I have drawn for you the circle of the earth and indicated the positions of the [25] winds, and the directions in which they blow, so that they may be presented to your vision.
**TEXT: O. Apelt, Teubner, Leipzig, 1888
ON MELISSUS, XENOPHANES, AND GORGIAS**
T. Loveday and E. S. Forster
1 · Melissus says that, if anything is, it is eternal, since it is impossible that [974a1] anything can come into being from nothing. For suppose that either all things or some things have come into being, in either case they must be eternal; for otherwise, in coming into being, they would do so out of nothing. For if all things come into [5] being, then nothing can pre-exist; whilst if some things were ever and others are added, that which is must have become more and greater, and that by which it is more and greater must have arisen out of nothing; for the more is not originally existent in the less, nor the greater in the smaller.
Since it is eternal, it is unlimited; for it has no beginning from which it has come [10] into being, and no end at which it ever ceased coming into being.
Being all and unlimited it is one; for if it were two or more, these would be limits for one another.
Being one it must be similar throughout; for if it were dissimilar, it would be several and therefore no longer one but many.
Being eternal and unlimited and alike throughout, the One is without motion; [15] for it could not move without passing somewhere else, and it can only pass either into that which is full or into that which is empty; but of these the former could not admit it, while the latter is nothing at all.
Such being the nature of the One, it is unaffected by grief and pain, and is healthy and free from disease, and cannot change either by transposition or by [20] change of form or by mixture with anything else; for under all these circumstances the One becomes many, and what is not is necessarily generated and what is is destroyed; but these are impossibilities. For, indeed, if it were maintained that any One is the result of a mixture of several constituents—suppose, that is, that things [25]were many and moved into one another, and that their mixture were either by way of the composition of the many in one, or, being due to the constituents fitting in with one another, resulted in their covering one another from view—then in the former case the constituents mixed would be easily discernible, if you separated them; whilst, if they covered one another, rubbing would reveal each constituent, [974b1] the successive layers being uncovered as the upper layers were removed. Now neither of these things happens. But according to Melissus it is only in these ways that many things could both be and also appear to us; and since these ways are [5] impossible, that which is cannot be many, and the belief that it is is erroneous, like many other fancies which are due to the senses; but argument does not prove either that things come into being or that what is, is many, but that it is one and eternal and unlimited and similar throughout.
Now surely one ought firstly to begin by taking not any and every opinion, but [10] those which are most firm. If, then, all our opinions are incorrectly conceived, it is perhaps quite wrong to adopt this doctrine too, that nothing can ever come into being out of nothing; for this is but a single opinion and an incorrect one too, which we somehow all of us1 have often been led to believe from our sense-perceptions. But [15] if not all that appears to us is false, and some beliefs even of objects of sense are correct, either one ought to demonstrate the nature of such a correct belief and then adopt it, or else demonstrate and adopt those which appear most likely to be correct; and these must always be more firm than the conclusions which are apt to follow from the arguments of Melissus. For supposing that we really had to do with two [20] contrary opinions, as Melissus thinks (for if there are many things, he says they must arise from what is not; and if this is impossible, what is, is not many; for, being ungenerated, anything which is, is unlimited, and therefore one), supposing this so, [25] still, if we admit both propositions equally, unity is no more proved than multiplicity, and it is only if one proposition is more firm than the other, that the conclusions following from it are better proved. Now, as a matter of fact, we do entertain both these beliefs, namely, that nothing can come to be out of nothing, and also that existents are many and are in motion; and of the two the latter is more generally credited, and every one would more readily give up the former opinion than this. [975a1] Now if it were the case that the two propositions are contrary to one another, and it were impossible that at the same time things should come to be of what is not, and there should fail to be a multiplicity of things, each of these views would refute the other. But why should his premisses be correct? Some one else might assert the [5] exact opposite. For he has not argued his case either by showing that it is a correct opinion from which he starts, or by taking a more firm opinion than that with which his proof is concerned. For it is usually considered more likely that things come to be from what is not than that there is not a multiplicity of things; it is confidently asserted about existents that things which do not exist come into being, indeed often have come into being, out of non-existents, and those who have asserted this are no [10] ordinary men, but some of those who are looked upon as sages. To being with, Hesiod says:
First of all in the world was Chaos born, and thereafter
Broad-bosomed earth arose, firm seat of all things forever
And Love that shineth bright amid the host of Immortals.2
All other things, he says, came into being from these, but these came into being out of nothing. Secondly, there are many who say that nothing is but all things [15] become, declaring that whatever becomes does not arise from existents; for then their statement that all things become would be false. So much, therefore, is clear, that there are some people of the opinion that becoming even out of non-existents is possible.
