After Ike left town, Philip Young, the civil service director, released his preliminary report, showing that the president had overstated the situation. Only 430 of the 2,200 had been separated due to security concerns, and the loyalty of just 29 had been questioned. The main body of discharges and resignations had arisen from “sexual deviation,” drinking, falsification of employment applications, and related traits that made access to classified materials unsafe. Two days earlier, at the Republican congressional leaders’ meeting, Massachusetts senator Leverett Saltonstall, the Armed Services Committee chairman, had called the fuss about the 2,200 “a funny thing.” “I never expected,” he quipped, “to have sex perversion as a topic of conversation at the dinner table until I came to Washington.”32
HUMILIATING A HERO
The day that John Adams dispatched his report to Sherman Adams, February 16, Frank Carr called the army counsel. He instructed Adams to bring General Ralph Zwicker, the commandant at Camp Kilmer, where Irving Peress had served, to a February 18 hearing on subversives in the army. Carr held out the usual Roy Cohn olive branch regarding David Schine: “We might get Joe to back off on this if you fellows [would] be a little reasonable.” He referred to Schine as a “hostage” and wisecracked, “All the Army has to do is capitulate and all its problems will be over.” Adams later phoned Secretary Stevens about the summons for Zwicker. Adams believed it would be “a first-class go-round” and that they had no choice but to make the general available.33
On the seventeenth, Adams flew to Camp Kilmer to talk with General Zwicker, cautioning him not to reveal either names or security information to McCarthy, based on President Truman’s 1948 executive order protecting personnel information.I That night, in New York City, the taxi carrying Joe and Jean McCarthy had an accident. Joe was knocked temporarily unconscious, and Jean ended up in the hospital with a broken ankle. McCarthy went to his hearing the next day sleep deprived and, according to John Adams, in need of a belt of whiskey to get himself going.34
That day, February 18, bearing copies of Stevens’s four-page letter to the senator about Peress, Adams accosted McCarthy outside his hearing room. The document precisely followed Eisenhower’s February 10 instructions to Stevens. The secretary admitted to “defects in the Army’s procedures” and took full responsibility, provided all the relevant facts (including Peress’s automatic promotion as a result of congressional action and his legal right to request separation), outlined the corrective measures he had instituted, and dissected false rumors to the contrary. The letter informed the senator that reversing Peress’s discharge was not legally possible and the law would not permit a reversal based on the officer’s invocation of his constitutional rights. Finally, Stevens made sure, in Eisenhower’s terms, to effectively express his confidence “in the efficiency and loyalty” of the army officials involved.35
McCarthy exploded. “I am sick of this coddling of Communists, this double-talk,” he railed and declared his intent “to subpoena every officer in the United States, and every officer and civilian” involved in Peress’s situation. Immediately following that confrontation, Adams called Stevens about how McCarthy had “upbraided” him over the letter. Stevens gave Adams permission to release his letter to the press, infuriating the senator even more.36
The hearing began at 10:30, with General Zwicker and his staff scheduled to follow Peress, who again invoked his constitutional rights. About 3:30 p.m., Adams witnessed McCarthy in the hallway, downing his “afternoon snort” of bourbon and thundering that there had been “some kind of Communist conspiracy” to give Peress an honorable discharge. McCarthy returned to the hearing room, now cleared of spectators and press, and began to interrogate Zwicker.37
Ralph Zwicker was a war hero. Senator Charles Potter, who had lost both legs in France, recalled the legend that, following D-Day, Zwicker had picked up the carbine from one of his fallen men and carried it for the next thirteen months. His awards included the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star, and the British Distinguished Service Order; his troops had contributed to the liberation of Paris and the rest of France. Potter’s memory was so vivid because, at the time, he had been suffering in the bitter cold in Luxembourg and heading for France “for my meeting a few weeks later with a land mine at Colmar.” After the war, Zwicker had served under Eisenhower at NATO, and, in 1953, had received his first star as brigadier general. Potter recalled that Zwicker’s commanding officers had called him “exceptionally able” and “superior.” In short, he was one of Ike’s boys.38
In fact, Zwicker was not a supporter of Irving Peress. He had first identified the dentist as suspect on October 21, 1953, had repeatedly evaluated Peress negatively and had been outraged that Congress had, in effect, promoted him to the rank of major. Regardless, Zwicker had informed McCarthy privately on the morning of the eighteenth that John Adams had instructed him to refuse to talk about Peress’s history on the grounds of President Truman’s executive order.39
In testimony, McCarthy harassed the general in what John Adams called “a savage performance.” Again and again, McCarthy pressed Zwicker for details of how Peress had been promoted and honorably discharged. Repeatedly, Zwicker responded that he was not at liberty to explain due to a presidential executive order. McCarthy retorted, “Well, you know that somebody has kept this man on, knowing he was a Communist, do you not?” Zwicker: “I am afraid that would come under the category of the executive order, Mr. Chairman.”
