81. Quoted in Laqueur and Rubin, Israeli-Arab Reader, p. 396.
82. Quoted in Fred Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, 3rd ed. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985), p. 403.
83. Publicly, the PLO and Syria condemned Sadat’s initiative but tried to keep their options open, while Saudi Arabia and Jordan took a wait-and-see attitude. Iraq, Libya, and South Yemen, however, were most vocal in condemning Sadat and succeeded in getting Egypt ejected, temporarily as it turned out, from the Arab League. Khouri, Arab-Israeli Dilemma, p. 404.
84. Ibid., p. 407.
85. Quoted in ibid., pp. 407–8.
86. Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, p. 254.
87. In announcing Jordan’s “administrative and legal disengagement from the West Bank,” the king argued that continued Jordanian administration of the territory “would be an obstacle to the Palestinian struggle, which seeks to win international support for the Palestinian question, considering that it is a just national issue of a people struggling against foreign occupation.” Quoted in Adnan Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1999), p. 226.
88. Savir, Process, p. 5.
89. Uri Savir was the chief Israeli diplomat who negotiated with the PLO in Oslo. For a most fascinating account of his efforts and his perspective, see ibid.
90. On several occasions, for example, Israeli negotiators presented the PLO teams with a “take it or leave it” option, and the Palestinians almost always caved in. See, for example, ibid., p. 43.
91. Ibid., p. 59.
92. For a full text of the DOP, see Laqueur and Rubin, Israeli-Arab Reader, pp. 599–611. For this and other related documents, see also Institute for Palestine Studies, The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: A Documentary Record (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994).
93. Avi Shlaim, “The Oslo Accord,” Journal of Palestine Studies 23 (Spring 1994): 34.
94. Guyatt, Absence of Peace, p. 35.
95. Edward Said, Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), p. 7.
96. Ibid., pp. 3–4.
97. Hillel Frisch, Countdown to Statehood: Palestinian State Formation in the West Bank and Gaza (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998), pp. 132–35.
98. Quoted in Jimmy Carter, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), p. 147.
99. Naseer H. Aruri, “The Wye Memorandum: Netanyahu’s Oslo and Unreciprocal Reciprocity,” Journal of Palestine Studies 28 (Winter 1999): 17–28; Norman Finkelstein, “Securing Occupation: The Real Meaning of the Wye River Memorandum,” New Left Review, no. 232 (1998): 128–39.
100. Finkelstein, “Securing Occupation,” p. 137.
101. Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: Norton, 2001), p. 600.
102. Don Peretz, “Barak’s Israel,” Current History 100 (January 2001): 22.
103. Sara Roy, “Why Peace Failed: An Oslo Autopsy,” Current History 101 (January 2002): 9.
104. Akram Hanieh, “The Camp David Papers,” Journal of Palestine Studies 30 (Winter 2001): 76.
105. Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, “Camp David: Tragedy of Errors,” New York Review of Books, August 9, 2001.
106. Shibley Telhami, “Camp David II: Assumptions and Consequences,” Current History 100 (January 2001): 11.
107. Tim Youngs, “The Middle East Crisis: Camp David, the ‘Al-Aqsa Intifada’ and the Prospects for the Peace Process,” United Kingdom House of Commons Library, Research Paper 01/09, January 24, 2001, p. 15.
108. Roy, “Why Peace Failed,” p. 15.
109. Ibid., p. 19.
110. Malley and Agha, “Camp David,” p. 71.
111. For a discussion of the Sabra and Shatila massacres and Sharon’s role, see Tessler, History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp. 590–99.
112. For excerpts of the Mitchell Report, see George J. Mitchell et al., “The Sharm al-Shaykh Fact-Finding Committee, ‘The Mitchell Report,’ 20 May 2001,” Journal of Palestine Studies 30 (Spring 2001): 146–50.
113. U.S. Department of State, “Israel and the Occupied Territories,” in Country Report on Human Rights Practices—2001 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2002).
