by Kershaw, Ian
139. TBJG, I/9, 231 (6 April 1941).
140. TBJG, I/9, 231 (6 April 1941); text of the proclamation, Domarus, 1687–9.
141. Domarus, 1689.
142. TBJG, I/9, 230 (6 April 1941); and in his speech to military leaders on 27 March 1941 (Domarus, 1677).
143. DRZW, iv.423.
144. Below, 268–9; Keitel, 263; Domarus, 1691 n.155 (where it is stated that the engine was kept under steam in case of air-attack, though without a source-reference).
145. Below, 268.
146. Below, 271; Keitel, 263–4; Domarus, 1692–3.
147. Domarus, 1692.
148. Keitel, 263.
149. Creveld, 158–66; DRZW, iii.458ff.
150. Creveld, 165–6; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 112.
151. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 112; Weinberg III, 221.
152. TBJG, I/9, 234 (8 April 1941). Hitler gushed about his admiration for the classical world, whereas he hated Christianity ‘because it had crippled everything noble about humanity’. He applauded the grandeur of classical architecture, ‘its clarity, brightness, and beauty’, and disliked the ‘gloominess and indistinct mysticism’ of Gothic architecture.
153. Creveld, 163. Jodl reported that the joint surrender had been grotesque (TBJG, I/9, Z79 (29 April 1941)).
154. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 113–14; Weinberg III, 222.
155. Keitel, 263, mistakenly says five weeks.
156. Creveld, 167.
157. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 115; Creveld, 170.
158. Creveld, 170; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 115.
159. Domarus, 1692, 1708; Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 158–60.
160. Weisungen, 97.
161. Halder KTB, ii.210, 214 (5 December 1940); and see Creveld, 151.
162. IMG, xxviii.23, Doc. 1746-PS.
163. KTB OKW, i.411–12 (28 May 1941); Halder KTB, 387 (30 April 1941); Hillgruber, Strategie, 507; Domarus, 1696.
164. Hitlers politisches Testament. Die Bormann-Diktate vom Februar und April 1945, Hamburg, 1981, 88 (17 February 1945). No authentic German text of the misnamed ‘Testament’ has ever come to light, though the comments certainly have the ring of Hitler about them.
165. See Hillgruber, Strategie, 506 n.26, who points out that Hitler’s comments served only the interests of his reputation for posterity.
166. Leach, 166; Hillgruber, Strategie, 506.
167. Hillgruber, Strategie, 506 and n.26.
168. Hillgruber, Strategie, 506–7.
169. Leach, 166.
170. Irving, HW, 233.
171. Domarus, 1709.
172. Schmidt, 549.
173. Schmidt, 549; and see TBJG, I/9, 309 (13 May 1941).
174. Rainer F. Schmidt, ‘Der Heß-Flug und das Kabinett Churchill’, VfZ, 42 (1994), 1–38, here 12–13.
175. James Douglas-Hamilton, Motive for a Mission. The Story behind Hess’s Flight to Britain, 2nd edn, Edinburgh, 1979, 172–6; James Douglas-Hamilton, The Truth about Rudolf Hess, Edinburgh, 1993, 141–5; Peter Padfield, Hess. The Führer’s Disciple, London, 1991, 193–211.
176. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. Vol.III: The Grand Alliance, London etc., 1950, 43; Douglas-Hamilton, Motive for a Mission, 174ff, quotation 180; Colville, 306–7; John Costello, Ten Days that Saved the West, London, 1991, 417–19; Padfield, Hess, 213–17, quotation 217; James Leasor, Rudolf Hess: the Uninvited Envoy, London, 1962, ch.1–2, 7; J. Bernard Hutton, Hess: the Man and his Mission, London, 1970, 1ff., 49–52.
