Walter Peach and R.L. Hall swung their Bren gun to face the approaching group and fired a burst over the heads of the Canadians. This had the desired effect as the West Novas hit the dirt, leaving the Germans exposed to a long burst from the Bren. The Germans returned fire equally quickly and the two men were killed. They had bought enough time, however, for the rest of ‘B’ Company to bring up weapons, and a fierce volley of fire tore into the Germans. All were killed or wounded. Not a man in the surrendered element of ‘A’ Company had been scratched.

  Not all of ‘A’ Company had been captured. Millard, a lieutenant, and eight other men were holding out in a farmhouse and some slit trenches against more Germans who had infiltrated the West Novas’ position. Wounds incapacitated the RCHA FOO and another man in this group, and the other eight were hard pressed to repel repeated attacks. Elsewhere, the battle was equally desperate. ‘D’ Company was almost overrun by two Mark IVs supported by infantry. Just as darkness fell, the tanks were driven off by PIAT fire. Only one PIAT round remained when the German tank disengaged. ‘C’ Company was virtually surrounded. ‘B’ Company and the former prisoners of ‘A’ Company were in similar straits. With his radio batteries weakening and no spares on hand, Millard contacted Waterman and said he was on the verge of being overrun.27

  While the West Novas’ situation worsened, the Three Rivers tank squadrons continued seeking a way to cross the gully. Lieutenant N.H. Bier ran half a mile north and discovered a point where the tanks could probably cross. He led the two tank squadrons to the position and they skidded down a steep bank, wallowed through the mud at the bottom, and clawed a path up the other slope.28

  With the tanks now across the gully, Waterman scraped the barrel for infantry reinforcements. Headquarters personnel and the platoon of scouts and snipers were rushed to link up with the tanks. The Bren carrier platoon under Lieutenant C.H. Smith went to relieve Millard’s little group. Numbering only eighteen men, the platoon managed to break through to Millard and, small though it was, its presence stabilized resistance there. While the fighting around the West Novas remained stiff throughout the night, the situation slowly improved. By 0100 hours on May 24, it was apparent the regiment would survive until dawn. The companies, however, had lost between 20 and 60 percent of their effective strengths.

  As the West Nova Scotia Regiment had reached the Pontecorvo–Highway 6 road, the Royal 22e Regiment had broken off from its follow-on position, turning sharply right to reach the road on the objective point originally assigned to the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. The regiment tenaciously fought its way through heavy defences with Major Ovila Garceau’s ‘D’ Company on the left and Major Charles Bellavance’s ‘C’ Company on the right. Captain Henri Tellier’s ‘A’ Company followed. When the regiment wheeled to the right, Garceau’s company stayed back of the main German fortifications and made directly for the objective, while Bellavance, supported by Tellier, began the slow work of clearing the German fortified positions.29

  Garceau, an old-guard regimental mainstay, appeared completely unfazed by the persistent German artillery and mortar fire. He and two platoon commanders strolled ahead of the company, as if walking in a park. When they reached the San Martino gully, Garceau called a halt. He stood in the middle of the road, joking with his lieutenants, who sat on the verge. Garceau tried lighting a cigarette, but it was raining too hard. Suddenly a shell struck the middle of the road and shrapnel tore into Garceau’s abdomen. As the lieutenants rushed to his side, Garceau looked up and made a joke. He continued laughing and joking as they wrapped him in a shell dressing and arranged his evacuation.30

  Lieutenant Colonel Jean Allard and RCHA Major George Mitchell were bouncing along in the R22eR commander’s Jeep between the two advancing companies. From a fortified house came the sharp thump of an .88-millimetre gun. The round hissed directly between Allard and Mitchell. The two officers and two corporals accompanying them dived out of the Jeep and scrambled to cover. Travelling with Allard’s party was a 17-pound gun crewed by members of the 1st Anti-tank Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery. This crew swiftly unhooked their weapon from its carrier and brought it to bear. The German gun was destroyed as the Canadian gunners put accurate fire through the gun port that the enemy had cut in the stone wall.

