1. See, e.g., Michael Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights Movement 3–53 (2007) (detailing the legally sanctioned segregation in place in the South prior to 1954); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 495 (1954) (Brown I); U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. Martin Luther King, Jr., MIA Mass Meeting at Holt Street Baptist Church (Dec. 5, 1955), in 3 The Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr. 71, 73 (Clayborne Carson et al. eds., 1997).
3. For cases decided during the NAACP’s step-by-step litigation campaign, see, for example, Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (per curiam); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). See generally Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality (1975; rev. ed. 2004) (tracing the history of desegregation lawsuits leading up to Brown). For desegregation of the armed forces, see EO 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948).
4. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495–96 (stating that remedial questions would be addressed in a subsequent opinion after further argument); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II).
5. Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2, and 3 and for Respondents in No. 5 on Further Reargument at 28–30, Brown II, 349 U.S. 294; Brief for the United States on the Further Argument of the Questions of Relief at 6, 22–29, Brown II, 349 U.S. 294; id. at 25. For a more detailed treatment of the executive branch’s participation as amicus curiae in Brown II, see David A. Nichols, A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower and the Beginning of the Civil Rights Revolution 66–74 (2007).
6. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299–301. See generally Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale L.J. 585, 609–28 (1983) (discussing “all deliberate speed” and the Court’s efforts to factor white resistance into its remedial approaches in Brown II and subsequent cases).
7. Nichols, supra note 5, at 118; Southern Manifesto, 102 Cong. Rec. 4515–16 (1965); Tony A. Freyer, Little Rock on Trial: Cooper v. Aaron and School Desegregation 38–39 (2007).
8. Klarman, supra note 1, at 154; Freyer, supra note 7, at 36–39, 68–73.
9. Nichols, supra note 5, at 116–18; Freyer, supra note 7, at 29–30.
10. Although the Civil Rights Act of 1957 was the first civil rights legislation Congress passed since 1875 (see Klarman, supra note 1, at 128), the bill that made it through the Senate was significantly weaker than the bill President Eisenhower proposed. See Nichols, supra note 5, at 143–68; id. at 112–15; Freyer, supra note 7, at 152.
11. Nichols, supra note 5, at 66–69 (discussing school integration in the District of Columbia); id. at 118; Paul E. Wilson, A Time to Lose: Representing Kansas in Brown v. Board of Education 198–202 (1995); Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. 387, 392 (listing cities that issued statements of intent to comply with Brown); Virgil T. Blossom, It Has Happened Here 9–24 (1959) (offering a first-person account of Little Rock’s preparations for compliance with Brown).
12. Farber, supra note 11, at 392–93 (stating that Little Rock’s elected officials were “mostly moderates,” that the “city had little history of racial violence,” and that the public transportation had been desegregated before the events giving rise to Cooper v. Aaron); Freyer, supra note 7, at 17–22 (discussing Little Rock’s reaction to a 1952 study decrying the conditions at black students’ schools and describing later reaction to the Brown decision); Blossom, supra note 11, at 11–12 (providing the Little Rock School Board’s May 1954 statement concerning Brown).
13. Freyer, supra note 7, at 27–28; see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 8 (1958); Blossom, supra note 11, at 21–24.
14. Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1956); Aaron v. Cooper, 243 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1957); Freyer, supra note 7, at 78–79 (discussing the selection of the Little Rock Nine).
15. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 8–9 (discussing the state constitutional amendments and legislation passed in Arkansas in the wake of Brown); Freyer, supra note 7, at 80–81 (detailing the Capital Citizens’ Council protests against Little Rock’s desegregation plans).
16. Freyer, supra note 7, at 81; see also id. at 63–66 (discussing Faubus’s economically liberal policies and primary victory over his segregationist opponent); id. at 81–88, 98–99 (describing the pressure placed on Faubus); id. at 99–112 (discussing the reasons that Faubus ultimately chose to defy federal authority).
17. Nichols, supra note 5, at 170; Freyer, supra note 7, at 90–112 (discussing rising political pressure in Little Rock leading up to integration); id. at 105 (describing Faubus’s public comments); id. at 90 (quoting threats aimed at Bates).
18. Freyer, supra note 7, at 104–6, 108.
19. Id. at 112–13.
20. Id. at 114.
21. Id. at 115.
22. Id. Will Counts, at the time a twenty-six-year-old photographer for the Arkansas Democrat, took the famous photograph of Eckford. See Will Counts, 70; Noted for Little Rock Photo, New York Times, Oct. 10, 2001, at D8. The photograph and numerous other pictures Counts shot of the events surrounding the integration of the Little Rock schools can be found in his book A Life Is More Than a Moment: The Desegregation of Little Rock’s Central High (2007).
