by Nir Rosen
and identity politics
of the Iraqi Security Forces
and Jordan
and Lebanon
as more covert
overt, receding of
perceptions based on
in the police force
provoking in the regional, possibility of
regional, rise in
rise in
and Saddam
sign of shift away from
during the surge
Syria and
in universities towards students
U.S. occupation promoting
See also specific geographical areas
Sects, religious. See specific sects
Secure Plus security company
Seidiya Guard
Selection bias
Sepp, Kalev
September 11 attacks
Sermons, impact of
Shaab
Shab-e-Barat holiday
Shah of Iran
al-Shahal, Sheikh Dai al-Islam
Shallaq, Fadil
Sham
See also Jund al-Sham (Soldiers of Sham/Levant)
al-Shami, Abu Anas
Shanshal, Falah Hassan
Shaqis, recruitment of
Sharikat al-Sadr (Rays of Sadr) newspaper
al-Sharman, Muhamad Mahmud
Sharon, Ariel
Sharqiya television
Shatila refugee camp
Shawish, Zuheir
Shawkat, Asef
Shehab, Fouad
al-Sheikh, Fattah
“Shiite crescent,”
Shiite Hizballah-Iranian model
Shiite House
Shiite militias
accusations against
in Amriya
cease-fire of
depending on Al Qaeda for protection from
and ease of integration into the ISF
Hizballah training, media accusation of
linked to Iraqi Security Forces
other targets of
and the road to civil war
treatment of Palestinians
See also specific militia groups and leaders
Shiite mosques See also specific mosques
Shiite pilgrims
Shiite Political Council
Shiite revival
Shiite shrines See also specific shrines
“Shiite south” label
Shiites
actual representation of Sunnis and
American perception of
beliefs held by
common epithet involving
divided, and U.S. strategic interests
empowerment of
failed uprising against Saddam by
in the first outbreaks of civil war
as the first target of AQI
important holidays of
moderate, losing
and mosque attendance
new Saddam of the
periphery vs. center
preferred burial site for
reported missing on the Internet
Salafi view of
secular
as the winners
Zarqawi’s warning to
See also specific Shiite leaders/people and organizations
Shiite-Sunni conflict/violence. See Iraqi civil war; Sectarian cleansing; Sectarianism; Shiite militias; Sunni militias
“Shock and awe” doctrine
“Shock therapy” techniques
Shoter, Faris Sayid Hassan
Shrine of Ali
Shuhada Mosque
Shuqair, Wafiq
Shurufi Mosque
Shuwafa
Siniora, Fouad
al-Sistani, Grand Ayatollah Ali
Slocombe, Walter
Smugglers
Soccer, views of
Social engineering
Solagh, Bayan Jabr
Somalia
Sons of Iraq (SOI) See also Awakening program/groups
Soviets/Soviet Union. See Russia
Special Republican Guard
Stalin, Joseph
Status of Forces Agreement
Straw, Jack
Sudan
al-Sudani, Abdul Falah
Sufis
Suicide bombings
Suleiman, Michel
Suleiman, Muhamad Haidar
Sunna, the, Salafis view of
“Sunni Arab” label
Sunni Endowment
Sunni militias
believed to be lying dormant
building, in Lebanon
cease-fire of
escalation between Mahdi Army and
funding for, significant source of
new, creation of
other targets of
paid by the U.S. military
See also specific militia groups and leaders
Sunni mosques See also specific mosques
Sunni newspapers
Sunni revival
“Sunni Triangle” label
Sunnis
American perception of
changing attitude of
coup attempts by
global fatwa calling on all
lack of alternatives facing
loss accepted by
and mosque attendance
overrepresentation of
percentage of, comprising the Muslim world
periphery vs. center
reported missing on the Internet
Salafi belief about Shiites view of
as the second target of AQI
secular
Sunni-Shiite conflict/violence. See Iraqi civil war; Sectarian cleansing; Sectarianism; Shiite militias; Sunni militias
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)
Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council