114. Ibid.
115. Quoted in Edward R. F. Sheehan, “The Map and the Fence,” New York Review of Books 50 (July 3, 2003): 8.
116. See, for example, Milton Viorst, “The Road Map to Nowhere,” Washington Quarterly 26 (Summer 2003): 177–90.
117. Sheehan, “Map and the Fence,” pp. 8–9.
118. “Address by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon at the Fourth Herzliya Conference,” December 18, 2003, www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches%20by%20Israeli%20leaders/2003/Address%20by%20PM%20Ariel%20Sharon%20at%20the%20Fourth%20Herzliya.
119. David Rose, “The Gaza Bombshell,” Vanity Fair, April 2008, pp. 192–98, 247–51.
120. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Field Update on Gaza from the Humanitarian Coordinator, 24–26 January 2009,” East Jerusalem, 2009, www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_gaza_humanitarian_situation_report_2009_01_14_english.pdf.
121. Clancy Chassay and Julian Borger, “New Evidence of Israel’s Gaza War Crimes Revealed: Investigation Finds Medical Staff Hit and Civilians ‘Used as Shields,’” Guardian, March 24, 2009, p. 1.
122. Robert Fisk, “What Has Been Gained, Apart from Netanyahu’s Re-election?” Independent (London), November 23, 2012, p. 30.
123. Ethan Bronner and Christine Hauser, “U.N. in Blow to U.S., Heightens the Status of Palestine,” New York Times, November 30, 2012, p. 1.
124. Jodi Rudoren, “Israel Defies Allies in Move to Bolster Settlements,” New York Times, December 20, 2012, p. 6.
125. Quoted in ibid.
126. Shlaim, Iron Wall, p. xx.
127. See, for example, Said, Peace and Its Discontents, p. 121.
128. Aharon Klieman, Compromising Palestine: A Guide to Final Status Negotiations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), pp. 239–42.
10. THE CHALLENGE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
1. Roger Owen and Sevket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 7.
2. Charles Issawi, The Middle East Economy: Decline and Recovery (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 1995), p. 101.
3. Owen and Pamuk, History of Middle East Economies, p. 7.
4. Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development, 6th ed. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 721.
5. Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), p. 175.
6. Ibid., p. 201.
7. Interventionism and heavy regulation of the economy can make a state appear socialist. Nazih Ayubi discusses at great length the question of whether the Middle Eastern state is socialist or what he calls “populist-corporatist,” arguing that despite the adoption of socialist slogans and even certain organizational structures, what predominates in the Middle East is not socialism but etatism. See Nazih N. Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999), pp. 196–203.
8. Monte Palmer, Political Development: Dilemmas and Challenges (Itasca, IL: F. E. Peacock, 1997), p. 30.
9. Cited in Richards and Waterbury, Political Economy, p. 180.
10. John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 160.
11. Richards and Waterbury, Political Economy, p. 184.
12. Volker Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997), p. 141.
13. Data collected from the Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract 2008, “Distribution of Employees (15 Years and Over) by the Employment Status (the Main Job), Sector and Sex, 2007,” www.cbssyr.org/yearbook
/2008/Data-Chapter3/TAB-5-3-2008.htm.
14. John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 216.
15. Richards and Waterbury, Political Economy, p. 187.
16. Ibid., p. 188.
17. Ibid., p. 195.
18. Hooshang Amirahmadi, Revolution and Economic Transition: The Iranian Experience (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), p. 189.
19. Anne Marie Baylouny, “Militarizing Welfare: Neo-liberalism and Jordanian Policy,” Middle East Journal 62 (Spring 2008): 287.
20. Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook, 2009, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.
21. Ibid.
22. “Cleanup” efforts have been largely unsuccessful. See Kate Gillespie and Gwenn Okruhlik, “Cleaning Up Corruption in the Middle East,” Middle East Journal 42 (Winter 1988): 59–82.
23. Owen and Pamuk, History of Middle East Economies, pp. 141–44; Andre Croppenstadt, “Measuring Technical Efficiency of Wheat Farmers in Egypt,” ESA Working Paper, No. 05–06, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, July 2005, p. 1.
