77 “We must”: “11 September 2001—Another Operation Northwoods?”
78 Corn objected: LAT, 7/3/02, “Van Jones & the 9/11 Conspiracy,” http://motherjones.com
79 “I won’t”: “When 9/11 Conspiracy Theories Go Bad,” by David Corn, 3/1/02, www.zcommunications.org
80 howl of rage: Nation, 5/31/02.
81 thousands of pages: see refs in sourcing for Chs. 1–9; Some skeptics suggest that the absence of formal NTSB investigations on Flights 11 and 175—as well as the other two hijacked flights—is suspicious. From the outset, however, these crashes were deemed to have been “criminal acts,” which meant jurisdiction fell not to the NTSB but to the FBI. Within two days of the attacks, though, the FBI requested technical assistance from the NTSB. According to the NTSB’s chairman, some sixty NTSB experts worked “around the clock in Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York, and at our headquarters in Washington, D.C., assisting with aircraft parts identification, searching for and analyzing flight recorders.” Some of the research done by NTSB experts has emerged in recent years, especially with the 2009 opening of 9/11 Commission files and absence of reports: e.g., notation on NTSB DCA01MA060 [Flight 11], www.ntsb.gov; (suspicious: e.g., “A Little Known Fact About the 9/11 Planes,” http://sabbah.biz, “Flight 77 Black Boxes,” http://911review.org; “criminal acts”/FBI requested: NTSB Advisory, 9/13/01, www.ntsb.gov; “around the clock”: Testimony of NTSB Chairman Marion C. Blakey, 6/25/01, Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportaion, U.S. Senate, www.ntsb.gov, corr. NTSB’s Ted Lopatkiewicz, 2009).
82 300,000: corr. NARA’s Kristen Wilhelm, 2011
83 “distracts people”: Nation, 7/12/02.
CHAPTER 12
1 memo/“How,” etc.: Philip to Tom & Lee, 9/6/04, “Farmer Memo re False Statements,” B4, Dana Hyde files, CF
2 chairman/vice chairman: Kean & Hamilton, 25
3 Roemer/“false”: int. Roemer on American Morning, CNN, 8/2/06
4 shocked: WP, 8/2/06
5 “deception”: Farmer, 4
6 Farmer questioned: Farmer, 4–, 227–
7 Meyers confused/had launched: Testimony of General Richard Myers, Hearings, U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 107th Cong., 1st Ses., 9/13/01
8 “We responded awfully”: transcript, OnLine NewsHour, 9/14/01, www.pbs.org
9 Weaver timeline/“There was no”: Dallas Morning News, 9/15/01, Seattle Times, 9/16/01
10 Cheney/“toughest decision”: transcript, Meet the Press, 9/16/01, www.msnbc.msn.com
11 “Did we shoot”: cited by Bob Woodward and Dan Balz in “10 Days in September,” a series of articles based on interviews with Bush, Cheney, and other official sources, WP, 1/27/02
12 “It’s my understanding”: CR, 43, 465n233
13 “Oh, my God”: Testimony of Norman Mineta, 5/23/03, CO
14 never missiles: Spencer, 277
15 report incorrect: Cape Cod Times, 8/21/02.
16 Rumors circulating: A retired Army colonel, Donn de Grand-Pre, claimed in 2004 that Flight 93 was shot down by a pilot flying for the North Dakota National Guard. He named the pilot supposedly responsible and said he had sent a report on the matter to a named general. Flight records reportedly show that the alleged pilot was on other duties at the relevant time—and the general denied even knowing de Grand-Pre. A contributor to a 2008 blog, posted by a person identifying himself only as a former Langley Air Force Base mechanic, quotes a colleague at second hand as having said, “They shot one down … One of those 16s came back with one less missile than it left with.” The claim has no value as information—it is anonymous, and the supposed veteran did not himself speak with the original source of the quote. Conspiracy theorists, meanwhile, seized on the alleged content of a 911 call made from Flight 93 by passenger Edward Felt shortly before the airliner crashed. According to a staffer at the emergency center that took the call, Felt mentioned that there been an explosion on board, and “white smoke.” The dispatcher who actually took the call, however, denied that Felt said anything about an explosion. The call was recorded, and there is no such reference in the transcript. David Griffin refers in his books to “considerable evidence” that 93 was shot down—yet cites none of substance (De Grand-Pre: eds. Dunbar & Reagan, 77–; blog: “The US Air Force Shot Down Flight 93,” 4/11/08, http://georgewashington.blogspot.com; Felt: FBI 302 of [name redacted], 9/19/01, Pittsburgh to Counterterrorism, New York, 9/17/01, & FBI 302 of [name redacted], 9/11/01, INTELWIRE, transcript of call 9/11/01, “Flight 93 Calls,” B12, T8, CF; Griffin: e.g., Debunking, 70, & David Griffin, The New Pearl Harbor Revisited, Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2008, 127–).
