by Tom Clancy
The briefing made a number of key points:
First, it showed the new CINC the deployment priorities for airpower in the Middle East region. The immediate need it foresaw was to build up air defenses (with fighters, AWACS aircraft, and SAMs), so that all the other component forces could deploy under a defensive umbrella covering Saudi airports and seaports. Next, attack and bomber aircraft would deploy to deter invasion, or (if an invasion occurred) to slow the invading forces until sufficient friendly ground forces could be put in place. Then came a whole basket of airpower capabilities most people did not appreciate: command-and-control aircraft to manage and facilitate air support of a ground battle, intelligence-collection aircraft, and vital support systems such as intertheater airlift. These were followed by discussions of mundane but essential issues such as how and where the air forces would be bedded down, supported logistically, and tied together with communications networks. Horner also described how his people would take over the air traffic control system and manage the airspace over the area of responsibility.
During all of this, the CINC listened closely and appeared to appreciate the important details.
Now came a discussion of actual operations. Here Horner described how they would manage intelligence assets and collection; air defense CAPs (Combat Air Patrols) and AWACS coverage; employment of Patriot missiles to defend against Scud attacks, and counter-air attacks on Iraqi airfields, radars, and SAM sites; as well as the overall command-and-control system networking them together. He covered interdiction of Country Orange (Iraqi) forces in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (if those countries had been invaded), and cutting them off from resupply. He described how they would provide close air support (CAS) to ground forces, using the tactical air control system, and ways to provide that same support to potential Arab allies. And he covered possible nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons targets.
Several elements from this Internal Look briefing remained months later in the plans eventually used in the air attacks on Iraq and its military. These included the first use of Patriot missiles in the ballistic defense mode; the integration of U.S. Marine air into CENTAF plans and operations; Push CAS; and perhaps most important, trust between the CINC and his air commander.
Patriot Missiles
Patriots, it should be noted, were originally developed for the Army as air defense systems (they were, therefore, Army missiles). Later, a ballistic missile defense capability was added, and that was how Chuck Horner wanted to use them in the Gulf, as a defense against Iraqi Scuds, and not as air defense (other systems could handle that task better than adequately).
Some in the Army wanted to use Patriots as both air defense and ballistic defense, which would have located the Patriots in less than optimum sites for ballistic defense and would have involved procedures that would have jeopardized the interception of missiles. Horner, therefore, decided to take early action to ensure that the Patriots would be used in the most effective way.
What happened next is convoluted, but in its twists it shows some of the practical side of Goldwater-Nichols. It’s also a good place to offer a brief primer on the way the various commands interacted.
★ As previously discussed, a service — whether Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps — organized, trained, and equipped forces to conduct military operations, and these forces were apportioned to unified commanders, who could organize their forces for battle in any way they felt was appropriate.
One such way might be to use them as a functional command. For instance, all fixed-wing aircraft from both the Air Force and Navy were assigned to a joint force air component commander — which was Chuck Horner, who was also the CENTCOM Air Force service commander. This dual role wasn’t unusual. As service commander, he had provided the major portion of the forces, and so it was appropriate that he be JFACC. If the Navy had provided the bulk of them, its service commander, Stan Arthur, would have had the position.
Disputes between functional elements in Desert Shield/Desert Storm were ultimately resolved by the CINC. If, let’s say, a Marine air commander wanted to use F-16s to patrol a road instead of his Harriers, then the JFACC would arbitrate. If the former were not satisfied, he could always go to his service commander, who would go to the unified commander. So, in Desert Storm, Walt Boomer of the Marines could go to Schwarzkopf and complain. If the CINC found his arguments had merit, then he could ask the JFACC to justify or reconsider his decision, or he could override it entirely.
Disputes involving another Coalition partner were more complicated. If the United Arab Emirate Air Force representative at headquarters did not agree with the JFACC on the employment of his Mirage aircraft, then he could appeal to his Air Force commander, who was supposed to go to the UAE national authority, who would talk to the UAE ambassador in Washington, who would talk to the Secretary of Defense, who would talk to the President, who would talk to the Secretary of Defense, who would talk to Schwarzkopf. Since that was obviously clumsy and slow, the UAE commander more than likely went directly to Schwarzkopf and asked for help with Horner.
The relationship between the service and the functional commanders depended on the way the services’ men and equipment were being used by the functional commander. Though on first glance there might seem to be potential for dispute here, in fact there was rarely a problem, since the functional commander used members of that service to plan how that service’s force would be used.
The functional commander might also ask the service commander about the military readiness of the forces he was using. So, for example, Chuck Horner might say to Walt Boomer, “Hey, Walt, would you please ask the USMC to ship your deployed air wing more anti-radiation missiles?” Similar relationships developed among the air forces of the various Coalition nations. So, for example, even though the JFACC had ordered the U.S. and Coalition air forces to make their bombing runs at medium altitude, the RAF might still want to conduct their attacks at low level. “Okay, Bill,” Chuck Horner would say to Bill Wratten, the RAF commander, “since your munitions can only be delivered at low altitude, go ahead.” Adding to himself, I hope they don’t get their asses shot away in the process.
