Personal touch—I saw the President at an August 6 meeting. He gave me a golf ball. I told him, “Great, I’ll use this in Maine tomorrow.” He asked me to fly with him to Maine which I did. On the plane we reminisced a bit about Maine and I told him it was my mother’s and dad’s fiftieth anniversary and he immediately placed a phone call from Air Force One to my father. Unfortunately Dad was not there at the time. Nixon does nice, gracious things like this but he gets little credit on that score. . . .
Public opinion was strong as the U.N. vote approached on whether to admit the People’s Republic of China and keep or expel Taiwan. I wrote this note to Senator Bill Brock after he and some of his Senate colleagues expressed concern over Taiwan being expelled.
September 30, 1971
The Honorable William E. Brock, III
United States Senate
Washington, DC
Dear Bill:
I have read the statement which you and your colleagues issued today on the China policy and I want to say at the outset that I understand how you feel and why you feel that way.
Your position reflects the realities of the situation today. In a very responsible way you are helping the American people know that there have been significant political changes in the world over the past decade.
In 1964 there were 115 member nations in the United Nations and only 39 of them had diplomatic relations with Mainland China. Today there are 130 member nations and some 62 U.N. members have recognized the Mainland Government.
In the last General Assembly the vote on the Albanian Resolution to expel the Nationalists and seat the Communists was 51 to 49 (although a 2/3rds vote was necessary for passage). Since last Fall, 12 more nations have established diplomatic relations, thus the trend has moved towards the PRC and against the ROC. Included among the nations which today maintain diplomatic relations are such friendly countries as Canada, the UK and France. This means they are not free to support us on our present policy. . . .
Nonetheless, I want you and the others in the Congress to know we are leaving no stone unturned here in our effort to win this issue. I have talked personally to some 65 Representatives of foreign nations. My staff is working virtually around the clock making contacts and soliciting support. In the capitals around the world our Ambassadors are contacting governments in behalf of our position.
People always ask “can we win.” I feel that we have a winnable proposition—but it will be extremely close.
After living with this problem for several months, I am totally convinced that the President is correct in his approach. Given the changes in the world, our former position would not have been sustained. The votes simply aren’t there to support it. The only way Nationalist China can be kept as a U.N. member is for the dual representation approach to succeed. They know it and so do we.
We are working desperately to keep them in the U.N.
Bringing PRC in, in my view, is a move towards reality and I support it, but we must not let a big reality “muscle out” a smaller reality.
ROC is bigger than 92 countries. Expulsion sets a very dangerous precedent. It is this point I am trying so hard to get across to the other U.N. members.
Your statement of interest puts appropriate emphases on this policy.
Yours very truly,
George Bush
October 19, 1971
Mr. Charles Untermeyer
Houston, Texas 77024
Dear Charles:
. . . Right now we are in the midst of the China question here at the United Nations. It is all encompassing—night and day—at every meal—first thing in the morning, last thing at night. I think we can win for a policy that I believe strongly in, but it’s going to be terribly close. I am enjoying this experience here at the United Nations tremendously. There are problems that at times seem insurmountable, but there are also some rewarding moments as well. All the kids are fine. Jeb is a freshman at the University of Texas. George is living in Houston. Dorothy is here with us in New York. Neil is boarding at St. Alban’s,24 and Marvin is boarding at Andover. Hurriedly, but with warmest regards.
Yours very truly,
George Bush
We lost the China vote. The People’s Republic of China was admitted to the United Nations—which we supported—but Taiwan was expelled. In the end, it became more of an anti-American vote than anything else, especially among Third World countries. Some anti-American delegates literally danced in the aisles when the final vote was tallied: 59–55, with fifteen countries abstaining. (Several of those countries had promised to support us.) I felt it was a dark moment for the United Nations and international diplomacy.
October 31, 1971
The China Vote. I am dictating this a week after the vote.
1. When we went into the voting I really thought we could win by one or two votes. The villains are documented in our [file]—ones who simply did not do what they said they would do. Foremost among these is Cyprus. I recall walking back when I heard that Cyprus was slipping during the voting. I asked the Foreign Minister whether we had a problem. He said, “Yes.” I said, “I don’t understand this. President Makarios has assured us twice that he would vote with us on the important question.” He said “You and I have never talked about this.” I said, “We have talked about this, but what’s important is that your President has assured us of his support.” I said, “Go ahead and vote for this, but simply remember that we do not view this lightly, and we feel we have a direct and strong commitment.”
2. After the vote there was a tremendous amount of discussion about American arm-twisting. I don’t know of a single case where we linked in the question of aid or where we made any direct pledge of any kind. We did make very forcefully clear to other countries what we were doing. All the reports talk about undue U.S. pressure and threats etc. but they simply are not true. We have been battling the news media from the very beginning. All of them at the outset said we had no chance at all and when we got within a gnat’s eyebrow of the whole thing, then they started talking about undue pressure. It simply is not fair reporting. It is untrue. . . .
