32 Following a series: FBI IG, CR, 267–, & re discovered/search see Chs. 27, 28, & 29. Aside from the events described here, the CIA and the FBI disputed each other’s versions of events about the identification of Tawfiq bin Attash (referred to in the Commission Report as “Khallad”) in the Malaysia surveillance photos. The identification was made by a source the FBI and the CIA shared—a circumstance that led to a prolonged tussle between the agencies. This barely penetrable story is detailed in the Justice Department’s inspector general’s report. The bottom line is that FBI agents working the Cole investigation, who knew of Attash’s connection to that attack, would have been far more concerned—and pressed to know all the CIA knew about the Malaysia meeting—had they been told that Attash had been present. As it was, they would learn nothing of Attash’s link to Mihdhar and Hazmi until after 9/11. The CIA’s performance on this matter notwithstanding, it is evident that once the information on Mihdhar’s and Hazmi’s likely presence in the United States was passed to the Bureau in August 2001, the FBI fumbled badly. As described in Chapter 27 of this book, the agent at Bureau headquarters who processed the information misinterpreted regulations, with the result that the assignment of looking for Mihdhar and Hazmi was given to an inexperienced intelligence agent, rather than to the experienced criminal agents working the Cole investigation (FBI IG, Wright, 340–, New Yorker, 7/10 & 17/06).
33 “The weight”: Staff Statment 2, CO
34 “that Mihdhar”: FBI IG
35 CIA summary/acknowledged/accountability board: Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, CIA, 6/05
36 Goss declined/“amongst the finest”: Director’s Statement on Office of Inspector General’s Report, “CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks,” 10/6/05, www.cia.gov.
37 “excessive workload”: Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, CIA, 6/05
38 “nobody read”: NYT, 10/17/02
39 “All the processes”: Report, JI, 151.
40 “It is clear”: Fenton, 311, 104. Fenton goes on to suggest that CIA officers may have been aware of the 9/11 plot and “desired the outcome we saw on our television screens.” Fenton has done an intriguing analysis, but the authors do not accept that there is sufficient evidence or rationale to accept such a heinous possibility (e.g., Fenton, 95, 239, 281, 241–, 327).
41 “good operational”: Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, CIA, 6/05
42 Maxwell: New Yorker, 7/10 & 17/06
43 “They purposely”: Bamford, Pretext, 224.
44 run operations in U.S.: For evidence of the CIA having engaged in operations within the United States, readers could consult, for example, the report of the Senate committee that investigated intelligence agency abuses in the wake of the Watergate scandal. That report, published in 1976, details a number of such operations, including four mail-opening programs spanning a twenty-year period, and CHAOS, launched in 1967 to gather information that might reveal foreign government influence on antiwar and civil rights protesters (Final Report, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1976, 559–, 679–).
45 Yousef/“wanted to continue”/“fought”: New York, 3/27/95
46 some Bureau agents: Wright, 312
47 “Without penetrations”/select group: Report, JI, 388–. This was the Small Group, which typically included Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Attorney General Janet Reno, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, CIA director Tenet, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Hugh Shelton, and counterterrorism coordinator Richard Clarke (CR, 119–, 199, Shenon, 255)
48 Berger episode: unless otherwise indicated—Biography of Samuel Berger, http://clinton4.nara.gov, Investigative Summary & Exhibits, “Report of Investigation: Samuel R. Berger,” Office of the Inspector General, National Archives & Records Administration, www.fas.org, Kean & Hamilton, 183–, 297, Shenon, 1–249-, Fox News, 1/23/07
49 MAAR/recommendations: Clarke, 215–, 219–, CR, 182, 504n78, Farmer, 41
50 handwritten notes?: Farmer, 41
51 “desperate”: ibid., 289
52 “What information?”: www.usnewswire.com, 7/20/04.
53 “Michelle” “we need”: Staff Statement 2, CO
54 “to determine”: Report, JI, 147
55 “believed they were”: KSM SUBST. Ramzi Binalshibh was to tell reporter Yosri Fouda after 9/11, before his arrest, that “Brothers Marwan [Shehhi] and Ziad [Jarrah] were tailed by security officers throughout their reconnaissance flight from New York to California … But Allah was with them” (Fouda & Fielding, 135)
56 Cambone note: Notes of Stephen Cambone, 9/11/01, released under FOIA to Thad Anderson, www.outragedmoderates.org.
CHAPTER 32
1 “Had the hijackers”: Kean & Hamilton, 234
2 “The terrorists”/“a sensitive”: press briefing, 9/18/01, www.defenselink.mil
3 no evidence Iraq: CR, 66, Staff Statement 15, CO.
