Other than the first three clauses, all the other points were covered in a note three paragraphs long. While the dominions considered the crown a symbol of external unity among the distant members states of the British commonwealth, Griffith argued, ‘Ireland, on the contrary lies beside the shores of Great Britain, which has been accustomed for generations to interfere, in the name of the crown, in every detail of Ireland life. The desire and temptation to continue interference will remain if the Crown remains, as it cannot be the symbolic Crown that the Dominions know, but will continue to possess the real power of repression and veto which Ireland knows.’ The defence issue, to which Childers took exception, was not covered by a paragraph but a mere sentence: ‘We acknowledge a reasonableness in the desire of the British Government for certain naval facilities in Ireland differing from those which they receive from Canada or the other Dominions.’
There was one curious development when the delegation met that evening before the sub-conference meeting. Griffith ‘asked me, Charters, and GD [Gavan Duffy] to draft an alternative form of oath, saying I was an expert with words,’ Childers noted in his diary. It was the ‘first time he has ever asked me for advice of any kind!’
‘We cannot make peace on these terms,’ Chamberlain wrote to Lloyd George, ‘but we must not break on this document.’
As Collins had not yet returned from Dublin, Duggan joined Griffith to discuss the latest document with Lloyd George, Birkenhead and Sir Robert Horne at Chequers on the evening of 28 November. ‘We told them we had no authority to deal with them on any other basis than exclusion of the Crown from purely Irish affairs,’ Griffith reported. ‘We then entered into a general discussion in which they knocked out my argument in the document we sent in – that the Crown in the Dominions was merely a symbol but in Ireland a reality – by offering to put in any phrase in the Treaty we liked to ensure that the functions of the Crown in Ireland should be no more in practice than it is in Canada or any Dominion.’ In short, the British trumped the Irish argument for External Association by offering to ensure that Ireland would have the actual freedom enjoyed by Canada and the dominion by inserting in the proposed Treaty any phrase desired by the Irish delegation to ensure that Ireland would have the same de facto status as Canada. The British guaranteed, for instance, that the representative of the king in Ireland would be ‘be merely a symbol, and that no one would ever be appointed to whom the Irish Ministry offered any objection.’
Griffith might just as well have written that the British undermined de Valera’s argument, which the Irish delegation had been pressing. It also undermined Childers who had been arguing that Canada was essentially independent. If the British were not going to honour the commitment to Ireland by not according the de facto status of Canada, they could just as easily violate External Association, because it was not going to move Ireland an inch further away from Britain. The negotiations were clearly coming to a conclusion. Indeed, Barton saw no point in remaining in London. He wished to return home next day, 30 November, but the others thought this would be seen as an affront to Griffith.
On the afternoon of 30 November Collins joined with Griffith and Duggan for a further meeting at 10 Downing Street with the prime minister, Birkenhead and Chamberlain. Lloyd George informed them that he would present the Irish delegation with Britain’s final terms in the form of a draft treaty on Tuesday, 6 December.
‘They proposed to send their final proposals to Craig and ourselves on Tuesday,’ Griffith reported. ‘We objected. We should see them beforehand. They agreed to send us them on Thursday evening, but formally to hand them to us Tuesday.’
Craig told Stormont that he had been authorised by the prime minister to issue a statement. ‘By Tuesday next,’ he said, ‘either the negotiations will have broken down or the prime minister will send me new proposals for consideration by the Cabinet.’
The British draft treaty – delivered to the Irish delegation late on the night of Wednesday, 30 November – offered the Irish Free State, as Ireland would be known, the same status as the Dominions in ‘law and practice’. The exceptions, which really limited Irish freedom in relation to that of existing Dominions, were in matters of trade and defence. The British insisted on free trade and also stipulated that the coastal defence of Britain and Ireland would ‘be undertaken exclusively’ by the British, who would retain control of four specified ports and such other facilities as might be desired ‘in times of war or of strained relations with a foreign Power’. The British and Irish armies were to be the same size in relation to each other as each was to its country’s population. Another specific difference was the form of the oath to be taken by all members of the Free State parliament, who would swear ‘allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State; the Community of Nations known as the British Empire; and to the King as head of the State and of the Empire.’
On the Ulster question the draft treaty gave a fleeting recognition to Irish unity in that it applied to the whole island even though the representatives of Northern Ireland were not even consulted, but the proposals protected their interests by stipulating that the area could opt out of the Irish Free State and retain its existing status. In that event, however, a Boundary Commission would be established to adjust the boundary of Northern Ireland ‘in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions.’
The previous day Lloyd George and Churchill met T. M. Healy. Churchill told him the British government would appoint a Boundary Commission that would ‘ensure the transfer to the Free State of the counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh, South Armagh, and (if I remember rightly) South Down.’ Churchill continued that ‘the inevitable result’ would be that Craig would have to accept Irish unity.
‘That,’ said Healy, ‘is a statement of supreme importance. Do you mind repeating it, so as to enable me to transmit it to those men. I cannot imagine anything better calculated to silence their objections.’
Healy took down Churchill’s words in shorthand. ‘Am I to understand,’ he asked, ‘that that assurance is endorsed by the Prime Minister?’
