[15] We shall use the same method to compose our accusations when we are dealing with wicked men. But we must not scoff at the man with whom we are finding fault, but we must describe his life; for statements have more effect than scoffs, bringing conviction to our hearers and causing annoyance to those with whom we are finding fault; for scoffing is directed against outward appearance and circumstance, while [20] statements about a man are the picture, as it were, of his habits and character. Be on your guard against calling disgraceful actions by disgraceful names, so as not to violate conventional feeling, but express such things by indirect hints and explain the facts in words which are really applicable to different actions. In finding fault [25] you must employ irony and laugh at the points on which your adversary prides himself; in private, and in the presence of a few listeners, you should seek to discredit him, but before the multitude you should abuse him by levelling only ordinary accusations against him. You must employ the same methods of amplification and minimization in finding fault as in eulogy. From what has been said we shall know how to practise these kinds of oratory.
[30] 36 · It remains for us to deal with the oratory of accusation and defence and inquiry. Let us next discuss how we shall compose and arrange these in the forensic type of oratory. We shall first set forth in the proem, as in the other kinds, the action which is to be the subject of our accusation or defence. We shall exhort our hearers [35] to attention by the same means as we employed in the persuasive and dissuasive styles.
† Again, as regards the goodwill of the audience, when they are well-disposed towards the subject of our speech in connexion with either the past or in the present and he is not the object of prejudice because they are irritated against him or his [1442a1] action or his speech, we must secure their goodwill by the method described in dealing with the other kinds of oratory. When they are neither well nor ill-disposed towards him in connexion with either the past or the present, or when his personality [5] or his action or his words are the object of prejudice, we must bring forward reasons for goodwill towards him, sometimes blending them together and sometimes taking them separately.†28 Such, then, is the method by which we must conciliate goodwill.
Those who are the objects neither of goodwill nor of illwill must briefly eulogize themselves and dispraise their adversaries. They must praise themselves in [10] connexion with the qualities which most nearly concern their hearers, calling themselves, for example, patriotic, true to their friends, grateful, compassionate; while they will dispraise an adversary by applying to him epithets which will arouse the anger of their audience, such as unpatriotic, untrue to his friends, thankless, [15] pitiless, and the like. They must also conciliate the jury by praising their justice and the intelligence which they bring to their task. They must also mention any point in which they are at a disadvantage compared with their opponents, whether in word or deed or anything else which concerns the suit; and they must further introduce the considerations of justice, legality, expediency, and the like. It is by these means [20] that we must win goodwill in the minds of the jury for one who is the object of neither kindly nor unkindly feeling.
When a man is an object of prejudice, if the prejudice dates from the past and is concerned with his person or with what he has said, we know from what has already been remarked how to remove it. If it dates from the present time, it must necessarily be concerned with the man’s personality29 if he is represented as unfit to [25] bring the case in question, or his character as contradicting the charges he brings or consistent with the accusation brought against him. It would be a case of unsuitability if too young or too old a man pleaded on behalf of another; of contradiction, if a strong man accused a weak man of assault, or if a violent man brought a charge of violence against a self-controlled man, or if a very poor man [30] went to law against a very rich man charging him with embezzlement. These are cases where there is a contradiction between the accusations and those who bring them. There will be consistency with the charge where a strong man is prosecuted for assault by a weak man or one who has the reputation of being a thief is put on his trial for theft. In a word, there will seem to be consistency with the charge in the [35] case of persons who cause an opinion to be formed about them which corresponds with their character. Such, then, will be the misrepresentations which arise at the moment against a man’s personality. Prejudice will be raised against a man’s action if he goes to law with his own friends or guests or relatives, or on petty or [1442b1] discreditable pleas; for these things bring disrepute upon the parties in a suit.
I will now show how we are to get rid of the above mentioned prejudices. I maintain that there are two principles which hold good in all cases. First, when you think your opponents are likely to impress the jury, anticipate them and make the [5] impression yourself. Secondly, when it is a question of acts, you should, if possible, turn the blame upon your adversaries, or failing that, upon some one else, urging as an excuse that you have been dragged into the suit against your will and under compulsion from your opponents. Against each particular prejudice you must urge such excuses as these: a young man, for example, should allege a lack of older [10] friends to fight the case on his behalf, or the enormity or number of his opponent’s misdeeds, or the short limit of time allowed, or some other such excuse. If you are speaking on some one else’s behalf, you must say that you are pleading his cause from motives of friendship for him or hatred of his opponent, or because you were present at the events in question, or for the public good, or because your client [15] stands in need of friends and is a victim of injustice. If his character agrees with the charge brought against him or is in contradiction to the accusation which he brings, you must make use of anticipation and say that it is not just or lawful or expedient to judge from an opinion or suspicion before listening to the facts. Such, then, is the [20] way in which we shall get rid of prejudices against a man’s personality; those which concern his action we shall repudiate by transferring the blame to his adversary, or by accusing the latter of libel or injustice or greed or contentiousness or anger, [25] alleging as an excuse that our client could not possibly obtain justice in any other way. This is how we shall get rid of personal prejudices in the law courts; those which concern a man’s public life we shall refute by the various methods prescribed for the kinds of oratory already dealt with.
