by Nir Rosen
A NEWSWEEK ISSUE in March 2010 declared U.S. victory in Iraq. But for Iraqis there was no victory. Since the occupation began in 2003, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis had been killed. Many more had been injured. There were millions of widows and orphans. Millions had fled their homes. Tens of thousands of Iraqi men had spent years in American prisons. The new Iraqi state was among the most corrupt in the world. It was often brutal. It failed to provide adequate services to its people, millions of whom were barely able to survive. Iraqis were traumatized. This upheaval did not spare Iraq’s neighbors, either. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees languished in exile. Sectarianism increased in the region. Weapons, tactics, and veterans of the jihad made their way into neighboring countries. And now the American “victory” in Iraq was being imposed on the people of Afghanistan.
Seven years after the disastrous American invasion, the cruelest irony in Iraq is that, in a perverse way, the neoconservative dream of creating a moderate, democratic ally in the region to counterbalance Iran and Saudi Arabia had come to fruition. But even if violence in Iraq continues to decline and the government becomes a model of democracy, Iraq will never be a model to be emulated by its neighbors. People in the region remember, even if those in the West have forgotten, the seven years of chaos, violence, and terror, and to them this is what Iraq symbolizes. Thanks to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and other failed U.S. policies in the Middle East, the U.S. had lost most of its influence on Arab people, if not the Muslim world—even if it could still exert pressure on Arab regimes. At first some Arab elites thought they could benefit from Bush and the neoconservatives, but now reformists and the elite want nothing to do with the U.S., which can only harm their credibility. Every day there are assassinations with silenced pistols and the small magnetic car bombs known as sticky bombs; every day men still disappear and secret prisons are still discovered. In Sunni villages Awakening men are being found beheaded. And although some militiamen have been absorbed into the security forces, others have turned to a life of crime, and brazen daylight robberies are common. But despite this, the worst might be over for Iraqis. On my trips to Iraq in years past, I had made a habit of scanning the walls of Baghdad neighborhoods for bits of sectarian graffiti, spray-painted slogans that were pro-Mahdi Army, pro-Saddam, anti-Shiite, or pro-insurgency. This time, however, there were almost none to be found. The exhortations to sectarian struggle had been replaced with the enthusiasms of youthful football fans: now the walls say, “Long Live Barcelona.”
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book would not be possible without the strong support of the New York University Center on Law and Security. I am very grateful to its generous director, Karen Greenberg, as well as Steve Holmes and David, Nicole, Jeff, Fransesca, Sarvenaz, and the rest of the family I have made there. They have given me a place to feel at home, the freedom to do my work, and the confidence of knowing I have their backing. My editor at Nation Books, Carl Bromley, was supernaturally patient with me and believed in my vision. Without him it would not have come to reality. Thanks to Mark Sorkin for his excellent copy editing and suggestions. I am also very grateful to my agent, Denise Shannon, for her enthusiasm and support.
I also acknowledge the Investigative Fund of The Nation Institute—particularly Joe Conason and Esther Kaplan—who have supported my work.
Many Iraqis welcomed me as a brother into their families. Meitham, Ali, Osama, Abbas, Hassanein, Aws, Wisam, the Hamdi family, Omar Salih, Omer Awchi, Rana al-Aiouby, and others made this book possible, and took great risks to care for me and share their lives with me. In Lebanon my close friends Mohamad Ali Nayel, Naim Assaker, Bissane el Cheikh, Amer Mohsen, Michel Samaha, and Patrick Haenni taught me all I needed to know. Thanks also to Ambassador Imad Moustapha, Toufic Alloush, Mirvat Abu Khalil, Seyid Nawaf al-Musawi, Haj Osama Hamdan, Wisam, Hamelkart Ataya, Mansour Aziz, Walid Abou Khashbee, Abdo Saad, Omar Nashabi, the brave members of Samidoun, Rami Kanan, Sharif Bibi, and Najat Sharafeddine.
