by Mark Stein
All these elements accelerated with the candidacy of Abraham Lincoln in 1860. Perea was in San Francisco the night Lincoln was elected. He later recalled, “The occasion was celebrated by immense processions of men and boys marching through the principal streets to the music of many brass bands, the firing of cannon, and the discharge of anvils. It is needless to say all of us New Mexicans heartily joined in to swell the throng.”1
Perea now returned to New Mexico just as Watts was leaving it. Watts was headed to Washington, having been elected the territory’s delegate to Congress. In letters to President Lincoln, he urged him to choose New Mexicans for the territory’s appointed positions, despite the fact that New Mexico’s leading citizens were ambivalent about slavery. He warned that appointing outsiders would offend New Mexicans, pointing out that slavery was not their foremost concern (Texas was). By choosing New Mexicans, the president would win their hearts and, should war erupt, their loyalty.2 Lincoln heeded this advice, though he took a lot of heat for it. Watts’s insights proved to be right. The man who proved it was Francisco Perea.
Perea had returned to discover that his birthplace was in crisis. As Southern states began seceding from the Union, Anglos in the Gadsden Purchase began seeking the establishment of a Confederate Territory of Arizona. Traveling throughout the Rio Grande valley, Perea visited the leading Hispanic families and urged them to commit their loyalty to the United States. His efforts succeeded. Hispanic New Mexico produced a greater percentage of volunteers for the Union army than any other state or territory.3
Perea’s success validated not only Watts’s advice regarding appointments but also Watts’s insight regarding New Mexico’s fear of Texans. Perea’s most effective argument for loyalty to the Union was that if the Confederacy accepted Arizona as a territory, it would send Texan troops to defend it.
And indeed they did. In July 1861 the Second Regiment of Texas Mounted Rifles entered the Gadsden Purchase. Perea had enlisted in the Union army, where he commanded one of the brigades assigned to oust the Texas troops. Over the course of several battles, Union forces finally prevailed.
Watts, meanwhile, was fighting the battle of the boundary. He introduced a bill in Congress for the creation of an Arizona Territory that would be divided by a vertical line along the 109th meridian. New York Congressman William A. Wheeler argued that dividing the territory was unnecessary, noting that the only logic for the location of the proposed Arizona-New Mexico border was that it continued the line dividing Utah and Colorado. When Watts responded with the reason for its location, he also shed light on why the Texas-New Mexico line had been located so far east of the Rio Grande valley. Because of the location of that Texas-New Mexico line, Watts pointed out that his proposed Arizona-New Mexico line “divides the Territory of New Mexico into two equal parts.”
The boundary battle, however, was about more than geographic equality. It was also about ethnic equality. Watts knew that this moment, on the floor of the House of Representatives, was the time and place to attack this head on:
There may be a well-grounded dispute in the minds of some people as to who are white and who are black. [Laughter] There are many men in the Territory of New Mexico who, by living constantly in the open air and exposed to the rays of a burning sun, have become bronzed in complexion.… Whatever may be their color, the treaty stipulations between the United States and the republic of Mexico have invested them with all the privileges and immunities of American citizens.… [T]he first duty which the government owes to its people is to give both military and civil protection. In this case, the government is under a double obligation.… [Mexico was] compelled to relinquish her right to a portion of her territory and her right to protect a portion of her people, endeared to her by ten thousand pleasant memories and hopes, and doubly endeared by ten thousand painful forebodings for the future.
Watts linked this understanding of the Hispanic population’s experience with the issue of boundaries:
I know how the people of New Mexico felt—I know how I felt—when a preceding Congress, merely for the purpose of beautifying the lines of the new Territory of Colorado, took sixty miles broad and two hundred and fifty miles in length from the Territory of New Mexico. Yes sir, Congress took those people and put them with a people alien in laws, alien in language, alien in association.
On February 24, 1863, Congress created the Territory of Arizona, stipulating the boundaries advocated by Watts on behalf of his Hispanic constituents.
Though Watts remained active in Republican politics, he chose to return to his law practice. Following that year’s November elections, John C. Watts introduced President Lincoln to New Mexico’s newly elected territorial delegate, Francisco Perea.
· · · MONTANA, IDAHO · · ·
SIDNEY EDGERTON AND JAMES ASHLEY
Good as Gold
Gov. Edgerton was not a member of the Committee on Territories, and I never heard of his having anything to do, directly or indirectly, with the organization of the territory of Montana or with fixing its western boundary.
—JAMES M. ASHLEY
I had many interviews with Gov. Ashley, who was a strong supporter of the bill [to create Montana] and, as chairman of the Committee on Territories, had a great influence.
—SIDNEY EDGERTON1
Clearly, one of these men had a faulty memory. The fault line dividing their recollections can be seen on the map. It is the boundary between Montana and Idaho—a border that often raises questions, since Montana would be quite a large state even if it didn’t overflow its straight lines as it barrels into the Rockies, pushing Idaho every which way until only a thin panhandle remains.
