by Mark Zuehlke
At 1430 hours, the order finally came for the advance. As the North Novas went in behind a creeping barrage, they saw ‘C’ Company of the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders advancing to the right from Gruchy towards the Château de Saint-Louet.10 The five remaining tanks of the Sherbrook Fusiliers’ ‘B’ Squadron supported the Glens, and only five tanks of ‘C’ Squadron accompanied the North Novas. The rest of this squadron remained behind to help ‘A’ Squadron quell resistance at Buron.11
The North Novas came upon a trench system in front of Authie, but the tankers ripped down the length of one after another with their machine guns. As the Shermans tackled each length of trench, those Germans not killed immediately surrendered. As ‘D’ Company’s point platoon reached a trench, machine-gun fire killed one of the section leaders and wounded the other two. Lieutenant Everett Sutherland cut down four Germans with a Sten-gun burst. As ‘D’ Company dived into the narrow trenches, a melee broke out with men throwing grenades and wielding bayonet-fixed rifles. One North Nova single-handedly killed six of seven Germans in a trench and then took the survivor’s surrender. When the panzer grenadier raised his arms, he was holding a stick grenade in one hand and trying to set off the fuse with the other. Three North Novas riddled him with Sten-gun bursts.
The two company commanders, Matson and Sutherland, “seemed to have charmed lives. They led rush after rush until the entire system of enemy trenches … had been cleared.” Pushing on, the battalion found itself entering the trench system in which it had been overrun on June 7. “There were rusted rifles and broken Stens and respirators, even North Nova tams with the badges still on them.” These trenches were on the edge of Authie, which proved only lightly defended. Not realizing some North Novas had already entered the village, the Shermans opened fire to cover their advance. A shell struck the side of a building just as Captain Sutherland looked out its door. Sutherland was killed, and his signaller, Private D.W. Ferguson, was blinded by the blast.12
Authie was reported taken at 1530 hours, but it would be hours before the last panzer grenadiers would be either killed or taken prisoner.13 At the head of ‘A’ Company’s leading platoon, Lieutenant R.G. MacDougall had an eye shot out. Company Sergeant Major F.J. Paynter took over the platoon and led it through the right side of Authie in a rush that cleared the Germans from that part of the village.14 On the opposite flank, Lieutenant Donald Columba Mackinnon and six other men were killed by the last machine-gun position in Authie.15
RIGHT OF AUTHIE, Lieutenant Donald Stewart’s No. 15 Platoon had led the Glens of ‘C’ Company in the attack on Château de Saint-Louet. In arrowhead formation, No. 15 Platoon was point with No. 13 Platoon to the right and No. 14 Platoon the left. Major Archie Mac-Donald’s command group was immediately behind Stewart’s men. Hugging a creeping barrage, the company advanced to within three hundred yards of the château before taking cover in a series of abandoned German slit trenches in the grain field, to allow time for the artillery to work over the mostly destroyed buildings. As MacDonald stood in the trench telling his platoon leaders what their next moves should be, a German grenade exploded and he was mortally wounded.16
No. 14 Platoon’s Lieutenant J. McKinnell took over and led the company into the château grounds. After taking thirty prisoners, the men started digging in, while German artillery began falling. Sergeant Harry Wilson was struck in the eye by a shard of shrapnel that cleanly excised his eyeball. He refused to be evacuated until his men promised to search for the missing orb. As Wilson turned to go, one man grumbled, “Jesus, I don’t know how you expect us to do it!” In their fight for Gruchy and the château, the Glens lost thirty men.17
As 9th Brigade’s fight for its objectives had moved into the afternoon, the North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment still in Carpiquet village had reported a steady stream of 12th SS panzer grenadiers “withdrawing southwards in disorder.” Pursued by artillery, many were seen to be struck down. The North Shores also believed the mile of country separating Carpiquet and the château was no longer strongly held.18
When the North Novas sent a ‘C’ Company patrol to Franqueville, this proved to be the case. Only some stragglers were encountered, and they immediately surrendered. ‘C’ Company quickly advanced on and began digging in among the ruined buildings of the village.19 There was a moment of surprise when they discovered a wrecked Sherbrooke Sherman tank in the ruins. Then someone realized it was left over from the tank regiment’s June 7 advance. Franqueville had been the farthest point inland from Juno Beach that the Canadians reached that day before being driven back by German counterattacks.20 The North Novas felt fortunate to have escaped another fight for Franqueville. Authie had already cost them more than a hundred casualties.
