12 NOVEMBER 1990
Mark Lennox-Boyd took the early meeting in Kuwait – horrified to discover that no one present had seen the record of the Prime Minister’s talks with Baker on Friday. As the talks had a direct relevance to whether we should now instruct David Hannay to discuss a further Security Council Resolution on the use of force, Mark said he would take it up with No. 10. I later had a quiet word with him, and advised him not to pursue this, as Douglas has already taken it up on several occasions. But it is quite revealing to see how shocked the PM’s former PPS is to discover the extent of No. 10’s paranoia over secrecy.
Nevertheless, the PM made an astonishing tribute to ‘the best traditions of the diplomatic service’ in her Guildhall speech tonight.
Douglas Hurd looked in to tell me today that he had more or less decided to give responsibility for Africa, including South Africa, to Lynda Chalker. I later discussed this with Patrick Fairweather and agreed that she should have an office and private secretary in Downing Street. Not an easy arrangement, though I think it has been done before, and was done again, rather unsatisfactorily, when David Simon had offices in both the DTI and the FCO.
Both Michael Heseltine and John MacGregor (respectively the Stalking Horse and the new Lord President) called on Douglas Hurd today. I was unable to extract any comment from Douglas about the current political turmoil beyond a remark that the more he stayed out of the tearoom, the better. He is certainly in high spirits.
13 NOVEMBER 1990
Geoffrey Howe made his devastating resignation speech today (‘cricket bats and all that’). It will almost certainly lead to Michael Heseltine declaring his candidacy tomorrow; he claims to have at least 100 supporters. We shall see.
Virginia and I went to the Hurds’ farewell lunch for the de Nanteuils at Carlton Gardens. He will not be much missed (at least by the FCO), though reports of his successor, Bernard Dorin, are awful. The Swiss ambassador in Brasilia has described Dorin’s appointment as a sign that Mitterrand must want to make life difficult for Mrs Thatcher. He sounds intolerable, and enjoys dressing up in uniforms.
14 NOVEMBER 1990
Douglas Hogg took the 8.30 a.m. meeting on Kuwait. There is a problem over discussions in New York between David Hannay and Tom Pickering; as Douglas Hurd put it later, our systems (and David Hannay) have moved too fast for the Americans, who have still not sent Pickering instructions following Baker’s talks here.
Douglas Hurd told me of a talk he has had with the Prime Minister on personnel questions. Three points came up which shed some light on Margaret Thatcher’s personal views and prejudices. On Charles Powell, she is (again) adamant that Charles should not leave No. 10, but that when he does, he should get either Paris or Bonn. Secondly, her description of another member of the service as ‘twee’ apparently relates to a suit she once saw him wearing with crocodile-skin shoes. She also reverted to her well-known prejudice for tall men by saying she did not think another member of the service was ‘big enough’ for a certain post.
A row is brewing over Christianity in Saudi Arabia, both on the question of Christmas trees and on army chaplains. David Gore-Booth and I tried to explain the need to take Saudi sensitivities into account, however illogical and outrageous they are. But everyone else at the meeting, including Douglas Hogg and David Lidington, clearly thought the Camel Corps had gone too far. There has already been quite a dispute about women driving in the armed forces. I later pointed out that almost anything can be done in Saudi Arabia, if it is done discreetly. But the press will no doubt continue to cause trouble.
Douglas Hurd has asked for some research to be done on how ministers produced public support at the time of the Falklands War, e.g. what statements were made and what consultations took place. This has produced some fascinating papers from my safe, including a draft minute from Antony Acland to Francis Pym on exactly the same lines as my current worries: i.e. pressing for proper military briefing and a clear statement of objectives.
16 NOVEMBER 1990
Robin Butler came to see me this afternoon, having discussed the ‘unthinkable’ with Andrew Turnbull, i.e. what to do if Margaret Thatcher is either defeated, or decides to resign, next Tuesday 20 November. Robin clearly has some hint that Denis is inclined to advise her to go if the result is at all humiliating. Douglas Hurd made it clear for the first time today that he would stand, but not against Margaret Thatcher.