Sidney Edgerton was an Ohio congressman from 1859 to 1863. James Ashley was an Ohio congressman from 1859 to 1869. Both were abolitionists who assisted escaped slaves via Ohio’s Underground Railroad. They were good men, but not perfect, as hinted in their divergent recollections regarding Montana’s western border.
Following Edgerton’s second term in Congress, President Lincoln appointed him to a judgeship in the newly formed Idaho Territory. This first territorial incarnation of Idaho was very different from today’s state. It encompassed present-day Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. Edgerton and his family set off for the arduous journey to the territorial capital at Lewiston. But they stopped short of their destination. “It is difficult to understand what it meant in 1863 to undertake a journey from Ohio to Lewiston, the capital of Idaho,” Edgerton’s daughter later recollected. “News of the recent gold discoveries at Bannack, together with the fact that the [winter] season was somewhat advanced, brought about the decision to go [to Bannack].”2
Another reason for not continuing to Lewiston was the fact that it was not in Edgerton’s judicial district. Some historians believe that territorial governor William H. Wallace was demonstrating his well-known opposition to imported judges by assigning to this Ohioan a vast and sparsely populated district east of the Rockies. Others believe that Wallace’s insult motivated Edgerton’s efforts the following year to push the western border of the Montana Territory as far as he could into the original Idaho Territory. And others, such as eminent Idaho historian Merle W. Wells, maintain that, because of the gold discoveries at Bannack, “Edgerton’s district had far greater importance than the one containing the temporary capital, and because of his financial interests in the district to which he was assigned, Edgerton had no great desire to make the long, hard trip to Lewiston.”3
Financial interests? Perhaps Judge Edgerton would have recused himself from any cases in which he would have had a conflict of interest. At it happened, he never presided at any trials because, before the snows had melted, he had accepted the task of returning to Washington to represent this region in the creation of the Montana Territory.
Whatever his motive, time was of the essence. James Ashley, chairman of the House Committee on Territories, was about to set the boundary ball in motion. During the previous Congress, Ashley had proposed radically different—an
d far more equal—borders for Idaho and Montana. Ashley’s plan was to divide the region horizontally, with Montana occupying the southern half and Idaho occupying the north. The proposal was then sent to committee.
Sidney Edgerton (1818-1900) (photo credit 36.1)
James Ashley (1824-1896) (photo credit 36.2)
Ashley’s original proposal
Word arrived in Bannack shortly after Edgerton’s arrival that Ashley was now planning to bring the bill back to the House floor. To rank-and-file miners, the boundary made little difference. But to those with financial interests in the mines, Ashley’s horizontal division would dilute their political clout in their respective territories by dividing the mountainous mining region and combining it with soon-to-be agricultural and ranching regions. Mine owners in Idaho could maintain more clout with a vertical division, since it would result in an agricultural region limited to the Snake River Valley in what would then be its south. In Montana, however, limiting the vast agricultural regions was not an option, no matter how you sliced it. Consequently, it was imperative for the mine owners that they acquire a western border with as much of the gold-rich mountains as possible.
The logical choice to make the case for Montana was Edgerton. Not only had he served in Congress, but he had done so from the same state and political party (Republican) as Ashley, the territorial committee chairman. Moreover, Edgerton was personally acquainted with President Lincoln. And he knew what to wear and how to pack. “Ingots were quilted into the lining of my father’s overcoat,” his daughter recollected, “and he carried in his valise immense nuggets wherewith to dazzle the eyes of Congressmen and to impress upon their minds by means of an object lesson some adequate idea of the great mineral wealth of this section of the country.”
While members of Congress may have been familiar with the quantities of gold being mined in the region, Edgerton’s daughter was quite right that the object itself would have dazzled their eyes—and possibly ethics. “Arriving safely in Washington, the gold was exhibited, Congressmen interviewed, and at length the desired end was accomplished,” her recollection continued, concluding, “Judge Edgerton saved to Montana all of her rich territory lying west of the summit of the Rockies.”
Idaho’s representative, William H. Wallace (the man who, as territorial governor, had assigned Edgerton his judicial district) joined Edgerton in supporting the vertical division over Ashley’s horizontal proposal. Wallace, however, sought a vertical boundary along the Continental Divide, whereas Edgerton sought a boundary that shifted to the more westerly crest of the Bitterroot Range. Edgerton won (though the northernmost segment of the border departs from the Bitterroots, preserving the Kootenai River Valley for Idaho).
Who, among those congressmen Edgerton “interviewed,” as his daughter put it, might have been both persuaded by his “object lesson” and sufficiently influential to change Congressman Ashley’s proposed borders so radically? The ideal person, of course, would have been Congressman Ashley himself. But could a man so committed to the most progressive issues of his day (abolition of slavery, the right of women to vote) have been influenced by the sight of gold? It doesn’t seem unlikely; in April 1869 the New York Times devoted four articles to Ashley, detailing “abundant evidence of his public corruption.”
Edgerton left Washington not only with the boundary he had sought for Montana but also with the governorship of the new territory. He soon discovered, however, that the line he purchased failed to take into account other lines that divided the region, such as the interests of farmers and ranchers. He was unable to govern the various groups opposed to his personal interests. He left the territory before his term expired and was replaced by an interim governor until—small world—James Ashley was appointed.