177. Padfield, Hess, 218–19, 225; Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 377. Cadogan was hugely irritated by what he saw as an unwelcome distraction caused by Heß. ‘Heß is the bane of my life and all my time is wasted,’ he noted on 14 May (Diaries, 378). ‘If only the parachute had failed to open, he would be a happier and more efficient man,’ he told close colleagues; ‘the handling of the whole business is difficult but very important psychologically’ (Colville, 388 (14 May 1941).
178. According to some versions, Hitler was still in bed when Pintsch arrived, though he dressed remarkably quickly (Heinz Linge, ‘Kronzeuge Linge. Der Kammerdiener des “Führers”’, Revue, Munich, November 1955-March 1956, 60; Below, 273). Linge later, however, contradicted his first account, indicating that, though not wanting to be wakened before midday, Hitler was already dressed when Pintsch arrived (Heinz Linge, Bis zum Untergang. Als Chef des persönlichen Dienstes bei Hitler, hrsg. von W. Maser, Munich/Berlin, 1980, 141–2). According to Engel, he was present – something disputed by Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 142 n. – while the Führer was discussing military matters when Pintsch was ushered into the Berghof. Angry at being disturbed, Hitler initially refused to see Pintsch, but eventually, with a bad grace, agreed to do so (Engel, 103 (11 May 1941)). General Karl Bodenschatz, Göring’s representative, claimed after the war to have been alone with Hitler when Pintsch handed over the missive from Heß around 11a.m. (lfZ, ZS 10, Karl Bodenschatz, Fol.32 (Interview with David Irving, 3oNovember 1970)); Irving, HW, 244; Schmidt, ‘Der Heß-Flug’, 5 n.20. Hitler himself apparently recalled, mistakenly, in April 1942 that he had received the news from Heinz Lorenz, Press Chief Dietrich’s representative at Führer HQ, while taking tea by the fireside (Picker, 282 (19–20 April 1942)).
179. Engel, 103 (11 May 1941). Linge, ‘Kronzeuge’, 60, in a scene he claimed he would never forget, has Hitler apparently calm as he read the letter, and only on Bormann’s arrival falling into a rage and thumping his fist on the table.
180. Speer, 189. Speer’s details are, however, not always accurate. He has Pietsch instead of Pintsch for Hess’s adjutant, and Leitgen also being present, which he was not. He has Goebbels and Himmler being summoned, and Bormann doing the telephoning. Neither Himmler nor Goebbels were there in the first round. Goebbels was not informed until the following day.
181. A package from Heß had, in fact, so Hitler told his military chiefs a few days later, been delivered to the Berghof the previous evening, but, presuming it was no more than routine Party administrative material from the Deputy Führer, he had simply not bothered to open it (Halder KTB, ii.414 (15 May 1941)). See also Irving, HW, 144. There is no obvious reason why Hitler would have made this up. But, since the letters have not survived, the precise content and how the Saturday evening package (left unopened until the Sunday) and the Sunday letter which came via Pintsch related to each other is unclear. The longer letter, which Hitler had not bothered to open, appears to have been a fourteen-page memorandum with the suggestions for peace that he intended to put to the British. The shorter letter, which so appalled Hitler when he read it, apparently began by saying that by the time the letter was received, its author would be in England. (According to Bodenschatz, who claimed to have read it, this letter was only about two pages long. – IfZ, ZS 10, Fol.32.) Heß handed this letter over to Pintsch immediately before taking off from the airfield at Haunstetten (David Irving, Rudolf Heß – ein gescheiterter Friedensbote? Die Wahrheit über die unbekannten Jahre 1941–1945, Graz/Stuttgart, 1987, 89–90, 100). Heß told the Duke of Hamilton that he had made three previous attempts, but bad weather had intervened. It was, however, also the case that he needed far greater navigational detail than he had initially thought (Irving, Heß, 91–2).
182. Domarus, 1711; Irving, Heß, 90, both resting on the post-war testimony at Nuremberg of Hildegard Fath, one of Heß’s secretaries: Eidesstattliche Erklärung, undatiert, ND Beweisstück, Heß-13, IWM FO 645, Box Nr.31, Nr.3 – cit. Irving, Heß, 444, note to p.89.