Jon Sawyer and Nathalie Applewhite of the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting supported my work in Afghanistan. Deb Chasman and Josh Cohen at the Boston Review gave me the opportunity and the space to write important chapter-length articles. Likewise, Monika Bauerlein of Mother Jones. Betsy Reed gave this manuscript a vigorous read, which I thank her for. I owe a big debt to Jonathan Shainin, my good friend who runs the best weekend review section in the English language at the National in Abu Dhabi.
Ghaith Abdul Ahad, Hannah Allam, Tom Bigley, Leila Fadel, Seymour Hersh, Bob Bateman, and Andrew Exum are friends and colleagues who helped, advised, challenged, and inspired me. In Afghanistan, Shahir and Melek gave me friendship, help, and also saved my life. Thanks to Qais for helping out with that too. Thanks to Aziz Hakimi, Aners Fange, Andrew Wilder and Peter Jouvenal, Fazel Rabie Haqbeen, Mullah Tariq Osman, Josh Foust, Professor Tom Johnson, Tom Stanworth, John Moore, Matt Bruggmann, Steve Clemons, As’ad Abu Khalil, Kristele Younes, Peter Bergen, Elizabeth Campbell, Joel Charney, Scott Armstrong, the Theros family, Ahmad, Marika, Nick, the Zivkovic family, the Lombardi family, and my editor at Rolling Stone, Eric Bates.
Numerous Iraqis, Lebanese, Egyptians, Syrians, Palestinians and Jordanians, as well as American soldiers, officers, and officials, trusted me with their knowledge and experience anonymously—I thank them all.
Lastly, to my parents, my brothers, my wife, Tiffany, and Dakota (for not totally destroying my laptop while I wrote this book), I love you and I thank you.
A NOTE ON SOURCES
In writing this book I relied on very few secondary sources; the bulk of it is based on the seven years I have spent reporting in the Muslim world, from Somalia to Afghanistan. I cannot thank the many hundreds of people who welcomed me, helped me, educated me, and shared pieces of their lives with me, but it is thanks to their trust and generosity that this book is possible. I tried to avoid senior officials on any side to avoid propaganda and simplistic generalizations, and instead I tried to find out what was really transpiring myself. I was helped by local and international academics, journalists, historians, soldiers, policemen, militiamen, and aid workers. My colleagues at the Warlord Loop listserv were very helpful and stimulating. When it comes to secondary sources, I did, however, learn a lot from Military Review and the Small Wars Journal, which informed my thinking for the chapters on the surge in Iraq and Afghanistan. Articles in McClatchy’s, the Washington Post, and even some in the New York Times were also important. The reports of the International Crisis Group are essential for background, as are the articles in the Middle East Research and Information Project (merip.org) and the Middle East Journal.
INDEX
A
Abbas Mosque
Abbas (son of Ali), tomb of
Abdel Mahdi, Adil
Abdillah, Mullah
Abdul-Ahad, Ghaith
Abdullah, King (of Jordan)
Abed, Abul
Abed, Dhari Muhamad
Abizaid, John
Ablawi, Salih (Abu Jaafar)
al-Absi, Shaker
Abu Abdallah. See bin Laden, Osama
Abu Anas
Abu Bakr
Abu Bilal
Abu Dira
Abu Dshir
Abu Ghraib prison
Abu Hanifa
Abu Hanifa Mosque
Abu Hatem (Karim Mahud al-Muhammadawi)
Abu Hudheifa (Marwarn Yassin)
Abu Hureira
Abu Jaafar (Salih Ablawi)
Abu Jaafar (Sheikh Ali)
Abu Jaber
