Now good birth in a race or a state means that its members are indigenous or ancient; that its earliest leaders were distinguished men, and that from them have sprung many who were distinguished for qualities that we admire.
The good birth of an individual may come either from the male or the female side; it requires legitimacy on both sides, and implies that, as in the case of the state, [35] the founders of the line have been notable for excellence or wealth or something else which is highly prized, and that many distinguished persons belong to the family, men and women, young and old.
Possession of good children and of many children is clear enough. Applied to a [1361a1] community, they mean that its young men are numerous and of good quality: good in regard to bodily excellences, such as stature, beauty, strength, athletic powers; and also in regard to the excellences of the soul, which in a young man are temperance and courage. Applied to an individual, they mean that his own children [5] are numerous and have the good qualities we have described. Both male and female are here included; the excellences of the latter are, in body, beauty and stature; in soul, self-command and an industry that is not sordid. Communities as well as [10] individuals should lack none of these perfections, in their women as well as in their men. Where, as among the Lacedaemonians, the state of women is bad, almost half of them are not happy.
The constituents of wealth are: plenty of coined money and territory; the ownership of numerous, large, and beautiful estates; also the ownership of [15] numerous and beautiful implements, live stock, and slaves. All these kinds of property are our own, are secure, gentlemanly, and useful. The useful kinds are those that are productive, the gentlemanly kinds are those that provide enjoyment. By ‘productive’ I mean those from which we get our income; by ‘enjoyable’, those from which we get nothing worth mentioning except the use of them. The criterion [20] of security is the ownership of property in such places and under such conditions that the use of it is in our power; and it is our own if it is in our own power to dispose of it or not. By ‘disposing of it’ I mean giving it away or selling it. Wealth as a whole consists in using things rather than in owning them; it is really the activity—that is, [25] the use—of property that constitutes wealth.
Fame means being respected by everybody, or having some quality that is desired by all men, or by most, or by the good, or by the wise.
Honour is the token of a man’s being famous for doing good. It is chiefly and most properly paid to those who have already done good; but also to the man who [30] can do good in future. Doing good refers either to the preservation of life and the means of life, or to wealth, or to some other of the good things which it is hard to get either always or at that particular place or time—for many gain honour for things which seem small, but the place and the occasion account for it. The constituents of [35] honour are: sacrifices; commemoration, in verse or prose; privileges; grants of land; front seats at civic celebrations; state burial; statues; public maintenance; among foreigners, obeisances and giving place; and such presents as are among various bodies of men regarded as marks of honour. For a present is not only the bestowal of a piece of property, but also a token of honour; which explains why honour-loving as [1361b1] well as money-loving persons desire it. The present brings to both what they want; it is a piece of property, which is what the lovers of money desire; and it brings honour, which is what the lovers of honour desire.
The excellence of the body is health; that is, a condition which allows us, while keeping free from disease, to have the use of our bodies; for many people are healthy [5] in the way we are told Herodicus was; and these no one can congratulate on their health, for they have to abstain from everything or nearly everything that men do. Beauty varies with the time of life. In a young man beauty is the possession of a body fit to endure the exertion of running and of contests of strength; which means [10] that he is pleasant to look at; and therefore all-round athletes are the most beautiful, being naturally adapted both for contests of strength and for speed also. For a man in his prime, beauty is fitness for the exertion of warfare, together with a pleasant but at the same time formidable appearance. For an old man, it is to be strong enough for such exertion as is necessary, and to be free from pain through escaping the ravages of old age. Strength is the power of moving something else at will; to do [15] this, you must either pull, push, lift, pin, or grip it; thus you must be strong in all of those ways or at least in some. Excellence in size is to surpass ordinary people in height, thickness, and breadth by just as much as will not make one’s movements slower in consequence. Athletic excellence of the body consists in size and strength; [20] for the swift man is strong—he who can fling forward his legs in a certain way, and move them fast and far, is good at running; he who can grip and hold down is good at wrestling; he who can drive an adversary from his ground with the right blow is a [25] good boxer; he who can do both the last is a good pancratiast, while he who can do all is an all-round athlete.