‘It certainly is,’ Lloyd George’s replied.
Collins and Griffith were already convinced the Boundary Commission would transfer extensive territory, but the main issues facing them at the time were the crown and empire. Many believed Childers was the real author of External Association and he seemed to be holding on to this with a kind of blind tenacity. He understood better than any of them the real status of Canada, but even though the British were offering Ireland that status with the specified exceptions of some defence and trade concessions, he argued those concessions essentially undermined that status. Even if the British dropped all the demanded concessions, he would still argue that Ireland would not have the same status as Canada because the Canadians essentially enjoyed their freedom as a result of their distance from Britain. The British were simply too far away to enforce their legal edicts. Ireland, on the other hand, was close enough that British laws ‘could be enforced against Ireland so as to over-ride the fullest constitutional freedom nominally conferred.’ But this would be a violation of the agreement, and if the British were going to violate it, they could just as easily violate External Association as Ireland was still going to be as close to Britain.
Childers worked that day on a second part to his document contrasting the legal and constitutional status of Canada. But Collins no longer had any confidence in his judgment. ‘Integrity of purpose is defeated at all times by those whose start rests elsewhere,’ Collins wrote on 30 November. ‘The advice and inspiration of C [Childers] is like farmland under water – dead. With a purpose, I think – with a definite purpose. Soon he will howl his triumph – for what it is worth.’
‘I think also that Birkenhead’s integrity of purpose is foiled in other quarters,’ Collins continued. ‘I can almost see the gloating that is so obvious among some of our opposites – whichever way it means trouble at home, an enj
oyable spectacle for more people than one imagines.’
Chartres and Childers had come up with the phrase ‘constitutional usage’ to cover the de facto status of Canada. This was communicated to the British, and the term was included in the British draft treaty, which guaranteed that the Irish Free State the same status as Canada in ‘law, practice and constitutional usage’. Collins objected to the oath being prescribed for Irish members parliament. He suggested an alternative. There is no indication of who suggested it to Collins. Did he come up with it himself, or was it the result of Griffith’s request that Childers and the others suggest an oath? The oath that Collins proposed on 30 November was:
I ... do solemnly swear to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State as by law established and that I will be faithful to His Majesty King George in acknowledgment of the Association of Ireland in a common citizenship with Great Britain and the group of nations known as the British commonwealth.
Such an oath would be explicitly in line with Childers’ assessment of the de facto situation in Canada, where he contended that each ‘Canadian owes obedience to his own constitution only’. The word ‘faithful’ was specifically included to denote equality between the monarch and those taking the oath, as opposed to allegiance normally owed to one’s sovereign. Although the oath involved common citizenship, which was tantamount to acceptance of indirect allegiance and also membership of the British commonwealth, the British rejected the proposal at this stage.
‘Got my political life at stake,’ Lloyd George said to Collins that night. Collins did not reply, but the following day he wrote to a friend, ‘My life – not only political – is at stake.’
Griffith called a full meeting of the Irish delegation for 1 December. ‘I want to hear all points of objections,’ he said, ‘so that nobody can say afterwards that all arguments were not fully heard.’
Childers noted that did not want to create a scene at the meeting of the delegation by repeating some of his old arguments, so he confined himself to the defence terms, but got in a hassle with Griffith anyway. ‘He flared at me with some vague charge of often before having said the delegation was going back on July 20th. I said on this occasion I had criticised on defence only. M.C. instead of backing me up, said he thought I implied a wider criticism and refused to withdraw when I asked him.’ After the meeting Collins made what Childers considered ‘a ghost of an apology’. Of course, there is no way of determining what Childers actually said, but it was significant that in referring to the draft treaty in his diary the previous night, he wrote, ‘It is July 20th’, with the addition of the de facto stipulation, the boundary commission scheme, and safeguards for Ulster, but without the right for the British to recruit in Ireland.
Before accepting the British terms the Irish representatives were obliged to consult the cabinet in Dublin in line with their instructions. Barton and Duffy, who were so opposed to the British terms, did not want the bother of returning to Dublin for consultations. But Griffith insisted that the whole delegation return for a meeting with the cabinet in line with their instructions. The negotiations had reached a critical stage and everyone knew that the conference was supposed to be concluded by the following Tuesday.
Arrangements were made for a cabinet meeting at the Mansion House on Saturday morning, 3 December 1921. Griffith returned to meet de Valera on Friday night, while Collins stayed on with Childers for some talks with the British on financial matters. De Valera broke off his tour of IRA units to return to Dublin on Friday. He insisted on driving all the way himself and was very tired when he reached Dublin at 10.30 that night. Griffith arrived about thirty minutes later and their meeting lasted for two hours.
‘First of all I got a document from Mr Griffith which I said I will never sign,’ de Valera recalled later. ‘I will not sign it.’ It was a strange thing for him to say, unless he was expecting to take over the leadership of the delegation at the last moment.
Griffith again emphasised that he was not going to break over the crown, but de Valera later told his authorised biographers that he was too tired at the time to argue the matter. So further discussion was postponed until the cabinet meeting next morning.