We shall arrange the proems of forensic speeches in the same manner as those [30] of public orations, and on the same principle we shall include the narration of facts in the proem or show them to be trustworthy and just in detail or else insert them bodily by themselves.
Next will follow confirmation, by means of proofs if the facts are disputed by [35] our opponents, or, if they are admitted, by considerations of justice, expediency, and the like. Of proofs we must put testimony first and admissions made under torture, if there are any. Next we must confirm our statements, if they are plausible, by maxims and enthymemes, but, if they are not entirely plausible, by considerations [1443a1] of probability, and afterwards by examples, evidences, signs, and refutations, and lastly by enthymemes and maxims. If the facts are admitted, we must leave proofs [5] alone and make use of justification as already described. Such, then, is the method of confirmation which we shall employ.
After such confirmation we shall next state the arguments which we can urge against our opponents, and anticipate what they are likely to say. If they deny the facts, we must amplify the proofs which we have already stated and criticize and [10] minimize those which they are likely to bring forward. If they admit the actions but intend30 to show that they are legal and just according to written laws, we must attempt to show that the laws which we bring forward, and laws similar to them, are just and right and to the common advantage of the state, and that this is the opinion [15] generally held about them, while the contrary is true of the laws which our opponents are bringing forward. If it is impossible to say this, you must remind the jury that they have to give their verdict not on a point of law bu
t on a point of fact, and that they have sworn to vote according to the established law, and you must tell them that they must not pass laws now but upon the proper days fixed for that [20] purpose. If it so happens that what has been done contravenes laws which appear to be bad,31 we must say that here we have not law but the negation of law; for law is laid down for the public benefit, but this law is harmful to the state. We must say [25] that they will not be acting illegally if they vote in contravention of this law, but will be legislating to prevent the use of bad and illegal ordinances. You can also point out that no law forbids the conferring of a public benefit and that it is a benefaction to the state to annul bad laws. Regarding laws, then, of which the meaning is clear, [30] we shall easily be able, by such methods of anticipation, to speak against any of them with which we are concerned. When there is ambiguity, if the jury understand a law in a sense which favours you, you must give it that interpretation; but if they give it the construction which your opponent puts upon it, you must tell them that this is not what the lawgiver meant but that he interpreted it as you do, and that it is to the advantage of the jury to put the construction which you do upon it. If you cannot twist the law round, point out that it cannot mean anything but what you say [35] it means. If you follow this method you will have no difficulty as to the way in which to deal with laws.
Generally speaking, if they admit the facts and intend to base their defence on pleas of justice and legality, you must employ these methods to anticipate what they [40] are likely to say. But if they admit the facts but claim to be pardoned, you must deprive your opponents of such arguments in the following manner. First, you must [1443b1] say that their conduct is all the more reprehensible and that it is only when they have been found out that they admit their mistake in so acting, adding, ‘If, therefore, you pardon the defendant, you will absolve every one else from punishment’. You can say, ‘If you acquit those who admit their mistakes, how will [5] you be able to condemn those who do not do so’? You must urge that ‘even if he has made a mistake, there is no reason why I should suffer through his mistake’. Furthermore, you must say that the lawgiver does not pardon those who make mistakes, and so the jury in giving their verdict according to the laws should not do [10] so either. Such then, as we have stated at the beginning, are the means by which we shall refute their appeals for pardon, and, speaking generally, we shall anticipate by the method already mentioned anything which our opponents intend to say with a view either to proof or justification or pardon.
Next we must iterate the whole story of the case in summary form, and, if [15] possible, in a few words instil into the minds of the jury a feeling of hostility or anger or envy towards our opponents and of goodwill or gratitude or pity for ourselves. How this is done we have already stated in dealing with public speaking and persuasion and dissuasion, and we shall again allude to it finally in treating of the [20] defensive style of oratory. This, then, is the way in which we shall compose and arrange our speech when we are the first to speak and are the accusers in a forensic case.
When we are defending a case, we shall frame our proem in the same way as when accusing, and we shall make no mention of the accusations, of which our [25] opponent has informed our hearers, but after the proem we shall set forth and refute the opinions which he has put into their minds and throw discredit on his witnesses and the testimony given under torture and the oaths, in the manner already described to you. If the facts are credible, we must put our defense against them [30] . . .32 changing to the technique of omission, and if the witnesses or those who have been examined under torture are trustworthy, we must have recourse to argument or statement of fact or any other strong point which we can bring against them. If your adversary accuses you by bringing a charge which accords with your advantage or habitual practice, you must defend yourself, if you can, by showing [35] that the crime with which you are charged does not accord with your advantage; or, failing that, you must urge that it has not been the custom either of yourself or of persons like you to do such things, or to do them in such a manner. This is how you will refute the argument of probability. When he employs an example, you must first show, if you can, that it does not resemble the crime with which you are charged, or, failing that, yourself bring forward another example to the contrary which has occurred against probability. If he employs an evidence, you must refute [1444a1] it by giving reasons why it implies the exact opposite, while you must show that his maxims and enthymemes are either paradoxical or ambiguous. His signs you must prove to be signs of a number of other things and not only of the charge which he is bringing against you. This, then, is the way in which we shall cause our adversary’s contentions to be discredited by either interpreting them in a contrary sense or [5] reducing them to ambiguity.