McCarthy accused the general of “hemming and hawing.” Zwicker responded, “I am not hawing, and I don’t like to have anyone impugn my honesty, which you just did.” McCarthy snidely countered, “Either your honesty or your intelligence.” Then he roared, “Who ordered his discharge?” Zwicker responded, “The Department of the Army.” “Who in the Department?” the senator demanded. “That I can’t answer,” the general responded.
McCarthy invented a rambling story about a hypothetical commander who had done what the senator alleged Zwicker had done with Peress: “Do you think, General, that anyone who is responsible for giving an honorable discharge to a man who has been named under oath as a member of the Communist conspiracy should himself be removed from the military?” Zwicker, cool under fire, responded, “He should by all means [be] kept if he were acting under competent orders to separate that man.”
McCarthy moved in for the kill: “You have a rather important job. I want to know how you feel about getting rid of Communists.” Zwicker shot back, “I am all for it.” McCarthy took that as a refusal to answer and snarled, “Anyone with the brains of a five-year-old child can understand that question.” Pressed again on McCarthy’s hypothetical general, Zwicker said, “I do not think he should be removed from the military.” McCarthy took the final, bizarre step: “Then, General, you should be removed from any command. Any man who has been given the honor of being promoted to general and who says, ‘I will protect another general who protected Communists,’ is not fit to wear that uniform, General.”
When pressed again on why he had given “an honorable discharge to a man known to be a Communist,” Zwicker replied, “Because I was ordered to do so.” “In other words, anything that you are ordered to do, you think is proper?” “That is correct,” Zwicker snapped. “Anything that I am ordered to do by higher authority, I must accept.”
At that point, it was abundantly clear who McCarthy’s target was. He asked Zwicker, “What is your considered opinion of this order forbidding you to assist this committee in exposing the Communist conspiracy in the Army?” Zwicker: “Sir, I cannot answer that, because it is signed by the President. The President says don’t do it and therefore I don’t.” He added, “I won’t answer that because I will not criticize my Commander in Chief.”
At 5:15, McCarthy closed the session, ordering Zwicker to appear again the following Tuesday at 10:30 a.m. He also told Zwicker to “contact the proper authority who can give you permission to tell the committee the truth about the case before you appear
Tuesday.” Zwicker, knowing that “proper authority” implied the five-star general who was president of the United States, stated, “Sir, that is not my prerogative, either.” “You’re ordered to do it!” McCarthy roared. Zwicker, the loyal soldier, said again, “I am sorry, sir, I will not do that.”40
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I. Truman’s 1948 executive order restricted the release of personnel information to a congressional committee. That differed from Eisenhower’s April 1953 Executive Order 10450, which focused on the criteria for hiring personnel, proclaiming that government employment was “a privilege, not a right.” The Truman order was modified by Eisenhower’s October 1953 Executive Order 10501 that eliminated “restricted” from the Truman information classifications that included “top secret,” “secret,” and “confidential.” The Truman order would be fully replaced by Eisenhower’s sweeping May 17, 1954 “executive privilege” order prohibiting the subpoena of executive branch personal advisers (including presidential advisers) to testify; see chapter 14.