2 · But had we not better leave aside the possibility or impossibility of his conclusions, and confine ourselves to what may very well be a distinct problem—namely, whether these conclusions follow from the premisses which he takes, or [20] whether nothing prevents things from being otherwise. And first of all, granted his first assumption, that nothing can come to be from what is not, does it necessarily follow that all things are ungenerated? Or is there no reason why one thing should not have come to be out of another, and so on in an endless series? Or may it not go [25] on in a circular process, in such a way that one thing has come to be out of another, there thus being always something in existence, and all things having come to be out of one another an endless number of times? In that case, although it be agreed that nothing can come to be out of what is not, everything may very well have come to be. (And none of the attributes which are attached to the One prevents our calling [30] existents unlimited in Melissus’s sense of the word. For he himself attributes to the unlimited that it actually is, and is said to be, everything. And even if existents are not unlimited, there is no reason why they should not come to be by the circular process.) Further, if all things come to be and nothing is, as some declare, how can they be eternal? Yet he certainly argues as though the existence of something were [35] real and agreed. For, he says, if a thing has not come to be but is, it must be eternal, as though being were necessarily inherent in things. Moreover, however impossible it may be for what is not to come to be, or for what is to be destroyed, yet what prevents some existing things from having come to be and others from being eternal, as Empedocles also affirms? For after admitting all this, namely, that [975b1]
Out of that which is not can nothing come into being;
And whatsoever exists, no art nor device can destroy it;
For it will always abide, where’er ‘tis implanted, for ever,3
he yet declares that of existents some are eternal, namely, fire, water, earth, and air, [5] but that the rest of things come to be and have come to be out of these. For in his opinion there is no other process whereby existents can come to be,
Save the mingling of things and exchanging of things that are mingled;
This
in the speech of men is called the work of Begetting.4
[10] But he denies that the being of the eternal things and of what really is, is the result of a process of coming to be; for this he considers impossible. For he says:
How could aught bring increase to the All and whence have arisen?5
But the Many come to be by the mixture and composition of fire and the other elements, and perish again when those elements are exchanged and separated; that [15] is, by mixture and separation many things are at any time, but by nature there are only four apart from the causes, or else only one. Or again if these elements out of the composition of which things come to be, and by the dissolution of which they are destroyed were from the first unlimited—which is what some affirm that Anaxagoras means when he says that things which come to be do so out of things that are always existent and unlimited—even so not all things would be eternal, but there [20] would be some things coming to be and having come to be from things that are, and passing by destruction into other modes of being. Furthermore, there is no reason why one form should not constitute the universe (as Anaximander and Anaximenes say, the former declaring that the universe is water, while Anaximenes says that it is [25] air, and as others say who have contended along these lines that the universe is one), and why this, but assuming various shapes and greater or less bulk—that is, by coming to be in a rare or dense state—should not make up the many unlimited objects which exist and come to be and compose the whole. Again, Democritus declares that water and air and each of the many things that exist are essentially the [30] same, but differ in their ‘rhythm’. Why should not the many come to be and be destroyed in this way, the One changing continually from being to being by the above-mentioned differences, and the whole becoming not a whit either greater or less? Furthermore, why should not bodies from time to time come to be from other bodies and be dispersed into bodies, and thus by dissolution the processes of generation and decay always balance one another?
[35] But if one were to make these concessions and allow that what is both exists and is ungenerated, how is its unlimitedness thereby more clearly demonstrated? For Melissus declares it to be unlimited, if it exists but has not come to be; for the beginning and end of the process of coming to be are, he says, limits. Yet what in his argument prevents a thing which is ungenerated from having a limit? For if a thing [976a1] has come to be, he contends that it has as a beginning that from which it began coming to be. Now why should it not have a beginning, even if it has not come to be—not, however, one from which it has come to be, but some other—and why should not existents, though eternal, be limited in relation to one another? Again, [5] why should not the whole, being ungenerated, be unlimited, but the things which come to be within it be limited by having a beginning and end of coming to be? Again, as Parmenides says, what prevents the universe, though it be one and ungenerated, from being nevertheless limited and
Like to the mass of a sphere on all sides carefully rounded,
Everywhere equally far from the midst; for Fate hath appointed
That neither here nor there should it either be greater or smaller?6 [10]
Now, if it has a centre and extremities, it has a limit though it is ungenerated; since if it be one and a body, as Melissus himself asserts, it has parts of its own as well, and these all alike. For when he says that the universe is similar, he does not use the term of similarity to something else (this is just the point that Anaxagoras7 raises in disproving that the unlimited is similar, i.e. that what is similar is similar to [15] something else, so that being two or more it would no longer be one, nor yet unlimited), but perhaps he means similar in relation to itself—in other words, that it is homogeneous, being all water or earth or something else of the kind. For he clearly holds that in this case it would be one; but each of the parts being a body is not unlimited (for it is the whole which is unlimited), and therefore they are limited [20] in relation to one another, although they are ungenerated.