Stephen Wall tells me that there are rumours that Peter Carrington is about to come out against Mrs Thatcher. This would certainly have a very powerful, and probably decisive, effect on the party. Meanwhile, Robin told me that the Thatcher camp, including Peter Morrison, claim to be totally confident of victory and of her remaining at No. 10; Morrison told Robin that they had a ‘certain’ 230 votes. As Robin pointed out to me, if you are asked whether you are going to support the Prime Minister, there is only one answer any career-minded MP is likely to give.
19 NOVEMBER 1990
I had a brief meeting with Lord Caithness about the Indian residence, in preparation for his meeting with Lord Mansfield, the Crown Estates Commissioner. General agreement that we must at least try to retain our New Delhi residence. If Mrs Thatcher remains Prime Minister, she would be furious if we allowed it to go. But the commissioners are demanding vast sums from the Indians, and we don’t yet know who the new Indian High Commissioner will be.
20 NOVEMBER 1990
The leadership contest results in 152 votes for Heseltine and 204 for Margaret Thatcher. (Jonathan Powell of Planning Staff won the office sweepstake with an exact forecast – insider intelligence from his brother?)
21 NOVEMBER 1990
An extraordinary day in British politics. On return from Paris at lunchtime, Stephen Wall told me that Douglas Hurd had telephoned him on 7 November to say, rather coyly, that Judy wanted to speak to him. She then said that Douglas did not think it right to ask his private secretary this question; but did Stephen think he should run for the leadership? Stephen had replied that there seemed to be considerable support for him in the party, and he thought that he should. Douglas later thought he had reached agreement with Margaret Thatcher that he would not commit himself to back her on the second round, until she had returned from Paris and consulted the party managers.
Douglas was therefore considerably put out by her hurried announcement last night, on the steps of the Paris embassy, that she would fight the second round. Robin Butler reported to perm secs this morning that the party managers were calling on the Prime Minister at lunchtime, and that everyone thought that Michael Heseltine would do much better on the second round than he had on the first. Conservative MPs, including several Cabinet ministers, were said to be switching their support, and the Chief Whip is believed to have advised the Prime Minister that she should stand down. As it was, she emerged from No. 10 after lunch, saying: ‘I fight; and I fight to win.’
Andrew Turnbull then asked me to call, saying he had been researching Harold Wilson’s resignation, and had come across a sheaf of messages to heads of government (apparently not having checked who P. R. H. Wright was!). He asked me to give some thought to what messages the PM should send if she resigned. I pointed out that Charles Powell was much better placed to draft messages in the way the Prime Minister would want, and was well aware of the circumstances surrounding any possible resignation. Andrew showed me a draft statement, saying that she had decided to tender her resignation. [I wonder if Margaret Thatcher herself was aware of the existence of that draft?]
I saw Elspeth Howe at a party this evening, and told her that I had been much moved by Geoffrey’s resignation speech. She confirmed that he had decided not to run for the leadership and thinks (as did virtually everyone I talked to) that Heseltine is home and dry.
22 NOVEMBER 1990
Douglas Hogg put on a strange performance at the Kuwait meeting this morning, getting cross with the Saudis about the recent misbehaviour of the Mutawa (the religious police), who have broken into two private par
ties this week, and beaten people up. Hogg was even crosser with the Americans for not, as he saw it, consulting us properly over a draft Security Council Resolution on the use of force.
When Alan Munro called on me later, I urged him to try to get Hogg to see Saudi fundamentalism in perspective. Hogg proposes to summon the Saudi ambassador to tell him that the Mutawa are ‘dotty’. On the Security Council Resolution, I have tried to explain to Hogg the amount of consultation that has already gone on at higher levels.
By the time I left for Dutch credentials this morning, I had heard that Norman Tebbit was also standing for the leadership.
It is not clear what job Douglas Hurd would offer Heseltine, if he wins the leadership election; I assume it would be Foreign Secretary. I rather doubt whether he would bring back Geoffrey Howe.