3. There is no question in my mind that the Kissinger visit [to China] gave our position some incredibility. The minute the President announced his trip to Peking the race to Peking was on, and my list . . . shows which countries tried to beat us in that race, and thus were unavailable for support. The timing of the planning trip was unfortunate. It was thrust on the White House by longstanding negotiations and uncertainty as to when the U.N. vote was going to be. There is no question in my mind that Kissinger feels that the bilateral approach to Peking is much more important than the U.N. I am convinced he did not deliberately sabotage the U.N. vote. Kissinger called me up after he got back from Peking. I have never heard him in such an ugly mood, ending up by saying, “I am not amused.” The source of his ire seemed to be the fact that he felt I told him the vote would come later, towards October 28. I distinctly remember discussing it with him in a very private meeting. I told him procedures could not be controlled, and the main thing in my mind was that he did not want the vote while he was in Peking . . .
I think history will show the Nixon initiative to Peking is the thing that lost the U.N. vote, although maybe there are things we should have done differently here. . . .
It was an ugliness in the chamber. I was hissed when I got up to speak on a procedural motion. Many of the ambassadors mentioned how bad it was. U Thant practically had tears in his eyes— so much so that I went to see him the next day to tell him that we were going to continue to support the U.N. and at that point he . . . joined in abhorring the ugly atmosphere. It was not pleasant and it was not glee. It was gladiatorial ugliness at its worst. I can certainly understand a country being happy at winning after many years of frustration, but this mood had more serious implications for the U.N. than that. . . .
November 5, 1971
Mrs. William A. McKenzie25
Dallas, Texas 75202
Dear Sally:
Thanks so much for your thoughtful note. You’re great. Life goes on, and there is no question that the U.N. will be a more realistic and vital place with Peking in here, but I had my heart and soul wrapped up in the policy of keeping Taiwan from being ejected. The withdrawal symptoms have been horrible.
Warmest regards,
George Bush
The new Chinese delegation arrived in New York with much fanfare. They were accompanied by their vice minister of foreign affairs, Chiao Kuan Hua. This was my diary entry after their first U.N. appearance:
November 15, 1971
On Monday the Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Chiao, gave his blast. We gave a warm welcoming speech, and then he got up and gave his speech which was clearly hostile to the United States, referring to us as bullies etc. It was not a speech that was unexpected and all the great experts, diplomats, news people plus our own people said this was to be expected. After the speech I came over and called the Secretary of State to tell him about the speech. I told him I felt it had to be answered. We were under strict instructions at the time not to answer it. We gave a gracious welcoming speech which received good comment at the U.N. If it weren’t for the domestic pressures perhaps it would not be necessary to answer Chiao’s speech but I told Rogers that my strongly held view was that if we didn’t answer it (the U.N. had just suffered a setback in the Gallup Polls—36 percent support by the American people—an all-time low), the U.N. would vanish off the scale completely.
. . . I think the feeling of the experts was that it was less inflammatory than it might have been. My point was that without any background on how inflammatory they were in the past, this would be grossly misconstrued by the American people, and the President would be ill-served if it appeared that we are unwilling to answer these allegations about our being bullies, super powers trying to dominate the little powers, etc. I told Rogers that the people are interested in the Peking trip, but not just on Peking’s terms. If we appear to be pushed around by Peking at every turn, the whole thing can backfire on the President.
. . . I went down to see Kissinger then and had a long and interesting discussion. He started off madder than hell. “I want to treat you as I do four other ambassadors, dealing directly with you, but if you are uncooperative I will treat you like any other ambassador.” I reacted very strongly, told him my only interest was in supporting the President, and told him I damn sure had a feel for this country and I felt we had to react.
. . . For 2 or 3 minutes we had a very heated and somewhat spirited exchange. After that he calmed down and was pleasant, charming and most cooperative. . . .
He suggested that it might be productive for me to sit in on some of his meetings on the Chinese thing so we could develop a future line. We talked about telling Red China we will “turn Bush loose” if certain things happen. All in all it was one of the most constructive talks I have ever had with Kissinger. . . . I told him very clearly when he got upset that I was not trying to screw things up, I was trying to serve the President and that it was the only interest I had. He ought to get that through his head. I was not trying to get any power or enter into any dispute between him and the State Department. I said it so forcefully that he seemed taken back and he really cooled down. The conversation ended in a very good way. Kissinger needs allies, and I am one of them. I also must and intend to remain loyal to Rogers. It is not easy, and it is a problem that I am not able to talk to anyone about in order to get advice . . .
[Because I felt caught between Rogers and Kissinger, I totally changed my mind about whether the U.N. ambassador should be a member of the President’s cabinet. The answer is absolutely not. Except in rare circumstances when the President personally intervenes, the U.N. ambassador must answer to the secretary of state—as do all ambassadors—and therefore should not be on the same cabinet level as the secretary.]