CHAPTER 8
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SAVING ROBERT STEVENS
The day after Joe McCarthy’s ferocious interrogation of Zwicker, he continued to publicly chastise the army for ignoring Irving Peress’s alleged communist ties. When he learned of McCarthy’s statements, Zwicker told reporters that McCarthy was guilty of “twisting everything” and presenting a version of the hearing that “was absolutely not a truthful one.”1
Although the transcript was not yet available, details of the hearing had leaked out. At 8:00 a.m. the following day, John Adams was in Secretary Stevens’s office, delivering a blow-by-blow account. Suddenly, two visibly irate generals barged into the room. Matthew Ridgway, the army chief of staff, and Charles Bolte, the vice chief of staff, had seen quotes from the testimony, including McCarthy’s charges that Zwicker was a “disgrace to the Army” and “not fit to wear the uniform.” “This,” Ridgway thundered, “is going too far!”2
At 9:38 a.m., the mortified Stevens called Zwicker at Camp Kilmer to give him “a vote of confidence.” “I deeply resent such comments as Sen. McCarthy made to you yesterday,” Stevens said. Zwicker was appalled to learn that the secretary had not yet decided if he would be required to return to testify on Tuesday. He warned Stevens that officer morale could be severely damaged if another soldier’s “character is impugned as mine was yesterday”—especially if government officials “are doing nothing to refute those statements.” Zwicker bitterly complained that “so-called Communists” were permitted counsel while army officers were not. When asked about his health, he growled, “I am feeling fine, and I will feel a whole lot better if I can wrap this rascal up.”3
Troubled by that conversation, Stevens contemplated defying McCarthy. After consulting with William Rogers, Stevens and John Adams decided to visit the members of McCarthy’s committee, starting with the Democrats. At 2:30 p.m., they met with Senators McClellan and Symington in McClellan’s office. They agreed that Symington should write McCarthy a letter requesting that no hearing be held on Tuesday. The party then consulted the prestigious Democratic political strategist Clark Clifford, who advised that “under no circumstances should we permit a subordinate officer of the Army to take on Senator McCarthy in a sort of contest.” Any confrontation, he said, “should be on the top levels.” Stevens and Adams also called on Republican senators Dirksen, Mundt, and Potter. Potter promised to do his part to get the Tuesday hearing canceled. He said he could not comprehend “what it was that McCarthy had against the Army.”4
“WE’LL FIGHT!”
At the White House on the morning of February 19, the nervous Joseph Alsop had secured a meeting with Sherman Adams for the purpose of sharing urgent information. Alsop read aloud from his notes detailing the positions and influence of communists during Ike’s tenure supervising postwar Germany. Adams asked, “Why do you think I need to know this, Mr. Alsop?” The journalist said that he and his brother Stewart believed that McCarthy’s next target was the president himself. They were considering publishing the information to inoculate the public against McCarthy’s use of it. Before going with the story, they wanted to know if the administration truly intended to fight McCarthy. “Alsop,” Adams responded, “we’ll fight.” “Well, that was all I came to find out, Governor,” Alsop said. “Leaving my notes with you, I have forgotten the conversation already.”5
By February 20, the newspapers had published Stevens’s February 16 letter to McCarthy refusing to turn over the records regarding the promotion and discharge of Peress. General Zwicker, not trusting army officials to protect him, released excerpts from the adjutant general’s letter ordering him to proceed with Peress’s discharge—an order he had had to obey. He also provided his own account of how McCarthy had charged that he was “a disgrace to the uniform.”6
The previous evening, Roy Cohn had called John Adams to say that they now had an FBI report with “the most damning evidence” on Peress. In response, at 9:40 a.m. on the twentieth, Stevens called McCarthy, telling him about his discussions with subcommittee members. “Joe,” Stevens said, “I am going to try to prevent my officers from going before your committee, until you and I have an understanding as to the kind of abuse they are going to get.” McCarthy raged, “Just go ahead and try it, Robert. I am going to kick the brains out of anyone who protects Communists.” If Stevens made that decision, McCarthy threatened, “I guarantee you will live to regret it.”
