by Mark Zuehlke
Later, he added that Clark was “making desperate efforts to get Rome on his own. I only hope he will do so, and we can then go north on our own business — but I’m so afraid he’ll bungle it like Cassino — and then we shall have to clear it up. I believe it would have been much better if he would wait for us to help — but he is now terrified that we might get to Rome first, which is the last thing we now want to do. I only hope it will not warp his military decisions.”35
Clark’s military decision-making was already badly warped by his obsession with Rome. Nothing the Canadians driving up the ever narrowing valley toward Rome could do would rescue the situation. They continued punching into the centre of the deliberately slow withdrawal by Tenth Army’s veteran divisions, which still enjoyed the great tactical defensive advantage of rugged terrain. Even as the width of their front was increasingly encroached on from the right by XIII Corps and on the left by the intentional “slop” of the French Corps, so that room for manoeuvre was ever more restricted, the Canadians fought on.
First light of May 30 found two regiments of the 5th Canadian Armoured Brigade moving toward Frosinone, a provincial capital and key junction point at which Highway 6 intersected with a north-south lateral highway, with links through the mountains to the Adriatic. A short distance into the mountains, this road intersected with Via Prenestina, an alternative route from the east to Rome. The capture of Frosinone would hinder German attempts to shunt some of the retreating army inland to take advantage of this line of retreat. Eighth Army’s intention was to channel the retreating Germans onto Highway 6 and subsidiary roads in the hope that the Americans would still sever this route at Valmontone to trap and eliminate some enemy divisions.
The 8th New Brunswick Hussars attempted to dodge the choked terrain that had so hindered the B.C. Dragoon advance by following a road running from Pofi southwest to Ceccano and then looping back via a road from that town to Frosinone. The ground was riddled with streams. All the bridge and culvert crossings had been blown. Lieutenant Herb Snell’s reconnaissance troop discovered that retrieved Teller antitank mines and Italian box mines could be used to blast down streambanks to create passable diversions.36 At 0900 hours, they hit the Arnara River, halfway to Ceccano. This was too great a barrier for Snell’s crude demolitions. A bridging tank was brought forward, but it was almost 1230 before the column was under way again.
Snell had been ordered to find a faster route north to Frosinone than would be possible if they had to go all the way into Ceccano, but he came up dry. The Hussars continued toward Ceccano until coming to a “point where many mines were found on the road and verges.” At 1800 hours, the first Shermans started creeping over ground that the engineers and reconnaissance troops thought was now clear. Two tanks were damaged as mines exploded under their tracks. The Hussars withdrew to a defensible point of high ground and dug in for the night. On May 31, the regiment advanced only slightly farther before being ordered at 1030 hours to stand down. Events on the Canadian right flank had rendered the attempt to reach Frosinone by the long leftward march no longer necessary.37
The Lord Strathcona’s Horse had spent an equally frustrating morning on May 30 trying to take a more direct route past Arnara toward Frosinone. “At this time the situation was very vague,” the war diarist recorded, “the CBH were understood to be in the vicinity, the GGHG on the high ground to our right but the situation on the left was completely obscure.” German shells followed them. Finally, a Cape Breton patrol was encountered. They reported seeing enemy tanks in the area.38 After wallowing across narrow streams and irrigation ditches, the Shermans rolled up onto a hogback ridge barely wider than the narrow road with almost sheer cliffs falling away on either flank. The Shermans were completely exposed to any lurking German tanks or antitank guns.
A sweaty, anxious advance followed, worsened when unidentified guns started firing on the column from a ridge 2,000 yards to the west. An ‘A’ Squadron tank was hit and burned. This left ‘A’ and ‘C’ squadrons blocked on the ridgeline, unable to creep around the burning tank or to push it off the road. The Strathconas’ commander, Lieutenant Colonel Phillip Griffin, ordered the tanks in these squadrons to wheel about and fire on the German-held ridge with high explosives and smoke while the leading ‘B’ Squadron moved off the exposed ground and occupied a small, unmarked village. This fire seemed to quiet down the Germans, although some desultory shelling from that quarter continued throughout the day.