Further, if it is both eternal and unlimited, how could it be one, being a body? For if it were heterogeneous,8 it would be many. Melissus himself contends that it would then be many. But if it is all water or all earth, or whatever this being is, it would have many parts (as Zeno, too, attempts to prove of that which is one in this [25] sense); its parts would then be many, being some of them smaller and less than others; so that in this way it would vary throughout, without any body being added to it or taken away from it. But if it has no body or width or length, how could the One be unlimited? Or why should there not be many, indeed innumerable, existents [30] of this kind? Further, if there are more existents than one, why should they not be unlimited in size, just as Xenophanes asserts that the depth both of the earth and of the air is unlimited? Empedocles shows this; for, as though certain people urged such views, he makes the criticism that, if this is the nature of earth and air, it is impossible for them ever to meet, [35]
If the depths of the earth are unbounded and ample the ether,
As the words that come forth from the lips of mortals unnumbered,
Empty and meaningless, say; they have seen of the whole but a little.9
Further, if it is one, there is nothing absurd in supposing that it is not similar everywhere. For if the universe is water or fire or something of that kind, there is no [976b1] reason why we should not suppose several kinds of this one being, each kind individually similar to itself. For there is no reason why one kind should not be rare and another dense, as long as the rarity does not involve a void. For in the rare there is not a void isolated in particular parts in such a way that of the whole part is dense [5] and part not dense (rarity then meaning that the whole is like this); but rarity is produced when the whole is uniformly full, but uniformly less full than in the dense.
But suppose it exists and is ungenerated, and suppose it were granted that for [10] this reason it is unlimited, and that more than one thing cannot be unlimited, and it must therefore be said to be one, and it is impossible. . . .10 For how, if what is unlimited is a whole, can the void, not being a whole, exist?
Now Melissus declares that it is without motion, if a void does not exist; for everything moves by changing its place. In the first place, then, this does not agree [15] with the opinion of many, which is that a void does exist, yet it is not a body, but is of the nature of the Chaos, as Hesiod describes it first coming into being in the birth of things, considering space to be a prime necessity for things which exist; and the void is, as it were, a vessel in which we expect to find an interior space. But even if there [20] is no void, why should it be less likely to move? For Anaxagoras, who devoted his attention to this subject, and for whom it was not enough merely to declare that a void does not exist, declares that things which are, are in motion, although there is no void. Similarly Empedocles says that they are ever in motion continually all through the period of aggregation, but that there is no void; for he says that
[25] Nought of the whole can be void; whence then could any be added?11
while when all has been aggregated into a single form, so as to be one,
Emptiness there is none, nor aught that is overflowing.12
For why should not things assume one another’s position and go through a circle of simultaneous movements, one thing taking the place of another, and that the place [30] of something else, and something else the first position? And what is there in what he has said that precludes a movement taking place in things, consisting in a change of form in an object which remains in the same position (what he, like every one else, terms alteration), as, for example, when white turns into black, or bitter into sweet? For the non-existence of a void and the inability of that which is full to [35] receive any addition does not at all preclude the possibility of alteration.
Thus neither are all things necessarily eternal nor is it necessarily unlimited (but many things are unlimited), nor is it one, nor similar, nor unmoved, whether it be one or whether it be many. If this is admitted, if there would be n
othing in what he has said to prevent existents from being either transposed or altered; if there is [977a1] one thing, the movement is of the whole, which differs in quantity, and alters without the addition or abstraction of any body; while, if there is a multiplicity of existents, their movement is due to their mutual mixture and segregation. For it is not likely that the process of mixture is either a placing of elements one above [5] another, or a putting of them together, such as he supposes, by which either they are immediately distinct, or else they appear each distinct from one another, if the layers above one another are successively rubbed away; but they are so arranged that any part of that which is mixed comes into such a relation to any part of that with which it is mixed, that even the smallest particles would be found not merely placed together but mixed. For since there is no smallest body, every part is mixed [10] with every other part, just as the whole is mixed.
3 · Xenophanes declares that if anything is, it cannot possibly have come into being, and he argues this with reference to God, for that which has come into [15] being must necessarily have done so either from that which is similar or from that which is dissimilar; and neither alternative is possible. For it is no more possible for like to have been begotten by like than for like to have begotten like (for since they are equal, all the same qualities inhere in each and in a similar way in their relations to one another), nor could unlike have come into being from unlike. For if the stronger could come into being from the weaker, or the greater from the less, or the [20] better from the worse, or conversely worse things from better, then what is not could come to be from what is, or what is from what is not; which is impossible. Accordingly for these reasons God is eternal.
The Complete Works of Aristotle Page 264