183. Engel, 103–4 (11 May 1941).
184. Below, 273.
185. Hewel’s diary entry speaks of ‘great agitation (Große Erregung)’ when Pintsch delivered the letter. Ribbentrop and Göring were summoned. Hitler broke off his talks with Darían. When Göring arrived that evening and was put in the picture by Bodenschatz, he was also ‘very agitated (sehr erregt)’. Hewel also described the atmosphere of the lengthy discussion in the hall between Hitler, Ribbentrop, Göring, an
d Bormann as ‘very agitated (sehr erregt).’ ‘Many combinations (Viele Kombinationen)’, the diary-entry ends (IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hewel-Tagebuch (entry for 11 May 1941)).
186. Martin Moll (ed.), ‘Führer-Erlasse’ 1939–1945, Stuttgart, 1997,172; Domarus, 1716; Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, 149–50.
187. See Orlow, ii.334.
188. See Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, 1 54ff., especially 178–9.
189. IfZ, ED 100, Hewel-Tagebuch, Irving-Sammlung, entry for 12 May 1941; Use Heß, England-Nürnberg-Spandau. Ein Schicksal in Bildern, Leoni am Starnberger See, 1952,130; Irving, HW, 246; Domarus, 1713 n.215,1714. Halder KTB, ii.414 (15 May 1941), conveys the mistaken impression that Göring and Udet had thought it probable that Heß would reach his target. According to Hewel, their initial view was that he would not; but Hitler overrode them.
190. Below, 273–4; IfZ, ED 100, Hewel-Tagebuch, Irving-Sammlung, entry for 12 May 1941: ‘Day full of agitation. Inquiries about Heß’s flight. The Führer decides on publishing. Section that it was an act of madness pushed through by Führer.’ (‘Sehr erregter Tag. Untersuchungen über Hess’s Flug. Der Führer entschließt sich zur Veröffentlichung. Passus, daß es sich um eine Wahnsinnstat handelt, wird von F[ührer] durchgesetzt.’)
191. Domarus, 1714.
192. TBJG, I/9, 309 (13 May 1941).
193. TBJG, I/9, 311 (14 May 1941).
194. Domarus, 1716.
195. TBJG, I/9, 309 (13 May 1941).
196. TBJG, I/9, 309–10 (13 May 1941). And see Below, 274. The following day – after he had seen Hitler – he wrote that it had been necessary to bring out the communiqué of 12 May and to attribute the affair to Heß’s delusions. ‘How else could it have been explained?’ he asked (TBJG, I/9, 311 (14 May 1941)).
197. TBJG, I/9, 311 (14 May 1941).
198. Kriegspropaganda 1939–1941. Geheime Ministerkonferenzen im Reichspropagandaministerium, ed. Willi A. Boelcke, Stuttgart, 1966, 728–36 (13,14,15 May 1941); Rudolf Semmler, Goebbels – the Man Next to Hitler, London, 1941, 32–3 (14 May 1941); Orlow, ii.332.
199. TBJG, I/9, 311 (14 May 1941). Heß was, in fact, officially the third man in the Reich, having been designated in September 1939 as Hitler’s successor after Göring in the event of his death (Domarus, 1709).
200. TBJG, I/9, 312–13 (14–15 May 1941).
201. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 167.
202. GStA, MA 106671, report of the Regierungspräsident of Oberbayern, 10 June 1941: ‘… der Monat der Gerüchte’.
203. See Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 164.
204. TBJG, I/9, 313–14 (15 May 1941).
205. TBJG, I/9, 315 (16 May 1941).
206. Hans-Jochen Gamm, Der Flüsterwitz im Dritten Reich, Munich, 1972, 36; The Berlin Diaries 1940–1945 of Marie ‘Missie’ Vassiltchikov, London, 1985, 51 (18 May 1941), and 50–51 for other Heß jokes.
207. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 1 6off., 166–7.
208. See Hewel’s description of the meeting, IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hewel-Tagebuch, entry for 13 May 1941: ‘Chief and Göring on the mountain. 4 o’clock all Reichsleiter and Gauleiter up there. Bormann reads out Heß’s letters. Dramatic meeting. Great emotion. Fürer comes, speaks very personally, analyses deed as such and proves mental disturbance through illogicality… Very moving demonstration. Sympathy. “The Fürer is spared nothing.”’ (‘Chef und Göring auf dem Berg. 4 Uhr alle Reichsleiter und Gauleter oben. Bormann verliest Heß’ Briefe. Dramatische Versammlung. Große Ergriffenheit. Führer kommt, spricht sehr persönlich, analysiert Tat als solche und beweist Geistesgestörtheit an Unlogik…. Sehr ergreifende Kundgebung. Mitleid. “Dem Führer bleibt auch nichts erspart.” ‘) For a summary of Hitler’s remarks, drawn up in Gau Kurhessen on the basis of an eye-witness account, see Franz Graf-Stuhlhofer, ‘Hitler zum Fall Heß vor den Reichs- und Gauleitern am 13. Mai 1941. Dokumentation der Knoth-Nachschrift’, Geschichte und Gegenwart, 18 (1999), 95 –100.
209. Cit. Fest, Face, 292.
210. IfZ, MA 120/5, Fol.480, ‘Rede Hans Franks über Wirkung des Englandflugs von Rudolf Heß’: ‘Der Führer war so vollkommen erschüttert, wie ich das eigentlich noch nicht erlebt habe.’ ‘I was absolutely dismayed (Ich war geradezu entsetzt),’ Frank wrote after the war, in prison in Nuremberg (Frank, 411).
211. Robert M. W. Kempner, Das Dritte Reich im Kreuzverhör. Aus den Vernehmungsprotokollen des Anklägers, Düsseldorf, 1984, 107–9 (testimony of Gauleiter Ernst Wilhelm Bohle).
212. TBJG, I/9, 312 (14 May 1941).
213. Kempner, 106.
214. R. Schmidt, 5 n.20, points out that the bugging of Bodenschatz’s conversations with other former high-ranking officers of the Luftwaffe while he was in British captivity has undermined his evidence, and thereby the testimony on which so many have relied to claim that Hitler was implicated. Julius Schaub, Hitler’s longstanding adjutant and general factotum, was convinced, in post-war testimony, that Hitler knew nothing of Heß’s flight. (IfZ, ZS 137, Julius Schaub, Vernehmung, 12 March 1947, Fol. 14).
215. See R. Schmidt, 5 n.20.
216. Costello tries to make the case for a British Secret Service plot. But for criticism, see R. Schmidt, 5 n.20. I am most grateful to Ted Harrison for the opportunity to read in advance of publication his essay ‘“… wir wurden schon viel zu oft hereingelegt” ‘. ‘Mai 1941: Rudolf Heß in englischer Sicht’, in Kurt Pätzold and Manfred Weißbecker, eds., Rudolf Heß. Der Mann an Hitlers Seite, Leipzig, 1999, 368–92, 523–6, which provides a thorough investigation of British intelligence and the Heß affair, plainly demonstrating the absence of any plan to lure Heß to Britain, or prior knowledge that he was coming.
217. After the war, Göring poured scorn on the notion that Hitler had been behind the Heß flight. Would he have sent him on such a lone mission without the slightest preparation, he asked? Had he wanted to deal with Britain, semi-official channels through neutral countries (as had been the case with Dahlerus) were open to him, and he, Göring, could through his connections have organized this within forty-eight hours (Irving, Göring, 323).
