by David Fisher
(4) BUT AND/OR HOWEVER, this agreement did not anticipate the reversal of fortune of said Beast, including the loss of several income-producing properties, resulting in the precipitous decline in the total value of all assets. Said agreement also did not anticipate the extremely high level of inflation resulting in a dramatic increase in the cost of goods and services necessary to the continued well-being of this family. Therefore this combination of factors had reduced the real value of this agreement far below that either anticipated or desired by both parties when such and said agreement was mutually agreed to and signed.
(5) THEREFORE, said agreement does not adequately compensate Beauty and such heirs as exist in a manner that would allow them to maintain the lifestyle to which they have become accustomed and to which the Beast agreed in this document, and therefore, said document should be considered null and void and should be abrogated, rescinded, withdrawn, annulled, and/or otherwise revoked and replaced with a court-ordered disposition of assets owned or controlled by the Beast, and failing that, this document should be replaced with court-ordered support payments to be made on a timely basis of such scale as to enable petitioner to continue to support her family in a manner approximating that enjoyed during the marital years.
(6) THE FACTS: Petitioner was coerced into signing this agreement. Eight years ago the plaintiff was the simple daughter of a merchant, home educated, an innocent maiden who was forced to share an abode with the respondent to relieve real threats to the family, specifically the father, of the petitioner. Said father, after partaking of the hospitality of the Beast, admittedly did rip, tear, and cause to come asunder a single rose from the property of the Beast. Beast thereupon threatened said father with capital punishment for the “crime” of rose robbing. Beast provided an alternate sentence to the father: If his daughter, the petitioner, would reside within the confines of the Beast’s estate for one year, the sentence passed upon the father would be revoked. After discussing this with his family the father agreed to these terms.
(7) At great personal sacrifice, giving up all she knew and to whom she was known, the petitioner did leave her abode and reside in common with the Beast. All parties to this binding contract agreed that the term “reside with” would be specifically limited to a physical presence on such premises as designated by the Beast and would not include any physical contact whatsoever. All parties involved agreed that this contractual provision was properly observed.
(8) STATE OF MIND: At the time the petitioner agreed to cohabit with the Beast, his state might properly be described as “the unfortunate victim of a wicked fairy.” In all physical traits he more closely resembled an individual identified as a member of the animal kingdom than those traditionally known as human beings. Rather than a nose he had a long snout. His ears were long and extended beyond the rim of his head. His entire body was covered by hair. He had a tail. Instead of the common hands and fingers, he had paws and claws. Such physical handicaps did cause the Beast to create a solitary existence. He lived completely alone. He had no known friends. He spent his days doing nonproductive work. Such traits have previously been described by the psychiatric community as being most common among individuals suffering from severe inferiority complexes, often bordering on excessive manic depression.
(9) While he existed in such a state, Beauty did come to fulfill all obligations under the contract agreed to between said Beast and her father. She did share a common residence, and a nonphysical relationship did grow between them. Beauty, void of all knowledge of this curse and believing the Beast to be, in fact, of his own mind and body, did fulfill completely all contractual terms.
(10) CHANGE OF STATUS: There came a time at which the petitioner requested and was granted temporary relief from contractual terms, allowing her furlough in which to visit her family. She left the residence with permission and goodwill and proceeded to return to her familial residence, at which time and place she enjoyed the familial bonds to which she was otherwise grievously deprived. After several days she did become aware through mitigating circumstances that the Beast was suffering a severe distress reaction occasioned by her absence. A feeling human being, the petitioner experienced great sympathy toward the plight of the afflicted Beast and did return immediately to the aforementioned residence.
(11) PETITIONER SAVES LIFE OF RESPONDENT: On arrival at said premises, petitioner found respondent to be extremely weak, apparently stricken with an illness of a nondetermined, nondiagnosed, and arguably psychosomatic nature. Respondent complained of difficulty in breathing and severe heart pains. Overcome by sympathy for said respondent, petitioner did willingly, of her own accord, without prompting, lean over and kiss respondent.