Seizing Franqueville concluded 9th Brigade’s phase of Operation Charnwood. The way was now open for 7th Brigade to take the Abbaye d’Ardenne and village of Cussy. Although the Abbaye was now a working farm, its medieval buildings included a large Gothic church with a small circular tower built into each front corner. High stone walls surrounded the complex, and access was limited to a few narrow portals. It was surrounded on all sides by grain fields.
The Abbaye had regularly served as Standartenführer Kurt Meyer’s headquarters since June 7, specifically because the church’s left tower provided an unrestricted view across open country all the way to Juno Beach. Presenting a large and obvious target, the church had by July 8 b een b adly d amaged by a rtillery and bombs, its soaring roof shot away. Both towers were in rough shape, but they still served as observation platforms. Meyer’s actual headquarters was not in the church. It was in a cellar under a sturdy building adjacent to a small orchard in the middle of the complex.
By afternoon the Abbaye confirmed Meyer’s fears as to how July 8 would develop. Dead Hitler Youth were scattered about, and the little orchard “looked like an inferno.” In the cellar headquarters, the ceiling shivered under the shells despite its being deep underground and buttressed by massive arches. Climbing to the top of the battered tower, Meyer watched Authie, the Chateâu de Saint-Louet, and Franqueville fall. Obviously the Abbaye and Cussy were next. Meyer warned the commanders responsible for both that it was imperative they hold until nightfall in order to screen the division’s withdrawal into Caen’s outskirts. He then requested his immediate superior, I SS Panzer Corps Obergruppenführer Josef “Sepp” Dietrich, to permit the 12th SS to withdraw east of the Orne at nightfall. Hitler had ordered Caen held to the last man, Dietrich replied.
Meyer decided to prepare a withdrawal across the river anyway. The heavy weapons would go first. Then the rest of the 12th SS would begin to slip away. But until night fell, the Abbaye and Cussy must be held.21
ALSO PL ANNING MOVES from a church tower were two officers from 7th Brigade’s Regina Rifles. Captain Gordon Brown and Major C.S.T. “Stu” Tubb had ascended a rickety ladder inside the tower of a church in Rots to study the battalion’s line of advance on the Abbaye. It was a sobering sight. “The area was flat, open, and devoid of cover where an attacking force would easily be seen. What is more, the defenders had the advantage of dug in defences and clear fields of fire.”22
Brown, who commanded ‘D’ Company, took in the massive stone Abbaye surrounded by high walls. “We were looking at what seemed to be an impregnable fortress. My God, I didn’t want to do this attack.” Lieutenant Colonel Foster Matheson’s plan called for ‘B’ Company, under Major Eric Syme, to advance from Authie to some curious small mounds about four hundred yards out in the field. These were believed to be fortifications, likely held by forty to fifty Germans. Once secured, Brown’s company and Tubb’s ‘C’ Company would advance past and then cross the remaining seven to eight hundred yards to the Abbaye.23 Captain Bill Grayson temporarily commanded ‘A’ Company, which had been so badly shot up on D-Day that Matheson hoped to keep it out of this fight.
A squadron of tanks from the 1st Hussars, a section of 6th Field Company engineers, and guns of 12th Field Regiment would be in supp
ort.24 Brown thought the Hussars would be of little help. There were too many places where German 88-millimetre guns could be hidden. Once the Hussars saw this, they would likely baulk at advancing. If they didn’t, the Shermans would end up on the losing end of a turkey shoot. Brown figured the Reginas would have to fight this one alone.25
Given the terrain they faced, nobody in 7th Brigade was keen on their phase of Operation Charnwood. Not only did the Canadian Scottish face the same kind of open ground as the Reginas, but they noted with concern how it gradually rose from the start lines to Cussy and the Abbaye. This meant they would constantly be under German observation and fire from higher ground. A map overlay with expected and known defensive positions pencilled in had been helpfully provided by divisional intelligence staff. Lieutenant N.T. Park of ‘B’ Company’s No. 10 Platoon duly placed the overlay on his map and saw “so much red on the map that it was difficult to trace [my] platoon’s route on it.”