Happiness in old age is the coming of old age slowly and painlessly; for a man has not this happiness if he grows old either quickly, or tardily but painfully. It arises both from the excellences of the body and from good luck. If a man is not free from disease, or if he is not strong, he will not be free from suffering or pain; nor can [30] he continue to live a long life unless he has good luck. There is, indeed, a capacity for long life that is quite independent of health or strength; for many people live long who lack the excellences of the body; but for our present purpose there is no use in going into the details of this.
The possession of many friends and the possession of good friends need no [35] explanation; for we define a friend as one who will always try, for your sake, to do what he takes to be good for you. The man towards whom many feel thus has many friends; if these are worthy men, he has good friends.
Good luck is the acquisition or possession of all or most, or the most important, of those good things which are due to luck. Some of the things that are due to luck [1362a1] may also be due to artificial contrivance; but many are independent of art, as for example those which are due to nature—though, to be sure, things due to luck may actually be contrary to nature. Thus health may be due to artificial contrivance, but beauty and stature are due to nature. All such good things as excite envy are, as a [5] class, the outcome of good luck. Luck is also the cause of good things that happen contrary to reasonable expectation: as when, for instance, all your brothers are ugly, but you are handsome yourself; or when you find a treasure that everybody else has overlooked; or when a missile hits the next man and misses you; or when you are the only man not to go to a place you have gone to regularly, while the others go there [10] for the first time and are killed. All such things are reckoned pieces of good luck.
As to excellence, it is most closely connected with the subject of eulogy, and therefore we will wait to define it until we come to discuss that subject.
6 · It is now plain what our aims, future or actual, should be in urging, and [15] what in deprecating, a proposal; the latter being the opposite of the former. Now the deliberative orator’s aim is utility: deliberation seeks to determine not ends but the means to ends, i.e. what it is most useful to do. Further, utility is a good thing. We [20] ought therefore to assure ourselves of the main facts about goodness and utility in general.
We may define a good thing as that which ought to be chosen for its own sake; or as that for the sake of which we choose something else; or as that which is sought after by all things, or by all things that have sensation or reason, or which will be sought after by any things that acquire reason; or as that which must be prescribed [25] for a given individual by reason generally, or is prescribed for him by his individual reason, this being his individual good; or as that whose presence brings anything into a satisfactory and self-sufficing condition; or as self-sufficiency; or as what produces, maintains, or entails characteristics of this kind, while preventing and destroying their opposites (one thing may entail another in
either of two ways—[30] simultaneously, or subsequently. Thus learning entails knowledge subsequently, health entails life simultaneously. Things are productive of other things in three senses: first as being healthy produces health; secondly, as food produces health; and thirdly, as exercise does—i.e. it does so usually. All this being settled, [35] we now see that both the acquisition of good things and the removal of bad things must be good; the latter entails freedom from the evil things simultaneously, while the former entails possession of the good things subsequently); or the acquisition of a greater in place of a lesser good, or of a lesser in place of a greater evil; for in [1362b1] proportion as the greater exceeds the lesser there is acquisition of good or removal of evil.10 The excellences, too, must be something good; for it is by possessing these that we are in a good condition, and they tend to produce good works and good actions. [5] They must be severally named and described elsewhere. Pleasure, again, must be a good thing, since it is the nature of all animals to aim at it. Consequently both pleasant and beautiful things must be good things, since the former are productive of pleasure, while of the beautiful things some are pleasant and some desirable in and for themselves.