(12) CHANGE OF STATUS OF RESPONDENT: This kiss-of-life caused to occur an immediate and dramatic transformation, during which the respondent was physically altered from an individual resembling a beast in all physical characteristics to a handsome prince. Respondent claimed that prior physical appearance resulted from an altercation with a wicked fairy. Respondent admitted that the kiss administered by petitioner of her own free will was the only antidote for such penalty. At that same time, respondent did suggest, ask, request, and otherwise beseech petitioner to abandon her blood relatives and exist in a marital state with him. And at such time respondent did suggest, ask, request, and otherwise beseech petitioner to agree to a prenuptial pact outlining distribution of his assets in the event said nuptials should not prevail for a substantial period of time. The petitioner, having just witnessed this transformation, can psychologically be described as “being in a state of confusion occasioned by such change as never before experienced” and therefore completely unable to make real and rational decisions based on the actual events having occurred. So without counsel to which she was entitled and, as a matter of law, obligated to consult, the petitioner did agree to such terms as outlined by the Prince. These terms eventually proved heinous in all aspects to the continued health and well-being of the petitioner and such heirs as now exist. In legal terms, the petitioner might be termed to be Princess Simplea.
(13) FAILURE TO LIVE HAPPILY EVER AFTER: Unfortunately this cautionary tale precludes any claim whatsoever by either party that the resulting nuptials concluded in an ending properly defined as “happily.” It is the position of the petitioner that in addition to the solely cosmetic change experienced by the respondent, there occurred concurrently a more substantive change, i.e. a complete reversal of personality. At the outset of this relationship the respondent might accurately be described as “a beast on the exterior, a prince on the interior.” However, once transformed, due entirely to the actions, dedication, and selflessness of the petitioner, the respondent thereupon became “a prince on the outside, a beast on the inside.” It is charged in divorce papers filed by the petitioner that the respondent, while fulfilling his spousal obligations, did also engage in extramarital activities in extremis. The petitioner can provide substantial evidence that the respondent did engage in carnal activities with eight or more village maidens while the petitioner was entirely engaged in providing a happy castle for him and producing his family. These extramarital activities did cause substantial pain and suffering, ridicule, emotional distress, and physical danger from prolonged contact with a variety of maidens. The petitioner and respondent did engage in at least several loud and lengthy discussions about these activities, and during one such encounter the respondent did knowingly accuse the petitioner of “gaining weight,” an unusually cruel and harmful attack on the emotional state of the petitioner. These prolonged discussions did occur more frequently until it became no longer viable for the petitioner to cohabit in the castle of the respondent.
(14) PRECEDENT: Various aspects of this petition have been litigated previously, and there exists substantial precedent to support the claims made by the petitioner. In Queen v. Rumpelstiltskin the Court held that an individual, in that case Queen, could not be compelled to fulfill a contract, however valid such contract, if provisions of
said contract forced either party into performing actions that otherwise would not be considered legal. In that case the issue was involuntary servitude to fulfill an obligation entered into by Queen. The Court said, “No party to a contract can legally waive such rights as to put them in such a position as they are compelled by said contract to perform activities or services deemed illegal under the existing statutes of that municipality, as such rights are beyond the scope of the individual to waive. Specifically, ‘Such contracts negotiated, agreed to, or signed in a situation in which any contracting party may be responding to pressure, duress, or other external factors, causing them to act against their own self-interest, are hereby held to be invalid and cannot be used to compel any action.” Having previously witnessed the respondent transformed from Beast to Prince can be seen by the Court to have created a situation rife with pressure and duress, which therefore would invalidate any agreements made in that state of mind.