The Can Scots had waited out 9th Brigade’s operations in the grounds of a large estate east of Cairon. Its ten-foot stone wall provided some protection from the German shelling, but the battalion still suffered casualties during the increasingly protracted wait. Despite 9th Brigade’s advance being far behind schedule, Lieutenant Colonel Fred Cabeldu received orders at 1030 hours to move to the attack assembly area—an open field midway between Buron and Gruchy that was exposed to fire from the Germans still defending Authie and their objective of Cussy.
No explanation was given as to why they must go to such an exposed position for an attack not scheduled to begin until 1400 hours. Cabeldu looked at the open wheat fields the battalion must cross and the similar field in which they were to loiter. There was no cover anywhere. The Can Scots would have to dig slit trenches, likely under fire. Casualties were inevitable.
A single gate provided an exit from the estate onto the southeast-running road from Cairon to Vieux-Cairon. The Can Scots were to use the road to reach the assembly area. Knowing Canadians were inside the estate, the Germans regularly shelled the road in front of the gate. When the battalion burst out of the gate, Cabeldu led the men away from the road and in a wide circling manoeuvre to the left of Vieux-Cairon. This brought them into lower ground that was less visible to the German artillery observers. ‘A’ and ‘C’ Companies led.26 En route, ‘C’ Company’s No. 13 and No. 15 Platoons encountered dugouts hidden in a wheat field that were still held by panzer grenadiers unwittingly bypassed by 9th Brigade. Some of these youths were scared stiff and immediately surrendered. But others wanted a fight. At the head of No. 15 Platoon, Lieutenant Geoffrey Corry suffered a tremendous blow to the head. “I found myself on the ground staring at my steel helmet with a bullet hole through the rim, which had cut my chin strap and nicked my temple. I got to my feet, burning with fury that anyone should have the audacity to fire at me and began to clear the area.” The Can Scots rooted out thirty prisoners. “My blood was up and, if time had permitted, I would have gleefully shot the lot.”27
At the assembly area, Cabeldu’s fears were realized. Shells rained down as the men dug frantically. Ahead, 9th Brigade’s battalions were still heavily engaged. There would be no 7th Brigade advance until the highland brigade won its fight. Gunfire was still steadily ringing out from Authie as 1400 hours came and went. A wireless signal pushed the attack back to 1730 hours, and the Can Scots were told to start closing on their start line, the road running between Buron and Authie. Cabeldu “could visualize many casualties while waiting close to the start-line for our zero hour. I therefore asked the Brigadier for permission to remain where we were, assuring him that we would make a forced march to the start-line and hit it at the appointed zero hour.” Brigadier Harry Foster agreed.28
Cabeldu was not just worried about the delays caused by 9th Brigade’s slow progress. He was equally concerned about the British 59th Infantry Division’s failure to clear the village of Bitot, which directly overlooked Cussy. The British had signalled that they were so badly held up that Bitot would not be attacked until the next day.29 Cabeldu expected his exposed flank to come under heavy fire from Bitot during the advance on Cussy.
WHILE CABELDU HAD held the Can Scots as far back as possible, the Regina Rifles had paced along a short distance behind the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders 9th Brigade’s advance. The battalion was woefully understrength. Instead of eight hundred men, it numbered less than five hundred.30 Matheson had wanted the Reginas positioned to directly attack the Abbaye the moment 7th Brigade gave the signal. But that had left the battalion out in the open ground, digging in repeatedly to escape heavy artillery and mortar fire. ‘B’ Company suffered five casualties by mid-day and ‘C’ Company, nine.31
Captain Brown’s ‘D’ Company hunkered beside a large hedgerow from which his men could watch the North Novas’ advance on Authie. Several Sherbrooke tanks were sheltering in a nearby gully that provided hull-down protection. Only the turrets were exposed so the main gun could be fired. One Sherman was hit in the turret by several anti-tank rounds, and its crew bailed out. Suddenly, the crewless tank reversed on its own. The Sherman “wandering backwards,” struck Brown as “a ridiculous sight,” even as his men scrambled to get out of its way before one track slid into a ditch and the engine stalled.
Spotting a German Panther approaching the hedgerow, Brown ran to a nearby British M-10 tank destroyer and tried unsuccessfully to get the crew commander’s attention. Finally he hugged the armoured hull, “hoping it would soon fire.” Instead, the steely-nerved gunners waited until the Panther was about seventy yards distant before opening up with their 17-pounder. “When it fired I was stunned by the noise and the jolt as the gun recoiled and the chassis seemed to rise right off the ground. The German tank burst into flames.”