[10] The following is a more detailed list of things that must be good. Happiness, as being desirable in itself and sufficient by itself, and as being that for whose sake we choose all other things. Also justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, and all such qualities, as being excellences of the soul. Further, health, [15] beauty, and the like, as being bodily excellences and productive of many other good things: for instance, health is productive both of pleasure and of life, and therefore is thought the greatest of goods, since these two things which it causes, pleasure and life, are two of the things most highly prized by ordinary people. Wealth, again; for it is the excellence of possession, and also productive of many other good things. [20] Friends and friendship; for a friend is desirable in himself and also productive of many other good things. So, too, honour and reputation, as being pleasant, and productive of many other good things, and for the most part accompanied by the presence of the good things that cause them to be bestowed. The faculty of speech and action; since all such qualities are productive of what is good. Further—good parts, strong memory, receptiveness, quickness of intuition, and the like, for all such [25] faculties are productive of what is good. Similarly, all the sciences and arts. And life; since, even if no other good were the result of life, it is desirable in itself. And justice, as the cause of good to the community.
The above are pretty well all the things admittedly good. In dealing with things whose goodness is disputed, we may argue in the following ways:—That is good of [30] which the contrary is bad. That is good the contrary of which is to the advantage of our enemies; for example, if it is to the particular advantage of our enemies that we should be cowards, clearly courage is of particular value to our countrymen. And generally, the contrary of that which our enemies desire, or of that at which they rejoice, is evidently valuable. Hence the passage beginning: [35]
Surely would Priam exult.11
This principle holds good for the most part, not always, since it may well be that our interest is sometimes the same as that of our enemies. Hence it is said that evils draw men together; that is, when the same thing is hurtful to them both. [1363a1]
Further: that which is not in excess is good, and that which is greater than it should be is bad. That also is good on which much labour or money has been spent; the mere fact of this makes it seem good, and such a good is assumed to be an end—an end reached through a long chain of means; and any end is a good. Hence the lines beginning:
And for Priam a boast,12 [5]
and
Oh, it were shame to have tarried so long13
and there is also the proverb about breaking the pitcher at the door.
That which most people seek after, and which is obviously an object of contention, is also a good; for, as has been shown, that is good which is sought after by everybody, and ‘most people’ seems pretty well to amount to ‘everybody’. That which is praised is good, since no one praises what is not good. So, again, that which [10] is praised by our enemies; for it is as though everyone were thereby agreeing. And that which is praised by those who have suffered—they would agree because it is evidently good. Similarly, those must be worthless whom their friends censure and their enemies do not. (For this reason the Corinthians conceived themselves to be [15] insulted by Simonides when he wrote:
Against the Corinthians hath Ilium no complaint.)
Again, that is good which has been distinguished by the favour of a discerning or virtuous man or woman, as Odysseus was distinguished by Athena, Helen by Theseus, Paris by the goddesses, and Achilles by Homer. And, generally speaking, all things are good which men choose to do; this will include the things already [20] mentioned, and also whatever may be bad for their enemies or good for their friends, and at the same time practicable. Things are practicable in two senses: it is possible to do them, it is easy to do them. Things are done easily when they are done either without pain or quickly: the difficulty of an act lies either in its painfulness or [25] in the long time it takes. Again, a thing is good if it is as men wish; and they wish to have either no evil at all or at least a balance of good over evil. This last will happen where the penalty is either imperceptible or slight. Good, too, are things that are a man’s very own, possessed by no one else, exceptional; for this increases the credit of having them. So are things which befit the possessors, such as whatever is [30] appropriate to their birth or capacity. And whatever they feel they ought to have but lack—such things may indeed be trifling, but none the less men deliberately make them the goal of their action. And things easily effected; for these are practicable (in the sense of being easy); such things are those in which everyone, or most people, or one’s equals, or one’s inferiors have succeeded. Good also are the things by which we shall gratify our friends or annoy our enemies; and the things [35] chosen by those whom we admire; and the things for which we are fitted by nature or experience, since we think we shall succeed more easily in these; and those in which no worthless man can succeed, for such things bring greater praise; and those which we do in fact desire, for what we desire is taken to be not only pleasant but [1363b1] also better. Further, a man of a given disposition makes chiefly for the corresponding things: lovers of victory make for victory, lovers of honour for honour, money-loving men for money, and so with the rest. These, then, are the sources from which we must derive our means of persuasion about good and utility.