(14i) In Kingdom v. Old Lady Who Lives in a Shoe (cit. 34 part b, ex parte 145), in which the Defendant (Old Lady) attempted to provide for many children by contracting for their services prior to their taking residence in the shoe, in direct contravention to an order from the Child Welfare Board, the Court held, “It is imperative that the Court recognize there exists no rights of any individual to proffer, contract for, or in any other way whatsoever accept or agree to any contract concerning the welfare of minor children without the express consent of coherent adult supervisors.” It is the contention of the petitioner that by agreeing to and signing this contract while in a state of extreme duress, and without counsel, the rights of the children were compromised and therefore the entire agreement is invalid, as the children were improperly represented in this agreement.
(15) REMEDY: It is within the power of this Court first, to declare said prenuptial agreement to have been signed under duress, at a time in which the petitioner was not in complete possession of faculties, and is therefore invalid; and, second, to replace this agreement with a court-ordered schedule of payments, compelling the respondent to fulfill his paternal obligations to the best of his ability.
Respectfully filed:
[O. King Cole]
LITTLE RED RIDING HOOD
V.
REGAL PICTURES, INC.
PLAINTIFF alleges Invasion of Privacy,
Trademark Infringement, Violation of
Right of Publicity, and Defamation
of Character
WHEREAS and wherefore Little Red Riding Hood, Plaintiff, is a living person, a citizen of this kingdom, with all the rights there-upon granted to her, it is hereby alleged that Regal Pictures, Inc., a division of General Entertainment Ltd., a wholly owned and operated subsidiary of Datsui International, did invade the privacy of the Plaintiff, infringe exclusive trademark rights, and violate a legal right of publicity of the Plaintiff by producing, releasing, and distributing into general release an animated motion picture entitled The Adventures of Little Red Riding Hood. This story, held to be a true telling of events occurring in the life of Plaintiff, did hold Plaintiff up to shame and ridicule, causing her extreme emotional pain and anguish. This did also cause Plaintiff irreparable financial harm by rendering her unemployable, and therefore Plaintiff asks for damages of not less than one million dollars ($1,000,000), in addition to 3.5 percent interest in gross receipts of this motion picture, with such gross receipts to be determined under a formula currently approved by Screen Actors Guild.
Little Red Riding Hood is a known figure. She has diligently created a public image by wearing, on any and all occasions, a red riding cape with a red hood. It is in all forms her costume, and it is uniquely associated with her by name. This costume holds a kingdom trademark and is entitled to all the protections given under the trademark laws. Little Red Riding Hood has licensed and continues to hold the exclusive license to this costume under said trademark for instances such as masked balls, Halloween costumes, school plays, and such events. This is a valuable property, and the licensor has fervently protected this trademark. A negotiated fee is required for each use of this license. Little Red Riding Hood has diligently protected this trademark, and the Court has upheld her ownership in toto of such license.
“Little Red Riding Hood” is a registered trademark. It is wholly owned by the Plaintiff under the name Little Red Riding Hood, Inc., a fiefdom corporation, a subsidiary of Little Red Riding Hood Enterprises. The right to use the name “Little Red Riding Hood” for commercial purposes is granted to licensees under contract in all such matters as deemed appropriate and consistent with the wholesome image projected by Little Red Riding Hood. In many instances Little Red Riding Hood, Inc., has refused to grant companies and/or individuals license to use this name, as association with such products or companies is inconsistent with the protected image of the Plaintiff. Among such companies that have applied for license but have not been so granted are manufacturers of feminine hygiene items, children’s lingerie, and tobacco companies.
The Plaintiff, Little Red Riding Hood, has actively defended all attempts to exploit her name and likeness for commercial purposes except those specifically licensed by Plaintiff. She has spent many years creating an image and protecting it from exploitation for commercial gain by anyone without proper commercial license. The motion picture produced, released, and distributed by Regal Pictures, Inc., does defame Plaintiff and can cause real and serious financial harm to any and all enterprises currently in existence or contemplated at any time in the future forever and ever.