Griffin went ahead on foot to find out what was happening to his leading squadron and the reconnaissance troop. Along the way, he encountered the Cape Breton Highlanders acting commander, Major Boyd Somerville, using a church as an observation point. Somerville said that his infantry had been driven off the ridge earlier by the German shelling. The infantry officer had also observed German tanks at the crossroads where the road they were following met Highway 6. Commandeering one of the Honeys from the reconnaissance unit to use as a command vehicle, Griffin ordered Captain Jock Usher to get his ‘B’ Squadron up to the crossroads.
With the remaining Honeys in the reconnaissance troop leading the way, Usher’s tanks lumbered up to where a huge crater had been blasted into the road on a tight curve at the bottom of a steep little hill. The Honeys had no trouble slipping past it, but the first Sherman got ditched in the hole. When others tried creeping off the road, they mired in holes and ditches.
Captain Edward Perkins, of Melfa River fame, took his Honeys up to the crossroads, which the Strathconas were now calling Torrice, after a small nearby village. He radioed that there were indeed German tanks around. Griffin told Perkins to send back some guides who could lead ‘B’ Squadron into good fighting positions from which to engage the German tanks. While the guides returned on foot, Perkins tangled with some enemy infantry and drove them off with .50-calibre Browning machine-gun fire. He then formed a defensive circle with the Honeys and dismounted reconnaissance troops to await the tanks. Although wounded, Perkins stayed with the troop for another six hours before agreeing to evacuation. The Germans were bringing artillery fire to bear on the reconnaissance troop, so Perkins retaliated by directing artillery against any target he saw.
Lieutenant D.P. Ramsay’s No. 2 Troop was first to get around the crater and head for Perkins’s position. The troop was down to only two Shermans, the other having earlier broken down. They had just crossed an open stretch of road and were passing a burning Honey that had been knocked out during Perkins’s advance when a German tank fired on Sergeant A. Zeal’s Sherman, which burst into flames. The two flaming tanks now nearly blocked the road. Ramsay carried on alone, reaching Torrice Crossroads at 1530 hours. Parking just south of Highway 6, Ramsay and co-driver Trooper A. Scott dismounted to find a good fighting position. As they started across the highway, the two men heard a throaty engine roar and saw a Panther tank backing up onto the road about 200 yards east of their position. Scott, having already crossed the road, hid in a small concrete hut while Ramsay ran back to the tank. The Sherman crept up to a corner in the road and halted when the gunner could just see down Highway 6 toward the Panther, now rolling west toward their position. The gunner blasted the Panther’s heavy frontal armour with fifteen .75-millimetre armour-piercing rounds. Neither slowing nor returning fire, the Panther kept coming. When it was only fifty yards off, a shot broke a track. This made the tank slew slightly sideways and Ramsay’s gunner got a shot into the thinner side armour, bringing it to a halt mere feet from the Sherman. As the Germans bailed out, Scott scrambled from his shelter and cut them down with his Thompson submachine gun.
Returning to the job of finding a position for the tank, Ramsay was standing on the side of the road when a German Mark IV sped past in the direction of Rome without giving the lieutenant a second glance. Ramsay jumped into his tank and ordered it backed up a slope so he could get above the highway. As the tank went up the bank, a German machine gun put a short burst directly into Scott’s open hatch. The bullets ricocheted into the turret and struck both
Ramsay and his radio operator in the legs. Ramsay fainted from loss of blood just as the tank backed over a mine. With the driver keeping the brakes engaged to prevent the disabled tank from rolling back down the hill, Scott and the gunner evacuated the two wounded men. The driver then bailed out as the tank slid to the bottom of the hill and came to rest.
