Late in the day, Cameron decides he will try and win over Conservative grass-roots and religious opponents. ‘If there is any church or any synagogue or any mosque that doesn’t want to have a gay marriage it will not, absolutely must not, be forced to hold it,’ he says.19 In his New Year’s interview with Andrew Marr in January 2013, he says that marriage needs to be reformed to allow all couples to benefit from tax breaks, incentives and benefit triggers.20 Iain Duncan Smith had argued that tax breaks and gay marriage should have been linked from the outset, which would have strengthened the political argument in its favour. For the time being, Cameron can only announce this as an aspiration because of Liberal Democrat opposition.
The Marriage (Same Sex) Bill is introduced by Culture Secretary Maria Miller on 24 January 2013. She is selected to steer the bill through the Commons because she is seen to be a mainstream Conservative rather than a moderniser, who could present the measure as a ‘sensible and modest change’.21 Many backbenchers fail to see it as either sensible or modest. ‘If I hear one more person call this a “free vote” I am going to hit them,’ says one. ‘People are being told that their careers are over if they go against the prime minister on this.’22 Senior Conservatives, including Philip Hammond, Owen Paterson and Gerald Howarth, are saying publicly they disagree with the bill. Many opponents claim they had supported civil partnerships (although when Number 10 checks the record, it turns out that most had not). On the day of the first vote, 5 February, Osborne, Hague and May publish a letter in the Telegraph declaring their support and encouraging other MPs to vote for the bill.23 No less than 136 Conservatives are unmoved by their plea and vote against, with 127 registering support and five abstaining, including Attorney General Dominic Grieve, who makes known his unhappiness with the law underpinning the bill, not voting. Paterson and Welsh Secretary David Jones are the only two members of the Cabinet to vote against the bill. It passes by 400 to 175 votes due to Lib Dem and Labour support. Having more than half his party voting against or abstaining, even on a free vote, is a bitter blow: ‘Few prime ministers have faced such an extensive rebellion in their own ranks,’ says the New York Times.24
When Cameron is under pressure, he has two responses: ‘kick the issue into touch’, as he would say, or ‘get it over and done with as soon as possible’. His taking the second option on gay marriage doesn’t seem to be helping. Opposition is intensifying as the bill goes through Parliament. The chief whip Patrick McLoughlin had not exaggerated when he told him that it was going to cause a lot of trouble in the party. Within the PM’s circle, it remains a running sore. To Lynton Crosby, whose influence is increasing over 2013, it is a distraction (even though he personally supports the move). ‘You’re fucking off the party big time,’ is his blunt assessment. Chairman of the 1922 Committee Graham Brady thinks gay marriage caused more difficulty between Cameron and the parliamentary party than any other single issue over the five years. The 1922 executive counselled very strongly not to push ahead at such a volatile point, though many have no objection to gay marriage in principle. They think the proposal has appeared from nowhere and, because it was not included in the manifesto, lacks any clear mandate. ‘It showed a cavalier attitude and dismissiveness of the views of others. It felt again like the party was being bounced, without significant reassurance or preparation.’25
The conservative political philosopher Phillip Blond believes this issue, more than any other, split the Conservatives in these years. ‘Cultural conservatives were deeply alienated by it because it broke with the conservative tradition as many understood it.’26 Backbencher Edward Leigh is one such: ‘We should be in the business of protecting cherished institutions and our cultural heritage. Otherwise what, I ask, is a Conservative Party for?’27 Backbencher Roger Gale argues similarly: ‘It is Alice in Wonderland territory, Orwellian almost, for any government of any political persuasion to seek to come along and try to rewrite the lexicon. It will not do.’28 Liam Fox articulates the views of many Conservative ministers as well as backbenchers: ‘The damage was caused because in the minds of many, it represented the victory of liberal-dinner-party, metropolitan thought over the wider party. For many others who didn’t have strong views on the subject, they were asking “What on earth does it gain us?”’29 But most Cameron loyalists believe he was right to push ahead despite internal opposition. ‘It wasn’t a matter of party management for him – he genuinely believes in it. I don’t think somehow if he had held more tea parties for sceptical backbenchers at Number 10 or met church leaders more often it would have made a difference.’
