Many privileged female nineteenth century travellers (and their male counterparts, it should be said) took a dim view of Damascene women. Catherin Tobin thought all the women of the "better class" she met were "splendidly attired" and naturally pretty. However, they pulled out all their eyebrows, replacing them with a dark line of makeup. That, she considered, "would spoil the handsomest face in the world." Worse, though, was their indolence: they were given over to clothes, gossip, smoking, drinking and eating, had no education and, as a result, went about with a "silly expression of countenance." They were, she continued, too lazy to take off their clothes before retiring at night, or to bathe more than once a month!74 That last point was a telling one, because her report was of a visit to a rich Jewish family that, perhaps, was not in the habit of visiting the local hammam. Or, perhaps, Catherine Tobin just got it all wrong.
This idea of the subjugation of women has been a common Western analysis of the Arab world generally and of Syria particularly, but belies that change is occurring and that it has a long heritage. In 1892, the Damascene woman writer, Hind Nawfal, began editing in Alexandria, Egypt, a journal called Young Girl.75 By World War I there were twenty five such women's journals throughout the Arab world, all seeking to place women more centrally in modern Islamic life, and raising doubts about whether the Quran really did sanction the veil and polygamy, among other things. These journals kindled women's networks throughout the region, including in Damascus, and that in turn led directly to the 1928 formation of the Arab Women's Union. The main drive was to assert the rights of women within the context of what was positive for women within Islam and Arab culture, although lessons were also to be drawn from the rising women's movement in other cultures. This attempt at balance has made promoting the cause of women a difficult task within the context of a changing Islamic and Arab world but in Syria, at least, has led to the formalisation of equality for women under the law. Critics, however, say that such laws are honoured more in the breach than in the observance.
As a result, it is still possible to see stories emerging in the early twenty first century about the need to establish in Damascus a women-only taxi service. The organiser of the service explained that she was driven to it by daily harassment from male drivers as she took her children to school, and as she herself proceeded to work.
There is no doubt that, in a Western sense, women are not considered to be as "free" in Syria as outside reporters might wish them to be, and that Islam's long practice of conservatism in gender relations, to put it mildly, is a major stumbling block to better international understanding. As always, things are sometimes not what they appear to be or are, at least, a little more complex than that. The West's view on this has a long history and much of the "Orientalist" literature, for example, proceeded from speculation and even prurience about the zenana and the harem. When Robert Richardson went to the Levant in the early nineteenth century, he was a member of the touring party got up by the second Lord Belmore, who used the affair as a means of escaping pressing financial problems back in Ireland. Belmore later became a controversial Governor in Jamaica, and his grandson a Governor of Victoria in Australia. On this trip, Belmore was accompanied by his wife, the former lady Juliana Butler. She was a character—Richardson describes her as dressing like a Mamluk and walking freely about the souks, drinking coffee in the riverside coffee houses, and smoking the nargileh.76 She was in the long line of such Western women that would later include Freya Stark and Gertrude Bell, but it was not an approach that local women could adopt.
In one respect, that is a clue to the essential difference between the Arab world and the West—the women's movement in the West has been much about emphasising the need for gender relations to be normalised in the publicly visual sense, things not only have to change but have to be seen to be changed. That is a vast generalisation, obviously, but if it has any standing, it helps explain some of the frustration encountered in dealing with Islam in this area—change might well be happening, but it cannot be seen to be happening. There has always been commentary about the real power of Muslim women behind the veils, where the veils exist, but for the West that is unconvincing.
The related point arises when the hijab and the veil begin to appear in places where they have not been seen before and, for the West, that is automatically assumed to be an imposition by males. As usual, it might not be that straightforward. In Jordan, a young woman anthropologist suggested to me that the increasing appearance of the hijab among young university women there could be traced, at least partly, to a conscious decision by those women to do so as a statement about their commitment to Islam in response to American actions in Iraq. A similar story came transpired in Syria, and there was much spirited discussion about who had taken the hijab and why, and occasionally who had forsaken it and why.
The hijab and the veil were evidently not widespread in Damascus at this time, except in the Shia section, yet another gap between the broader reporting and the ground conditions which were, as always, more complex. Some local observers suggested that the hijab, at least in its milder form, was quite common a generation or so ago, and in Sunni as well as Shia quarters. Sunni-dominant cities like Hama have always had women wearing the hijab commonly. Again, the al-Assad regime has had a shaping influence on practice, as in Rifat al-Assad (Hafez's brother) leading his troops into Damascus during the 1980s and ordering women to remove their veils. Even against that background, however, now Jordan had the reputation for being more liberal yet was not, at least in this respect, while Syria was cast as the oppressive state, yet many of its women had more freedom than anywhere else in the Arab world.
Whatever the truth in any of this, there is no question that the role of women in Islam, and in Syria, will continue to be a major blockage to mutual understanding.
Trysting
~
Over in the Christian Quarter, one little restaurant offered a welcome escape from the streets with the pleasant proprietors offering excellent food and very cold beer at very reasonable prices. Just off Bab Touma Street and on the edge of the tourist sections, it was well situated.
