Even now Russia has no government whatsoever …
True enough, the intimidated government was less and less able to make its existence felt.
The next session of the State Duma must put decisive pressure on the regime. There is unlikely to be a more favorable moment for taking power by storm.
This was something the Kadets had realized already.
We have arrived at a moment when patience is finally exhausted and trust used up completely.
The patient liberal public had been offering for more than a year to take over the government and save the country—but there was no persuading the blind self-serving maniacs whose hands convulsively gripped the rudder! Should the liberals put off their action yet again? And risk seeing the Duma itself dubbed a Black Hundreds organization? However reluctantly, however much it went against the grain, they had to act.
On 5 November an all-Russian conference of the Kadet Party gathered, without inviting the press. Yet again the intransigent provincials visited their leftist indignation on the metropolitan compromisers. Milyukov’s caution is destroying the party in the eyes of a public moving steadily leftward! Traveling so much abroad, he no longer knows the mood at home! Remember that the Fifth Duma is due to be elected in 1917! If we do not emerge from the final session of the Fourth Duma with greater authority, if we do not show the people that we are no less determined than the left … As it was, they had missed an opportunity when they failed to obtain autonomy for Poland—and now Wilhelm had declared Poland independent! Should the Kadets really be uniting with the moderates? No, with the Unions of Zemstvos and Towns! With the cooperatives! With the workers! With the trade unions! The fight should be carried on outside the Duma! And their best platform was… the food supply problem!
They were right in thinking that the supply problem was a very effective way of stirring up the public and hammering the government, but the trouble was that the Kadets themselves did not know how to solve it. In the supply problem and price inflation lurked a menacing conundrum. The unenlightened man in the street was more preoccupied with them than with the war itself, with victory and the Turkish straits, but the Kadets, a party of intellectuals, could not sink so low: all problems must be viewed from the perspective of Russia’s future greatness.
Milyukov was becoming more of a stick-in-the-mud, more stubborn and more circumspect all the time, and he resisted the trend yet again: they should confine themselves to struggle through the Duma—no illegality, no underground activity!
In the last resort the terrified government will try to cling to us, and our task then will be not to complete its destruction but to establish a constitutional order. That is why we must preserve our sense of proportion in the struggle with the government. As it is, the mind of the people has a dangerous inclination toward anarchy, and in the darkest recesses the idea of the state is totally discredited.
He stood firm and collected the support he needed, but in the Duma itself he could not avoid going over to the attack.
He was on the horns of a dilemma: either they will win the war without us (if we are too restrained) or revolution will trump us (if we are too rebellious). Could the government be overthrown without a mass movement? But what if the mass movement escalated into a revolution? It was easy enough for the provincials to assemble, clamor a while, and disperse. But things were different for the parliamentarians, who had no power, whichever way they voted. Perhaps one thing and one thing only gave the Duma any power at all: that it could not be summarily dissolved. If that happened, there would be such a hullabaloo! Long-suffering Russia would rise to a man!
But what if it did not?
There was only one thing to do: Stürmer must be brought down at all costs. The prolongation of the war for a third year was not dangerous, and the Progressive Bloc used all its eloquence to push the Russian state farther and deeper into it. Nor were the shortages, the high price of grain, and the possibility of famine so very dangerous. The main danger was Stürmer. If Stürmer was dismissed and replaced by someone from the Progressive Bloc, the path to salvation would open up for Russia.
In early November there was less and less daylight in Petrograd. Whether the Bureau of the Progressive Bloc met in private apartments during the long evenings, or in Room 11 of the Tauride Palace on mornings when dawn never came, their tangled and troubled discussions were held under electric light. White papers lay on green plush cloths in the pools of light from desk lamps. Milyukov, busy now bending, now defending his difficult line, still found time to record these discussions for us.
Milyukov: We must concentrate our attack on Stürmer.
Shulgin: The most effective way to get at Stürmer is the struggle against German domination. I’m in favor of breaking the government’s neck, but we must have some measures of an organic character in place at the same time.
Kapnist: I agree. To reassure the country we must break the government’s neck! Let’s not start discussing “German domination”—by doing so we put a weapon in the hands of the rightists.
Shingarev: On that matter we need to find formulations aimed against the rightists. We must show that we can work as well as talk. Raise important questions, like that of the rural district zemstvo.
Efremov: Yes, we must break the government’s neck! In the first week there must be no peaceful work at all, we must concentrate on trying to bring down the cabinet! Trying to formulate advice for this regime is a waste of time, they are incapable of doing anything. In any case, it is not for the legislature to propose concrete plans and introduce projects of its own. That would be a risky business, it would mean accepting too much responsibility. The critic’s role is more profitable.
Shulgin: What if they say, “All right, you take over”? You wouldn’t be ready, wouldn’t know what to do instead.
Maklakov: You claim to believe in responsible government, yet you’re unwilling to offer advice to the executive. I’m afraid we may discredit the parliamentary principle.
Rostovtsev: The country won’t understand it. It’ll say, “They’re good at abuse, but they’ve got no advice to offer.”