Abu Karar
Abu Khalel family
Abu Khalid
Abu Khalil, As’ad
Abu Lahab
Abu Laith
Abu Midyan
Abu Muhamad/Abu Shahid (Mustafa Ramadan)
Abu Muhamad (in Jordan)
Abu Muhammad, Sheikh
Abu Musa
Abu Muthana
Abu Nidal Organization
Abu Obeida (Abdallah Khalaq)
<
br /> Abu Omar (Firas Yamin)
Abu Omar (Khalil Ibrahim)
Abu Qutaiba
Abu Risha, Ahmad
Abu Risha, Sheikh Sattar
Abu Rumman, Mohammad
Abu Teiba
Abu Yasser
Accountability and Justice Commission
Adesnik, Ariel David
al-Adhami, Sheikh Muayad
Adhamiya
al-Adib, Ali
Adnan, Adil
Afghan Ministry of Interior
Afghan Ministry of Justice
Afghan National Army (ANA)
Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)
Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS)
Afghan National Police (ANP)
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
Afghan Regional Security Integration Command
Afghanistan
assumptions about
attacks on NGOs in
civilian death toll
civilian surge in, call for
COIN theorists’ failure to question the U.S. invasion of
context of, in-depth knowledge of, lack of
and defensive jihad
drug trade in
failure of U.S. COIN operations in
fighting picking up in
jihadis in
loss of U.S. influence due to war in
new U.S. strategy for
oppression in, continuation of, by U.S. military
population of, characteristics of
prisons in
Rumsfeld’s view of U.S. troops in
situation in, and the resurgence of U.S. troops, aspects of
Soviet invasion and occupation of
and the surge in Iraq
U.S. initial invasion of
withdrawal of Soviets from, American neglect following
Aflaq, Michel
Ahad, Ghaith Abdul
al-Ahdab, Musbah
Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud
al-Ajami, Mukhtar Shaaban
Akef, Mahdi
Akhundzada, Sher Muhamad (SMA)
Akkawi, Khalil
Al Akhbar newspaper
Al Aqsa Mosque
Al Arab al-Yawm newspaper
Al Arabiya television
Al Ashur al-Hurm period
Al Azhar University
Al Basa’ir newspaper
Al Furat television
Al Hawza newspaper
Al Hayat newspaper
Al Iraqiya television
Al I’tisam newspaper
Al Jazeera television
Al Manar television
Al Mustafa Mosque
Al Mutaibeen alliance
Al Qaeda
accusation of Syria helping
and Afghanistan
and Fatah al-Islam
groups/people inspired by
and Lebanon
major reason for the growth of
new U.S. strategy for targeting
sources of funding
worldview of
Zarqawi’s rejection of
See also Tawhid and Jihad group
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
in Amriya
and the Awakening groups
and the banks of the Tigris River
believed to be lying dormant
creation of
and implementation of COIN
initial Sunni support for
jihad conditions breached by
and Lebanon
local resistance against
and the Mahdi Army
remnants of, targeting
Sunni opponents of
and the surge
and tribal leaders
Al Qaeda paradigm
Al Qaqa Battalions
Al Rai newspaper
Al Rusufa prison
Al Sabah newspaper
Al Sahwa (the Awakening)
See also Awakening program/groups; Sons of Iraq (SOI)
Al Sajjad Mosque
Al Tanf refugee camp
Al Wathba (The Leap) movement
Al Zawra TV
Alawites
Algeria
Ali (cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad)
Ali, Jamal Jaafir Mohammed (Abu Mahdi al-Muhandes)
Allawi, Ayad
Allush, Mustafa
al-Alousi, Mithal
Amal Movement
Amawi, Mohammad Zaki
America/Americans. See United States
American Enterprise Institute
American proxies
Amir, General Abdul
al-Amiri, Hadi
al-Amli, Abu Khalid
Amman
Amriya
Amriya Freedom Fighters (AFF). See Fursan (Amriya Freedom Fighters/Thurwar)
Anbar Awakening
