by Mark Zuehlke
At one point, several German tanks growled to within three hundred yards of Cussy. Instead of attacking, however, they fired their machine guns into the village and then retired. Crofton thought the tanks were trying to cover the escape of any Germans who might remain in the village. But none escaped. During the night, ‘C’ Company rounded up thirty prisoners. They counted about forty German dead. Two German veterans of North Africa and the Eastern Front said they thought “it was a miracle how we advanced so close to our barrage, leaving them no time to man their weapons. When our men let out blood curdling yells their men broke and ran and they could not hold them. They stated they would rather meet four Russians than one Canadian.”29
The July 8 attack on Cussy cost the Canadian Scottish two officers killed and another five wounded. There were thirty-two other rank fatalities, sixty-three wounded, and two missing.30 Corry was evacuated to the beach, where the bullet was removed at a field hospital. After thirty-five days in Normandy, his war was over.31
FOR THE REGINAS, the night of July 8 –9 was extremely tense. Only one company, Captain Brown’s, had managed to gain the outside wall of the Abbaye. As he had left the wireless set at Authie, Brown and Lieutenant Jack Mooney returned there to contact battalion headquarters. En route they were caught in a terrific mortar bombardment. Throwing themselves to the ground, they lay with arms over their heads as eighty or more rounds detonated around them. Covered in dirt but otherwise unhurt, they carried on. A few minutes later the two came upon the stretcher party carrying Major Tubb on a door. Brown saw his friend’s leg was “badly mangled … but he seemed unconcerned about himself. All he could talk about was his men, so many of whom had fallen.” Tubb would lose the leg.32
In Authie, Brown tried unsuccessfully to raise Lieutenant Colonel Matheson on the wireless. Learning that battalion headquarters had moved to a nearby field, he told Mooney and Captain Hec Jones to take the wireless sets to the Abbaye while he reported to Matheson.33
Brown found Matheson in the battalion’s headquarters van. Matheson looked “wan and drawn in the dim light inside the vehicle.” Brown thought of how Matheson “had served so courageously throughout the first month, only to have many friends killed or wounded. At 40, he was ‘old’ for infantry warfare.” Matheson had written ‘D’ Company off entirely until Brown appeared and explained that the Abbaye was in his hands. But he wanted ‘A’ Company sent to strengthen the Regina’s hold. When Matheson asked how the company could find the Abbaye in the pitch-black night, Brown took him outside and pointed to “the fires still burning brightly in and near the Abbaye. It stood out like a beacon.”
Matheson agreed to release ‘A’ Company on condition that Brown guided it forward. Brown and Captain Bill Grayson got the men moving. At the Abbaye, they dug in alongside ‘D’ Company. Most of ‘A’ Company’s men were green troops. Grayson told Brown that, although dug in, his men were scattered “helter skelter.” Many were unwittingly pointing their guns at each other rather than outwards. Suddenly, at 0300 hours, the German guns that had been unceasingly battering the Abbaye fell silent. An eerie quiet settled in.34
The battalion’s losses were staggering. Eleven officers and 205 other ranks became casualties on July 8. Of these, 36 were f atal. Another man was missing. It was the worst fighting the Reginas had seen since D-Day itself. Those two days alone accounted for so many casualties that few of the men who had landed on Juno Beach remained.35
THE 12TH SS had ceased fire because they were withdrawing to the east side of the Orne. At 2100 hours, Rommel had approved Eberbach’s request to immediately withdraw all heavy weapons from Caen. All artillery, heavy mortars, Nebelwerfers, and tanks were to be gone before daybreak. A strong infantry force, supported by engineers, would remain and hold for as long as possible. This plan was meant to buy time to form a new line stretching from behind Hill 64 to the north of Caen to the northern outskirts of Saint-Germain-la-Blanche-Herbe, just east of Carpiquet. Rommel realized this front could not be held for long. When it was broken, the Germans would then withdraw to a stronger position running through Caen along the eastern bank of the Orne to Bretteville-sur-Odon, immediately south of Carpiquet airfield. The intention was to maintain a toehold in Caen for as long as possible.36