Rodzyanko (he had not felt free to join the Bloc formally, but sometimes attended its meetings secretly): The government is utterly useless. That must be the starting point for the Bloc’s representatives. There are, of course, various things that can’t be said: about the conduct of the war, about our diplomatic failures. We must not revolutionize the country. But to keep quiet altogether is equally impossible.
A pretty puzzle for Milyukov. There was nothing you could talk about, but silence was impossible. You couldn’t offer advice, but not offering advice was impossible.
Shidlovsky: We won’t tell them what we want, or else they’ll accept our amendments and write them into their draft bills.
As had already happened with fixed prices. The Bloc, blessed with an abundance of ideas, had thrown out this one, and the government had snapped it up and emerged so much the stronger. Now the traitor Protopopov would snap up their thoughts on the supply problem—inspection raids, roadblocks, obligatory deliveries—and once again the results would be something of an improvement. That was the tragedy of it all.
Stempkovsky: Fixed prices alone are not enough. We must go on to requisitioning with fixed quotas.
V. Lvov: We have already set out along the road to state socialism. What we need is a dictatorship over the food supply exercised by the social organizations.
Shingarev: We must decide whether we want to support state socialism or say no to it. We may find ourselves falling out over this.
Stempkovsky: If we suddenly switch to practical efforts to improve the food supply, the army will not understand.
But what was this talk of practical steps? The thing to do was to draft a shattering Declaration.
Milyukov: The main theme must be our patriotism: they cannot bring the war to a victorious conclusion.
Another difficulty was that the threat of military catastrophe had receded: it no
longer loomed as large as it had the year before. In fact, Russia was now stronger than when the war began. But this must not be said, this was not the note to be sounded in Duma speeches—or else the whole policy of the Bloc would be in ruins.
Efremov: The situation is most alarming. Society’s energy is visibly declining. Our situation is tragic, because it is our duty to carry out a coup to make sure of winning the war. But a coup in wartime is an act of treason and, if we love our country, impossible. I won’t say, “Brothers, overthrow the government!” Let us phrase our speeches so that no call for revolution is implicit in them. Let us draw the boundary lines beyond which we must not go.
Stempkovsky: Without a sharp change of direction we will have lost anyway. If we are less aggressive, too peaceable, the country will leave us behind. Away from the capitals people are talking of treason, saying that the Empress is more or less Wilhelm’s friend. If we don’t make a decisive move, if we allow the Duma to be dissolved, we will only have ourselves to blame. In my mind there is no doubt at all: another few months of this regime and Russia will perish.
Kapnist: Should the Duma be dismissed, a tidal wave will overwhelm us. We must follow Pavel Nikolaevich’s lead and content ourselves with pinpricks. Only if a separate peace is signed can we take the revolutionary road.
Shingarev: I don’t believe that a separate peace would cause a revolution. All those tired people would simply say, “Let’s have a good sleep, a good wash, and something to eat.” Of course, the blow to our national pride would have serious consequences. But if ill-wishers are working for a separate peace, they are what we must attack. We must declare such activities treasonable—and the State Duma will put itself in an unassailable position! This will give satisfaction to the army, which talks about nothing else. We will hit the regime where it hurts most.
V. Lvov: There is no more patriotic slogan than this: save the country from the government!
Yes, they would put themselves in a very strong position if they declared that they were the patriots, and the government defeatists and traitors. The main danger was Stürmer’s government! Milyukov spent day after day drafting and redrafting declarations to be made by the Bloc. Some of them, when he listened too much to his colleagues, were very strongly worded. Then he would have second thoughts, or let himself be dissuaded, and tone his draft down. With every revision some caustic and toxic expressions were grudgingly dropped and replaced by others.
The treasonable behavior of the regime … The steep moral decline in government circles… Privileged predators … A regime hated and despised by all… None of this is a secret to our enemies… The State Duma disowns responsibility for the wanton shedding of the nation’s blood and for the army’s sufferings, and points the finger at the real culprits …
Day after day was spent discussing drafts. (Shulgin also submitted one.)
Krupensky: We must not use those terms “treason,” “betrayal.” The throne is surrounded by a gang of criminals, yes, but we must not say so out loud. Excessively severe criticism will demoralize the country. We must not flaunt the truth, or we might check the upsurge. It is not a question of evil intent but of total incompetence. The main thing is to destroy Stürmer. Accusations of treason and incompetence must be directed against him personally. And we shouldn’t exaggerate England’s merits as Milyukov does.
Shulgin: Blaming everything on particular ministers and depicting them as criminals is just trifling with the problem. I recognize that it is politically necessary for us to say only damning things. But we can’t have it both ways: if the system is to blame, what’s the point of talking about criminals? We ought to be telling the truth about the Supreme Power itself, but we can’t.
Kapnist: The burden of our declaration must be that Russia is great and rich in resources. The rest must be an onslaught on disorders.
Rodzyanko: Softly, softly, or they may dissolve the Duma.
