by David Row
Short Stirling bomber. This will be introduced into service in 1941. While superior to the older generation of bombers, there are issues which indicate it will be inferior to the Manchester and Halifax. These are its short range with a heavy bomb load, and its low ceiling which will make it very vulnerable to AA fire.
Shorts have offered two suggestions for versions. The first would be a high-altitude version with different engines and wings. The second using the Centaurus engine.
Since we have the superior Halifax in production, and a 4-engine version of the Manchester will be available soon, we recommend that we allocate the Stirling to Coastal command at present. This will fill their need for a long range patrol aircraft, the low ceiling not being a problem, and the load carried is adequate for the AS load carried. In addition, it can be produced in a second version without a number of the turrets, as many of the patrol areas envisaged will not encounter enemy fighters (in particular aircraft . Shorts should produce options on the re-engined low altitude bomber, and a high altitude version for evaluation and possible production alongside or instead of the Supermarine 318.
Handley Page Halifax bomber. This has now entered service in limited numbers, and is a considerable improvement on the existing bomber aircraft. It's one limitation is the size of the bomb bay which limits the size of bombs that can be carried; raids by the Luftwaffe have shown that heavy bombs have different effects to light bombs, and that the types of bombs need to be suited to the type of damage required by the raid. We recommend production to continue in order to build up a sizeable force of heavy bombers
Supemarine 318 (Coventry) bomber. This high-altitude bomber has undergone some trials, but a rework is necessary in order to achieve the high altitude envisioned in the original design. Data is now coming in from the high-altitude Wellington project, and this will be used to modify the aircraft. As Supermarine are heavily loaded with Spitfire work, the project has been passed over to Vickers, and development will continue under Mr Wallis. They expect to have a new prototype flying with all necessary modifications in the summer.
We currently see this aircraft as supplementing the lower altitude bombers. It will fly above the current German AA, and will be difficult for fighters to intercept, but is not ready yet and will be expensive. Until it is available in numbers, it will not be feasible to conduct raids using only this aircraft.
Use of our air assets.
(1) Air Defence of the United Kingdom.
While at the moment the threat of the day bomber seems to have been solved (or at least made it too expensive for the Luftwaffe), it is possible that at any time some new tactic or equipment may make this viable again. Given this, it is necessary to keep Fighter Command at its operational strength of around 1,000 planes. In addition the Navy needs some 2-4 squadrons to defend Scapa Flow and its convoy ports such as Loch Ewe in the extreme north of Scotland. These can either be flown by the RAF or Navy. The Spitfire is the best available fighter for daytime air defence, and we will shortly have the required strength available. There is also a need for a limited number of Spitfires specifically modified for high altitude to counter Luftwaffe high-level reconnaissance aircraft.
(2) Air Operations (North Africa and the Mediterranean)
In general, the nature of the airstrips and the size of the theatre makes it difficult to use the Spitfire (which find the general conditions too poor). We recommend a mix of Spitfires (for defence of higher value targets in the rear), and Sparrowhawks in their fighter role (these are much better suited for rough strips). The Hurricane is also more suitable for rough airstrips, and will be used until Sparrowhawk production builds up.
There are already Whirlwind and Wellingtons operating in theatre for reconnaissance and bombing, and these are proving suitable. We recommend that these retain the role for at least the next year, and that additional numbers are made available. Maritime strike by the RAF will either be by Beaufighter or Wellington (which can be modified to carry two torpedoes)
The role of army support will be by Sparrowhawk or Beaufighter in their fighter-bomber role. For heavier support, the Wellington is suitable, but we need a better light bomber than the Blenheim, although this is currently still usable in this theatre (unless Luftwaffe fighters are assigned there in numbers)
(3) Air Operations SE Asia
The air threat is much lower in this theatre, and we consider that any of the Sparrowhawk, Hurricane or Beaufighter will be suitable (depending on availability of the aircraft). Given the long ranges normal in this theatre, the Beaufighter and the Sparrowhawk are the better choice. Beaufighters would also be suitable for the maritime role in theatre, but until sufficient aircraft become available we can use older models as they are replaced in Europe. There also exists a need for limited numbers of long and very long range reconnaissance aircraft. The Navy has suggested that the SeaLance would cover the medium/long range need, and as it is currently only in use by the FAA it would be possible to provide the small numbers needed. For the very long range needs a number of Whirlwinds needs to be made available. Since this theatre is currently only at risk, we suggest a small number of squadrons of the different types needed will be useful to allow training and doctrine to be established in case there is need to counter Japan in this theatre. While this will complicate logistical support, we consider it a sensible precaution.
(4) Convoy defence
It was seen in the last war that the best defence of a convoy is a combination of air and light surface forces. Our analysis of the situation so far indicates this has not changed. The Navy is building light anti-submarine escorts as fast as possible, and we recommend no change to this priority. In order to maximise their effectiveness, we also need to provide air cover.