Suyuf Allah group
Swindell, Sean
Syria
accused of helping Al Qaeda
blamed for major terrorist attack in Baghdad
closed borders of
exiles in
Fatah al-Intifada in
and Fatah al-Islam
foreign fighters from
and the March 8 coalition
patrolling the borders
political and military domination of Lebanon
population of
and sectarianism
and starting jihad in Sham
U.S. threat toward
Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP)
T
Taamir
Tactical Humintelligence Team
Taha, Abu Salim
al-Taha, Sheikh Ahmad
Tahash, Muhamad Mahmud
Taif Accords
Tajik-dominated government
Tal Afar
Talabani, Jalal
Taliban
origins of the
and the resurgence of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, aspects of
speedy defeat of the, in 2001, 464
symptoms before the fall of the
al-Tamimi, Abu Azzam
al-Tamimi, Sheikh Safaa
Tariq al-Jadida area
Tawhid and Jihad group See also Al Qaeda
Tawhid Brigade
Tawhid (Harakat al-Tawhid al-Islami) group
Tawhid movement
Tawhid (Unity) association
Team Ironhorse
Team Prowler
Tel al-Zaatar refugee camp
Terror in the Hands of Justice (television show)
Terrorism vs. freedom fighting, difficulty distinguishing
Thar Allah group
Thuwar. See Fursan (Amriya Freedom Fighters/Thurwar)
Tigris River, banks of the
Tikrit
Tikriti Mosque (Fardos Mosque)
Time magazine
al-Titi, Muhamad Jamil
Together Forward I and II,
Torture device, popular
Townsend, Steve
Treaty of Portsmouth
Tribal elders in
Afghanistan
Tribal leaders, shift in treatment of See also specific leaders
Tribal militias See also specific groups
Trinquier, Roger
Tripoli See also specific districts and neighborhoods
Tripoli Brigades
Turkey/Turks
Turki, Prince
al-Tuweijiri, Sheikh Abdullah
U
Um Al Qura Mosque (Um al Maarik)
Um Qasr, fall of
Um Qasr prison
al-Umama, Sheikh Adnan
Umayyad dynasty
UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)
UN Security Council
United Arab Emirates
United Iraqi Alliance
United Nations
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFL)
United States
as adopting Al Qaeda’s worldview
Afghani view of
comparing Saddam to the
continuing involvement of, in spiraling violence
and control over Saddam’s execution, issue of
demanding compensation from
failure of the, to question the invasion
focus of the, from the beginning of the occupation, issue with
ignoring involvement of
influence of, loss of, due to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
international community waiting for leadership from, on the refugee crisis
and Iraq, previous relationship between
Iraqi views of the
Jordanian jihadis view of
Lebanese views of the
and Lebanon
military alliance backed by
perceptions/views held by the
planners and observers, exaggerated claims of
presidential campaign in the
push by, in Palestine and Lebanon
response to Iran’s nuclear intransigence
sermon blaming the
and shifting support between sects
and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
and the Taliban, previous relationship between
trepidation in, over the Iraqi elections
victory for, magazine declaring
See also specific U.S. government agencies, institutions, and people
Unity, calls for
Universities
sectarianism in the
as targets
See also specific schools
University of Baghdad
University of Haifa
University of Jordan
University of Technology
University of Zarqa
U.S. Army, manual for See also U.S. troops
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
U.S. Combined Arms Center (USACAC)
U.S. Defense Department
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
U.S. embassy, Afghanistan
U.S. Government Accountability Office
U.S. House Armed Services Committee
U.S. Marine Corps.