I discussed the election with Peter Carrington, who is supporting Heseltine. He had been invited to call on Margaret Thatcher yesterday, but had declined. He clearly thinks she should have gone months ago. He commented that Douglas Hurd had looked very much like Anthony Eden when declaring his candidacy, and wondered if he was not just a little too smooth to win.
23 NOVEMBER 1990
Douglas Hurd and John Major went into full gear in their campaigns today, with each of them obtaining open support from about five Cabinet colleagues each. Stories that Mrs Thatcher had ‘declared’ for John Major were later denied from No.10.
Robin Butler had seen Mrs Thatcher, and discussed her change of residence, during which she made the throwaway remark: ‘Unless of course I was to become ambassador to Washington’ – reflecting a half-serious ambition?
25 NOVEMBER 1990
In a letter to the service, dated today, I wrote:
The Thatcher years have been remarkable for all sorts of reasons, perhaps for none more so than the radical changes which they have brought about in domestic and economic policies. But none of us would, I think, deny the substantial impact which she has made on Foreign Policy and on Britain’s reputation overseas. Like her or hate her, no foreign statesman could ignore her; and some of the tributes reaching her (often through your telegrams) this week are an eloquent testimony to that. From this side of Downing Street, it has not always been easy, if only because Mrs Thatcher, like so many of her predecessors, has often suspected the service of an excessive readiness to compromise, and a failure to fight to the last ditch for British interests. In her attitudes to the office as an Institution, she sometimes reflected the comment of Churchill, quoted by Sir John Colville in his diaries:
‘What is wanted in that department is a substantial application of the boot.’
Her attitude to individual members of the service, on the other hand, was almost invariably appreciative and complimentary, and she believed passionately in the role which diplomacy and representation could and should be playing in the promotion of Britain’s image and interests abroad. It is sad that her style of government, and her treatment of ministerial colleagues, occasionally meant that she did not make full use of the ministerial and official advice which the service and the department could provide…
26 NOVEMBER 1990
Both Heseltine and Major were today claiming about 160 supporters each, with Heseltine commenting wittily that the number of Conservative MPs seemed to have risen to over 500!
A letter from No. 10 today reporting that Zamyatin had handed over a farewell message from Gorbachev, describing the PM as ‘Margaret’ for the first time, and describing the consternation in Moscow when the news reached him – ‘how can such a thing happen?’ Zamyatin himself commented that times had changed since the East had party coups, and the West had elections!
27 NOVEMBER 1990
John Major wins the leadership election today. I wrote a note to Douglas Hurd in commiseration, saying that we had all much admired the way he had conducted his campaign, and expressing relief that he would remain at the helm of the FCO. I was not enthralled by the idea of a fourth Foreign Secretary in two years.
I called on Douglas Hogg this afternoon to try to avert a row with the Saudi ambassador about the Mutawa, and indications that the Saudis would not allow our war dead to be buried there. I pointed out that the main message should be to reassure the Saudis that government policy on the Gulf would not change with a new Prime Minister.
28 NOVEMBER 1990
Douglas Hurd held a ministerial meeting this morning, at which he told his junior ministers that he had been asked by John Major to stay on as Foreign Secretary, and didn’t expect any of them to change jobs either (with interesting reactions, varying from Garel-Jones, who seems to have been half expecting promotion to the Cabinet, to Douglas Hogg, who expressed relief at not being sacked!). There were rumours at lunchtime that Lynda Chalker would get a Cabinet post; she will have been all the more dismayed this evening to discover that she is not.
Robin Butler telephoned me this evening to ‘offer’ me another parliamentary under-secretary. I pointed out that there was a ‘snobbery’ problem in the FCO, in that foreigners did not take kindly to being dealt with by a mere parliamentary under-secretary. David Goodall had told me that the Indians had already commented on having their affairs dealt with by Lennox-Boyd. But I did think that Lynda Chalker, if staying on at the ODA, could possibly use one to help her with her African responsibilities.