Air cover can be provided either from a carrier or by land based aircraft. Again, the escort carrier program currently ongoing is at about the maximum resources allow, but we recommend that it continues to be resourced at this level (there are indications that competing claims for shipbuilding may reduce the effort on the escort carriers). Ideally we need one per convoy, plus some additional ships, and the current building program will not provide these within 2-3 years. If possible, consideration should be given to building more ships in Canada, and if possible getting a number of the escort carriers built in the USA.
With respect to the land-based air support of Coastal Command, this currently is being given a very low priority by the RAF, with the suitable aircraft going to Bomber Command. We recommend that this policy is changed, and that Coastal Command is given a much higher priority for the aircraft it needs, especially over the next year which we see as the critical period in the North Atlantic. There is a specific need by Coastal Command for a long range four engine aircraft to supplement the Sunderland; production difficulties and costs mean the seaplane cannot be produced in the numbers needed. The US-produced Catalina flying boat is a useful supplement for the Sunderland, and it is recommended that purchases of it are increased.
(5) Operations over the North Sea and coastal regions.
The best planes available are the Hudson (US import) and the Beaufort. The Beaufighter will also be used once production permits. These are seen as adequate for the strike, reconnaissance and anti-submarine roles, the problem is that there are currently insufficient planes available and many of the existing planes are obsolete. We can see no quick solution except to increase production of the relevant planes. The Catalina is also suitable for the reconnaissance role.
Both the Beaufort and Wellington are suitable for minelaying, and in addition this low-risk mission can be supplemented by older, obsolescent models of bomber until the modern aircraft are available in sufficient numbers.
There are issues with providing protection to coastal convoys on the East Coast against aircraft. We do not have enough carriers to provide cover, and it has always been expected that the RAF would cover these convoys. The problem is (1) detecting enemy attack in time to allow interception, and (2) the range of the figh
ters. Detection is being addressed by fitting selected merchant ships with radar and communications to act as fighter control ships. This is currently slow due to availability of the needed equipment. The problem of the range of the fighters can be eased by using the Goshawk or the Reaper as the fighter, or a fighter version of the Whirlwind. It is recommended that the RAF and Navy undertake a specific analysis of this to work out an optimal solution.
(6) Operations in support of the Army
During the last year this has been the role of light bombers such as the Battle, which have proved unable to deliver the needed support. We have looked at the idea of providing a dive bomber (which has been used to great effect by Germany), either based on the Henly or the Cormorant, but are worried about the vulnerability of the dive bomber against fighters ( we realise the Navy has specific requirements for which this limitation is accepted). We propose support be based on (1) a fighter-bomber which can defend itself after an attack - currently this is the Hurricane, but this will be superseded by the Sparrowhawk, and (2) a light bomber - again, we have no suitable British aircraft for this role. There is also the possibility of using the Beaufighter in this role, although it is only an adequate fighter, its range and load carrying capability makes it a good choice for overseas theatres.
(7) Attacks on Germany
After looking in detail at the possibilities open to us, bearing in mind the types and number of aircraft we have available, and the state of the German defences, we consider that the types of operation we can undertake fall into three broad categories
(a) Mine laying (also known as 'Gardening').
This is a low risk operation which nonetheless causes significant damage and disruption to German industry. Used coastally, it damages and sinks both naval vessels and coastal shipping, and requires a great deal of effort in sweeping the mines. In addition, as the Beaufighter becomes available it would be suitable for attacking or disrupting the minesweeping efforts, rendering the mine laying even more effective.
In addition, it is very feasible to mine the major German inland waterways, canals and rivers. these are used heavily for industrial transport (far more heavily that we use them in the UK)
Finally the lower level of risk involved means it can have the new, green crews assigned, allowing them to gain useful operational experience and perform a useful role while becoming seasoned crews.
We understand that there has been political opposition to this as it might cause Germany to respond in kind, but the Luftwaffe is in any case targeting our ports and coastal waters, and we make far les use of inland waterways than does Germany.
This operation can be conducted by the Wellington (indeed, by any heavy bomber) over the coast and estuaries; river attacks can also be a productive use of light and medium bombers since they do not need to drop the large sea mines needed to damage ocean-going ships.
(b) Pinpoint attacks on specific installations
The FAA have shown that precision attacks on targets, while often costly in planes, can drastically damage the target. While the losses are higher as a percentage than area raids, the damage done is such that there is no need to revisit the target, and so the actually losses (for a specific amount of damage) are actually lower. Since this type of attack can concentrate on small targets that cause severe damage to the German war economy, by attacking targets which cannot be easily replaced, the effects can be much larger than just the immediate damage indicates. We recommend that we build up a capability to do this type of attack on a regular basis.