17 Commission “required”: Public Law 107–306, 11/27/02, www.archives.gov
18 delays/obstruction/tapes withheld/recalcitrant: Kean & Hamilton, 83–, 258–, Shenon, 203–
19 “incomplete”: corr. Miles Kara, 2011
20 Scott timeline/“9:24”/“awful decision”/In one breath, etc.: Testimonies of Larry Arnold & Alan Scott, 5/23/03, CO, Farmer, 262–
21 leery/proof/subpoena: Shenon, 203–, Kean & Hamilton, 88, 260
22 “Whiskey tango foxtrot”: Farmer, 265.
23 NORAD/more than 100 squadrons/14 “alert”/intercepts: CR, 16–, Spencer, 286–
24 planes as weapons: Staff Monograph “The Four Flights and Civil Aviation Security,” 55–, CF, Farmer, 98–
25 hijacking protocol: CR, 17–, Farmer, 117
26 multiple Centers: e.g., Miles Kara, “Archive of the ‘Transponders and Ghosts’ Category,” www.oredigger61.org—Centers involved were Boston, New York, D.C., Indianapolis, and Cleveland
27 “primary target”: MFR 04016798, 9/22/03, “Aeronautical Information Manual,” 2/11/10, www.faa.gov
28 “coast mode”/coastline: Avionics, 6/1/05, Farmer, 135, 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD, NEADS Transcripts Channel 4,” B3, NYC files, CF, MFR 04016774, 10/27/03
29 not know NORAD: MFR 04017316, 10/2/03
30 units different training: MFR 04020720, 3/11/04
31 unable to communicate/frequencies/none worked: MFR 040176171, 10/2/03
32 Transcripts/In that book, etc.: Farmer, 215–
33 “Washington [Center] has no clue”: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Transcripts Channel 7,” B3, NYC files, CF
34 “It’s chaos”/“The challenge”/Kara: Miles Kara, “Chaos Theory and 9–11, Some Preliminary Thoughts,” 6/12/09, www.oredigger61.org, & see Archives, 911 Revisited, www.oredigger61.org, Kara Career Summary, 12/12/02, “Commission Meeting 4/10/03, Tab 7,” B1, Front Office files, CF.
35 evidence of tapes and logs: In writing this account of the FAA/military response to the attacks, the authors relied—as did the 9/11 Commission—on the tapes and transcripts of conversations between the various FAA and NORAD sites. As the Commission’s Miles Kara wrote in 2009, the “complete set of information needed to attempt any analysis of the events [of that morning] includes the radar files and the software to run them, time-stamped tapes, and any transcripts that were made” (Commission account: Miles Kara, “Archive for the NEADS files category,” www.oredigger61.org; NORAD audio files are available at the National Archives, B82 & B110, GSA Files, CF, but—for ready availability—at http://911depository.info).
36 nerve center: Vanity Fair, 9/06, Spencer, 2.
37 Marr/hijacking/Vigilant Guardian: Vanity Fair, 9/06, CR, 458n116. The military exercise scheduled for September 11, and several others that took place earlier in the year, have been the source of speculation. Some thought aspects of the exercises indicated U.S. government foreknowledge of the manner and timing of the 9/11 attacks. Others suggested that September’s Vigilant Guardian exercise had a negative effect on NORAD’s ability to react to the attacks. The 9/11 Commission found that the timing of the drill may have had a positive impact, because more perso
nnel were on duty that day. The tapes and transcripts, though, reflect temporary confusion within NORAD as to whether the attacks were part of the war game or were real-world (Miles Kara, “9–11 Training, Exercises, and War Games, Some Collected Thoughts,” 9/11 Revisited, www.oredigger61.org, “Exclusive Report: Did Military Exercises Facilitate the 9/11 Pentagon Attack?,” by Mathew Everett, 7/06, www.911truth.org, Aviation Weeks & Space Technology, 6/3/02, “NORAD Exercises Summary,” Team 8 files, posted on www.scribd.com, CR, 458n116).
38 “on the shitter”: NEADS audiotape, DRM1, CH2, www.oredigger61.org
39 Arnold in FL: MFR 04016749, 2/3/04
40 Dooley et al.: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 4,” B3, NYC files, CF
41 “Real World Unknown”: Memorandum for CC et al. from NEADS Sector/CVX, 8/23/01, “RDOD 03013146, Entire Contents, Vigilant Guardian,” B116, GSA files, CF.