The final debate on the bill takes place on 21 May. Various amendments are discussed, including proposals raised by David Burrowes (Conservative MP and Owen Paterson’s parliamentary private secretary), who believes the bill undermines traditional marriage and wants changes to ‘protect the liberty of conscience for people who believe marriage should stay as it is’.30 The bill passes its third reading by 366 to 161. Only 40% of Conservative MPs support it. Despite intensive lobbying by Cameron and the Number 10 machine, Tory support has fallen away.
The focus now moves to the House of Lords. On 25 May, Conservative peers are said to be plotting a revolt against the passage of the bill.31 Baroness Warsi is reported as being asked by Cameron to take the bill through the Lords but refuses to do so.32 Opposition is led by a former chief constable and crossbencher, Lord Dear. By ‘trying to defeat the bill on the second reading, rather than trying to ambush it with amendments at committee stage’, the government is let off the hook. On 15 July, the Lords pass the bill after a short debate and without a formal vote. The chamber is packed with peers wearing pink carnations.33 Two days later, the bill receives Royal Assent. Cameron’s team experience momentary relief. A warning from the Coalition for Marriage, which claims nearly 700,000 supporters (about five times the number of members of the Conservative Party), is seen by some as a harbinger of what is to come. ‘They are just ordinary men and women, not part of the ruling elite.’ The repercussions, says its chairman Colin Hart, ‘will be felt at the next general election’.34
Cameron has a new problem. Have they achieved a heroic victory to proclaim from the rooftops? His team debate whether they should reap the benefit from the passage of the bill, or say nothing about it and sweep it under the carpet. In September, the issue comes to the fore, when they discuss whether he should mention it in his party conference speech. He plays it safe, saying the government is ‘backing marriage’.35
Six months later, on 29 March 2014, the first same-sex marriages take place. Cameron sends congratulations cards to the initial couples to marry. He hopes that the ‘country … is growing stronger socially because we value love and commitment equally. Let us raise a toast to that – and [to] all those getting married this weekend.’36 ‘I believe that our country should feel proud that almost uniquely in the world, leaders from across the political spectrum put aside their differences to unite in favour of equality for all, regardless of their sexuality,’ he continues.37 ‘Only the right to marry … is true equality,’ Clegg had said in 2013. ‘Let every member – young or old – of our LGBT community, know that they are recognised and valued, not excluded.’38
The gay-marriage saga has lasted three years. It has shown all sides of Cameron, and displayed him at both his best and his weakest. It is one of his principal achievements as prime minister. Yet why exactly did he take such an unnecessary risk? He himself offers an explanation: ‘I am proud of what I did, and what is more, if we hadn’t done it, we would have had endless pressure with Members of Parliament wanting to introduce legislation. People don’t think of that when they criticise me for doing what I did. It got the decision done.’39 A fair point, if something of a post hoc rationalisation. He drove it forward for a variety of reasons: because he believed it was the right thing to do, and was convinced by Cooper’s strategic argument that it could bring a political dividend. He didn’t then want to be seen to do a U-turn, which he felt could permanently under
mine the government’s reputation following months of bad headlines. He also had Osborne by his side all the way. A more experienced leader would have prepared the ground better and done more to win over allies once the initiative had been launched. It exposed both his naivety and deficiency as a strategic thinker. It had been removed from the 2010 manifesto because of the objections from one media counsellor, Coulson; and it may never have been allowed to make it to the statute book had another adviser been in play earlier: Lynton Crosby.
TWENTY-THREE
Lynton to the Rescue?
January 2013–October 2014
‘You guys have political Attention Deficit Disorder,’ Lynton Crosby tells Cameron’s team in early 2013. ‘Everything is all too fragmented, you have no plan.’ Introducing gay marriage at such a dangerous time is, to Crosby, the very height of idiocy. But there are many other candidates for capital folly. Cameron’s team are uncomfortable hearing the tirade. But they know that he is right. The outlook is bleak, and they lack any clear idea how to regain control and get back on top.