The aircraft used by the FAA are not suitable except for some of the coastal/port targets. We need a fast, medium bomber capable of delivering some 1-2 tons of bombs precisely. In addition, the navigation of the crews needs to be improved significantly. Ideally, such raids should take place in daytime to make sure the maximum damage is done, but defences may make this impossible. If we decide on daylight raids, we will need a long range fighter capable of escorting the bombers. The only suitable long range fighter currently is the Whirlwind, and we need to use some of the current production to see if it capable of the task against the Luftwaffe's first-line fighters. Another possibility is the US-produced Mustang, currently undergoing testing with a Merlin engine. It would also be possible to use Spitfires or Goshawks (with overload tanks) for some closer targets.
A list of suitable targets by type should be drawn up, paying careful attention to the effects that destroying these targets would have on the German economy, assuming a bomber force of some 200 planes available carrying 200-400 tons of bombs. The Navy has asked specifically if some initial operations can target German naval facilities (particularly submarine construction and support), and we suggest this is not only a useful target, but will allow the force to build up experience on easier to locate coastal targets without having to also fight through Germany to get to their target.
(c) Area attacks on installations, transport & Communications, and the oil industry.
While we feel that the pinpoint raid is the most effective in terms of results for resources used, there are a considerable number of targets for which this type of raid is not suitable - they are either too large, too dispersed, or too heavily defended. For these the option of a large raid by heavy bombers is the most suitable choice. In order to be able to attack these successfully, we need to build up the requisite bomber force. We have had estimates from the Air Ministry of up to 4,000 bombers needed to achieve success with an area bombing campaign. We reject this scale of build-up for a number of reasons. First, the amount of fuel needed to prosecute such a campaign (and it would be a campaign, not limited to a few raids) exceeds our capability to import. Second, such an effort would virtually exclude the other services from investment in equipment. Third, the existing evidence suggests that the current accuracy of bomber command is so poor as to make this scale of attack extremely inefficient. We should also examine carefully the nature of the raids made on us by the Luftwaffe, to see why some raids have caused more damage than others, with a view to learning how to cause more damage to Germany.
Bearing in mind the need to do sufficient damage to neutralise (at least for a time) a large target, we consider that we should build up a heavy bomber force capable of operating 500 planes on a regular series of missions (plus allowance for maintenance and training). This will allow either a number of smaller raids or one large raid with the available force. This force will need support by Pathfinders to find and mark the targets, as we are seeing that the current training of ordinary crews does not allow them to find targets at night, especially in poor weather.
Studies are being prepared as to the best composition of this force. First indications are that a mix of high and medium altitude planes will be the best initial solution, using a mix of bombs to disrupt the ability of the target to protect itself, cause direct damage, and allow the use of a large quantity of incendiaries. Since we will not have the planes available in numbers for a year, these studies should be concluded in time to make sure we are building the correct mixture.
It is expected that initially the force will be comprised of the Halifax, supplemented by the four-engine Manchester once this passes evaluation trials.
(d) Raids or sweeps over Northern France and other areas covered by the range of our fighters
We view these and being an inefficient and costly way to use our fighters and light bombers. The number of targets in range is relatively small, and many of these have political issues (too close to the occupied countries civil population). We would meet a strong defence on any worthwhile target, and would suffer crew losses in the same way as the Luftwaffe did in its attacks on us - lost crew will not be recovered, while German crews will. It is an obvious aim to weaken the Luftwaffe fighter arm, but we consider a more efficient way will be to use our surplus of fighters against them in other theatres. It does not matter where we shoot them down, and playing them on their own ground puts us at an unnecessary disadvantage.
While the above covers the operat
ional use of our bombers, it is realised that in addition we need to be seen to be hurting and damaging the enemy. Mine laying does not show this. Pinpoint raids may, as long as they are large and do a significant amount of damage (the FAA raid on Wilhelmshaven is an example of this), or hit a notable target, but otherwise they are not likely to be seen as causing major damage; the significance of their success will often not be obvious to the uninformed. The area attacks, although the last effective in terms or aircraft usage, do have the political advantage of being easy to use in propaganda terms. However we feel that effectiveness should be a higher priority than propaganda, as otherwise we risk diluting and damaging our bomber force for small results.
Summary of Recommendations for the next year.
The Spitfire and the associated Merlin engine should continue to be developed as our primary air defence fighter, especially for high altitude work.
The Sparrowhawk (initially the Hurricane) is seen as the best option for army support as well as air defence of the theatre, as it can deliver a useful bomb-load yet act as a first-rate fighter when unloaded. We have considered a dedicated dive bomber, but the vulnerability of these planes to AA fire and to fighter opposition leads us to think that the fighter-bomber is the more efficient option (we realise the Navy has specific and specialised roles for dive bombers, and note that this means suitable planes are available in small number if specialised raids are contemplated, although training will need to be given to RAF pilots in this case.)