24. Richards and Waterbury, Political Economy, p. 153.
25. Ibid., p. 206.
26. Ruedy, Modern Algeria, p. 220.
27. World Bank, “Foundations of Future Growth and Job Creation,” in Unlocking the Employment Potential in the Middle East and North Africa: Toward a New Social Contract (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004), p. 171.
28. Richards and Waterbury, Political Economy, p. 216.
29. Perthes, Political Economy of Syria, p. 204.
30. Richards and Waterbury, Political Economy, pp. 233–37.
31. World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003), pp. 258–60.
32. Iliya Harik, “Privatization: The Issues, the Prospects, and the Fears,” in Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East, ed. Iliya Harik and Denis Sullivan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 18–19.
33. John Page and Linda Van Gelder, “Missing Links: Institutional Capability, Policy Reform, and Growth in the Middle East and North Africa,” in The State and Global Change: The Political Economy of Transition in the Middle East and North Africa, ed. Hassan Hakimian and Ziba Moshaver (London: Curzon, 2001), p. 46.
34. Ibid., p. 28.
35. Put differently, rentierism is the product of “unearned income not generated by the productive operation of the national economy.” Khaldoun Hasan Al-Naqeeb, Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula: A Different Perspective, trans. L. M. Kenny (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 78–79. Todaro offers a more precise definition of economic rent: “the payment to a factor of production (i.e., resources or inputs such as land, labor, or capital) required to produce a good or a service over and above its highest opportunity cost.” Todaro, Economic Development, p. 716.
36. Laurie Brand, “Economic and Political Liberalization in a Rentier Economy: The Case of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” in Harik and Sullivan, Privatization and Liberalization, p. 168.
37. Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 23. Nevertheless, especially in relation to the Middle East, a rentier state is generally seen as one that “depends on external sources for a large portion of its revenues. These revenues from abroad are called rent. Rent is not the only income, but it certainly predominates. In the past, rentier states have been based on international trade in gold or bat guano. Today, the term refers most often to the oil states whose income is derived from the international sale of petroleum.” Gwenn Okruhlik, “Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political Economy of Oil States,” Comparative Politics 31 (April 1999): 295.
38. Timothy J. Piro, The Political Economy of Market Reform in Jordan (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), p. 11.
39. Brand, “Economic and Political Liberalization,” p. 168.
40. Gregory S. Mahler, Politics and Government in Israel (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), p. 105. For more on Israel’s “imported money,” see Asher Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2005), pp. 71–72.
41. Brand, “Economic and Political Liberalization,” p. 168.
42. Ibid., p. 169.
43. Kiren Chaudhry rejects the argument that the state deliberately seeks to foster clientelism and patronage, instead maintaining that social outcomes can be best explained by examining “the interaction of laissez-faire distributive imperatives undertaken for growth alone, the lack of economic information, and the preexisting composition of the bureaucracy” (emphasis added). Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 191. Nevertheless, the outcome, namely the acquiescence of important economically active sectors of the population to state authoritarianism, remains the same.
44. There is a rich body of literature on rentierism in the Middle East. A sample of this literature includes Rex Brynen, “Economic Crisis and Post-rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 25 (March 1992): 69–97; Barnett Rubin, “Political Elites in Afghanistan: Rentier State Building, Rentier State Wrecking,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 24 (February 1992): 77–99; Hootan Shambayati, “The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy: State and Business in Turkey and Iran,” Comparative Politics 26 (April 1994): 307–31; and Eva Bellin, “The Politics of Profit in Tunisia: Utility of the Rentier Paradigm?,” World Development 22, no. 3 (1994): 427–36.
45. There are, needless to say, differences in the context of rentierism that need to be taken into account. Okruhlik, for example, maintains that in Saudi Arabia “rent did not buy the support or loyalty of different social groups even during the boom,” as the uneven distribution of its proceeds led to resentment and opposition. Okruhlik, “Rentier Wealth,” p. 297.