As for the relationship between the component commander and the unified headquarters, George Crist, a former CINC of CENTCOM, summed it up this way, “The role of the Unified command is to create the environment needed for the component commands to fight the war.” The Unified command creates the proper environment by defining the overall objectives, apportioning forces, ensuring that services or nations share people and material so everybody can fight, and by determining priorities for the employment of the various forces. The Unified command must serve as the connection between those who conduct the politics of war and those who do the fighting.
The problems that develop most often result when the Unified staff decide they’d rather run the war than devote themselves to the less exciting and prestigious job of creating a good working environment for the component commanders. Unfortunately for the staff, the component commanders have a direct link in the chain of command with the CINC. Commanders like commanders more than they like staff, for commanders are the ones who must lay it on the line, and who must be responsible for their decisions and actions. Staffs merely advise and coordinate. So when the truth is difficult to discern, or when the issue has two reasonable alternatives, the CINC will normally side with his subordinate commander rather than a subordinate staff member. He loves and treasures his staff, but he understands the role of command and the importance of trusting his subordinate commander (and showing that trust).
★ As the JFACC, Chuck Horner concludes, I had to live or die by the quality of my ATO planning and execution. And while I looked for assistance from any source, in the end I had to satisfy the other component commanders, and ultimately the CINC, if I was to keep my job. Yet I could disagree with any of these and survive if my work was unassailable in terms of common sense and support to the overall campaign plan. If I failed to do that, it rea
lly didn’t matter whether or not I pleased or angered any of the various staffs, components, or authorities with their agendas. I always listened, but always kept my own counsel and did what I thought was best. And in the end, I did what I was trained to do, command. The ATO was the expression of that command.
★ We return now to April 1990, and the question of the Patriot missiles. Before his briefing to Schwarzkopf, Horner stopped into Third Army Headquarters in Atlanta to give John Yeosock (the Third Army commander, and CENTCOM’s Army service commander, or ARCENT) a briefing of his own, since, as CENTCOM’s area air defense commander (AAADC), that was also one of the JFACC’s responsibilities.
Since Horner was the area air defense commander, the Patriots (by virtue of the declaration of air defenses states and the rules of engagement) came under his tactical control; but because the missiles were apportioned to ARCENT, either the Army or Horner could position them. Thus, in meeting with Yeosock, the two men simply needed to reach an understanding about how to use them. Placement would logically follow. If Horner, as ADC, could not guarantee the Army that they would not be attacked by the Iraqi Air Force, then he would have had a very hard time obtaining agreement about placement of the Patriots. On the other hand, if he and the Army agreed that the ballistic missiles posed a greater threat than air attacks, then there would be no problem deciding where to put them. And this was what happened: Yeosock, the service component commander, said to Horner, “Good idea, you got them.”
After Horner gave his briefing to the land component commander (Schwarzkopf), Schwarzkopf said the same thing, “Good idea, you got them.” Since the air component commander and the land component commander had agreed, there was no need to raise the issue with the CINC for resolution. Horner simply informed him (Schwarzkopf) at the same time that he was convincing the land component commander (Schwarzkopf).
Thus, the Patriots were to be used in their ballistic defense mode during Internal Look… and of course later during Desert Storm.
Integration of Marine Air
Another issue Horner anticipated and headed off was an attempt by the U.S. Marine Corps to carve out their own space (as ground forces tend to do with land space). Marines like to run their own show, so they bring radars and air controllers to the fight, and are fully capable of controlling the airspace above their portion of the battlefield. Nevertheless, the JFACC is the airspace coordination authority under the CINC, and for him to cede a block of airspace to the USMC component would not only be inappropriate (a functional commander giving responsibility to a service commander) but would not provide for optimum management of the theater airspace.
Though it was not an issue with Walter Boomer, a few Marine officers did have a hidden agenda during the Gulf War: some Marines do not like functional commands — especially when another service will be commanding Marine forces. Since they are in essence a land force, and since the U.S. Army usually provides the major portion of the land forces, the Marines almost always work for the Army, and they don’t like that. For that reason, they resist any efforts to strip off their forces — aircraft working for the JFACC, for instance.
And for that reason, in the part of the Internal Look briefing in which he discussed airspace management, Horner made clear to the CINC that U.S. efforts should be integrated with the in-place system of the host nation, and that all airspace should then be coordinated under JFACC, who knew how to do that better than anyone else, and who would not anger the host nation (which would have been the CINC’s problem, but Horner’s undoing).
Schwarzkopf agreed.
Though some Marines were not happy with this decision (as had been the case in every previous exercise), he had confidence in Horner, and little further came of this problem. (During Desert Shield/Desert Storm there were attempts by Marine officers to go their own way, but Walter Boomer set these people straight.)
Push CAS
Land forces require close air support.