in Afghanistan
manual for
See also U.S. troops
U.S. National Security Agency
U.S. National Security Council (NSC)
U.S. occupation
actions during, giving a bad name to democracy
based on a vision
COIN theorists’ failure to question the U.S. invasion and
demographic changes brought by, article warning of
failed, strange epitaph for a
focus of the U.S. administration from the beginning of the, issue with the
impact of, aspects of the
incompetency of the
and making major decisions without Iraqi input
new security plan for
opposition to, from the beginning
role shift during the
stated goal of the
suffering brought on by
as a systemic imposition of violence
See also specific aspects related to the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan
U.S. Senate
U.S. Special Forces
U.S. State Department
U.S. troops
in Afghanistan, number of
cease-fire with
change in behavior of, for the better
changing role of the
COIN manual for
continuing presence of, as a constant implied threat
decline in casualties of
films of the resistance against
Iraqi views of
leaving more, than previously agreed, talk of
legitimizing withdrawal of, need for
onerous presence of
power dynamic between the street and
provincial presence of, expected reduction of
questioning the approach of
recruiting by
withdrawal of, timetable for, issue of
U.S. troop surge
in Afghanistan
airstrikes during
alleged success of, problem with the
and the battle over Amriya, aspects of
costly toll of the
and the eclipse of the Mahdi Army, aspects of
initiating the, and the move toward Iraqi-based solutions, aspects of
Maliki benefiting from
overview of the, and its influence
purpose of the
reduction in violence falsely attributed to
timing of the
Usbat al-Ansar (The League of Supporters)
al-Utaibi, Juhayman
al-Uzri, Abdel Karim
V
Vietnam
Violence
decline in levels of
extreme and indiscriminate
future, and the Bush administration legacy
increase in, in areas of U.S. expanded operations
purpose of the
self-sustaining cycle of
shift in the source of
spiraling, continuing U.S. involvement in
systemic imposition of
triggers of
Volcano Brigade
W
Wahhabi Mosque (Abdel Rahman Auf Mosque)
Wahhabis
See also Sunnis
Wardak province
Warlords, U.S. backing of, and reliance on
Wasfi, Muhamad Abu Muntasar
Washash
Washington Post
Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), issue of
West Point
Widows, number of
Wilder, Andrew
al-Windawi, Mouayad
Winds of Victory (video)
Wolf Brigade
Wolfowitz, Paul
Women
in Afghanistan
attending markets, issue of
with “bad” reputations, targeting
clothing covering, in Jordan
held as hostages by Americans
imposing strict interpretation of Islam on
militias and
in prison, treatment of
using, in anti-regime operations
World Trade Center bombing
Y
Yakan, Fathi
Yamin, Firas (Abu Omar)
al-Yaqoubi, Muhammad
Yaqubi Camp
Yarmuk
Yarmuk refugee camp
Yazid (son of Muawiya)
Yemen
Younes, Kristele
Z
Zafraniya
al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab
See also Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
al-Zawahiri, Ayman
al-Zeidi, Muntadhar
Zeinab (daughter of Ali)
Zia ul-Madaris al-Faruqia religious school
Zionists, perceived strategy of
Copyright
Copyright © 2010 by Nir Rosen
Published by Nation Books,
&nbs
p; A Member of the Perseus Books Group
116 East 16th Street, 8th Floor
New York, NY 10003
Nation Books is a co-publishing venture of the Nation Institute and the Perseus Books Group.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For information, address the Perseus Books Group, 387 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016-8810.
Books published by Nation Books are available at special discounts for bulk purchases in the United States by corporations, institutions, and other organizations. For more information, please contact the Special Markets Department at the Perseus Books Group, 2300 Chestnut Street, Suite 200, Philadelphia, PA 19103, or call (800) 810-4145, ext. 5000, or e-mail [email protected].
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rosen, Nir, 1977-
Aftermath : following the bloodshed of America’s wars in the muslim world / Nir Rosen.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
eISBN : 978-0-786-72758-2
1. Iraq War, 2003—Social aspects. 2. Iraq War, 2003—Influence. 3. Iraq—Social conditions—21st century. 4. Iraq—Politics and government—2003- 5. Iraq—Strategic aspects. 6. Middle East—Strategic aspects. 7. Islam and politics—Middle East. I. Title.
DS79.767.S63R67 2010
956.7044’31—dc22
2010023467
www.nationbooks.org
NOTES
1
Another soldier told me: “I spent a lot of time thinking about COIN prior to leaving the U.S. I read U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, as well as books by David Galula, Roger Trinquier, and Sir Frank Kitson, and thought long and hard about how to apply these lessons to our area of Baghdad, especially in terms of how intelligence was central to successful COIN. Of course, once we arrived in Baghdad, a lot of this was put aside, unfortunately, as we were taken away by events. Soldiers were being injured and our area seemed to be out of control, so the emphasis shifted from applying good COIN techniques to just responding to what was happening. We never really gained the initiative in that first area. Indeed, it took us about sixty days or so to really get back to the COIN basics that we had read about. Once we began to apply these lessons, things changed in our favor, and never turned back.”
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