42 Cooper call: MFR 04016791 & 04016790, 9/22/03, CR, 20. Disregarding the official FAA/military protocol, Boston Center had made two earlier attempts to contact the military on a “freelance” basis. The first such call, which went to the New Jersey Air National Guard’s 177th Fighter Wing at Atlantic City, got nowhere because the wing was not on alert status. Boston’s second early attempt to reach the military—through the FAA’s Cape Cod facility—did eventually lead to an alert being passed to NEADS, but only after the call made by the FAA’s Cooper. These calls were made at the initiative of Boston Center’s traffic management supervisor, Dan Bueno. Bueno—who was aware of the protocols in place—told the Commission that his actions were based on the “urgency of the situation.” Cooper’s use of “F-16” was a misspeak for “F-15” (CR, 20, Position 15, pts. 2 & 3, “ATCSCC Tape Transcription,” B1, T8, CF, Bergen Record [N.J.], 12/5/03, MFR 04016791, 9/22/03, MFR 04016790, 9/22/03, MFR 03012969, 9/30/03, CF, Spencer, 22–).
43 “Cool”/all business/Boston could say: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 4,” B3, NYC files, CF, Vanity Fair, 9/06
44 8:41 battle stations: CR, 20, Farmer, 123
45 conferred Arnold/ordered: “Conversation with Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold,” www.codeonemagazine.com, 1/02, CR, 20
46 without direction/assigned: CR, 20
47 “Oh, God”: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 4,” B3, NYC files, CF
48 Mulligan: Full Transcript: Command Center; NOM Operational Position, Sept. 11, 2001, 10/14/03, “NOM Operation Position (5),” B1, NYC files, CF, CR 22.
49 Air Force knew nothing: Some skeptics have seized on an early NORAD chronology that appeared to suggest that the FAA notified the military of the hijacking of Flight 175 at 8:43 A.M., claiming that this was evidence that U.S. forces failed to react promptly—even “stood down”—as the attacks unfolded. The contention is spurious—the 8:43 notification time in the NORAD chronology was simply incorrect. Although 8:43 A.M. does approximate the time the plane was hijacked, that fact was not at the time known to the FAA (critics: Griffin, The New Pearl Harbor Revisited, 8–; 8:43 notification: Chronology of the September 11 Attacks & Subsequent Events Through Oct. 24, 2001, “Timelines, 1 of 2,” B20, T7, CF, “FAA Believed Second 9/11 Plane Heading Towards New York for Emergency Landing,” & linked FAA document 4, 9/5/05; time incorrect: www.gwu.edu, Miles Kara, “Chaos Theory & 9/11,” 9/11 Revisited, www.oredigger61.org, corr. Miles Kara, 2010).
50 Otis pilots holding: Cape Cod News, 8/21/02, BG, 9/11/05, Vanity Fair, 9/06. The speed at which the fighters traveled and their exact route to New York has been the subject of some debate. Available tapes, and Commission interviews with the pilots and the mission commander, make clear that when they were first launched the flights headed for military-controlled airspace where they stayed in a holding pattern until after NEADS learned the second tower had been hit. The fighters then proceeded to New York, where they established a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) over the city at 9:25. The F-15 fighter, when new and stripped of its armament, is capable of doing a speed of Mach 2.5—some 1,650 miles per hour. Pilot Nash told the Commission that he and Duffy never exceeded Mach 1.1 (727 mph) as they flew toward New York. Duffy estimated that the fighters had reached between Mach 1.1 and 1.3, but said the pair “throttled back” on learning of the second strike—to conserve fuel. While it is possible that the Otis fighters went supersonic on the final leg of the journey to New York, radar data showed that the pair averaged a less-than-supersonic speed of Mach.86 (debate: see refs, “Complete 9/11 Timeline,” www.historycommons.org; record scanty: CR, 459n120; available tapes/interviews: transcripts from Voice Recorder, 11/9/01 1227Z-1417Z, Channel 24, “Trip 2 of 3, NEADS Transcript Color Coded,” B20, T8, CF, 9/11 ATCSCC Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 5,” B3, NYC files, CF, MFR 04016778, 1/22 & 1/23/04, MFR 03012972, 10/14/03, MFR 04016756, CF, CR, 21–, 23–, corr. Kris Wilhelm, Miles Kara, 2010).
51 Long Island: Full Transcript: Command Center; NOM Operational Position, Sept. 11, 2001, 10/14/03, “NOM Operation Position (5),” B1, NYC files, CF, CR 22
52 Five minutes after: CR, 23–
53 “I thought”: Cape Cod Times, 8/21/02
54 “We don’t know”/“We need”/urged/Marr at first: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 2,” B3, NYC files, CF & re Boston, authors’ check of audiotape, CR, 460n137
55 “Listen”: Position 15, Parts 2 & 3, “ATCSCC Tape Transcript, Position 15,” B1, T8, CF.