Kurt Meyer had ordered the shelling of the Abbaye to gain the 25th Panzer-Grenadier Regiment “some breathing space.”37 When the Canadians failed to follow, which he had feared they would, he relaxed a little. The 12th SS was battered, but not broken. At about 0300 hours on July 9, he ordered the division to fall back across the Orne. The 26th Panzer-Grenadier Regiment’s 3rd Battalion would serve as a rear guard—delaying the advance into Caen for as long as they could. Meyer realized that, with the Abbaye and Cussy lost, holding any ground west of the Orne River would be possible for only a short time.38
As July 8 closed, Lieutenant General John Crocker concluded that Caen west of the Orne was his for the taking. Because its combat initiation had been harsh, the 59th Division’s tasks were limited to completing clearance of the fortified villages in its sector. The Canadian and 3rd British Divisions would respectively pinch out the 59th and then push into the city from the west and north. They would join hands in the centre of Caen at a point where several bridges crossed the Orne.39
On the Canadian front, 9th Brigade would attack Caen from Cussy and the Abbaye, while an armoured-car column would try reaching the bridges inside the city ahead of the infantry, in an attempt to secure a crossing before the Germans blew them all. Meanwhile, 8th Brigade would break out to the west from Carpiquet, take the airfield, and, if possible, press on to the Odon.40
After a hurried Orders Group of 9th Brigade’s battalion commanders at 0300 hours, the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlander war diarist wrote skeptically: “The Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Crocker claimed that the enemy had fled that region.”41
[ 6 ]
Most Successful Operation
AT DAWN ON July 9, Captain Gordon Brown led ‘D’ and ‘A’ Companies of the Regina Rifles into the Abbaye d’Ardenne. Resistance was confined to a few snipers, who were not all eliminated until mid-afternoon. Dead and wounded panzer grenadiers were scattered throughout the complex.
At the former German headquarters, Brown found “a large military telephone exchange against a wall outside … but the operator was dead in the midst of the wreckage.” Brown took over the place for his company headquarters. Then he and ‘A’ Company’s Captain Bill Grayson walked over to a field northeast of the Abbaye, where Lieutenant Colonel Foster Matheson had established the battalion headquarters. Matheson looked less worn than he had the night before.
As Brown and Grayson were returning to the Abbaye, it was rocked by a salvo from German artillery near Carpiquet airfield. Lieutenant Al Law of ‘D’ Company—the first man inside the Abbaye the night before—was badly wounded. His runner lay dead.
‘D’ Company’s second-in-command, Captain Hec Jones, had found a basement where the German headquarters staff had stored a huge collection of wines. Jones led Brown to the room with the tidily made-up bed Lieutenant Jack Mooney had discovered the previous night. While Jones popped a cork from a bottle of champagne, Brown removed his boots. Then he drank a glass of champagne, crawled under the bedcovers, and fell asleep.
A mere hour later, a runner shook Brown awake. Top brass had shown up, the man warned. He led Brown to where a British general with several staff officers in tow stood staring out a glassless window towards Caen.1 Brown had no idea the general was I British Corps commander Lieutenant General John Crocker.2 Nonplussed, Brown looked about for Matheson to appear. Unshaven, covered in the filth of battle, Brown realized he was on his own. The general took one look, sniffed, and then snorted, “Are you in command here?”
Brown said he was and suggested that it would be good if “such distinguished visitors” stepped away from the window. He was keenly aware that a few snipers still lurked. Instead, the man glared out the window and pointed. “Look, man, look! The
re lies Caen like a plum to be plucked.”
Brown agreed that Caen was definitely there, a “massive pile of rubble as far as the eye could see.”
“Yes,” the general thundered, “it’s there for the taking. Good God, man, exploit success. Get your troops together and seize it.”
Brown responded “with a stream of less than respectful language. I made it clear that our battalion had just captured this place after losing almost half of our 500 infantry soldiers killed or wounded.” While his company had been lucky and lost only twenty-five, ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies were decimated. “Further,” Brown exclaimed, “our Colonel tells me when to attack Caen or any other place. I just don’t on my own decide to take on the German army.” Harrumphing and snorting, the general led his coterie back to a cluster of armoured cars and demanded directions to Brigadier Harry Foster’s headquarters. After the vehicles left, Brown returned to the bedroom, drank more champagne, and caught another hour of dreamless sleep. This time when he was roused, it was to find Matheson had set up shop in the Abbaye.