46. In addition to chapter 8 in this volume, see Daniel Brumberg, “Authoritarian Legacies and Reform Strategies in the Arab World,” in Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, vol. 1, Theoretical Perspectives, ed. Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 233.
47. Although almost the rule, rent seeking in the Middle East has been a highly risky endeavor, especially lately, as the amount of revenues accrued from it—namely from oil, labor, and tourism—has been volatile and unpredictable.
48. Brumberg, “Authoritarian Legacies,” p. 239.
49. For essays on the different liberalization experiences in the Middle East in the 1980s, see Harik and Sullivan, Privatization and Liberalization. See also Henri Barkey, ed., The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992).
50. As Okruhlik puts it, Middle Eastern states have opted for “system maintenance in the guise of liberalization from above . . . [hoping to] coopt wider circles of the political public and direct political and religious organizations into acceptable and controllable channels.” Okruhlik, “Rentier Wealth,” p. 305.
51. David Waldner, State Building and Late Development (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 198–99.
52. Ibid., pp. 49–51.
53. Robert Looney, “Reforming the Rentier State: The Imperative for Change in the Gulf,” in Critical Issues Facing the Middle East: Security, Politics, and Economics, ed. James A. Russell (New York: Macmillan, 2006), p. 43.
54. The linkages between declines in economic rents and political instability are not as direct as they may appear on the surface. Even in times of economic difficulty, in many instances the state is still seen as an important source of patronage and protection under adverse circumstances, and as the only ally that can turn the economy around and once again funnel capital into private hands.
55. Richard Auty, “The Political State and the Management of Mineral Re
nts in Capital-Surplus Economies,” Resources Policy 27 (2001): 79.
56. See, for example, Amirahmadi, Revolution and Economic Transition; Chaudhry, Price of Wealth; Manochehr Dorraj, “State, Petroleum, and Democratization in the Middle East and North Africa,” in The Changing Political Economy of the Third World, ed. Manochehr Dorraj (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 119–43; Ellis Jay Goldberg, ed., The Social History of Labor in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996); Harik and Sullivan, Privatization and Liberalization; Homa Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran, 1926–1979 (New York: NYU Press, 1981); Piro, Political Economy; and Richards and Waterbury, Political Economy.
57. Edmund Burke, ed., Struggle and Survival in the Modern Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
58. On informal networks, see Guilain Denoeux, Urban Unrest in the Middle East: A Comparative Study of Informal Networks in Egypt, Iran, and Lebanon (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993). Sanchez, Palmiero, and Ferrero do discuss a “quasi-formal” sector, although they apply the concept to “those earning a high income either because of advanced skills, or because of high capital intensity or because of oligarchical market environment”; they describe the sector as including “self-employed professionals like doctors, lawyers, etc.; small engineering units and manufacturing activities with significant amounts of skills and investment; self-employed construction workers including plumbers and electricians and the like; and commercial activities with a substantial capital input.” Carlos Sanchez, Horacio Palmiero, and Fernando Ferrero, “The Informal and Quasi-Formal Sectors in Cordoba,” in The Urban Informal Sector in Developing Countries: Employment, Poverty and Environment, ed. S. V. Sethuraman (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1981), pp. 144–45.
59. John Waterbury, Exposed to Innumerable Delusions: Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 1.
60. Monte Palmer, Ali Leila, and El Sayed Yassin, The Egyptian Bureaucracy (Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, 1988).
61. Piro, Political Economy, pp. 96–97.
62. Richards and Waterbury quote an Egyptian study that found four different subsectors within Egypt’s informal sector: (1) small-scale manufacturing and handicraft work; (2) itinerant and jobbing artisanry (masons, carpenters, tailors); (3) personal services (servants, porters, watchmen); and (4) petty services and retailing activities (car washers, street hawkers and vendors, garbage collectors). According to the broader classification used here, subsectors 1 and 2 are stationary, while 3 and 4 are mobile members of the informal sector. Richards and Waterbury, Political Economy, p. 139.
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