56 9:21 call/Scoggins/checked D.C./“First I heard”/Scoggins insisted: MFR 04016798, 9/22/03, 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 7,” B3, NYC files, CF. Scoggins has said he is “99% certain the person who made that call on the Telcon [about Flight 11 still being airborne] was Dave Cannoles.” The FAA’s Cannoles told 9/11 Commission staff that he did not recall doubt as to whether Flight 11 had crashed into the Trade Center. Another staff member, Doug Davis, thought the chief of staff for the director of air traffic at FAA headquarters, Mary Ellen Kraus, said Flight 11 was still airborne. Kraus denied it (“Losing Flight 77,” www.911myths.com, handwritten notes of Dave Canoles interview, 3/25/04, “Dave Canoles, FAA WOC,” B2, Dana Hyde files, CF, MFR of int. Mary Ellen Kraus, 4/27/04, “FAA HQ—Mary Ellen Kraus,” B6, T8, CF).
57 new “track”: Miles Kara, “Archive for the ‘Transponder & Ghosts’ Category,” 9/11 Revisited, www.oredigger61.org, Traffic Situation Display (TSD) Demo, 4/13/04, “FAA HQ Floor Position Maps—Herndon,” B19, T8, CF
58 “listening on a Telcon”: int. of Colin Scoggins at www.911myths.com
59 “Shit!”: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 2,” B3, NYC files, CF, CR, 461n149.
60 9:30 fighters into air: CR, 27. Two planes on alert duty were ready and loaded with live missiles, while the third—the “spare”—had only its 20mm gun. The pilots were Major Lou Derrig, Captain Dean Eckmann, and—piloting the spare—Captain Craig Borgstrom (Spencer, 115–, 142–).
61 Nasypany figured: MFR 04016778, 1/22 & 23/04, MFR 04016771, 10/27/03.
62 NEADS ordered/tower sent: “Staff Statement 17,” CO, MFR 04016771, 10/27/03. The Commission Report offers three explanations for the change of course. One, that the scramble order had given no distance to the target, nor where it was. Two, that the pilots followed a “generic” flight plan designed to get them out of local airspace. Three, that the lead pilot and the local FAA controller assumed that the Langley tower’s instruction superseded the order received from NEADS. According to author Lynn Spencer, who interviewed members of the unit involved, Captain Dean Eckmann assumed the fighters were “being vectored eastward in order to fly around the traffic in their way. He doesn’t second-guess the instructions.… The jet’s targets are customarily out over the ocean.” There is, however, no mention of traffic on the Air Traffic Control tapes (CR, 27, Spencer, 1
43–; corr. Miles Kara, 2011).
63 NEADS finally learned: American Airlines executive vice president Gerard Arpey had been told at 9:00 A.M. that communications with American 77 had been lost. As reported in Ch. 4, the FAA controller at Indianapolis Center had his last routine contact with Flight 77 as early as 8:54 (CR, 8–)
64 “Let me tell”: 9/11 ATCSCC Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 5,” B3, NYC files, CF
65 “Latest report”/“not sure”/“rumor”: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 7,” B3, NYC files, CF
66 “Get your fighters”: “Transcripts from Voice Recorder, Channel 14,” B20, T8, “NEADS Transcripts color-coded,” CF
67 asked where fighters/“I don’t care”: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 2,” B3, NYC files, CF
68 Scoggins back/“Delta 1989”/“And is this one?”: Chronology of Events at Mission Coodinator Position, 9/24/03, “Boston Center—Colin Scoggins,” B3, T8, CF, 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 7,” B3, NYC files, CF. Based on a Commission staff timeline, the authors have taken 9:39 as the time Scoggins warned NEADS about Delta 1989—even though the Commission Report uses a time of 9:41. (“Timeline of the Events of the Day,” www.scribd.com, & see MCC log, “Miles Kara trips,” B19, T8, CF, Farmer, 193– v. CR, 28).
69 Boston speculated: Miles Kara, “Archive for the Delta 1989 category,” 9/11 Revisited, www.oredigger61.org, & see Position 15, Parts 2 & 3, “ATCSCC Tape Transcription,” B1, T8, CF. In a chronology he gave the Commission of the day’s events, Scoggins noted that an “Open Telcon reports that DAL1889 [sic] is NORDO [no radio]” and described his own subsequent action as “call NEADS to advise” suggesting that his concern about 1989 was piqued only after hearing of it from others. In an interview much later, Scoggins said he thought Delta 1989 might have become suspect because it “missed a frequency transfer” or “didn’t make a transmission back” when given a frequency change (“Open Telcon”: Chronology of Events at Mission Coordinator Position, 9/24/03, “Boston Center—Colin Scoggins,” B3, T8, CF, & see Position 15, Parts 2 & 3, “ATCSCC Tape Transcription,” B1, T8, CF; later interview: “Q & A with 9/11 Boston Air Traffic Controller,” http://sites.google.com).
The Eleventh Day: The Full Story of 9/11 and Osama bin Laden Page 56