Brown found Matheson standing at a large map, explaining to the other officers what the Reginas were to do next. The lieutenant colonel bowed at the waist and said, “Major Brown, I believe.”
Smiling, Brown looked at the three pips of a captain on his shoulder. “I don’t see a crown there yet, sir.”
“You will,” Matheson grinned. He then explained that 7th Brigade would follow 9th Brigade’s advance into Caen. The Reginas needed to be ready by mid-afternoon.3
WHILE THE REGINAS were making ready at the Abbaye, 8th Brigade had attacked Carpiquet airfield at 1000 hours. The Queen’s Own Rifles struck out of Carpiquet village for the airfield control-tower complex, and Le Régiment de la Chaudière advanced from Marcelet towards the hangars on the southern edge. As the Queen’s Own’s ‘D’ Company started out, it was struck by several shells that fell short from the supporting barrage. Several men were killed or wounded. One of the men killed was Lieutenant John Denison Dickson, who had just celebrated his twenty-second birthday the day before.4
Both regiments met very little resistance and were on their objectives within thirty minutes. The Chauds, however, found the hangar area so heavily sown with mines that it was mid-afternoon before they could report the area truly secure.5
Brigadier Ken Blackader was encouraged to think that the Germans had pulled back beyond the Odon River. South of the airfield, the ground sloped into a shallow valley, and Bretteville-sur-Odon stood adjacent to the river. Seizing the village would anchor 3rd Canadian Division’s right flank alongside that of the British 43rd Infantry Division, which was advancing on Verson. Blackader ordered the North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment to take the village.6 Because the ground was so open, Lieutenant Colonel Donald Buell decided to keep everyone well dispersed. ‘A’ and ‘C’ Companies would lead, with ‘B’ and ‘D’ Companies following loosely behind. He sent the carrier platoon to show itself on the edge of the valley to the left, hoping this would divert German attention from the spot where the attack was going in. At 1525 hours, placing his headquarters’ carrier between the two forward companies, Buell ordered the men forward.7
The moment the carrier platoon showed itself, the Germans fired on it with heavy artillery. Seeing no signs of movement in the village below, Lieutenant Bob Currie signalled Buell that “Jerry was gone on the run.”8 When the main force came over the crest and began their descent, they were ranged on by mortars and 88-millimetre and 105-millimetre guns. By the “time the two reserve [companies] had started down the slope the shelling had reached a terrific pitch and it could be seen that ‘B’ and ‘D’ [Companies] were suffering casualties.”9
Buell jumped from his command carrier and ran over to steady some men who were wavering. No sooner had he left the vehicle than a shell knocked it out. Captain Harold Arseneau, the second-in-command, and the others aboard dragged the wireless sets free and jumped into a large shell crater. Looking back at the wrecked carrier, Buell smiled and started walking into the valley. Arseneau sent one signaller with the portable wireless to catch up, while he stayed in the crater with the larger wireless set, which was too heavy to carry.10
By sprinting forward during momentary lulls and throwing themselves to the ground when shells exploded nearby, the leading companies descended rapidly into the valley and broke into the village at 1630 hours. Forty-five minutes later, they reported Bretteville secure and that they were digging in under intense artillery fire and bracing for a possible counterattack. Inside Bretteville, the North Shores had met “very light” resistance. The “enemy had evidently moved out in a great hurry.”11
Having endured endless shelling for four days in Carpiquet, the North Shores were subjected to what seemed even heavier artillery and mortar bombardment in this new village. Lieutenant Currie set up in a small house, until one of his men got twitchy and insisted they move to slit trenches. They had just finished digging in when “a direct hit blasted the whole interior of the place we had been in. A slit trench was as safe a place as a man could find in those towns.”