While Ramsay’s crew fought its action at Torrice Crossroads, Lieutenant J.W. Black’s No. 1 Troop approached the open gap where Zeal’s tank had been knocked out. Sergeant Clifford Macey of the reconnaissance troop, who had won a Distinguished Conduct Medal for his part in the Melfa battle, met the lieutenant. Having lost one tank in mud, Black had only his corporal’s tank behind him. Macey jumped onto Black’s tank and pointed out suspected gun positions in the woods. He told Black to make his crossing as fast as possible. Black was almost up to the two burning tanks when a shell hit his Sherman and killed him. The addition of a third wrecked tank blocked the road entirely. Without crossing the gap, Corporal J.B. Matthews set up in a covered position from which he was able to see Highway 6. As Macey and other reconnaissance troops pointed out targets, Matthews brought them under fire, changing position as needed to get a better firing angle. One Panther and a self-propelled gun were confirmed kills and he also assisted in knocking out another Panther and a Mark IV tank engaged by other troops of ‘B’ Squadron that had formed up alongside his tank. Matthews was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal.
The Strathconas were under constant artillery and tank fire during this action. Griffin was running around on foot, helping the tankers target German tanks trying to escape westward. A high-explosive shell exploded near him. A piece of shrapnel sliced deep near his left eye while sand and gravel kicked up by the blast penetrated his face, neck, chest, and arms. Covered in blood, Griffin walked to Perkins’s position by the road and was given first-aid treatment.
As darkness approached, the battle quieted down and no more German armour or vehicles attempted to get past the tanks’ position. Griffin was evacuated to the church being used by Highlander Major Somerville as an observation point. Here he found three brigadiers gathered: 5 CAB’s Desmond Smith, 11 CIB’s Eric Snow, and 2 CIB’s Graeme Gibson. The latter’s brigade was preparing to take over the advance that night, with the Loyal Edmonton Regiment leading. The tankers were to pass into reserve in the morning. During the fight at the crossroads, the Strathconas had had one officer killed and 3 wounded; 6 other ranks were killed, 4 more would die of wounds, and another 11 were wounded. One Honey and four Shermans had been destroyed in exchange for three Panthers, one Mark IV, one self-propelled gun, two half-tracked vehicles, a number of trucks, two motorcycles and their riders, and an unknown number of German infantry killed.39
25
VIVA IL CANADESE
There were many new faces in the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade regiments as they marched toward the sound of the guns on May 30. Since it mauling at the Hitler Line, the brigade had been heavily reinforced to regain combat strength. On May 25, for example, the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada received eight new officers and 208 other ranks.1 Some were returning after recovering from wounds, sickness, or completing assigned training duties. Most, however, were raw recruits fresh from training bases in Canada or Britain. On May 27, Major Jim Stone returned from training in Britain to take over acting command of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment. He was still settling into this role when 2 CIB commander Brigadier Graeme Gibson advised him early on May 30 that the Eddies would spearhead the Canadian advance on Frosinone.
The brigade plan was for the Edmontons to pass through the Cape Breton Highlanders and advance to the high ground code-named Harry, which the Cape Bretoners had failed to reach. On the Edmontons’ left, the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry would pass through the Irish Regiment of Canada, which was holding the height of land code-named Dick. Meeting no opposition, the Edmontons reached Harry in just forty-five minutes. ‘A’ and ‘B’ companies pressed straight on to another height of land two miles from Frosinone. Again, they met no resistance and were in position by 2220 hours. Ten minutes after arriving on the objective, Stone sent a four-man patrol toward Frosinone to determine whether it was occupied.2
On the left flank, the PPCLI was less fortunate. The regiment had spent a difficult day getting to Dick because heavy traffic on Highway 6 had log-jammed its trucks. Finally, Lieutenant Colonel Cameron Ware ordered the regiment to dismount and march cross-country. There was no time to dispatch food rations, so the men carried only water bottles and hard rations.3 They arrived at the Irish position after a six-hour trek and immediately continued on with ‘B’ Company leading. Crossing a patch of open high ground, the company came under mortar, machine-gun, and small-arms fire. ‘B’ Company went to ground and all attempts by Ware to get other companies around the German flanks were blocked by heavy fire.
At nightfall, the PPCLI leapfrogged forward by companies to find the enemy gone. They scooped up a few prisoners on the way and were soon anchored on the Edmontons’ left flank. All except for Major P.D. Crofton’s ‘D’ Company, which had become separated in the thick brush and was missing. The men in the other companies settled in for the night with grumbling stomachs and the knowledge that no rations would reach them until Frosinone was taken and their transport rejoined them.