4 Iran not know re 9/11: CR, 241. Iranian contacts with al Qaeda went back at least as far as bin Laden’s time in Sudan. Up to ten of the future muscle hijackers traveled through Iran, as did Binalshibh—who said they did so because Iran did not stamp Saudi passports. Numerous al Qaeda operatives fled to Iran following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11, and members of the bin Laden family were given sanctuary there. In 2010, in what was surely a crude exercise in political mischief making, Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, claimed that 9/11 had been merely a “big fabrication” to justify U.S. actions abroad (CR, 240, trial transcript, U.S. v. Ali Mohamed, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of NY, 10/20/00, Shenon, 372, int. Thomas Joscelyn, FrontPage Magazine, 9/28/07, ABC News, 2/11/10, Newsweek, 8/19/02, Tenet, 244, The Independent [U.K.], 3/7/10)
5 “convincing evidence”: www.thedailybeast.com, 5/20/11, Daily Mail (U.K.), 5/20/11, www.newsmax.com, 5/19/11
6 “provided direct”: Havlish et al. v. Usama bin Laden et al., U.S. District Court for the Southern District of NY, Case No. 1:03-cv-09848-GBD, Doc. 294, 12/22/11, NYT, 12/16/11.
7 last-minute changes/Snell/Jacobson/De: Shenon, 398–.
8 Bandar delight/posted: press statement, 7/22/04, www.saudiembassy.net. Prince Bandar’s own name and that of his wife, Princess Haifa—whose name featured in an intriguing part of the investigators’ work, described later, in the Notes to Ch. 33—made fleeting appearances in the Report’s endnotes, but not in the text (CR, 482n66, 498n123, 557n27, 563n19)
9 “no evidence”/“problematic”/“a commitment”: CR, 171, 371–
10 Khilewi/“A Saudi citizen”: Middle East Quarterly, 9/98, & see WP, 8/25/94, New Yorker, 10/22/01
11 Khalifa: see Ch. 20 and related Notes, “In re search of luggage and personal belongings, Khalifa v. U.S,” 3/6/95 cited in ed. Berger, Khalifa, “Top al Qaeda Fundraiser Dead,” www.counterterrorismblog.org.
12 limousine/“high-ranking”/Prince Sultan: Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002 [author was in fact Michael Scheuer], 138–, Lance, Triple Cross, 166, “Mohammed Jamal Khalifa: Life & Death Secrets,” INTELWIRE. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8/11/00. The authors are unaware of any response by or on behalf of Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz to the report that he welcomed Khalifa home. Nor have they been able to establish that Khalifa did carry a diplomatic passport.
13 “Since 1994”/“ ’96 is the key”: New Yorker, 10/16/01
14 Paris meeting/protection money: Complaint, Thomas Burnett et al. v. al Baraka Investment & Development et al., U.S. Di
strict Court for the District of Columbia, pt. 1080, Trento, 306–, Greg Palast, The Best Democracy Money Can Buy, NY: Plume, 2004, 99–
15 Kerrey: LAT, 6/20/04
16 “It’s a lovely”: transcript, Frontline: “Saudi Time Bomb,” www.pbs.org
17 Turki recalled: Time, 8/31/03, int. Turki, OnLine NewsHour: Inside the Kingdom, 1/21/02, www.pbs.org, Lacey, Inside the Kingdom, 208–, 364, Wright, 266–, 288–, Anthony Cordesman, “Saudi Security & the War on Terrorism,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 4/22/02, Bergen, 240
18 Others say two trips: Rashid, 48 & see LAT, 6/20/04
19 Khaksar/deal: Guardian, 3/2/03, NYT, 3/24/09 & see WP, 1/15/06
20 Turki deny: MSNBC, 9/5/03
21 met with OBL: Reeve, 194—citing interview with U.S. intelligence source
22 “at least two”/“The deal was”: U.S. News & World Report, 1/6/02
23 named the two: Henderson, formally a journalist with the BBC and the Financial Times, later named Naif and Sultan bin Abdul Aziz in this connection in articles in The Wall Street Journal and in a paper published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The authors are not aware that Prince Naif or Prince Sultan has commented on the allegation (WSJ, 8/3/05, “After King Abdullah: Succession in Saudi Arabia,” Policy Focus 96, 8/09)
24 “hundreds”/“Saudi official”: int. & corr. Simon Henderson, WSJ, 8/12/02.