Anbar province
See also Falluja
Annadawi, Muhamad Fawad Latufi
Ansar al-Islam group
Ansar al-Sunna group
Ansar al-Tawhid wa al-Sunna group
al-Ansari, Sheikh Haitham
Anti-Saddam militias, Iranian-sponsored
See also Shiite militias
Aoun, Michel
Arab Current
Arab League
Arab University of Beirut
Arabiya television
Arabsat network
Arafat, Yasser
al-Araji, Baha
al-Araji, Hazim
Arbaeen ceremonies
al-Aridi, Ghazi
Armed Forces Journal
Army of Muhammad
Army of the Mujahideen
Ash Sharq radio
Ashura holiday
Asia Foundation
al-Askari, Sami
Askari Shrine
See also Samarra shrine attack
al-Assad, Bashar
al-Assad, Hafiz
Association of Free Prisoners
Association of Muslim Scholars
Assumptions, underlying, about Iraq and Afghanistan
al-Aswad, Muhamad
Atiyyah, Ghassan
Australia
Awakening Council
Awakening phenomenon
Awakening program/groups See also Iraqi Security Volunteers (ISVs); Sons of Iraq (SOI)
al-Awamli family
al-Awar, Hossam
Ayn al-Hilweh refugee camp
Azzam, Abdallah
Azzam, Hudheifa
B
Baath Party/Baathists See also Hussein, Saddam
Bab al-Tabbaneh area
Badr Brigade
Badr Organization (formerly the Badr Brigade)
Baghdad
American devolving their authority in
battle for
as a city of decay
concentration of attacks against the coalition in
continued escalation of violence in
economic center of
improved security in, reason for
main no-go zone of
major coordinated terrorist attacks in
media coverage of inside and outside of, issue with
number of refugees from
sectarian cleansing in
and the shifts in sectarianism
six years after the fall of, changes that were apparent
surge efforts in and around, aspects of the
See also specific districts, neighborhoods, and sites
Baghdad Brigade
Baghdad International Airport
Baghdad Operation Center (BOC)
Baghdad Security Plan
Baghdad TV station
al-Baghdadi, Abu Omar
al-Baghdadi, Ayatollah Ali
Baghdadiya television
Bahrain
Bakri, Nada
Balkans
al-Banna, Hassan
Baquba
Barack, Obama
Baradar, Mullah
Baram, Amatzia
al-Barrak,
Abdul Rahman bin Nasser
Barudi, Sheikh Bilal
Barzani, Massoud
Basair (The Mind’s Eye) newspaper
Basra
Batal al-Tahrir (Heroes of Liberation) section
al-Bawi, Ghassan Adnan
Bayat al-Imam (Oath of Loyalty to the Leader)
Bazzaz, Hassan
Bedawi refugee camp
Beirut See also specific districts and neighborhoods
Beirut International Airport
al-Beit, Ahl
Beri, Nabih
al-Berjawi, Shaqer
“Best Practices in Counterinsurgency” (Sepp)
Biden, Joe
bin Aqil, Muslim
bin Jabrin, Sheikh Abdallah
bin Laden, Osama See also Al Qaeda
bin Sultan, Bandar
Bishara, Azmi
Black September (Palestinian uprising)
Blair, Tony
Bodine, Barbara
al-Bolani, Jawad
Bonn conference
Bosnia
Bremer, Paul
Britain
and Afghanistan
and Basra
British colonizers
British Mandate authority
Brookings Institution
Brown, Gordon
Buratha Mosque
Burj al-Barajneh refugee camps
al-Burqawi, Isam Taher al-Oteibbi
Bush administration
Bush, George W.
C
Cairo
Campbell, John
Canada
Carter, Phil
Casey, George
Celebrity pundits
Center for New American Security (CNAS)
Center for Strategic International Studies
Central Command
Chadarchi, Naseer
Chalabi, Ahmad
Chamberlin, Robert
Charge of the Knights campaign
Chechnya
Chesney, Ed
Chiarelli, General
Children
art from Palestinan
fear in
fights between Sunni and Shiite
and IEDs
as orphans
view of Americans
Christian Lebanese Forces
Christian militias
Christians
in Baghdad areas
in Lebanon
relocation of