Captain Robert Robichaud thought the fact “that we had moved out of Carpiquet seemed to give renewed energy to the unit; the Carpiquet we [left] behind was a dreary place indeed as by this time all the trees were completely denuded of their leaves, and stood like soldiers on guard where so many gallant men had fallen.”12
WHILE 8TH BRIGADE had been seizing the airport and Bretteville-sur-Odon, 9th Brigade had thrusted towards Caen. The Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders led the advance with a column consisting of its ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies, four 3-inch mortars loaded on carriers, two sections of carriers, four 6-pounder anti-tank guns, and two sections of pioneers. Advancing from Château de Saint-Louet, the column was to pass through Franqueville and gain the Caen-Bayeux highway. It would then move through Saint-Germaine-la-Blanche-Herbe and into the city. Although running along a prominent ridge visible to German forces within the city and to the southeast, the highway offered the most direct route. All intelligence reports stressed that there would be next to no resistance and speed was imperative.13
Everything was rushed. Lieutenant Colonel G.H. Christiansen briefed his company commanders at 0500 hours and said they must be ready to move by 0730 hours. The “remainder of details,” he told them, would “be tied up later.” Even as the men bolted breakfast, organized their fighting kits, and headed towards the start line, Brigadier Ben Cunningham hectored Christiansen to hurry. The brigadier, Lieutenant Reg Dixon wrote in the war diary, “is most anxious that we push on … He is being pushed from higher formations. We work as urgently as possible, but we are very tired.” The 0730 start time passed, the Glens still shaking off a stupor from the past day’s combat and overall weariness from being on the front lines since June 6. At 0900, Christiansen signalled Cunningham that the column would not be ready until 0930 hours. Cunningham retorted that they were “to start at once.” Reluctantly, Christiansen ordered the Glens forward.14
Heading out, the column was joined by two tank squadrons of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment. Between them ‘A’ and ‘B’ Squadrons fielded thirty-four Shermans, and the tankers counted each Glen company as numbering only fifty-one men.15
As this weightier column lumbered forth, a second, nimbler one comprised of armoured cars from the British Inns of Court armoured reconnaissance regiment and ‘B’ Squadron of the 17th Duke of York’s Royal Canadian Hussars had gathered.16 Not tied to the highway, the armoured cars darted down narrow farm lanes and tracks in a race for Caen.
Confined to the highway, the main column advanced warily. After two miles absent resistance, Christiansen ordered the column “to proceed at the best possible speed, only deploying if fired on.” Christiansen noted that the Sherbrooke tankers kept pace on the left.17
Captain Don Scott, the battalion’s support company commander, provided direct liaison with the tankers. It was unappreciated duty because he rode in one of the leading tanks. Wireless linke
d Scott with Christiansen. Theoretically, this allowed tankers and infantry to work together. In reality, Scott’s wireless proved useless. But the tankers had started moving, and bailing out was not an option. Like most infantrymen, Scott hated the Sherman’s close confines.
As the tanks crossed the start line, Scott saw Brigadier Cunningham “waving the tanks on.” Scott grabbed a headset and announced he was in the tank. Cunningham said excitedly, “It’s you, Don. God, keep those tanks going. There’s nothing between you and Caen.”18
The brigadier’s words were not prophetic, as just in front of Saint-Germain, the advance ran afoul of a “belt of mines … across the road.” Then, when the pioneers came up to lift them, they were fired on from nearby buildings. At the same time, several tanks were disabled by mines. The rest stopped, but started firing on the houses.
With Scott’s wireless not working, Christiansen could not coordinate his infantry with the tank actions. The moment the tanks stopped firing, he sent a platoon into the houses. They “found only dead and wounded Germans.”19
‘B’ Squadron started advancing, but without Scott’s tank. A mine had blown a track, and thirty seconds later a shell struck close by. The crew commander told everyone to bail out. Leaving the tankers, Scott ran to rejoin the infantry. Behind him, the tank exploded.20 Ranging from about two thousand yards, a German Tiger tank’s 88-millimetre had destroyed Scott’s Sherman and knocked out two more ‘B’ Squadron tanks. Seeing this, ‘A’ Squadron fired smoke shells to blind the Tiger and advanced a troop on either side of the road.21
With the tanks screened by smoke, the Tiger then turned on the infantry column, firing high-explosive that sent the men scattering off carriers for the cover of ditches.22 At 1245 the fire abated, and Christiansen ordered his other two infantry companies forward to join the advance.23