Efremov: But there are profiteers and money grabbers among the general public too. If we reprove them, we’ll weaken our attacks on the government, which is also out of the question.
Shingarev: The government knows exactly how things stand. They don’t give a damn for Russia, just as long as they can hang on. Judged by results, the government’s performance is tantamount to a crime. If the Duma does not take a strong line the country will say, “There goes our last hope.” We can’t paint things blacker than they are in reality. Any minute now there will be no bread in the shops and the workers will take to the streets in a rush. The country is already itching to take justice into its own hands. Are we to wait for the street to find its voice? Or openly cry, “Treason!”
They managed somehow to agree on a text. Six copies were typed and distributed, one to each parliamentary group, for approval. And suddenly—betrayal! a leak! The venerable Krupensky took fright and showed it to Protopopov, who showed it to Stürmer and word came from the government that the Duma would be dissolved! The only possible answer to their Declaration was immediate dissolution!
What a debacle! Three days before the next session opened! When it was already too late to change the thing! And just think of the danger they were in!
On 12 November, although it was Sunday, an emergency meeting was called—all members of the Duma Bureau (except the traitor, of course) and senior members of the State Council.
Shidlovsky: The word “treason” will make the greatest possible impression. If it is uttered from the rostrum of the Duma the people will take that as a guarantee of its truth. The result will be rejoicing in Germany. We must not give way to threats, but “treason” must take a back seat. People down below demand that we “cry out” but sometimes silence is required. After all, we are not trying to start a revolution but to prevent it.
M. Stakhovich: It will damage the government, of course, but it will help the country. We shouldn’t come right out with accusations of treason, but should say that “such a system of government leads to rumors of treason.” If we let the possible danger deter us from mentioning treason at all, members of the Duma will kick themselves when they realize that they have waited too long to speak. We shouldn’t try to get by with a compromise. And they won’t dissolve the Duma anyway.
Milyukov: Dissolution is not at all impossible.
Yes, they had got themselves in a tangle with that word “treason”—they could neither leave it in nor take it out. It would have been more sensible to drop it, but the public was incensed and would say that the Duma had taken fright and connived at treason.
B. Golitsyn: If there is a dissolution we must try to ignore it! We mustn’t all take off for home! Otherwise there will be repressions and the country will be plunged into darkness. But it’s better not to provoke dissolution. To word it more cautiously: either they’re idiots or they’re traitors, make your choice.
This idea rather appealed to Milyukov.
Shingarev: News of the government’s threat will get around, and if the Declaration is not read out people will say, “The Duma lost its courage.” Even at the price of dissolution we must preserve the moral standing of the people’s representative body!
Stempkovsky (on second thought): Of course, the threat ought not to influence us. The Duma must be above reproach. But it’s equally evident that we are in too much of a hurry. What if our action is followed not by any sort of storm, but just normal Petrograd weather?
(Meaning gray black clouds and dirty drizzle?)
Suppose the public puts up with all the government’s affronts and the war ends in Russia’s favor? Suppose they say, “There you are—we won even without the Duma”? Shouldn’t we postpone out-and-out condemnation until it’s clear that all is lost?
Shulgin (also backing down): A Duma that can be influenced by threats is one we don’t need anyway! But if we can possibly get an adjournment instead of dissolution, that would be great!
(Many members of the Duma would appreciate the difference: adjournment meant that deputies’ stipends would still be paid, and they w
ould not be called up into the army, dissolution would mean that some of them would have to become soldiers.)
If the passage about treason is unnecessarily dangerous we can withdraw it.
(They had no idea that the crown would be even more alarmed than they were.)
VI. Gurko: Spreading the notion of treason simply aggravates unrest in the country. The masses pick up the general drift and get the impression that there are traitors at the top in Russia, so let’s drive them out. But the government is not guilty of treason in the strict sense—that is a false suggestion. We can, however, emphasize even more strongly that the government’s stupidity is such that it gives rise to false rumors of treason.
(True—Milyukov accepts the point.)
They dispersed to consult with their various parliamentary groups. They met again on 13 November, the day before the opening of the Duma. Anxious moments! It was now or never!
Shulgin: We have to fight—this government is rubbish. But since we have no intention of going to the barricades ourselves we mustn’t incite others. The original program of the Bloc, on which we all agreed, was to support the regime, not to overthrow it. The Duma was to be a safety valve, letting off steam, not building it up. The paragraph about treason should therefore be removed.
Stempkovsky: We don’t want to summon anyone to the barricades, and we won’t be there ourselves. We must not talk in such a way as to stir up the crowd even more. We must draw a line between the government and the Supreme Power—and not accuse the latter.
Kapnist: But surely we don’t want to break up the Duma majority. Not to make a Declaration shows signs of disintegration.
But it was too late to do it all again.
Shidlovsky: Without the Bloc what is left? Underground activity? No use at all. And anyway there are no fundamental differences between us. It’s just that we aren’t used to working as a coalition.
Milyukov: The Bloc was in danger of splitting right from the beginning, but it’s less serious now than it was.
November 1916 Page 120