  When Allard returned to the Jeep, he heard on the radio that Garceau lay
wounded in a nearby house. He hurried over to check on his childhood friend, who, like Allard, hailed from Trois Rivières. Even as Allard walked into the house and saw Garceau lying on the floor with a gaping wound in his abdomen, he knew the man was dying. Allard did not ask what had happened; that did not matter. Garceau, still lucid, said, “You know, Jean, old buddy, it’s an honour to die for the Van Doos. Tell my mother I died happy and say goodbye to her for me. Say hello to Jos Trudeau for me.” Allard and some others gently laid Garceau on a stretcher and sent him back to hospital, but he died on arrival. The Van Doos commander thought sadly that Garceau “had given his all, like thousands of other Canadians before him, in a war far from home, a war that would go on without him.”31

  But the Canadians had breached the Hitler Line. Allard found his companies had moved well west of the main fortifications and were pressing northward, ever widening the opening. ‘D’ Company, now commanded by Captain Vaugeois of the reconnaissance platoon, anchored the left flank near the West Nova Scotia line. ‘C’ Company moved up the Aquino-Pontecorvo road and found a lost platoon from the PPCLI there. And 1,500 yards to the northwest of where Allard established his regimental command post, Captain Tellier’s ‘A’ Company was ensconced on the Pontecorvo–Highway 6 road. It was a victory that had come at a terrible price, for since crossing the Gari River on May 13 the regiment had suffered more than 200 casualties. Twenty-eight men were dead. Given the heavy artillery fire falling on the Canadian positions, Allard knew more of his men would not be alive to greet the morning.32

  The more-than-one-mile-wide breach opened by 3 CIB was a stunning achievement, particularly from an attack hastily thrown together to pluck victory out of potential disaster. South of the line of 3 CIB’s attack, the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade had also broken through the Hitler Line, albeit on a much narrower front.

  Because all available artillery had initially been supporting Operation Chesterfield on the northern flank, the offensive conducted by 1 CIB was limited to continuing the 48th Highlanders of Canada’s drive toward Point 106, the previous day’s objective. Since the Princess Louise Dragoon Guards had established a bridgehead through to the isolated Highlanders during the night of May 22, a fresh squadron of tanks from the 142nd Regiment Royal Armoured Corps reached the regiment’s forming-up point at 0645 hours. The Highlanders attacked at 0800 hours on May 23 with ‘D’ Company on the left and ‘B’ Company on the right, each supported by a tank troop. In a replay of the day before, the advancing troops immediately faced withering fire from the ridgeline. But yesterday there had been no Allied tanks. Today, they smothered the ridge with main gunfire, enabling the two companies to reach the road running along the foot of the ridgeline and to capture the houses there.33

  ‘D’ Company paid a heavy cost for the houses. Two platoons were badly cut up. Among the dead was Lieutenant Doug Snively. ‘B’ Company had also been shredded.34 The two companies reorganized and ‘B’ Company commander Captain Jack Wilson radioed Lieutenant Colonel Ian Johnston to suggest that the drive to the ridgeline proceed with ‘D’ Company leading and the battered ‘B’ Company tagging close behind, ready to pass through once ‘D’ reached the crest. Johnston said, “Try it, Jack, and good luck.”

  Major Jim Counsell led ‘D’ Company up the slope into a storm of German fire that cut down men and brewed up Churchills. Just short of the crest, the one remaining tank was knocked out by a Faustpatrone rocket launcher. Counsell concluded that it would be suicide for the remaining men to venture up onto the crest without armoured support or reinforcements. Appreciating the situation, ‘B’ Company’s Wilson, bleeding badly from a head wound, veered his men left to form up alongside Counsell’s men. The supporting tanks died one after the other and then a mortar round killed Wilson.35

  Johnston fed Major John Clarke’s ‘A’ Company into the battle, but halfway up the slope before his company was driven to ground. ‘C’ Company remained in reserve, as there was no room on the slope for it to deploy. Clarke radioed back that trying to continue the attack in daylight would be futile. He suggested they hold in place and renew the attack under night’s cover. Johnston agreed, but he already suspected the attack would not be necessary. Minutes earlier, the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment had broken into the Hitler Line to the north and were already driving directly toward Point 106.36

  1 CIB Brigadier Dan Spry had ordered the Hasty P’s into action at 1240 hours. He told commander Lieutenant Colonel Don Cameron that the Highlanders were “fairly cut-up and that it was vital that the battalion should move forward and contact their right forward company.” Cameron held a hasty Orders Group, where he said that, “although the opposition would be strong, it was to be understood that it would be taken.”37 Cameron not only wanted to make contact with the Highlanders, but he wanted Point 106. To this effect, he ordered ‘D’ Company to attack on the left front and break through to the Highlanders. ‘B’ Company, meanwhile, would drive for Point 106. ‘C’ Company would provide covering fire from the front of the German wire and ‘A’ Company was in reserve.