23. Freyer, supra note 7, at 115–16, 119–20.
24. Nichols, supra note 5, at 176–83.
25. Id. at 182–83, 186–87.
26. Id. at 189–91.
27. Id. at 67.
28. Id. at 186. For a discussion of Eisenhower’s reservations about expanding federal authority over traditional state functions, see id. at 141, 153–55, 176; and Freyer, supra note 7, at 41–46.
29. Nichols, supra note 5, at 198 (recounting Eisenhower’s belief, detailed in a presidential address, that “the overwhelming majority of the people in the South—including those of Arkansas and of Little Rock—are of good will, united in their efforts to preserve and respect the law even when they disagree with it”).
30. Id. at 136; Freyer, supra note 7, at 42.
31. Nichols, supra note 5, at 6 (describing Eisenhower’s youth in Abilene, Kansas); id. at 8–13 (discussing Eisenhower’s experience with black soldiers during World War II); id. at 42–43 (discussing Eisenhower’s desegregation of the armed forces); id. at 34–40 (discussing Eisenhower’s desegregation of federal contracting); id. at 26–29, 33–34, 40–41, 66–69 (discussing the desegregation of the District of Columbia). But see Alan L. Gropman, The Air Force Integrates, 1945–1964 149–53 (1985) (describing Eisenhower’s approach to civil rights as “passive”); Everett Frederic Morrow, Black Man in the White House: A Diary of the Eisenhower Years by the Administrative Officer for Special Projects, the White House, 1955–1961 298–300 (1963) (describing Eisenhower’s stand on civil rights as “lukewarm”). See also Report: Tuskegee Airmen Lost 25 Bombers, USA Today, Apr. 1, 2007.
32. Nichols, supra note 5, at 191–96 (describing Eisenhower’s decision to send federal troops to Little Rock).
33. Id. at 192.
34. Id. at 195.
35. Id. at 197, 199.
36. Freyer, supra note 7, at 133; Blossom, supra note 11, at 120–24.
37. Nichols, supra note 5, at 200.
38. Id. at 202, 212–13; Freyer, supra note 7, at 138–40.
39. Nichols, supra note 5, at 222.
40. Freyer, supra note 7, at 142–44; Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13, 17–21, 28 (E.D. Ark. 1958).
41. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. at 32; Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Freyer, supra note 7, at 151.
42. Freyer, supra note 7, at 152–57.
43. Id. at 169–70, 175; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
44. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4, 18.
45. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (emphasis added); Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
46. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 19. For an extens
ive discussion of the opinion-drafting process in Cooper v. Aaron, see Freyer, supra note 7, at 169–201; and Tony A. Freyer, Cooper v. Aaron (1958): A Hidden Story of Unanimity and Division, 33 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 89 (2008).
47. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 15; id. at 6.
48. Freyer, supra note 7, at 174–75.
49. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 6 (citing Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300–301); id. at 4–7; id. at 25–26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 19–20 (emphasis added); Gewirtz, supra note 6, at 627–28, 676–77, 681.
51. Freyer, supra note 7, at 203.
52. Id. at 205–7.
53. Id. at 208–9.
54. Id. at 203–4; Gary Smith, Blindsided by History, Sports Illustrated, Apr. 9, 2007.
55. Freyer, supra note 7, at 232; see also Smith, supra note 54.
56. Freyer, supra note 7, at 205; Jack Bass & Walter De Vries, The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social Change and Political Consequence Since 1945 89–90 (1995).
57. Felicia R. Lee, Return to a Showdown at Little Rock, New York Times, Sept. 25, 2007; American Youth Policy Forum, Expanding Advanced Placement Participation and Building Public Will in Little Rock, AR www.aypf.org/tripreports/2007/TR110707.htm (accessed Jan. 28, 2010).
Chapter Six / A Present-Day Example
1. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
2. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
3. U.S. Const. amend. XII; U.S. Const. art. II, § 1; Fla. Stat. § 103.011 (2000).
4. Bush, 531 U.S. at 100–101.
5. Id. at 112–22 (Scalia, J., concurring) (expressing concern that the Florida Supreme Court had established a system for appointment of electors, in contravention of U.S. Const. art. II, § 1’s requirement that the state legislature do so); id. at 110 (“[I]t is obvious that the recount cannot be conducted in compliance with the requirements of equal protection and due process without substantial additional work”).
6. Id. at 158 (Breyer, J., dissenting). I agreed with the majority, however, that there should be a uniform standard for all counties.
7. The author was present to hear Senator Reid’s remarks.
Chapter Seven / The Basic Approach
1. Cf. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (holding that a child witness may testify via closed-circuit television); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n. 6 (2004) (considering whether the use of a dying statement in a criminal prosecution violates the Sixth Amendment).
2. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
3. U.S. Const. amend. II (emphasis added). See James Lindgren, Fall from Grace: “Arming America” and the Bellesiles Scandal, 111 Yale L.J. 2195 (2002) (describing the controversy surrounding Michael Bellesiles’s book Arming America).
4. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. Const. amend. XVII, § 1; U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5. See, e.g., Giles v. California, No. 07–6053, slip. op. (U.S. June 25, 2008) (admitting into evidence the unconfronted testimony of the murder victim under a doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing).
6. Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty 457 (2009).
7. Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty: Papers and Addresses of Learned Hand 120 (1959).
8. Federalist 51 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
9. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
10. Ken Gormley, Archibald Cox: Conscience of a Nation 46 (1999).
11. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Tribute to Sandra Day O’Connor, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1239, 1244 (2006).
12. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
Chapter Eight / Congress, Statutes, and Purposes
1. Ségolène de Larquier, La SNCF en fait baver aux escargots, Le Point, Apr. 6, 2008; Escargots sans billet: La SNCF va rembourser le propriétaire verbalisé, La Dépêche, June 4, 2008.
2. Cf. Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214 (2008) (emphasis added).
3. Einer R. Elhauge, Interpreting Statutes: Ordinary English, Canons, and Conventions (Feb. 29, 2008) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
4. Cf. Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of Education, 550 U.S. 81, 93–95 (2007).
5. Cf. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005) (holding that a statute prohibiting firearm ownership by any individual “convicted in any court” of certain crimes did not apply to a person convicted in Japanese court); Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U.S. 125, 132 (2004) (“ ‘[A]ny’ ” means “different things depending upon the setting”).
6. Ali, 552 U.S. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
7. Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 303 (2006); Brief of Respondents at 8, Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy (U.S. Mar. 28, 2006) (No. 05–18).
8. Brief of Respondents, supra note 7, at 9–10.
9. Id. at 10–11.
10. Murphy, 548 U.S. at 294.
11. Id. at 297.
12. Id. at 313–16 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 308–13 (emphasis added).
14. See generally J. Gordon Christy, Federal Statutory Interpretation: The Gordian Knot Untied (Mar. 12, 2009) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (defending reliance on statutory purposes in interpreting statutes as the only correct method of statutory interpretation).
15. See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal”); Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006) (providing minimum sentences for multiple “violent felony” or “serious” drug crime offenses).
16. For a classic statement of the criticism that Congress, as an institution consisting of multiple individuals, cannot have an intent, see Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863 (1930). For an equally classic response, see James M. Landis, A Note on Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 886 (1930).
17. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
18. Id. at 684.
19. Id. at 685–86.
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (1994) (emphasis added); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689.
21. U.S. Const. amend V; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–92.
22. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
23. Id. at 689 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 [1932]).
Chapter Nine / The Executive Branch, Administrative Action, and Comparative Expertise
1. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
2. See President’s Committee on Administrative Management, Report with Special Studies (1937) (characterizing administrative agencies as a “headless ‘fourth branch’ ” of government).
3. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Career Guide to Industries, 2010–11 Edition (2009), www.bls.gov/oco/cg/home.htm.
4. James M. Landis, The Administrative Process 46 (1938); Federalist 51 (James Madison).
5. See M. J. C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers 277–80 (1st ed. 1967) (tracing the history of the idea of public administration as an apolitical science).
6. See 5 U.S.C. § 706; see, e.g., Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388 (1957).
7. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6); see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979); see 5 U.S.C. § 706.
8. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 68 v. National Labor Relations Board, 448 F.2d 1127, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
9. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 365–67 (1986) (describing two opposing views toward agency decisions of law—one “deferential” and another “independent”); id. at 371–72 (“[T]he ‘delegation’ way of looking at deference … suggests that Congressional intent to ma
ke agency decisions of law binding is really a question of how much deference Congress intended courts to pay to the agency’s decisions, a matter of degree, not kind”).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a).
11. National Labor Relations Board v. Labor Services, Inc., 721 F.2d 13, 14–15 (1st Cir. 1983); cf. Breyer, supra note 9, at 383 (“When writing an administrative law case book in the late 1970s, the authors could find only a handful of cases that faced so directly an agency policy decision and held it ‘arbitrary’; by the time the second edition was published in 1985, they found many more”).
12. Cf. National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944); see Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (noting that legislative delegation to an agency may be implicit, in which case a court must defer to a reasonable interpretation by the agency).
13. See Breyer, supra note 9, at 370 (noting that courts have inferred legislative intent and looked to whether an agency has special expertise when deciding whether to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory provision).
14. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840–42; id. at 856–58; id. at 866.
15. Id. at 842–44.
16. Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 505–6 (2007); id. at 528–30; 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).
17. 19 U.S.C. 1500(b); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 225–27 (2001); id. At 229–34.
18. Mead, 533 U.S. at 233.
Chapter Ten / The States and Federalism
1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280–311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 55 (1967) (quoting James Madison); see U.S. Const. preamble; U.S. Const. amend. X.
3. See Federalist 45 (James Madison).
4. New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
5. See Chantal Millon-Delsol, L’état subsidiaire 13 (1992).
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