Regal Pictures, Inc., did cause to be produced, released, and distributed the animated motion picture The Adventures of Little Red Riding Hood, featuring an animated character who wore a red riding cape and a red riding hood consistent in all ways with the trademark-protected costume generally associated with Little Red Riding Hood; moreover, this animated character identified herself as, and answered to the name, “Little Red Riding Hood,” a name protected by copyright. In this animated motion picture the character identified as Little Red Riding Hood did leave her home with the intention of taking to her ailing grandmother a basket of goodies, then residing on the distant side of a forest. According to this animated motion picture, the character identified by likeness and name as Little Red Riding Hood did meet a vicious wolf during such trip and did engage in a conversation with this wolf. As depicted in this motion picture, Little Red Riding Hood did inform the wolf that she was on her way to visit her ailing grandmother, thereby communicating to the wolf information that might be considered extremely dangerous to the grandmother. This did cause the wolf to proceed immediately to the grandmother’s address, at which time the grandmother was eaten by the wolf. Upon arrival on the premises of Little Red Riding Hood, the wolf did don the garments of the eaten grandmother and proceeded to trick, fool, and charm Little Red Riding Hood into believing the wolf was indeed the ailing grandmother. According to this animated motion picture, Little Red Riding Hood failed to notice that this was a wolf in grandmother’s clothing and instead commented only on the big eyes, big ears, and big teeth of this grandmother impersonator. The wolf leaped upon Little Red Riding Hood, inflicting serious injury, and Little Red Riding Hood was saved by hunters who happened to be nearby. This animated story is constructed from whole cloth, bears no resemblance to the truth, and misappropriates the name and likeness of Little Red Riding Hood for profit in violation of her rights of publicity.
This scenario gives the appearance that Little Red Riding Hood had complicity in the untimely death of her grandmother due to ingestion by the wolf, that Little Red Riding Hood did knowingly hold civil conversations with a wolf, that Little Red Riding Hood failed to recognize a wolf dressed in a bonnet and dressing gown and required the timely assistance of hunters to save her life. This scenario presents Plaintiff as weak, needy, nearsighted, hard of hearing, dependent, and foolish and is not in keeping with the true facts as they are known.
The scenario featured in the animated motion picture The Adventures of Little
Red Riding Hood is provably false and inconsistent with the true facts as they are known. Little Red Riding Hood did endeavor to take to her ailing grandmother a shopping bag of pharmaceutical drugs intended to assist her recovery, an act of mercy intended to restore the ailing grandmother to good and proper health. She did dress in her trademarked red riding cape and hood. But she did drive to her grandmother’s house, using Royal Route 4, making any and all contact with a wolf impossible. She did not meet this wolf. She did not converse with this wolf. She did not inform this wolf, or any member of the animal family of any kind, that her grandmother was infirm. Upon arriving at the grandmother’s house, she did note immediately that all lights had been turned off and all the shades were closed, making it impossible to see more than a few feet. When she endeavored to turn on lights, she was informed, by the wolf impersonating a grandmother, that the light affected her eyes and therefore she did not want any light emitted to the house. This complete lack of light prevented Little Red Riding Hood from seeing the individual lying in her grandmother’s bed. Little Red Riding Hood, upon arriving at her grandmother’s house, did immediately notice that the voice coming from the bed did not resemble her grandmother’s; upon remarking about that, she was informed that the illness had detrimentally affected the vocal cords, thereby causing the known voice of the ailing grandmother to change and making it impossible for Little Red Riding Hood to determine an impostor was on the premises. Little Red Riding Hood, upon arriving at her grandmother’s house, did immediately attempt to kiss her grandmother but was warned to maintain a safe distance of approximately fifteen (15) feet from the bed to prevent communication of virus-caused disease, making it impossible for Little Red Riding Hood to determine an impostor was in her grandmother’s bed. It is provably false and detrimental to the image created by Little Red Riding Hood to claim that she mistook a wolf for her grandmother. Such a thing did not happen, could not happen, and the portrayal of such an episode has caused and will continue to cause mental distress and serious financial harm to the Plaintiff.