At the end of 1971, ABC sportscaster Dick Schapp wrote a tongue-in-cheek article for New York magazine on the ten most overrated men in New York City. A modest man, Schapp did not put himself on the list—a terrible oversight. Besides me, the other “honorees” were McGeorge Bundy, president of the Ford Foundation; Terence Cardinal Cooke, archbishop of New York; Ralph DeNunzio, chairman of the board of governors of the New York Stock Exchange; Sanford Garelik, president of the New York City Council; Senator Jacob Javits; Broadway and Hollywood producer David Merrick: Steve Smith, married to Jean Kennedy Smith, and the man “who managed the clan”; Gabe Pressman from NBC; and Arthur Sulzberger of the New York Times. Barbara and I decided to give a party in honor of the “overrated” so we could check each other out. I remember that Ambassador Malik, who attended the party, was confused by it all, and he was overheard asking someone, “Vat is dis ‘overrated’?”
January 4, 1972
Mr. David Merrick
New York, New York
Dear “Most-Overrated” Mr. Merrick:
. . . I was kind of flattered to be included on this list.
I thought it might be fun to get together. I’d like the chance to look you over to see why you are so “overrated.”
Barbara and I would like to have you and your wife come by the U.S. Embassy (42-A Waldorf Towers) for a cocktail on Tuesday, January 11, at 6:30 p.m.
I’ll invite the guy who wrote the story plus the editor of New York Magazine—We’ll get some of my colleagues at the U.N. to come by so we can have an international judgment as to who is indeed the most “overrated” of them all.
Please come.
Very truly yours,
George Bush
The Security Council met in Africa in February 1972 (it was the United States’ suggestion to move U.N. meetings to different countries), giving Barbara and me a chance to visit this fascinating but troubled continent. One of my regrets as President was that we were not able to do more in Africa, where I planned to visit during my second term, if elected. Here are some of my observations from 1972.
Zambia—President Kaunda—we met with him for some thirty minutes. He is a warm, amiable man. . . . He looked far older than his 45 years. He was very friendly to me, gave me a fairly long statement in very tolerant and understanding tones. They wished the United States could do more, wished we could be more helpful to the freedom fighters . . . He is not nearly as uptight as many of the ministers we met but he was very concerned. An example—he mentioned going down the river in a canoe on a continuous journey. He and many other African leaders have a question of whether the canoe can continue its journey or whether it will be upset, given its troubled waters of racism. . . .
Wednesday—visit to Botswana . . . They have no means to solve their own problems. They need a $12 million loan to help them with this road that means so much to them. It is something I want to strongly recommend when I get back.
Our Ambassador Nelson was there at the border to meet us. We were observed closely by the Rhodesian and South African troops who stood only 10 yards away from us—taking pictures, looking through spyglasses as we crossed the river, etc. At one time they fired shots at the ferryboat from Botswana to Zambia.
Zambia is a land of contrast. They can eliminate dissent and political freedom of those that oppose them and yet they give us lectures on establishing freedom on racial basis in the south. We don’t mention this but maybe we should publicly. It is annoying for the United States to get constantly lectured on what the United States should be doing about guaranteeing freedom by countries thousands of miles away who have yet to perfect their own political processes to guarantee even much less freedom than our country has. It is a great exercise in keeping one’s temper, and yet one cannot question as one looks at apartheid and the police methods in South Africa and Rhodesian South Africa that one must be tremendously concerned. But the nasty question lingers on. What should the United States do about it? . . .
The problem of development in Africa is so tremendous, particularly in countries like Somalia and Sudan, as opposed to Zaire which has made some progress, that
it is almost like throwing a penny into the ocean to fill it up. I am continually appalled by the difference of standards in Zaire. There are some beautiful living sections, but of course immense poverty. Once one gets out in the countryside in the Sudan, poverty is all around you all the time. . . .
Zaire is easily the most up-to-date. Officially they are very friendly with the United States—they are very leery of China and Russia. President Mobutu runs a tight ship and our ambassador pointed out that this is the only place where the soldiers saluted the American Ambassador’s car whether his flag was flying or not. . . .
I had a long, roundtable discussion with the ambassadors from Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia, etc.—a very frank exchange in which I took the offense and criticized them for not criticizing other countries, while they all felt free to blast us on things like Rhodesian sanctions. It is odd how much we agreed and how much they seemed to like one’s taking the offense.
I discussed the same thing with the Zairian Foreign Minister. He felt we should indeed use more rhetoric and more name-calling at the U.N. when people chewed us for being the old colonialist, imperialist. I am getting sick of hearing our country so abused. He felt we should respond in kind. He said it would be well received. My own view is that we respond too little to these outrageous charges and thus it was fun to have a very frank discussion with these ambassadors, to take the offense, and to get the feeling that at least they were listening. . . .
Though I readily admit that it is hard to judge without having been to Rhodesia or South Africa, I am convinced that the United States must find ways to help solve these problems. The system of apartheid has got to go, and the United States would be helpful without sending troops or resorting to violence. Many Africans think when I talk about peaceful change, that we are not talking about change at all. I made this point very clear to the President, Kaunda, in Zambia and the foreign ministers in the various countries. We are talking about peaceful and change but sometimes they fail to realize this . . .
All the Best, George Bush: My Life in Letters and Other Writings Page 17