Its ambience had also attracted young couples wanting to get away from it all. That was partly because the back section of the restaurant had several tables tucked around a corner and out of sight. It was discreet. Consequently, late in the afternoon and especially at weekends, it was common to see couples sitting back there spending time together with coffee and food, sometimes the Lebanese wine. The restaurant, like many others in the area, carried Ksara wines from the Beqaa Valley, that area known also for hosting military bases.
On one occasion in the restaurant the proprietors and waiters were intrigued, interested and amused because the couple of the day became very, well, close, with a considerable amount of mutual body searching conducted. The male headed for the gents toilet at one point particularly flushed in the face, surreptitiously rearranging his clothing as he went. After he returned, a little while later the lady in question retired to rearrange what was clearly a serious state of dishabille. Having thus rearranged themselves, they then proceeded to undo the good work, necessitating further expeditions later before they could brave the outside world. This was not a unique occurrence, either. A few weeks later another couple became similarly involved, the woman with a head scarf that was subject to considerable rearrangement.
The café provided a service as such places do all over the world, but its importance here was accentuated by the relative absence of private space in traditional settings, especially joint family homes, the still somewhat personal restrictions on the freedom of women, and rapidly changing modern attitudes towards relationships. In 1906 the Karl Baedeker guidebook to Palestine and Syria was forthright on this general matter in relation to Damascus:
In this jealous and fanatical city it is impolite and even dangerous to be too observant of the fair sex.77
At the same time, however, the guide book also referred to white-garbed women in the drapery souk
"coquetishly" raising their veils to emphasise haggling positions on purchases. Once again, these were not straightforward matters.
Well over a century later, that complexity found its way into the Damascus For You guide which carried a curious reference to this general area:
Sexual relations between young men and woman [sic] are correct and socially acceptable , only if they occur within the social habits regarding engagement and marriage.78
If that was so, then naturally the café couples were at least engaged, if not married and simply escaping the strictures of home in order to display their affections in public!
One local male made an interesting comment. In discussion, he suggested that the young American in the discussion group stood a better chance of getting a "date" (clearly code for something more) with/from a local girl, because any Syrian male given the same opportunity would shortly thereafter be served with a notice for marriage.
Casual observers are frequently struck by an odd phenomenon in Syria that is relevant to all of this. Throughout the souks, windows frequently display the most risqué women's underwear, bordering on or right in the territory occupied in the West by straight-out sex and porn shops.79 There it is, all bright colours, loudly displayed and given regular and prolonged inspection by men and women alike. It is sold only by men, as are all goods in all shops, including the more regular women's clothing and underwear outlets—women rarely run shops in the Old City. Heart-shaped pieces of fluff on impossible strings and all the usual variations of the genre are to be seen everywhere.
By definition, that means there is something very interesting going on in the field of social relations here, because it is otherwise hard to match the black veils with the black G-strings.
Tony Blair Should Live in The House
~
This fantasy arose during a conversation sparked by a BBC World News report about the latest collapse in "Middle East Peace Talks", as they are now honoured and which have now been going on for a very long time. The "Middle East" has been the subject of some intermediary action or other, perhaps, from the moment of its emergence as a labelled entity. In its more modern sense, the process dates from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire during World War I, and the subsequent carve-up initiated by the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement that saw Anglo-French interests best served, and from which Israel eventually emerged as a separate Jewish state at the expense of Palestine. The world has not been the same since.
The "Middle East" as a term is really the starting point for the problem. Because it was "east" of the major metropolitan powers, and because it was between the Turks and the "Asians" (another ascriptive term), it was just easier to describe the entire area as the "Middle East." That was defendable, except that, the term became a readily monolithic means by which to describe a whole set of peoples, no matter how significant their internal divisions.
At the popular media level now, there is still a conveyed sense in which Israel is surrounded by a unified team of Arab/Islamic opponents. Some media commentators work hard to nuance that view, and academic specialists know only too well the complex contours, along with the dangers of trying to flatten them out in search of a "story". Persistently, however, those nuances escape the general viewer and reader, so that the "Middle East" becomes a game of goodies and baddies.
Take, for example, the issue of Syria, Iran and Lebanon. These three are superficially reckoned the leading hawks against Israel, and at some levels that is a fair enough analysis. But the deeper search opened real fissures in that bloc view on the eve of the 2011-12 struggles. First, Syria scarcely recognised Lebanon as a separate state, because what is now Lebanon was once all Syrian (at least, in the Syrian view), and the country still believes it should be that way. Second, while Iran is predominantly Shia, Syria is not. In fact, while Sunni constitute about seventy percent of the population, the government remains controlled by the Alawites, a disputed offshoot of Shia. The Assad government ruled by drawing strongly on other minorities such as the Christians so the balancing act, a delicate one, was threatened by the rise of the "Syrian spring". Third, the tussle over Lebanon was intense, hence the anxiety over the inquiry report concerning the assassination of Rafiq Hariri that was anticipated to cite direct Syrian involvement—prior to publication of that report, complex diplomatic negotiations sought to prevent the emergence of undue chaos.