If, on the other hand, we admit that we have done the acts with which we are charged, we shall base our plea on justice and legality and try to prove that our acts are juster and more legal. If this is impossible, we must resort to pleas of error or [10] misfortune, and try to win pardon by showing that the harm which has resulted is small, pointing out that error is common to all men, while wrongdoing is peculiar to the wicked. You must urge that it is right and just and expedient to pardon errors; for no man knows whether it may not fall to his lot to commit such an error. You [15] must also point out that your opponent claimed pardon when he committed an error.
Next will come the anticipations which your adversaries have made in their speeches. Anticipations of other kinds we shall easily be able to refute by an appeal to the facts; but if they misrepresent us by saying that we read our speeches or [20] practise them beforehand, or that we are pleading for the sake of some reward, we must meet such accusations with irony and say with regard to the writing of speeches that the law does not forbid a man to read out a written speech any more than it forbids his opponent to speak without notes; for, while it prohibits the doing of certain actions, it allows a man to make a speech in any way he likes. You must [25] also say: ‘My opponent considers that the wrongs which he has committed are so serious that he does not think I am doing justice to the accusation which I am bringing against him, unless I write out and take a long time to think over my speech’. Such then is the way in which we must meet the misrepresentation of having written out our speech. If our opponents declare that we learn and rehearse [30] our speeches, we shall admit it and say: ‘We who, according to you, learn what we are going to say, are not litigious, whereas you, who declare that you do not know how to speak, have been convicted of bringing vexatious suits in the past and are doing so now against us’; and we shall draw the conclusion that it would apparently therefore be better for the citizens, if our opponent also learned to be an orator, for [35] then he would not be such a scoundrel and pettifogger. We shall meet the accusation that we are paid to plead in court by a similar argument—admitting it and speaking ironically and pointing out that our accuser and every one else does so. You must distinguish between the different kinds of pay and say that some men [40] plead in court for money, others as a favour, others for vengeance, others for honours. You must show that you are yourself pleading as a favour, and say that [1444b1] your opponent pleads for no small payment; for he is going to law that he may make money unjustly, not in order to avoid having to pay it. We must follow the same method if any one accuses us of teaching others how to plead and of composing speeches to be delivered in court. You must point out that every one else, as far as [5] lies within his power, helps his friends by instruction and advice. Thus you will have an answer in such cases in accordance with the rules of rhetoric.
You must not be slow in any questions and answers which occur in cases of this kind; but you must make a clear distinction in your answers between admissions and [10] denials. The following are examples of admissions: ‘Did you kill my son’?—‘Yes, I did kill him, when he, unprovoked, raised a sword against me’; or again, ‘Did you thrash my son’?—‘Yes, but he first assaulted me’; or again, ‘Did you break
my head’?—‘Yes, when you were forcing your way into my house at night’. Such [15] admissions are made in reliance on the legality of your action. Denials, on the other hand, aim at diverting the course of law, for example: ‘Did you kill my son’?—‘No, it was not I, but the law that killed him’. This is the kind of answer which you must always make when one law enjoins, while another forbids, a certain course of action. Out of all these various methods you will gather the means to meet your [20] adversaries.
Next will follow an iteration by way of brief reminder of what you have said. It is useful on all occasions and should therefore be employed in every part and in every kind of speech. It is very suitable in accusation and defence and also in [25] persuasion and dissuasion. In my opinion we ought here not only to remind our audience, as in eulogistic and vituperative speeches, of what has been said, but we ought also to dispose our judges to be favourable towards ourselves and unfavourable to our opponents; we shall make this the last part of our speech. It is possible to [30] refresh your hearer’s memory in a summary manner either by arguing or by narrating the points which you have mentioned, or by picking out the best of your own points and the worst of your opponent’s, or, if you like, you can use the form of a question. The nature of these methods we know from what has already been [35] said.
We shall win a favourable hearing for ourselves and an unfavourable one for our opponents if, as in persuasion and dissuasion, we show briefly how we ourselves (or our friends) have benefited or are benefiting or will benefit those who are now seeking to wrong us (or those for whom they care); and point out to them that now is [1445a1] the opportunity to show us gratitude for our good services; and also, when it is possible, induce them to pity us. This we shall do by showing that a close tie binds us to our hearers and that we are suffering undeserved misfortune, having been unfairly treated in the past, or being so now, or being likely to be so in the future, [5] unless they help us now. If such arguments are inapplicable, we must describe the advantages of which we have been, or are being, or are likely to be deprived, if our prayers are rejected by our judges; or show that we never have been, or are not now, or are never likely to be in enjoyment of some benefit, unless they help us. For it is [10] by these means that we shall win pity and gain the goodwill of our audience.
The Complete Works of Aristotle Page 397