[5] 7 · Since, however, it often happens that people agree that two things are both useful but do not agree about which is the more so, the next step will be to treat of relative goodness and relative utility.
A thing which surpasses another may be regarded as being that other thing plus something more, and that other thing which is surpassed as being what is contained in the first thing. Now things are greater or more always in comparison [10] with something smaller or less, while they are great and small, much and little, in comparison with normal magnitude. The great is that which surpasses the normal, the small is that which is surpassed by the normal; and so with many and few.
Now we call ‘good’ what is desirable for its own sake and not for the sake of something else; that at which all things aim; what they would choose if they could [15] acquire understanding and practical wisdom; and that which tends to produce or preserve such goods, or is always accompanied by them; [Moreover, that for the sake of which things are done is the end (an end being that for the sake of which all else is done)]14 and for each individual that thing is a good which fulfils these conditions in regard to himself. It follows, then, that a greater number of goods is a greater good than one or than a smaller number, if that one or that smaller number [20] is included in the count; for then the larger number surpasses the smaller, and the smaller quantity is surpassed as being contained in the larger.
Again, if the l
argest member of one class surpasses the largest member of another, then the one class surpasses the other; and if one class surpasses another, then the largest member of the one surpasses the largest member of the other. Thus, if the tallest man is taller than the tallest woman, then men in general are taller than [25] women. Conversely, if men in general are taller than women, then the tallest man is taller than the tallest woman. For the superiority of class over class is proportionate to the superiority possessed by their largest specimens. Again, where one good is always accompanied by another, but does not always accompany it, it is greater than the other, for the use of the second thing is implied in the use of the first. A [30] thing may be accompanied by another either simultaneously, or subsequently, or potentially. Life accompanies health simultaneously (but not health life), knowledge accompanies the act of learning subsequently, cheating accompanies sacrilege potentially, since a man who has committed sacrilege is always capable of cheating. Again, when two things each surpass a third, that which does so by the greater amount is the greater of the two; for it must surpass the less great as well. A thing productive of a greater good is itself a greater good than that other. For that is what [35] being productive of something greater is. Likewise, that which is produced by a greater good is itself a greater good; thus, if what is wholesome is more desirable and a greater good than what gives pleasure, health too must be a greater good than pleasure. Again, a thing which is desirable in itself is a greater good than a thing [1364a1] which is not desirable in itself, as for example bodily strength than what is wholesome, since the latter is not pursued for its own sake, whereas the former is; and this was our definition of the good. Again, if one of two things is an end, and the other is not, the former is the greater good, as being chosen for its own sake and not for the sake of something else; as, for example, exercise is a greater good than physical well-being. And of two things that which stands less in need of other things [5] is the greater good, since it is more self-sufficing. (That which stands less in need of others is that which needs either fewer or easier things.) And when one thing does not exist or cannot come into existence without a second, while the second can exist without the first, the second is the better. For that which does not need something else is more self-sufficing than that which does, and presents itself as a greater good for that reason. Again, that which is an origin of other things is a greater good than that which is not, and that which is a cause is a greater good than that which is not; [10] the reason being the same in each case, namely that without a cause and an origin nothing can exist or come into existence. Again, where there are two origins, what arises from the greater is greater; and where there are two causes, what arises from the greater cause is greater. And conversely, that origin or cause is itself the greater [15] which has the greater consequences. Now it is plain, from all that has been said, that one thing may be shown to be greater than another from two opposite points of view: it may appear the greater because it is an origin and the other thing is not, and also because it is not an origin and the other thing is—on the ground that the end is greater and is not an origin. So Leodamas, when accusing Callistratus, said that the man who prompted the deed was more guilty than the doer, since it would not have [20] been done if he had not planned it. On the other hand, when accusing Chabrias he said that the doer was worse than the prompter, since there would have been no deed without some one to do it; men, said he, plot a thing only in order to carry it out.
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