McCarthy continued, “I don’t give a goddam whether an officer is a general or what he is, when he comes before us with the ignorant, stupid insulting aspect of those who appeared, I will guarantee you that the American people will know about it.” Stevens responded that he had told McCarthy’s fellow subcommittee members that he “was not going to let General Zwicker appear on Tuesday.” McCarthy growled, “I am all through with all this covering up of communists. I am sorry Bob Stevens is one that is doing it too. You can consider yourself subpoenaed for 10 o’clock, Tuesday morning.” He slammed down the phone.7
After reporting to the other subcommittee members about his conversation with McCarthy, Stevens arranged with Jerry Persons to go to the White House for consultation with Sherman Adams. After returning, Stevens talked with the columnist James Reston, who had heard about McCarthy’s calling Zwicker “a disgrace to the uniform.” Stevens confirmed that he had decided against permitting the senator “to put General Zwicker on public display next Tuesday.” Reston asked the big question: “Has the President been apprised of this?” Stevens dissembled, “Not as far as I know.” He worried to Reston that the transcript of Thursday’s session with Zwicker was “being rather carefully edited” by McCarthy and his staff. The headline on Reston’s column the next day read, “Officers Ordered to Defy M’Carthy and Not Testify.” Reston reported, “The Army was in touch not only with members of Senator McCarthy’s office today but also with the White House on the run-in with McCarthy.”8
After talking with Reston, Stevens spoke more candidly with Deputy Defense Secretary Roger Kyes about his discussion with Persons and Sherman Adams at the White House. “Everybody in authority,” he said, “is fully informed.” Stevens said that they had decided to “play it by ear” for the moment and he would be informed of “any decision at a high level” regarding whether he should personally testify on Tuesday. Stevens of course was referring to the president, who was still in California. The delay in making a decision was probably to allow for consultation with Eisenhower.9
By midday February 21, word came down to Stevens from the White House. At 6:00 p.m., the secretary of the army released a crisply worded statement, probably edited by Seaton or Hensel, that began, “I have directed Brigadier General Ralph W. Zwicker, of Camp Kilmer, NJ, not to appear before Senator McCarthy on Tuesday.” Zwicker, the statement continued, had “suffered humiliating treatment only because he carried out actions which were his official duty.” Stevens repeated his own willingness to appear, if requested, in the general’s
place. While pledging cooperation with congressional committees to rid the army of subversives, the secretary declared himself certain “that the American people do not believe in unwarranted abuse of our loyal officers any more than I do.”10
Stevens later boasted to the journalist Arthur Hadley that he had not “asked anybody’s approval or clearance” to issue the statement. That was untrue, but the secretary was ready to mount his white horse with the journalist. “It was time for me, Stevens, to make a statement; do the job myself,” he told Hadley. That afternoon, Stevens called Senator Karl Mundt and invited him to ride with him to Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, the following day, where both were to receive Freedoms Foundation awards. During the trip, Mundt suggested to Stevens that they organize a luncheon meeting with McCarthy and the other Republicans on his subcommittee.11
AN “ALOOF” PRESIDENT?
The morning papers on Monday, February 22, reported that Stevens was headed for a “public showdown” with McCarthy, due to the mistreatment of General Zwicker. William Lawrence of The New York Times noted that Zwicker had been praised by General Eisenhower for his heroism in the campaign in Europe and had recommended Zwicker’s division for a presidential citation.12
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