25 7,000: WSJ, 2/15/11
26 “They would go out”: MSNBC, 9/5/03 & see WP, 7/19/07
27 “We’ve got”: U.S. News & World Report, 10/11/98
28 “an interminable”/“Your Royal Highness”: Tenet, 106–
29 Gore/“The United”: CR, 122.
30 “never lifted”/clerics: Baer, See No Evil, 33. The two clerics were Salman al-Awadah and Safar al-Hawali (National Review, 3/11/03, Erik Stakelback, “The Saudi Hate Machine,” 12/17/03, www.investigativeproject.org)
31 “the Saudi government”: Report, JI, 110
32 “As one of”/“foreign enemy”: Scheuer, Marching Toward Hell, 72, 15
33 “You’ve got to be”: Wright, 238.
34 “All the answers”: Brisard & Dasquié, xxix. The O’Neill conversation was with Jean-Charles Brisard, who began investigating terrorist finances for French intelligence in 1997. After 9/11, he became a lead investigator for the legal firm Motley Rice in connection with the civil action brought by 9/11 victims’ families against a list of Saudi-based Islamic charities, a number of financial institutions, and several members of the Saudi royal family. He provided written testimony to the U.S. Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs in 2003 (ints. Jean-Charles Brisard, Written Testimony, Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, 10/22/03, www.banking.senate.gov, Brisard & Dasquié, xxvii–, xxi).
35 longtime head: Prince Turki had resigned as GID chief, after a quarter of a century, just ten days before 9/11. The reason for the resignation remains unclear. Turki’s departure was the more striking, reportedly, because he had been confirmed in his post as recently as the end of May (Simon Henderson, “A Prince’s Mysterious Disappearance,” NPR, 10/22/10, Hamel, 237).
36 “At the instruction”: Arab News, 9/18/02. On another occasion, in a 2010 CNN interview, Prince Turki said much the same. “From my previous experience, there is a continuous exchange of information between the CIA and the Saudi security agencies” (CNN, 11/17/10)
37 GID/U.S. understanding: e.g., Cordesman, “Saudi Security”
38 specifically/“What we told”: USA Today, 10/16/03, Salon, 10/18/03
39 Bandar hinted: transcript of int. Bandar, Frontline: “Looking for Answers,” www.pbs.org
40 Abdullah now king: Abdullah had succeeded to the throne in 2005, on the death of his long-ailing and incapacitated half-brother King Fahd
41 “Saudi security”: ABC News, 11/2/07, CNN, 11/2/07
42 “We have sent”/British deny: John Simpson int. of King Abdullah, BBC News, 10/29/07, CNN, 10/29/07
43 denial: Wright, 448
44 silence: Scheuer, Marching Toward Hell, 72–
45 “There is not”: USA Today, 10/16/03.
46 Turki stood by/Badeeb: Wright, 448, 310. A Saudi security consultant, Nawaf Obaid, also told author Lawrence Wright that the terrorists’ names were passed to the CIA station chief in Riyadh. Wright believed Turki’s 2003 account, and indicated in a New Yorker article that the CIA had consulted the Saudi authorities—after learning from an intercept on the Yemen phone “hub” that Mihdhar was headed to Kuala Lumpur (Wright, 310, 376n, 448, New Yorker, 7/10 & 16/06).
47 Scheuer/“fabrication”: Scheuer, Marching Toward Hell, 72–
48 Bandar/Commission: MFR of int. Prince Bandar, Access Restricted, Item (3 pages) withdrawn, 10/14/08, CF.
49 Turki/“I can”: corr. Kristen Wilhelm. This reply to the authors’ inquiry is known as a “Glomar Response” to a request under the Freedom of Information Act—so called after the first occasion on which it was used, when the CIA sought to prevent publication of a Los Angeles Times story on the agency’s operation to raise a sunken Soviet submarine. The U.S. ship that had been intended for use in the operation to raise the sub was called the Glomar Explorer. The Glomar Response has been used in cases involving both national security and privacy issues (“The Glomar Response,” http://nsarchive.wordpress.com).