In the morning, Ware sent six scouts out to locate Crofton’s company. Finally, Sergeant T. Inverarity of the scout platoon brought the major, who had only joined the regiment on May 26, and his men in from the woods. Ware then set off after the Edmontons.4
During the night, that regiment’s four-man patrol into Frosinone had failed to return. Stone consequently moved ‘D’ Company to just outside the town and then had it probe the defences with a fighting patrol. The patrol found only rearguard troops scattered in the town, but a short firefight ensued in which the commander, Lieutenant E.M. Simms, was killed. With the company only five days, this had been his first combat. The rest of the company followed the patrol into the streets and swept it clear, scooping up five Germans, but finding no sign of the lost patrol. Stone could only surmise that the patrol had been captured. Except for the Germans taken prisoner, the regiment’s war diarist wrote, “the city was empty and in ruin.”5
While the Edmontons secured Frosinone, the PPCLI enjoyed “a pleasant march through cultivated fields, orchards, and vineyards. Many were so hungry they pulled up potatoes and ate them raw.” Upon reaching the day’s objective about 1,000 yards south of Frosinone, the PPCLI dug in on both sides of Highway 6 without having fired a shot during the advance. When a patrol went into Frosinone, however, one of the scouts, Private H.A. McDonald, was wounded by light machine–gun fire. Whether the fire originated from Germans, however, was undetermined. The regiment’s intelligence section also went into the town to search for a badly needed typewriter. They returned to report that Frosinone “had been completely gutted of all furniture or equipment of any kind. Apart from bomb and shell fire damage, everything breakable had been deliberately and needlessly smashed by the Germans.”
At noon on May 31, the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada moved through the PPCLI position to secure the main crossroads. Severing that junction would block the major route north into the mountains from use by the retreating Germans. Behind the Seaforths came the quartermaster trucks, bringing food to end the PPCLI’s thirty-six-hour fast. The Canadian vehicles were followed later by several German trucks that, depending on the belligerence of the passengers, the PPCLI either shot up or captured.6
The Seaforths had been on the move forward since 0400 hours, initially by truck. Faced with clogged roads, however, they had soon unloaded north of Arnara and marched on a mule track to the PPCLI position. Seaforths commander Lieutenant Colonel Syd Thomson had been warned that the Germans would put up a stiff fight for the road crossing. However, “it became evident that the main body of the Germans had withdrawn from the area, leaving only delaying parties and one task force which included some Panther tanks.”7
At 1
445 hours, the Seaforths started a left-hand flanking manoeuvre to get behind Frosinone and cut the road junction. ‘B’ Company moved across open country to a disused railway. Following the railway, the company came out on Highway 6, just west of the junction. When Captain O.H. Mace led his men up to the road, they came under fire from tanks and machine guns. Six men were hit, three fatally. While Mace spread his platoons out so that they dominated the road, mortars began pounding their line.
‘C’ Company, meanwhile, had paralleled ‘B’ Company’s line of advance by following the road that cut laterally across Highway 6 en route to the mountains to the north. As it skirted the edge of Frosinone, mortar fire injured seven men. When ‘A’ Company passed through ‘B’ Company’s line to seize a height of ground on the other side the ground was quickly taken. Highway 6 was now well covered by Seaforth rifles and machine guns.8
The regiment began reaping a bountiful harvest of German vehicles trying to escape toward Rome. By nightfall, they had knocked out or captured four enemy Jeeps, two trucks, and one motorcycle. Four Germans were dead, 3 wounded, and 17 captured. The Seaforths’ casualties were 3 killed and 16 wounded.9
From where Frosinone stood atop a 300-foot summit, the next objectives lay straight up Highway 6. Seven miles northwest, the town of Ferentino perched on top of a 500-foot-high pinnacle-shaped feature that rose out of the surrounding plain. Three miles east of Ferentino was 850-foot-high Monte Radicino. The assigned 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade drew the task of seizing Ferentino and 2 CIB Monte Radicino.