218. Cit. R. Schmidt, 14.
219. R. Schmidt, 15–16.
220. See also R. Schmidt, 26–7 for Heß’s third interrogation with Lord Simon and Kirkpatrick on 9 June. Here, too, Heß explicitly denied any knowledge of his escapade by Hitler. See also National Archives, NND 881102, US intelligence report on Heß, 28 Oct. 1941: ‘Hess has always insisted that Hitler had no knowledge of his flight.’
221. See Schmidt, 26.
222. Padfield, Hess, xiii for ‘Fräulein Anna’ and xiv for other unflattering nicknames. Sir John Simon concluded from his interrogation of Heß on 10 June ‘that Heß’s position and authority in Germany have declined and that if he could bring off the coup of early peace on Hitler’s terms he would confirm his position… and render an immense service to his adored Master and to Germany’ (cit. Schmidt, 28).
223. NA, NND – 881102; Douglas-Hamilton, The Truth about Rudolf Hess, 68, 128ff.; Irving, HW, 246–7 and n.2. Harrison, ‘Rudolf Heß’, 369–71, points out that the British counter-intelligence organization MI5 had received on 2 November 1940 a letter from Albrecht Haushofer to Hamilton, dated 23 September and intercepted by British censors. This referred to a previous letter of July 1939, and suggested a meeting with Hamilton in Lisbon, or elsewhere on the periphery of Europe. MI5 discussed the letter with the Secret Service, with a view to using Hamilton to ply the Germans with misinformation. Hamilton himself was not consulted about the idea until some months later. Meanwhile, the original of the letter went missing. Hamilton’s cagey response to the proposal left the British authorities hesitant about proceeding. It was at this point that Heß arrived.
224. Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 379, expressing Cadogan’s impatience with Churchill’s initial line, that Heß had come on a peace-mission, which he thought corresponded too closely with what German propaganda was saying. Churchill, in a furious temper, only bowed next day, 15 May, to pressure from Ca
dogan and other advisers to refrain from a public statement on the Heß affair. Massively relieved that the British had not acted as he would have done in making maximum propaganda capital out of the affair – ‘the only but also dreadful danger for us’ – Goebbels remarked that ‘it seems as if a guardian angel is again standing near us’, witheringly concluding that ‘we’re dealing with dim dilettantes (mit doofen Dilettanten) over there. What we would do if it were the other way round!’ (TBJG, I/9, 315 (16 May 1941).
225. See R. Schmidt, 24.
226. R. Schmidt, 29.
227. Irving, Göring, 316–17, 327; Irving, HW, 22m.
228. R. Schmidt, 10; Gabriel Gorodetsky, ‘Churchill’s Warning to Stalin. A Reappraisal’, The Historical Journal, 29 (1986), 979–90. For information reaching Stalin on the German military build-up, and his awareness of a coming invasion, see Valentin Falin, Zweite Front. Die Inter-essenkonflikte in der Anti-Hitler-Koalition, Munich, 1995, 193–5.
229. R. Schmidt, 18–19. Harrison, ‘Rudolf Heß’, 382–8, plays down the intent, emphasizing instead the confusion in the British Foreign Office and the missed propaganda opportunity, while acknowledging the enormous concern and misinterpretation which ensued in the Soviet leadership.
230. R. Schmidt, 34–6.
231. Stalin was still suspicious about the Heß affair, believing it had been a plot to involve Britain and Germany entering the war together against the Soviet Union, some three years later (Churchill, iii.49).
232. R. Schmidt, 32, 36. Such moves do not provide evidence of a prior intention on the part of the Soviet Union to attack Germany – the notorious ‘preventive war theory’. See Chapter 9 n.4, below.
233. Weisungen, 139–40; Domarus, 1719–20; Oxford Companion, 571.
234. Elizabeth-Anne Wheal and Stephen Pope, The Macmillan Dictionary of the Second World War, 2nd edn, London, 1995, 57–9, contains a summary description of the sinking of the Bismarck. A vivid account is provided by Churchill, iii.Ch.XVII.