Learning of Ashley’s appointment, Montana’s congressional delegate, James M. Cavanaugh, stated on the floor of the House that he “never solicited [Ashley] to come among us.” Cavanaugh (who, unlike a territorial governor, was elected, not appointed) characterized Ashley as “having been spewed out at the mouth” and protested that the territories were “being made receptacles for political convicts.”
Idaho’s border proposal
Like Edgerton, Ashley proved unable to govern the tough, pugnacious people of Montana. He was dismissed by the president before his term expired. Together, Sidney Edgerton and James Ashley demonstrated that all that’s gold does not glitter.
· · · ALASKA · · ·
WILLIAM H. SEWARD
Why Buy Alaska?
Seward appeared before the Committee and made a long explanation of the status of affairs in Alaska and the reasons which induced him to make the purchase.… The discussion which followed was decidedly spicy, and somewhat acrimonious.
—NEW YORK TIMES, MARCH 19, 1868
On a map, Alaska looks like it ought to be part of Canada. How and from whom did the United States obtain it? Not from the Canadians, since it never belonged to them, nor to their colonial predecessors, the British. Since the Battle of Sitka in 1804, it had essentially belonged to Russia (although indigenous peoples such as the Tlingits, Aleuts, and Yupiks would have begged to differ). In 1867 the United States acquired Alaska when Secretary of State William H. Seward negotiated a treaty with Russia for its purchase.
At the time, Alaska was popularly derided as “Seward’s folly” and “Seward’s icebox.” Even the New York Herald, which supported the purchase, couldn’t resist Alaska laughs. Its November 12, 1867, edition contained an abundance of what purported to be classified ads, among them:
Cash! Cash! Cash!—Cash paid for cast off territory. Best price given for old colonies, North or South. Any impoverished monarchs retiring from the colonization business may find a purchaser by addressing W.H.S., Post Office, Washington, D.C.
Aside from its coastline, Alaska was viewed by many as little more than a mammoth stretch of barren tundra and ice. It is indeed a lot of land—over twice the size of the nation’s second largest state, Texas. Virtually no public opinion was expressed leading up to the treaty’s signing, since only a select few knew that it was in the wind. The purchase of Alaska was not revealed, even to Congress, until the day the treaty was signed. At that point, it became headline news.
Typical of the initial press reports was that of the San Francisco Bulletin, whose March 30, 1867, front page story trumpeted:
Important Treaty With Russia
She Surrenders Sovereignty
to all Russian America
British Excluded From the Ocean
The President has communicated to the Senate a treaty with Russia. The latter surrenders to the United States sovereignty over all Russian America and adjacent islands, and especially includes a strip of 400 miles down the coast, excluding British America from the ocean. British diplomats are highly excited.
Britain was indeed “excited” but not, as first reported, excluded from the ocean. British Columbia, with its bustling port at Vancouver, remained between Alaska and the rest of the United States.
How could—and why would—such a huge purchase be pulled off so secretly? The answer can be summed up in two words: William Seward.
Seward had been raised in Orange County, New York, the son of a prosperous doctor. As a young lawyer, he became a protégé of Thurlow Weed, a political boss from whom he learned his way around back rooms. He was elected to the state senate in 1830 and later became New York’s governor and then senator. In 1860 he was the odds-on favorite to become the Republican nominee for president. But he lost out to a relative newcomer from Illinois named Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln chose Seward to be his secretary of state. It was a smart choice.
Though the purchase took place after the Civil War, Seward’s reasons for purchasing Alaska were rooted in that war’s underlying element. Before, during, and after the war, Seward’s greatest political fear was that the United States might disunite.
William H. Seward (1801-1872) (photo credit 37.1)
Seward first voiced this fear in 1849 w
hen California sought statehood. That suddenly populated gold rush region presented Congress with proposed boundaries that were outrageously large. Many members of Congress sought to create two states—in effect, North and South California—and to push back the proposed eastern boundary to the crest of the Sierra Nevada range, thereby sharing its gold with the neighboring states yet to be created. Seward opposed these adjustments. Pointing out that the U.S. military had no direct access by rail or sea, if it were needed to prevent California from declaring itself a separate nation, he argued in the Senate, “Are we so moderate, and has the world become so just, that we have no rivals and no enemies to lend their sympathies and aid to compass the dismemberment of our empire?”
Seward’s remarks on California reflected his insight into foreign affairs, which he viewed as a multidimensional chess game. As secretary of state he demonstrated this view in the way he went about the purchase of Alaska and, prior to that, in the way he urged Lincoln to avert the Civil War. In April 1861, with Southern states seceding and war appearing inevitable, he sent Lincoln a memo entitled, “Some Thoughts for the President’s Consideration.” Among those thoughts were such notions as, “I would demand explanation from Spain and France [regarding intervention in Mexico to retrieve unpaid debts].… And if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France, would convene Congress and declare war against them.” In a letter to governors of those states bordering the Great Lakes, Seward suggested going to war to acquire Canada. With the nation on the verge of Civil War, such actions were not the kind of recommendations one would expect from the nation’s premier diplomat.