  At 1400 hours, ‘D’ Company jumped off into strong German machine-gun fire from several stone buildings. But the Plough Jockeys, as the regiment was nicknamed, were so determined to succeed, Cameron later wrote, that in “an outstanding display of initiative and courage, [they] stormed forward, and took their objective, destroying many enemy and taking numerous prisoners.” One platoon hooked up with the Highlanders, while the rest mopped up positions in front of the Highlanders’ front line.

  Having held ‘B’ Company back until he knew whether ‘D’ Company would reach the Highlanders, Cameron unleashed it at 1500 hours. The men drove forward quickly, but once through the wire were forced to take cover by heavy machine-gun fire. A supporting troop of tanks was called up and its fire made short work of the German gunners. After that, ‘B’ Company moved easily to a position just short of Point 106, from which at 1700 hours ‘A’ Company moved toward the little hill. The company met only slight resistance from an enemy already in retreat. After a few minutes’ fighting, the Hasty P’s were on top of the hill and consolidating. The day’s battle cost the regiment thirty casualties, of which eight had been killed. They took 300 prisoners.38 “No one ever doubted that the job couldn’t and wouldn’t be done,” the regiment’s war diarist wrote.39

  As the Hasty P’s secured Point 106, the Royal Canadian Regiment entered the bridgehead from which the Highlanders had launched their morning attack and probed toward Pontecorvo. By nightfall, they were positioned to attack the town in the morning. To their south, the Princess Louise Dragoon Guards had tried to open a way between the town and the Liri River and advance to the Melfa River. However, when the regiment’s armoured cars ran into a wide mine-field in front of Pontecorvo, the advance ground to a halt.40

  Several armoured cars were knocked out in the minefield, including one in which Trooper Bill Pasfield served as the gunner. Pasfield’s head was injured in the blast. Although shaky and groggy, the trooper got the other, more seriously injured men in the car out and dragged them to safety. Then, seeing that the lead armoured car was pinned down by Germans threatening to overrun it, Pasfield ran back to his own car and brought its machine gun to bear against the enemy. His accurate fire forced the Germans to break off the attack, enabling the armoured car to escape safely from the minefield.41

  The breaches cut in the Hitler Line by 1 CIB and 3 CIB ended any hope of that front’s containing Eighth Army’s advance. Already German forces were streaming west, surviving units desperately trying to beat the Canadians in a race to the Melfa River. About five miles west of the Hitler Line, the Melfa drained out of the northern mountains and followed a winding path across the breadth of the Liri Valley to a junction with the Liri River. Behind its western bank, the Germans hoped to form another defensive line.

  First Canadian Infantry Division had paid a high price to break the Hitler Line. After the one-day fight, 47 officers and 832 other ranks were dead or wounded, more
than half from 2 CIB. In addition, 7 officers and 70 men from other Canadian units were casualties.42

  The Germans defending the line were virtually annihilated. By last light, 1 CID had captured 15 officers and 547 other ranks. Canadian intelligence estimated that 500 Germans were dead. One intelligence officer wrote: “Of the infantry involved in the attack hardly any escaped. Of the supporting arms over 50 percent were killed or captured. Twenty-five percent of the PWs captured were from staffs and supporting arms. Presumably this is true of the killed too.”43

  The Canadians were not exaggerating German losses. As early as 1130 hours on May 23, Tenth Army Chief of Staff Generalmajor Fritz Wentzell learned from 90th Panzer Grenadier commander General-leutnant Ernst-Günther Baade that 1st Battalion and 2nd Battalion of the 361st Grenadier Regiment “must be considered destroyed.” Later it was reported that one battalion of the 1st Parachute Division and two companies of the 5th Mountain Division sent to strengthen the endangered line “were wiped out.”

 

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