I had a few minutes alone with Douglas Hurd to debrief him on his first talk with John Major last night. I asked him if he had yet discussed visits to Washington (he hadn’t), and told him that I thought John Major ought to make the European Council his first trip.
Predictably, I was tackled by Mrs Thatcher at Robin Butler’s farewell drinks for her this evening. I opened by thanking her for what she had done for Britain’s image abroad over the past eleven years, and for enhancing the role of diplomacy. Typically, she at once went on the attack, telling me sternly that diplomacy was not just about compromise and negotiation; one needed to work to firm objectives. I said that I saw diplomacy as the promotion and projection of one’s national interests.
After some discussion about Charles Powell’s future, she said that she was hearing a great deal of on dit (repeating this in her speech later) and claiming that the ‘FCO’ had spread a great deal of hostile comment about John Major’s time as Foreign Secretary. When I said this was absolutely untrue, she corrected herself. When I went to say goodbye to her, she again told me firmly (and frankly rather rudely) that I must remember what she had said. I responded by saying that I hoped she would also remember what I had said. I thought that Robin Butler, who was listening, looked a bit alarmed!
30 NOVEMBER 1990
The record of Douglas Hurd’s talk with Shevardnadze in the margins of the Security Council’s foreign ministers’ meeting in New York quotes Shevardnadze as saying he was delighted that Douglas had lost the leadership election (as, incidentally, was Douglas himself, whom I saw beaming from ear to ear just after he had heard the result), because they had established such a good relationship as foreign ministers. Douglas replied that he had suspected all along that there were secret forces undermining his campaign; and now he knew!
The Use of Force Resolution went through last night with a ten-to-two vote, almost entirely achieved by a remarkable piece of diplomatic bullying by Baker – an extraordinary bout of activity involving personal visits to about eight different capitals.
3 DECEMBER 1990
The FCO have let the Royal College of Defence Studies down badly, with Douglas Hogg (who in any case was standing in for Douglas Hurd) falling out at the last minute on the grounds that he had lost his voice. (Geoffrey Adams told me that when this had been mentioned to Hogg’s office, they had expressed surprise!) Hogg has told Patrick Fairweather that he doesn’t want any Friday engagements, as he always shoots that day.
5–6 DECEMBER 1990: VISIT TO PARIS
A busy programme, as the guest of Ewen and Sara Fergusson, including two and a half hours of plenary talks with François Scheer, at which the French record-taker wa
s Mariot Leslie (on a two-year secondment to the Quai as British desk officer). Scheer was impressive, speaking with great authority and hardly glancing at his briefs; and prepared to commit heresies, e.g. by forecasting that France would have to change her attitude towards NATO’s military structure.
7 DECEMBER 1990
Robin Butler has not only got himself included in John Major’s Camp David talks with Bush; it is now apparently and explicitly acknowledged that Robin (not Charles Powell) is regarded as Scowcroft’s opposite number. I shall have to ensure that Robin now keeps Antony Acland and the FCO properly informed.
10 DECEMBER 1990
Stephen Wall told Geoffrey Adams from Paris that Douglas Hurd had said he was really very angry with David Gore-Booth for misleading him on the handling of the Hindawi case during his negotiations with the Syrians on the resumption of relations, thereby committing the worst error an official could commit – namely advising a minister to give an assurance in the House without justification. I later spoke to David, telling him that I was speaking both as PUS and as a longstanding friend and admirer of the Gore-Booth family. I advised him to make a quick and unvarnished apology to Douglas Hurd.
11 DECEMBER 1990
When Charles Powell called today, he talked about John Major’s working methods as Prime Minister. According to Charles, he spends a lot of time on the telephone to colleagues, and is not very thorough on paper. He hardly ever comments on papers, and Charles therefore has little idea whether he has read them or not. Apparently Mrs Thatcher underlined and side-lined a great deal, and one could even tell (as we could when Alec Douglas-Home was Foreign Secretary) at which point she had gone to sleep over her box! Charles also commented on John Major’s fear of being caught out underprepared. He sticks firmly to his own brief at OPD or Cabinet.
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