Meanwhile Collins was doing such an effective job of hiding his own attitude that Childers could not determine where the Big Fellow stood on the proposals. He and Childers set out for Dublin that evening and crossed from Holyhead on the mail boat, but it was delayed on route by an accident and had to return to port. As a result the mail boat it did not eventually dock until shortly before the cabinet was due to convene. A sleepless night was certainly not the best preparation for the arduous meetings that were to follow.
15 - ‘Amendments were not mandatory’
Before setting out Collins had requested a meeting with the available members of the supreme council of the IRB while he was in Dublin but, because of the delay, he was unable to meet them as planned. Instead, he telephoned Seán Ó Muirthile from the Mansion House to pick up a copy of the draft treaty while the cabinet was meeting.
In addition to the cabinet members, Gavan Duffy and Duggan were invited to sit in on the meeting, as were Kevin O’Higgins and Childers, while Colm Ó Murchada attended as acting-secretary to the cabinet,
At the outset each member of the delegation gave his views on the draft terms. Griffith explained he was in favour of accepting them, and he emphasised that he would not break on the question of the crown. Barton, on the other hand, argued against acceptance on the grounds that the proposals were not Britain’s last word, that they did not really give full Dominion Status, and that there was no guarantee of unity. Gavan Duffy agreed with him, but Duggan concurred with Griffith.
There was come confusion about the attitude of Collins, who was obviously still trying to keep his views to himself, especially in the presence of Brugha and Stack. Childers noted in his diary that ‘Collins was difficult to understand - repeatedly pressed by Dev but I really don’t know what his answer amounted to.’ Stack later recalled that ‘Collins did not speak strongly in favour of the document at all.’ But Ó Murchada described him as being ‘in substantial agreement’ with Griffith and Duggan in arguing that rejecting the ‘Treaty would be a gamble as England could arrange a war in Ireland within a week’. Collins did say, however, that further concessions could be won on trade and defence, and he suggested the oath should be rejected.
At the president’s invitation, Childers criticised the proposals. Confining himself to the defence clauses, he denounced them saying that they meant the Free State’s status would be less than that of a dominion.
Barton asked him if the dominions would support the Free State in any question involving status, seeing that any British infringement in Irish affairs might be seen as setting a precedent affording Britain the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of the other dominions.
‘No,’ replied Childers. So long as those defence clauses remained, he felt the Free State would not really be a Dominion at all. ‘I said,’ he recalled, ‘we must make it clear that we had a right to defend ourselves.’
Griffith suggested consulting a constitutional lawyer to interpret the significance of the stipulation that the defence of Irish coastal waters would be undertaken ‘exclusively’ by the British. At this point Childers adopted a distinctly censorial tone.
‘I said,’ he wrote in his diary, ‘two such lawyers had been brought by him to London and had been there for some time and could have been consulted.’
De Valera contended that the word ‘exclusively’ in the provision stipulating that ‘the defence of the sea of the British Islands, including Ireland shall be undertaken exclusively’ by British forces ‘clearly meant a prohibition on us which could not be admitted,’ according to Childers. ‘He said he differed from me in that he thought it natural for them to demand facilities on our coast as being necessary. I said I didn’t disagree in this but we had to keep up our principles.’
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p; ‘There was a very free expression of disagreement at the cabinet meeting,’ according to Barton. But Childers noted that Brugha went over the top and created ‘an unpleasant scene’.
Observing that Griffith and Collins had been doing most of the negotiating, Brugha asked who was responsible for the sub-conference set up in which some of the delegation were not in complete touch with what was happening. Someone replied that the British had invited Griffith and Collins to meet them, and Brugha remarked that the British had selected ‘their men’.
Griffith was furious. He stood up and went to where Brugha was sitting and demanded that the remark be withdrawn, but Brugha refused at first. Collins, too, was angry, but he contained himself. ‘If you are not satisfied with us,’ he said to Brugha, ‘get another five to go over.’
‘Brugha had at last realised the situation but he took no steps to strengthen our hands or to join the delegation himself or to induce the President to do so,’ according to Barton. ‘He was serious, glowered and took no action.’ But that was largely Barton’s own fault, because he came to the defence of his colleagues. Not withstanding his own dislike of the sub-conference set up, he said that Griffith and Collins had been negotiating with the ‘knowledge and consent’ of the full delegation.
Brugha therefore withdrew his remark, but Griffith insisted it be entered in the minutes. The damaged had been done and an air of tension prevailed throughout the rest of the day’s discussions.
De Valera avoided personalities in criticising the draft treaty. He rejected it mainly on the grounds that the oath was unacceptable. ‘The oath,’ he later wrote, ‘crystallised in itself the main things we objected to – inclusion in the empire, the British King as King of Ireland, Chief Executive of the Irish State, and the source from which all authority in Ireland was to be derived.’ He also criticised the fact that Northern Ireland would be allowed to vote itself out of the Irish state. While he could have understood accepting Dominion Status in return for an end to partition, he complained that the proposals afforded neither one nor the other. He therefore suggested the delegation should return to London, try to have the draft treaty amended and, if necessary, face the consequences of war.
I Signed My Death Warrant Page 19