In amongst that manoeuvring lay what was probably the best example of nuance going unnoticed in the outside world—Hezbollah. Along with Hamas, this is the group most vilified in the West, and that applies also to its leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Yet behind the scenes, Syria and Iran and others like Saudi Arabia have a constant struggle to control the group's evolution and position. Nasrallah is effectively a Hezbollah moderate, and Iran would have preferred him to be replaced by a hawk. Syria did not, wishing to avoid being caught between the two. Nasrallah was a constant and obvious presence in Syria, his photograph appearing everywhere, and alongside that of President Bashar al-Assad. It was also common to be in a restaurant, eating along to the latest live televised Nasrallah oratory that, significantly, few people appeared to watch seriously.
So, all this was obviously far more layered in reality than portrayed by the mainline media. Yet, major world leaders and their representatives (increasingly ex-politicians themselves) seemed to spend inordinately short periods on the ground in any attempt to gain understanding. On one of his first "peace" missions to Syria, Kofi Annan spent something like eight hours in Damascus. Yes, they have professional diplomats to do background analysis. Yes, there are discussions preliminary to the pre-meetings that negotiate the agenda, structure the actual meeting, and pre-plan the communiqués. Yes, these are intelligent people with good goals at heart. Somehow, though, it all goes badly. People like Tony Blair fly in and out, diplomats shuttle back and forth, Secretaries of State come and go, but the conditions endure.
So, having reached that point in the analysis one night, up popped this idea: what about if Tony Blair were to spend a month in the house? Why him? Well, because in amongst all the interfaith foundation work and speaking engagements he takes on in amassing what is an extraordinary income for someone now being revealed as shallow and disingenuous, he is the Middle East envoy for the Quartet: USA, the European Union, the United Nations and Russia, where they meet as a consortium on the Middle East. Since his 2008 appointment, his work has been sporadic and largely futile. He has been reduced to making largely meaningless pronouncements, flying in for very brief visits, visiting the odd school, and generally playing about on the fringes. By mid-2012 the Palestinians, at least, thought his efforts "useless", and that he was actually more an apologist for Israel than genuine arbiter for all parties.
This fantasy became even more pertinent as the Syrian crisis worsened because, again, Blair seemed to deal in slogans and assertions rather than substance. In one mid-2011 interview, for example, he opined that the Arab Spring gave new opportunities to re-start the Middle East peace process—just how would that be possible, and who would be involved? On Syria, he suggested that Bashar al-Assad would find it difficult to retain any legitimacy without a "truly credible reform process". That was just playing with words and bore no relationship to reality, because what a "truly credible reform process" might be, or need to be, was nowhere to be seen. It looked suspiciously like the envoy had no clue as to what was happening in Syria.
Quite apart from any qualifications he may or may not have had for the envoy role, a good part of Blair's problem, then, rested with the fact that he saw little or nothing of any of these affairs "up close and personal". By spending some time in the house, he might get a more interesting view on things. He might not be able to travel to and from meetings by taxi, perhaps, because of the inevitable security issues. But if he did get to stay in the house near Brokar, what might change?
He would meet people who would surprise him with their love of American movies and American English. And he would encounter people who want peace more tha
n anyone, so long as it involves justice for Palestine. Tony Blair would see surprisingly few people corresponding with the stereotyped image of a fundamentalist: full beard, local garb, and haj hat. He would, however, see a lot of people with considerable knowledge of the outside world, and a genuine desire to see Syria more involved with and connected to that world. He would see a commitment to education as a generator of future prosperity and peace. He would meet people who welcomed him, even if they disagreed with his views. He would encounter people wary of Iraq and sceptical of Iran. He would meet people with very different views about the best ways to develop the Arab world, from Pan-Arabists to hardline nationalists.
Would he find sympathy and understanding for Israel? That is unlikely, given that metal Israeli flag fastened to the cobblestones in the Old City and trampled upon by thousands every day. The continuing Israeli hold on the Golan Heights is an on-going embarrassment and irritation for Syria, as is the Israeli grip on the West Bank for Jordan. Quneitra, up in the Golan Heights, is preserved as a ruined Syrian town, following its destruction by the Israelis during the 1974 war. Given the history before and after 1948, there is much ground to be given up before any sort of rapprochement might be possible.
Yet, by not being in the house, Blair has achieved little or nothing. So the question inevitably arises, would it do any harm to try? Maybe they could even move in President Bashar as well. That way, he and Blair would at least get to know each other. They would get wonderful service and food at the restaurants nearby, especially Brokar. They would have plenty of people ready to give them a street view, including my friends at the bakery and in the antique shop.
It was a fanciful idea, borne out of frustration between what seems an increasing gap between decision-makers and those who live the life, but if it happened, living in the house would educate even more people, important ones this time.
A House in Damascus - Before the Fall Page 20