A few minutes later, three Bren carriers arrived. Matheson, Tubb, and Syme were aboard, and the lieutenant colonel told Brown to climb onto one. They were going into Authie—now reportedly taken—for a reconnaissance. En route, the carriers took a wrong turn into a field west of the village, where the North Novas were still duelling with a strong force of 12th SS troopers. A bullet to the head killed Matheson’s driver. The officers dived into the tall wheat beside the road, while the carrier crews turned around under fire. Panzer grenadiers were chucking grenades, and one exploded at Syme’s and Brown’s feet. Both men were shaken but otherwise unharmed. Suddenly, the carriers started rolling, and the officers scrambled to get aboard. Brown chucked himself flat “on top of some boxes which read clearly, ‘High Explosives.’” These contained ammunition for the 3-inch mortars, and Brown shivered as “bullets bounced off the rear of the carrier.”
Authie also proved still bitterly contested. The officers took to a ditch occupied by some North Novas. “Where are the forward lines?” one asked. “Right here. Be our guests,” a North Nova snapped back.
From the ditch, the officers could see nothing but the “stone walls of battered buildings in the village.” It was 1700 hours, and the Reginas were to attack in just thirty minutes. Already, supporting artillery was saturating the Abbaye with shells. The explosions were so loud Brown could barely hear Matheson. Finally, the lieutenant colonel yelled: “The companies are on their way to join us and our tank support will be here soon. We must launch our attack without delay or lose the benefit of the barrage.”
Realizing their companies were unlikely to find them, the officers moved into the field behind Authie. They spread out and lay down in the open, so the approaching troops would see them and be able to rally on their respective commander.32 Several 1st Hussar’s ‘A’ Squadron Shermans moved close to where Brown lay in order to gain a line of fire on the Abbaye. No sooner did they stop rolling than a hidden 88-millimetre gun opened up. Three Shermans were quickly knocked out, including that of squadron commander Major W.D. “Dud” Brooks. Trooper Raymond Patterson was killed, and three other men wounded.33 Brooks and his crew would likely have died had it not been for the extra tracks welded onto the front of their Sherman, which
lessened the penetrating impact of the armour-piercing shell.34 Brown saw a lot of machine-gun fire coming towards the tanks from the mounds midway between Authie and the Abbaye. Clearly, that position was heavily defended. Syme’s ‘B’ Company faced a tough fight.
When the three companies of Reginas arrived, their commanders had a difficult time organizing them in the midst of intense enemy shelling. The men in Brown’s ‘D’ Company were reeling, many wiping tears from their eyes. Moving towards the start line, Company Sergeant Major Jimmy Jacobs had been killed by shellfire.35 As the battalion was starting to advance, a Sherman rolled up with Lieutenant E.J. Hooper, a 12th Field Regiment forward observation officer (FOO), aboard.36 The barrage had come and gone, but he promised to direct more artillery on the mounds and the Abbaye. Hooper hid his tank behind the last building in Authie that faced the Abbaye. As Brown had predicted, the tankers refused to advance into open fields covered by at least one 88-millimetre gun waiting to pick them off.
Left of the Reginas, meanwhile, the Can Scots had fulfilled Lieutenant Colonel Cabeldu’s promise to Brigadier Harry Foster. After a forced march, they went right over the start line on schedule at 1730 hours. On their flanks, Gruchy, Buron, and Saint Contest were all still embattled. The 12th SS firmly held Bitot, which left the battalion exposed to flanking fire from the left. But there was no question of waiting for any of this to be cleared up. The Can Scots and Reginas were going to attack, and because the Reginas were still getting organized behind Authie, this would not be a coordinated assault. Each battalion would instead fight its own isolated battle.
[ 5 ]
A Terrible Dream
TYPICALLY, THE GERMANS began to heavily shell the ground directly behind the creeping barrage as ‘A’ and ‘C’ Companies led the Canadian Scottish advance on Cussy. ‘A’ Company vectored towards a strongpoint surrounded by hedges midway between the start line and village. Its No. 7 Platoon headed for the 88-millimetre gun position with No. 8 Platoon close behind. ‘A’ Company’s plan called for the Highland Light Infantry in Buron to provide fire support with their Bren guns, mortars, and anything else within range. The Can Scots’ ‘C’ Company would also help as much as it could while advancing alongside. On ‘C’ Company’s opposite flank was ‘C’ Squadron of the 1st Hussars under Major D’Arcy Marks.1