‘It’s two years away, but the 2015 election is already lost,’ writes ConservativeHome executive editor Paul Goodman on 29 December 2012. He is hardly alone in his analysis. Reasons why Cameron will not win an outright victory include: lack of support amongst ethnic minority voters, with only 16% voting Conservative in 2010; the rise of UKIP, which Goodman is (presciently) tipping to win the Euro election in 2014; unity on the left, despite Miliband’s uncertain leadership; and Britain’s electoral geography, which, after the failure to achieve boundary reform, means the Conservatives will have to lead Labour by seven points to win a bare majority. ‘Losing older voters on the one side, failing to win ethnic minority ones on the other, and all at sea in Scotland and in parts of the North’ is a desperate scenario. ‘Conservatism has been living through a crisis for the past twenty years – one which Opposition after 2015 may not relieve.’1 Cameron’s speech at the party conference in October 2012 had given the party a lift, but a ComRes poll published later that month had the Conservatives still stuck on 33% with Labour on 43%, while an Ipsos MORI poll published in November had the Conservatives on 32% and Labour on 46%, with a predictable impact on party morale.2
A critical spotlight focuses more than ever on the Number 10 team and especially Cameron himself. Tories ‘increasingly fear that David Cameron is a loser’, writes Martin Ivens in the Sunday Times.3 Fraser Nelson, editor of the Spectator, is predicting that ‘drift and disillusion will lose Cameron the next election’.4 Academic John Curtice, whose election exit polling is unsurpassed, is even more cutting in the Guardian: ‘People used to think Cameron was charismatic. But he is proving to be a kind of average prime minister. His ratings are not terrible, but he’s not Thatcher, he’s not Blair. He is not a dominant figure. Nobody loves him.’5
Cameron’s deficiencies are more evident in late 2012 and early 2013 than at any previous point. It has become clear he is not an architect conceiving the agenda of government in the mould of Thatcher and Blair. He contracted out much of his strategic thinking to Osborne and Steve Hilton, and the latter’s departure leaves him exposed in shaping the overall direction of policy. Not winning outright in 2010 deprived Cameron of personal kudos and authority. Partnership with the Lib Dems plays to his strength, but militates against him driving the government in a clear direction beyond Plan A, or confronting those who are in the way of achieving clarity and cohesion.
After the departure of his two biggest players, Hilton and Coulson, no comparable giant personalities have emerged to take their place. Heywood had proved an unexpected boon to the team in Number 10 when the coalition first came to power, but his successor, the gritty Chris Martin who had been press secretary at the Treasury to Brown and Darling, soon is up to speed. Ed Llewellyn and Craig Oliver continue to steady the ship, but they become targets: Llewellyn is criticised by Tory MPs for being a Europhile and defensive of the Liberal Democrats; Oliver is resented by several in the press lobby because he is ‘not one of them’. The Policy Unit is under attack for not firing on all cylinders and the political side of Number 10, including the chief whip George Young, are said to lack grip. ‘Nobody’s really frightened of Number 10,’ writes Tory blogger Iain Dale.6 Cameron’s team have allowed themselves to become overly defensive, too inward-looking and too tactical. They fret too much about what is written in the press: ‘Did you read what Ben Brogan has written in his blog?’ they ask one visitor, who is surprised that they are so worried about what journalists are saying, rather than seeing the bigger picture.
Number 10 badly needs a big hitter, a strategic thinker who understands the electorate, and someone with real force of character. Enter Lynton Crosby. Osborne and Andrew Feldman have been talking and decide that he could be the answer to their prayers. Campaign director to Liberal prime minister John Howard in Australia, Crosby was best known in Britain for masterminding four Australian general election victories in the 1990s and 2000s. He came to Britain in 2005 to work on Conservative Party leader Michael Howard’s general election campaign in which Blair was victorious. He later claimed that he’d arrived too late to make a major impact: ‘You can’t fatten a pig on market day.’7 He returned disappointed to Australia, but in December 2007 had a phone conversation with Osborne to ask if he would be willing to insert more strategy and structure into Boris Johnson’s campaign to become mayor of London in 2008. Crosby duly became his campaign director in January 2008.