But how much do they need? And when? Is air best used here and now, striking enemy tanks and artillery, or somewhere else — say, striking his fuel depots and tanker trucks? These questions aren’t always easy to answer, unless enemy tanks are about to overrun friendly positions.
As a young pilot, both in war and in countless exercises, Horner had watched airpower’s potential squandered by assigning it to support the Army. He was determined not to let that happen again.
Airmen and landmen see CAS from different perspectives.
The airman sees it as answering the question, “How do I keep from hurting my guys on the ground?” In other words, he sees CAS as a system to hit the enemy in close proximity to friendly ground forces. His worry is not so much about hitting the enemy as about not hitting his own troops on the ground.
Through the eyes of the soldier on the ground, however, “CAS is airpower attacking the enemy that is killing me.” He sees it as powerful artillery. Sure, there must be measures to keep it from killing his own people, but the real issue is, “How do I get those jets to hit what is bothering me?”
These twin issues have been traditionally handled by means of the tactical air control party (TACP) — which is usually composed of a forward air controller (historically a fighter pilot in a helmet, with a rifle) and a radio operator who also drives the Air Force vehicle containing their radios and fixes broken equipment (radios, Humvees, or tents). The role of these two is to be assigned to a battalion (at the brigade and corps level, FACs are called ALOs, air liaison officers). The Army uses the FAC/ALO teams to communicate what it wants airpower to do, by means of preplanned processes. For example, the FAC/ALO may transmit a tasking directly to the TACC/AOC: “We need to hit the enemy machine gun bunker at 0300 two days from now in conjunction with an attack planned for 0330.” That tasking would go into the ATO as a “preplanned CAS sortie,” and forces would be assigned against that task.
Since the Army rarely knows what kind of air support they will need within the ATO cycle (two days), they put their requests for CAS in terms of “I will need ten CAS sorties sometime between 0300 and 0600 hours two days from now.” And this is translated into “air or ground alert CAS sorties.” Sometimes an aircraft that was intended to strike another target is diverted to support the ground forces because of a dire situation or an opportunity to do greater damage to the enemy. This is called “CAS Divert.” There will also be a CAS CAP, if the fighters must come from a great distance or if the need for the air is expected to be sudden and dire.
“Push CAS” is a planned concept wherein the sorties are spaced so as to fly over the friendly ground forces throughout the twenty-four-hour period. Meanwhile, there is in place a command-and-control lash-up that can access any of these sorties if it is reasonable to do so.
There are several ways for the aircraft to be sent into a particular area: the pilot may have been tasked to go there before takeoff, or he may have been sent there by Joint STARS, AWACS, or, in the past, a system called Air Borne Command Control Communications (ABCCC[38]).
Once the aircraft arrives in the area of the FAC, the FAC tells the flight leader what needs to be attacked, where the friendly ground forces are located (including himself), and special information, such as enemy defenses in the area and perhaps a required attack heading, in which he amplifies target location data: “Look 100 meters to the north of the bombed-out schoolhouse at the crossroads east of the small hill in the bend in the river.” This information is called a nine-line report, for it consists of nine items that must be briefed by the FAC (even if some elements are not required).[39]
Airpower must be used to support land forces — this is an absolute — but only when appropriate. In Chuck Horner’s view, land forces have too often confused trust with ownership. Trust is the knowledge that they will get the support they need. Ownership is the conviction that they are guaranteed the support they believe they need.
Before Push CAS, the system used to provide CAS was both arcane and obsolete. In theory, the CINC apportioned a percenta
ge of the air effort to the land commander, who would then parcel it out to the various subordinate commanders. They would then use this as an element of their planning for the fight that was to take place in the future. Unfortunately, the subordinates rarely needed what they asked for (having been trained to “ask for too much” in order to ensure they’d get something close to their actual needs). Likewise, land commanders have often been unwilling to turn back air they didn’t need (unless a friend in dire straits needed it more). Few land commanders willingly part from anything they own.
Not all land commanders fell into this school. Some belonged to what Chuck Horner calls the “trust school”: “If we need it, it will come to us. If we don’t need it, let it be used efficiently against our common enemy.”
In the April 1990 briefing, Horner convinced Schwarzkopf of that position. And Push CAS was its expression: “We’ll provide CAS where and when it’s needed.”
Chuck Horner takes up the story:
In this briefing, I had two advantages: First, John Yeosock agreed with the Push CAS concept; and second, the land component commander knew he was responsible for all land forces and would have no problems apportioning the air effort to where it was needed. If lots of CAS was needed, he, Schwarzkopf (the JFLCC), would be able to convince the CINC (Schwarzkopf) to give him what he needed.
I was also sure he was confident that his JFACC could work out for him how much airpower to place in the CAS role, because he, Schwarzkopf (the CINC), had no idea how to determine how much airpower should be apportioned to CAS and how much to other roles, such as, say, Air Superiority or Air Interdiction. If Horner got it wrong, he could have him shot and find someone else. That way, if anything went wrong, Horner would get the blame. If things went well, then the man Horner worked for would get the glory.
Trust