50 “penetrated al Qaeda”: Seattle Times, 10/29/01
51 returned to Saudi/disclosed: Report, JI, 131–.
52 “presented with”: Staff Report, “9/11 & Terrorist Travel,” 12, 15, 37. Before 9/11, according to the Commission’s staff report on terrorist travel, neither State Department personnel processing visa applications nor immigration inspectors were aware of such indicators. Even two years after the attacks, the information had “yet to be unclassified and disseminated to the field.”
53 Commission footnote: The Commission footnote appears to distinguish the cases of Mihdhar, the Hazmi brothers, and two other hijackers from those of the other ten Saudi hijackers. This may reflect the possibility that only the passports of Mihdhar and his named comrades were marked by the Saudi authorities. Absent fuller and clearer information, it is impossible to know (CR, 563n32). 399 “contained a secret”: Bamford, Shadow Factory, 58
54 Trento account/“We had been”: Joe Trento, “The Real Intelligence Cover-up,” 8/6/03 & Joseph Trento & Susan Trento, “The No Fly List,” 1/11/10, http://dcbureau.org, & Trento & Trento, refs., conv. Joseph Trento.
55 Kuala Lumpur “to spy”: Trento & Trento, 7–. The administrator of the Islamic Center of San Diego, whom Mihdhar and Hazmi asked for assistance following their arrival in early 2000, said after 9/11 that he had “suspected that Mihdhar might have been an intelligence agent of the Saudi government” (CR, 517n29, 220).
56 Mihdhar multiple-entry visa: Trento & Trento, 8. According to the Trentos, citing Michael Springmann, who had years earlier served as head of the visa department in the Jeddah consulate, the CIA would have known this fact even sooner—because a CIA officer in the Jeddah consulate “routinely approved visas for Saudi intelligence operatives as a courtesy” (Trento & Trento, 8—see Michael Springmann, “A Sin Concealed—the Visas for Terrorists Program,” 12/13/07, http://visasforterrorists.blogspot.com).
57 “were perceived”: Trento & Trento, 9
58 “Many terrorists”: ibid, 187
59 “because they were”: Joe Trento, “The Real Intelligence Cover-up,” 8/6/03, http://dcbureau.org
60 “In fact”: Trento & Trento, 9.
61 account bumps facts?: The Trento account, for example, asserts that the “complacency” of the Bush administration in summer 2001 is explained by CIA assurances that it had high-level penetration of al Qaeda via the GID. In fact, as documented in this book, the CIA leadership was far from complacent that summer, desperately worried and telling the White House—notably Condoleezza Rice—as much (Trento & Trento, 193; see—re far from
complacent—pp. 315–16).
62 “[name redacted]”: Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, 6/05, www.cia.gov
63 “hostile service”/passed to al Qaeda: Risen, State of War, 181–
64 “On some occasions”: Report, JI, 274
65 Rahman defense: New York, 3/27/95.
66 screen saver: The intelligence counterparts who told the CIA about bin Laden’s picture being used as a screen saver were those of Jordan—apparently in the late 1990s (Risen, 182)
67 “80% sympathetic”: The Times (London), 7/5/04.
CHAPTER 33
1 tens of thousands: Reuters, 9/11/01
2 honked horns: transcript, Frontline: “Saudi Time Bomb,” www.pbs.org
3 killed camels: int. of Saad al-Fagih for Frontline: “Looking for Answers,” www.pbs.org
4 screen savers/“somebody”: int. of person in Saudi Arabia who asked to remain anonymous
5 Ahmed/“muted”/“So, they lost”: Qanta Ahmed, 395.
6 survey/Prince Nawwaf: The survey was conducted by the Saudi GID, the intelligence service, and leaked to The New York Times a year later by a U.S. administration official. Prince Nawwaf had become GID chief following the resignation of Prince Turki. In a 2004 interview, Prince Bandar was to claim the situation was very different, that a Zogby poll “showed 91 percent of Saudis said they like America.” What the poll actually said was that 91 percent of Saudis said they had “no quarrel with the people of the United States, yet their overall impression of the American people is 70% unfavorable, 24% favorable” (leaked survey: NYT, 1/27/02, Middle East Economic Digest, 9/14/01; Bandar: int. Bandar, Meet the Press, NBC, 4/25/04).
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