Osborne and Feldman were impressed that Crosby pulled off a second, and harder, victory in London in 2012. They agree that they must have Crosby at the heart of the Conservative campaign for the 2015 general election and approach him straight after Boris’s victory. Feldman is delegated to start negotiations to bring Crosby in, initially part-time. Crosby then has a meeting with Osborne who alludes to his ‘unfinished business’ with the party at general elections. The Australian has a host of questions: ‘Will I have control? Will Steve Hilton come back? What will Number 10’s role be? Who will report to me? How much freedom will I have?’ Negotiations go on throughout the latter half of 2012. Crosby had been very bruised by the 2005 general election campaign: he never felt that he had complete control and was forced into agreeing to an agenda that had been set before he was hired. Cameron is not involved in discussions at this stage. He is being kept informed, but does not conceal he is nervous about Crosby. A part of him remains happier with ambiguity. He worries about the prospect of ‘having one clear figure in charge dictating one clear message’. Feldman implores Cameron to hire him: ‘I cannot contemplate fighting another election unless we hire Lynton. He’s the only person who can bring discipline and order to the campaign – I cannot go through 2010 all over again.’8
Crosby remains unsure he wants to do it and needs persuading. He only wants to run campaigns if he is in charge, and he looks with dismay at the bleak forecasts for the Conservatives. He looks back at the shambles of the 2010 election campaign with its ‘multiple points of authority’ which resulted in no overall strategy or clarity of message. He will only become involved, he says, if he reports solely to the prime minister and is answerable to no one else, though he is happy to work closely with Feldman and Osborne. Exclusive control is a red line for him. Osborne, the strategist in 2010, must take a back seat.
On 18 November 2012, it is announced that Crosby will begin working on a part-time basis from 1 January 2013.9 He is determined not to be bogged down in detail and only comes into Number 10 for two or three political strategy meetings a month, basing himself instead at CCHQ.
The appointment receives a mixed reception. Former Tory funder Lord Ashcroft is no fan. Ashcroft did not blame Crosby for the failure of the 2005 campaign, but after Cameron became leader Ashcroft offered to fund a comprehensive research programme for the party and support candidates in marginal seats. Cameron decided it would be better to keep Ashcroft within the camp, and they worked reasonably well with him on campaigning until the general election. But they f
ell out over the planned TV debates in the 2010 election campaign, which Ashcroft strongly disapproved of, and over the criticism from Labour and some newspapers about his tax status. Ashcroft felt let down by the leadership for not coming to his defence. In 2006, Hilton had approached Crosby to run the 2010 general election campaign, and there followed several meetings including one between Crosby and Cameron in Dean. But Ashcroft threatened to walk away and pull his resources, and Crosby told Llewellyn he did not want the job.
Ashcroft is even angrier after the election, when Cameron does not offer him a ministerial post, which he considers a betrayal, and he becomes a regular and vocal critic of Cameron and his team. Crosby’s appointment inflames Ashcroft still further, given what happened before the last election.
Crosby is a man of pronounced views: ‘Don’t let us down or we’ll cut your fucking knees off,’ he reportedly told Boris Johnson before taking on the 2008 mayoral campaign.10 He makes his mind up quickly about people and rarely alters his view. When he was taken on, he rapidly formed a view of everyone in Cameron’s team. He had been worried about Llewellyn and Oliver, but decides that they are both ‘okay and essentially on the right track’. One figure who Crosby believes does not have the right strategic qualities, though, is Hilton. ‘Steve is an engine room of ideas but that was not what was needed.’11 Crosby doesn’t believe his approach is correct for an election, and is adamant he will not have him anywhere near the 2015 campaign. Hilton lets Cameron know that he’s unhappy about this, but Crosby repeats to the prime minister: ‘I absolutely mean it.’ Crosby will not budge. Hilton’s modernisation, he believes, appealed to West London but not to the Conservative Party in the country. It is too socially liberal, while Crosby is more interested in social justice, and the issues of tax, crime, immigration and Europe, which he thinks matter to people at large.
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